SELECTIONS

FROM THE

# RECORDS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,

## FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT SERIAL No. 17.

# FIRST ADMINISTRATION REPORT

OF THE

# BALUCHISTAN AGENCY

FOR

1886-



CALCUTTA:
PRINTED BY THE SUPERINTENDENT OF GOVERNMENT PRINTING, INDIA.

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No. CCXI.

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INCLUDING THE

## DISTRICTS OF QUETTA, PISHIN, THAL CHOTIALI, AND SIBI.



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# FOREWORD

The Directorate of Archives Government of Baluchistan was established in the year 1984. It's Archivist Mr. Habib Ahmad Khan, did some ground work in the field of classification and cataloguing of Government records.

It, nevertheless, did not achieve the goal in the sense in which similar organizations have attained in other provinces of the country.

The Directorate General of Archives has since undertaken the reprinting of rare official books on Baluchistan. It has already published and distributed a set of twelve volumes of the District Gazetteers of Baluchistan. We are now presenting a set of ten volumes of Annual Administration Reports of Baluchistan Agency (1886–1900).

Because of interest taken by Mr. S.R. Poonegar, the Chief Secretary Government of Baluchistan, Mr. Atta Mohammad Jaffar, the Additional Chief Secretary, Mr. Nasir-ud-Din Ahmad, Secretary S&GAD, Mr. Atta Shad, Secretary Information and Culture, Mr. Mohammad Yousaf Niazi, Additional Secretary Finance, the post of Director General of Archives was created and an additional charge of the post was entrusted to me on May 2nd, 1988.

I am glad that these rare volumes will be of some use for the researchers and scholars interested in the history of this province.

Quetta September, 1988.

A. Aziz Luni
Director General
of Archives
Government of Baluchistan.

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# FIRST ADMINISTRATION REPORT

OF

# THE BALUCHISTAN AGENCY.

## CHAPTER I.

The boundaries of Baluchistan.

**1.** The countries immediately contiguous to Baluchistan are on the east the British Indian province of Sind and that portion of the Panjab frontier called the Lower Dera jât; on the north Afghanistan; on the west Persia; while on the south the Arabian Sea washes the coast for nearly 600 miles. The Sind-Baluchistan frontier commences at Ras Muari, a cape due west of Karachi; thence it runs first along the Hab river, and thence the Brahuik chain of hills separates it from Sind. From a point near the 28th parallel of north latitude the boundary "runs in an easterly direction, and is conterminous with the Sind frontier as far as a point 20 miles or so north-east of the Lehri tower." At one point the position of the boundary between Sind and Kalát territory is in dispute and has not yet been settled. Further on the boundary "skirting the Panjab frontier" and marching with the boundary of the Dera Ghazi Khán district reaches a spot near Harrand, which is the trijunction of the British, Baluch and Afghan boundaries. The boundary between Afghanistan and Baluchistan includes in the latter Kachhi, Sibi, Quat Mandai, the valleys of Ḥarnáí, Zawar Sángán, Thal-Chotiálí, Bori, Kachh, Khawás, and Amadun; it then follows the northern boundary of the Pishín district, a detailed account of the boundaries of which will be found in Chapter VII of this Report, which deals with Pishín affairs. In the same place the western boundary between Pishín and Afghanistan will be found: from the south-west corner of the Pishín district the boundary between Khárán and Afghanistan has never been defined, but it may be said that Khárán territory extends up to the Helmand river, including the desert of Registan. Portions of the boundary between Baluchistan and Persia also have never been defined. A part of the boundary was defined by a commission under Sir F. Goldsmid in 1872. The line runs from a point between the mouths of the Dasht and Dashtyari streams northwards in the direction of the Darahal hills, as far as the southern ridge of the Jambki hills. Thence it follows the line of water parting between the Kalaki and Saman torrents to the Puru hill. Thence east along the summit of the ridge connecting the Puru with the southern of the two Jambki peaks and of that between them. From the north Jambki peak to the junction of the Kastag and Ghistan torrents. From Kastag along the water parting of the Dasht and Dastyari rivers to the westernmost peak of the Nakuh range, near the Persian village of Pishín. About 5 miles from Pishín are two cultivated patches—called Bok and Mazamband, near two small torrents of the same names. The latter, though, on the watershed of the Bahu river, belongs to Mand, and is therefore on the Kalát side of the frontier. North of this the Talar hills are entirely on Persian ground, as are the

northern slopes of the Shairas hills, their southern belonging to Mand. Fromthe Shairas hills the line follows the centre of the Hamzai torrent to the point where it joins the Nihing river along the centre of the bed of which it is carried to its source on the Sar-i-Sham plain, south-east of the Persian village of Gishtigan. A prolongation of the line due east defines the frontier as far as the meridian of the westernmost peak of the Sagarkand hill, along the ridge of which the boundary runs sufficiently far east to enclose both the banks of the torrent on which the Persian villages of Pakkuk and Kolan are situated, until the torrent joins the Mashkid river. Here the Persian and Kálat frontiers cease to be conterminous, being divided by the land of the independent villages of Kuhak (including Konarbasteh) and Isfandak. These cover a space of about 40 miles from east to west, with an average breadth of 12, and are bounded by the Mashkid river on the south and east, the Sianeh mountains on the east, and on the west by an imaginary north and south line across the desert, half way between the village of Isfandak and the Persian village of Dehak. North of the point where the Mashkid river issues from the hills, between the Sianeh and Kuh-i-Sabz ranges, the frontier of Kalát is undefined, but the Washati mountains which run up to the extreme southern part of the Khárán district of Kalát may be taken as the probable boundary between it and Afghanistan.

Physical features.

2. The physical features and characteristics of the country are very varied and may be described as being abnormally exaggerated. The region may be said to be generally mountainous, but still it possesses plains which stretch in a perfectly flat expanse without a hill to the horizon. The river-beds are either empty and almost dry, or else temporarily filled with rushing torrents caused by sudden and heavy rain in the hills, the violence of which have recently been attested by our engineers, whose works and engineering plant have been at times destroyed and washed away. Where cultivation has succeeded and water is obtainable the land is very productive, but in juxtaposition to fertile valleys of limited extent may be seen masses of sand as barren as the sea-shore, or a desert of stones on which cultivation is impossible. At Sibi, in Kachhi, and Gandáváh the heat in summer is at least equal to any portion of the Indus valley, perhaps the hottest portion of India; so hot and dry are the plains that some of the rivers or mountain torrents after leaving the mountains never reach the sea at all, but are evaporated and lost in sands; while, on the other hand, the extreme cold of the winter in the upper regions, intensified by biting winds, is testified to by the fact that not only men but also animals have been found dead in groups from intense cold; the last case occurred during the winter of 1884-85, near Darwaza, on the high road to Quetta from the plains of India.

Mountains.

3. The chief mountain tract has been called by Pottinger the Brahuik range. It has, however, several local names—

Thus that portion which separates the high lands of Saráwán from the low portion of Kachh-Gandáváh is known as Takari; further south and down to the 26th parallel of latitude this chain is called Kirthar, and thence to the ocean it obtains the name of the Pab hills. Similarly other offshoots west of these are known as the Harbin, the Danwara, and the Hara mountains. These last form a line of demarcation between the Lus and Makrán provinces.

The highest of the two peaks of Takátú is 11,390 feet above the sea, and is situated to the north of the Quetta valley. In Western Baluchistan is a plateau rising from the sea, first gradually and then abruptly. Its average height has been given by Hughes as about 2,500 feet above the sea-level. The Khwájah Amrán range of mountains separates Pishín from Afghanístan, one of the peaks of which rises to a height of 8,864 feet. The chief passes in it are the Khojak, the Rhoghani, and Gwajah; of the former, frequent mention will be found in this Report. The hills, in which the Thal-Chotiálí district lies, will be mentioned in the chapter of this Report which deals with the affairs of that district.

Rivers.

4. There is no river or lake of importance in Baluchistan. The Harnáí, Bolan, Nari, Urnach, Nal, and Purali rivers are mountain torrents. The Hab river is also of the same nature, but on a somewhat larger scale. Into Gwadar bay the Nihing of

Dasht torrent falls. The Hingol or Aghor or Paho stream partly separates the province of Makrán from Lus.

Sáráwan, Jalawán, Khárán, Makrán, &c.

5. The tract known under the name of Saráwán is a highland tract lying west of Kachhi, to the north and west of the Jalawan tract, and south of the districts of Quetta and Pishin. The district of Khárán "extends to within 12 miles of Gidar, and dominates the Mulla Pass route; while at the same time it flanks the whole line of communication between Panjgur and Kalát" extending to within 40 miles of Kalát itself, whence it may be said to extend up to the Helmand river. The tract called Jalawan lies to the west of Sind, to the south-west of Kachhi, to the south and east of Saráwán and Khárán; to the east and south east lie Panjgur and Kolwah, while to the south are Makrán and Lus Beyla. Of the districts of Quetta, Pishín, Thal-Chotiálí, Sibi, Kachhi, and Lus Beyla, descriptions will be found in the chapters which deal with them respectively in this report. Makrán may be said to extend from Lus Beyla on the east to Persia on the west, on the south is the sea, while to the north lie Jalawan, Kolwah, and Panjgur. These two last districts with those of Kej, Tump, Balgettar, and some minor districts lie to the west of Lus Beyla and Jalawan and south of Khárán, extending up to the Persian border.

Kej.

6. Kej is the chief town in Makrán, and was once in the possession of the Malik family—

The Maliks were ousted by the Boleidee family in the latter part of the seventeenth century and Makrán became divided into separate chiefships. The Boleidee Amírs probably ruled over Kej for about three generations, when it fell into the hands of the Gitchkis of Rajput extraction who had adopted the Zikri faith. It was during the rule of Nassir Khán of Kalát that Kej first passed into the hands of the Chiefs of that State. Thenceforward until recent times the Gitchkis made frequent attempts to shake off the Kalát yoke. In the time of Muhammad Khán, the son of Nassir Khán, they temporarily recovered their independence, but lost it again in the time of Mehrab Khán. About 1831, Sheik Kasim Gitchki, father of the present head of the family Mír Bhayan, rose in rebellion and killed the Khán's deputy, but was eventually obliged to submit. Half the revenue of Kej is still devoted to the Gitchki family, who also retain the chiefship both in Kej and other places.

Brief résumé of Kalát history prior to the accession of the present Ruler.

7. The Kháns of Kalát have nominally been the ruling Chiefs of Baluchistan, but for many years the allegiance of the outlying provinces to the Kháns was merely nominal until the time when Sir R. Sandeman effected a settlement of the disputes between the Khán and the sirdars at Mastúng in 1876. The first Khán of Kalát of any note was Abdulla Khán, who reduced several provinces to his rule. After the invasion of India by Nadir Shah all territories west of the Indus were annexed to the dominions of that Ruler. When he died Kalát fell with other territory into the hands of Ahmed Shah Abdali, and he deposed Mahabat Khán, the then Khán, and placed on the throne Nassir Khán, who became far the most distinguished of the Kháns of Kalát. He consolidated the Baluch and Brahui tribes, and obtained from Ahmed Shah the valleys of Shal and Mastung, to which he added by conquest Panjgur and Kej. He was succeeded by Mahmud Khán, and in 1819 Mehrab Khán came to the throne, a well-meaning but weak Ruler. When in 1833 Shah Shuja failed to recover the Afghan dominions, he went to Kalát as a refugee. When the restoration of Shah Shuja was determined on, the co-operation of Mehrab Khán was sought for. The success of arrangements made by Sir A. Burnes were, however, frustrated by Mulla Hussain, the Khán's Minister, and it was at the time erroneously thought that the Khán was personally hostile to the British. In order to punish him, on the return of the British from Kabul in 1839, Kalát was taken by assault, and Mehrab Khán was killed. Shah Newaz Khán was set up by the

British; he was, however, deposed during a revolution, and the British representative at Kalát was murdered. Nassir Khán II was then placed on the throne by the British, and a treaty was concluded with him in 1841. In 1854, when war was anticipated between England and Russia, to strengthen the position on the frontier, a fresh treaty was made, under which the Khán engaged to act in subordination to the British Government, not to enter into negotiations with other States without its consent, and he was to receive, if necessary, British troops into his country. The Khán, on the other hand, was granted ₨50,000 per annum on condition of reducing his transit dues to a uniform rate, of his preventing outrages on or near the British frontier, and of his protecting merchants and permitting no exactions on trade. Nassir Khán died in 1857, and was succeeded by Khudadad Khán, the present Ruler.

Introductory sketch decided on.

8. As this is the first Administration Report which has been submitted from this office, I have decided to draw up an introductory sketch of the events which led to the formation of the Agency, and of the principal incidents from that time up to the commencement of the year under review.

Materials scattered.

9. Much of the material for the narrative which I propose to write, and especially of that part of it which relates to the earlier period, has already been published by the Government of India; but at the same time there is much which is hidden away in scattered reports and papers, and I feel assured that it will be of considerable value if I can succeed in placing on record a clear and consecutive history of the circumstances which led to our occupation of Quetta, and of the events resulting therefrom.

Necessity for examination of the constitution of the State.

10. Before, however, entering on this part of my subject, it is essential to examine the real character of the constitution of the Kalát State and of the relations existing between the Khán and the various Chiefs and tribes of Baluchistan. Without a correct understanding on this point, it is as impossible to estimate the past as to form an opinion on the policy to be carried out in the future.

The constitution federal not feudal.

11. It is by no means uncommon, even amongst the well-informed, to find the institutions of Kalát described as being mainly of a feudal nature, in which the Sirdars of Baluchistan are said to play the part of the barons in mediæval Europe. There is just enough analogy between the two systems to make the comparison an attractive one; but I firmly believe that it is not only false in theory, but that practically it has led to mischievous results. It seems to me quite clear, as far as I can learn from a study of the past history of the country, and from evidence still existing, that the institutions of Baluchistan are federal and not feudal.* The Khán's very title tends most forcibly to this belief. His titles are Beglar Begi, *i.e.*, Chief of Chiefs, and Wali or Ruler of Kalát.

Baluchistan includes Kalát and confederate tribes.

12. By Baluchistan, I mean to include, under one common name, not only Kalát proper, but the districts inhabited by the Baluch tribes in confederation with the Kalát State, *e.g.*, the Marris, Bugtís, Rinds, &c. Within this outer circle, as it were, is Kalát proper, an *imperium in imperio*, with regard to the internal government of which the Khán exercises a despotic power. The Federation seems to have taken place some time early in the 18th century, and was no doubt a measure of self-defence, undertaken by a number of tribes, who found themselves in imminent danger of being absorbed by more powerful neighbours.

* This point is argued with much force by Sir E. C. Bayley, in his Minute on Kalát affairs, which is published at pp. 312-353 of the Baluchistan Blue Book No. 2; and from which I have derived much assistance in writing the paragraphs immediately following.

13. At an early period two provinces were formed, one in the highlands of Baluchistan, called Saráwán, and the other in the low country, called Jalawan. The chieftainships of these soon became hereditary, the one in the Raisani, and the other in the Zahri tribe. The office of hereditary counsellor to the Khán also vested in the Saráwán and Jalawan Sirdars, who had a title, which still exists, to the seat in darbar to the right and left, respectively, of the Khán. Their duties were, as Sir E. C. Bayley remarks, "apparently consultative rather than executive, and they were admitted to some substantial share in all deliberations affecting the kingdom generally." The principal Brahui Sirdars are Sirdar Assad Khán, who holds rank next to the Khán, Muhammad Khán Shahwani, Shadi Khán Bangalzai, Said Khán Muhammad Shahi, Yar Muhammad Khurd, and Dost Muhammad Lehrí. Among the Jalawan Brahui Sirdars are Gauhar Khán Zahri, Khira Khán, Bezanjo, and the Gitchki Sirdars of Panjgur and Kej. There are many minor Chiefs.

The Saráwán and Jalawan.

14. The office of Wazir was also hereditary in a Tajik family, and continued to be so till recent times.

The Wazir.

15. The Sirdars had almost absolute powers in the internal administration of their own lands, save that there appears to have been a general power of appeal to the Khán. They were elected by their tribes, subject to confirmation by the Khán; but after they had been confirmed, the interference of the latter in domestic affairs was apparently limited to disposing of appeals in certain cases and confirming sentences of death. The position of the Jám is peculiar. Sir B. Frere and General Jacob recognised him as a Sovereign Prince who owed some specific dues to the Khán. Sir W. Merewether was inclined to treat him as a feudatory which he certainly is not. His position towards the Khán is purely a federal one. The males of his family intermarried with the Kalát Ruler.

The Sirdars, and the Jám.

16. The Khánship of Kalát was partly elective and partly hereditary; that is to say, the Sirdars had the power of electing their Khán, but their choice was limited to members of the "Kambarani" family. The Khán was supreme in external matters; the power of making peace and war was in his hands; he could contract treaties binding on the Confederacy, and call out the levies which the Chiefs were obliged to furnish at his demand. As a counterpoise to this privilege, he was bound to keep no force independent of the Chiefs, who have always regarded with the greatest jealousy, any attempt by the Khán to form a standing army. The Khán's authority in internal matters was limited to Kalát proper, which he governed through his *naibs* or deputies.

The Khánship.

17. In presenting the above rough sketch of the Baluch Constitution, I do not mean to contend that it has assumed a crystallised form on these lines. The state of society, in which it has existed, has prevented any such result. In latter days, at all events, the Marris and Bugtís have been virtually quite independent of the Khán; a position which has the recognition of the Supreme Government, which has ruled that our relations with these powerful tribes should be direct, and not, as was formerly the case, through the intervention of the Khán of Kalát. As regards others of the Confederacy: at one time the Khán, at another time the Chiefs, have gained the upper hand, and have strained or broken the institutions of their country to compass their own ends. Examples of this are the ill-fated act of Mehrab Khán in removing the hereditary minister and appointing a creature of his own in his place; and the attempt of the present Khán, in the early

Relations between the Khán and the Baluch confederacy.

part of his reign, to appoint his infant son to the Sirdarship of Jalawan. On the other hand, the Chiefs have shown themselves at different times to be exceedingly tenacious of their privileges; and a remarkable instance of this is shown in the statement of their grievances, made to Captain Harrison, the then British Agent at the Court of Kalát, in March 1869, by Mulla Muhammad, Raisani, and Alladina, Khurd. The statement is, in many ways, a striking one; and will come under fuller notice later in this report. But one claim insisted on, which shows very clearly the view which the Chiefs took themselves of the place of the Khán in the Constitution, was that all treaties entered into with the British Government by him should be considered as contracted, not by the Khán of Kalát as such, but by him as head of the Baluch Confederation. It was for this demand, and for others of a like nature, that the Sirdars of Baluchistan waged war with the Khán of Kalát for so many years. Other incidents in the history of Baluchistan might be quoted, which would prove that the Sirdars have consistently refused to acknowledge themselves the subjects of the Khán of Kalát (excepting of course so far as many of them have held *jagirs* within Kalát itself). But I think that enough has been said to show the true nature of the relations existing between them. The view which I here advance was, in effect, recognised by both the British Government and by the Khán, at the time when the quarrels between the latter Prince and the Sirdars were submitted to the arbitration of the Commissioner in Sind in 1872, and again when the treaty of 1876 was contracted between the two Governments.

Election of the present Khán to the headship of the Confederacy.

18. It was then to the headship of the Baluch Confederation, as well as to the Rulership of Kalát, that Mír Khudadad Khán was elected by the Sirdars, on the death of his brother, Mír Nassir Khán, in 1857. He was then a lad of sixteen, and has been described as being of weak intellect, and quite unfitted, from his previous seclusion in the Palace Zenana, to take any active part in State affairs. The fact is that very little was known of him at that period; and subsequent events prove that the above estimate was not a correct one. It has often been remarked, when discussing the Khán's character, that if His Highness could be got to give a promise, he rarely breaks it. He has many good qualities, and is, I think, honest in desiring to maintain faithfully his relations with the British Government. In some respects he is weak and anxious to lean on the British Government.

The advisers of the young Khán.

19. At the outset of his reign, Mír Khudadad Khán fell under the influence of two counsellors, both of whom were distinguished by their bitter hostility to the British Government. The first of these, both in weight and position, was the Darogha, Gul Muhammad Khán, a man who had served the three preceding Rulers of Kalát, but who, there is reason to suspect, was guilty of compassing the death of his latest master, Mír Nassir Khán. The other adviser of the young Khán was the Bunniah, Ganga Ram, who had contrived to usurp to himself more than the authority of Wazir, although it does not appear that he was ever appointed to that office.

Commencement of the struggle between the Khán and the Sirdars.

20. Shortly after the accession of the young Khán, the Sirdars, with the Jám of Lus Beyla at their head, had come to Kalát, in order to obtain redress for their grievances, and they soon found that the power possessed by the Darogha and Ganga Ram was exercised in a manner adverse to their cause. Either party was jealous of the other; and naturally attached much importance to preventing its rival from obtaining a preponderating influence with the Khán. In these circumstances an open rupture was only too probable; and it is not now of moment to enquire whether the immediate cause of what followed was the overbearing conduct

the Sirdars, or the treachery of Darogha, Gul Muhammad. The first overt act of hostility was committed by the latter, under whose orders the Khán's forces attacked the Sirdars on the 17th September 1857, and, taking them by surprise, drove them out of the valley of Kalát with their grievances unheard, and their discontent aggravated.

The chronic struggle between the Sirdars and the Khán.

21. In this way commenced the struggle between the Khán and his Sirdars, which lasted, with brief intervals of peace, for nearly 20 years, or until the treaty was signed at Jacobabad between the Khân of Kalát and the British Government, on the 8th of December 1876.

The struggle has not been followed in detail.

22. It would be foreign to the purpose of this report to follow the history of this struggle in any detail; and it will be quite sufficient to set down briefly, in their order, the most prominent events connected with it, and with the history of Baluchistan during the next few years.

The Shahgassi.

23. In 1858, through the influence of Sir H. Green, the then Political Agent at the Court of the Khán, Darogha Gul Muhammad, and the Bunniah Ganga Ram, were excluded from power, and Shahgassi Wali Muhammad was appointed Wazir. The Shahgassi, who plays a prominent part in Kalát history until he fell under the displeasure of the Khán, and finally resigned his service in 1873, was a man of honest purpose and sufficient ability. He employed his influence over Mír Khudadad Khán, which for many years was considerable, for the benefit of both Governments, and succeeded in winning the confidence of those British officers with whom he was chiefly brought into contact.

The rebellion which forced the Khán to take refuge in Sind.

24. The history of the next few years is the history of rebellion and anarchy; the discontent of the Chiefs, fomented by the restless intrigues of the Jám of Lus Beyla and Azad Khán of Khárán, from time to time broke into active opposition. In 1862 the Khán chose to put a deliberate insult on Taj Muhammad Zahri, the Jhalawan Sirdar, by refusing to marry his daughter after a formal betrothal had been entered into. This affront he accentuated by marrying the Sirdar's sister, the widow of the late Khán, but the acknowledged enemy of her own brother. These events naturally increased the ill-feeling of the Sirdars towards the Khán and early in the following year they broke into open rebellion. The Khán was defeated, and had to take refuge in Sind; and his cousin, Sherdil Khán, was elected Khán of Kalát in his stead.

Sherdil Khán enjoys the Khánship for one year.

25. Sherdil Khán enjoyed his dignity for only about a year. He was murdered by his own guards in May 1864, and Mír Khudadad Khân was reinstated, mainly through the influence of the Saráwân Chief, Mulla Muhammad, Raisani, who had stood by him staunchly in his exile, only to become his most persistent opponent in after years.

Renewed revolts after the recall of Khudadad Khán.

26. Within a year of the recall of Mír Khudadad Khán to the throne, the standard of revolt was again raised. In March 1865, Taj Muhammad, now joined by Mulla Muhammad, Raisani, organised a conspiracy to assassinate the Khán and place his infant son on the throne. The plot was unsuccessful; Taj Muhammad was taken and placed in confinement at Kalát, where he died two years later, while the Raisani Sirdar fled to Kandahar.

Renewed revolt of the Jám.

27. In July of the same year the Jám was again in rebellion, in concert with Nurdin, the Mingal Sirdar. Their forces were defeated, and they were both made prisoners, but were shortly afterwards pardoned and released.

Temporary settlement made by Sir H. Green.

28. For the next two years peace was maintained in Baluchistan. Towards the end of 1867, however, Mulla Muhammad, Raisani, returned from Kandahar, where he had been residing since his flight thither in 1865, and again stirred up an insurrection in which he was speedily joined by Sirdars Adam Khán, Bangalzai, Alladina, Khurd, and Muhammad Khan, Lehrí, three of the minor Chiefs, with a small following. Any further attempts were checked by the prompt action of the Shahgassi Wali Muhammad, who attacked and completely routed the rebellious Chiefs before their revolt could gather head. Mulla Muhammad Khán once more took to flight and sought an asylum among the Marris. Early in the following year Sir H. Green, at that time the Political Superintendent on the Upper Sind Frontier, arranged a meeting at Jacobabad between the fugitive Sirdar and the Shahgassi Wali Muhammad, who attended on the part of the Khán, and effected a temporary settlement between His Highness and the Chiefs, which it was hoped would be placed on a permanent footing on the occasion of the Khán visiting Kachhi during the succeeding winter.

Renewed revolts.

29. The expectation thus formed was not fulfilled; scarcity at that time prevailing in Kachhi prevented the Khán from holding the meeting with the Sirdars, which had been contemplated; and at the end of the year the Jám of Lus Beyla and Sirdar Nurdin Mingal again took the field against the Khán and were joined by Baluch Khán, nephew of Azad Khán of Khárán. After some desultory fighting, negotiations were entered into, with the result that the rebellious Chiefs retired peacefully to their own homes.

Representations made by the Sirdars to Colonel Phayre.

30. In March of the following year (1869), Mulla Muhammad, Raisani, and Alladina, Khurd, waited on Colonel Phayre, who had succeeded Sir H. Green on the Upper Sind Frontier, at Jacobabad, and submitted to him a statement of their grievances. After a recital of their personal claims against the Khán, they proceeded to recount the grounds on which the Sirdars, as a body, were discontented with Mir Khudadad Khán's rule. Some of these show so clearly the views held by the Chiefs regarding the Constitution of their own country, that I think it will not be out of place to give them place in this report. These spokesmen for their brother Chiefs raised the following points:—

(*a*) They claimed that the Khanate should be constituted, as to laws and Government, as it was in the days of Nassir Khán the Great.

(*b*) They complained that a large body of mercenaries had been raised.

(*c*) They claimed the appointment of Wazir, as the office had been alienated from the family in which it was hereditary.

(*d*) They claimed to have a voice, as of old, in the Civil and Military Councils of the Khanate.

(*e*) They declared that the treaty of the British Government was with the Khán as the Ruler of Baluchistan, as the head of the Brahui Confederacy, not with the individual Khudadad Khán, who had become their enemy by disregarding the rules and the laws of their Confederacy.

I do not propose to discuss in this place the representations thus made by the Sirdars; I have transcribed them here merely on account of the important bearing which the principles here enunciated have exercised in the past, and must exercise in the future.

31. An untoward event, which occurred shortly afterwards, prevented any mediation by the British Political Officers between the disagreeing parties. From Jacobabad Sirdar Mulla Muhammad and Alladina, Khurd, proceeded to Beyla, where a murderous attack was made upon them by an assassin, who declared, probably without truth, that he had been instigated by the Khán. The sirdars, irritated by this act of treachery, as they considered it, cast aside any intentions which they might have formed of approaching the Khán amicably; and collecting their force marched on Kalát, with the determination of enforcing their demands at the point of the sword. With great difficulty Captain Harrison, the Political Agent at Kalát, persuaded them to relinquish their plans and disperse quietly to their several homes. This took place in May 1869; and in the autumn of the same year the Jám of Lus Beyla allied with Nurdin Mingal was again in active revolt. His forces were utterly routed in the open field by the Shahgassi, who marched on and occupied the town of Beyla. The Jám fled to Sind (whence he was a short time after exiled to the Deccan), Nurdin Mingal to Kandahar, while Mulla Muhammad, Raisani, who after the affair in May had retired to Sibi, took refuge in the Marri hills. The Marris applied to me, at that time Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khán district, for advice; and I recommended them to try negotiations, and to refrain from openly assisting the Sirdar against the Khán. Mulla Muhammad, on becoming aware of this, fled to Kandahar and laid his grievances before the Amír Sher Alí, who addressed the Government of India on the matter; the latter, however, took no action in his case.

*Defeat of the Jám of Lus Beyla and Nurdin Mingal.*

32. I have now brought my sketch of Kalát affairs up to the period immediately preceding the meeting of Panjab and Sind officials in January 1871, which is known by the name of the Mithankot Conference. I next propose to deal with the events on the Panjab and Sind Frontiers which led directly to the assembling of the Conference. I shall then endeavour to show how, in the course of events, my first mission to Kalát followed on the carrying out of the policy laid down at Mithankot.

*Affairs up to the Mithankot Conference.*

33. Before, however, commencing to deal with affairs which culminated in the Mithankot Conference, it may be noted that to the west of Kej lie a number of petty Chiefships which under Boleidee, and Gitchki rule formed part of Makrán—

*Delimitation of the Perso-Kálat boundary.*

Dissensions among these Chiefs and their raids on Persian territory afforded Persia opportunities which she was not slow to improve of extending her frontier to the eastward until she had not only exacted tribute from the whole of Makrán westward of Kej, except a portion of the sea-coast about Charbar and Gwadar, but asserted claims of sovereignty over Kej and its dependencies which were under the authority of the Khán of Kalát. The British Government having treaty relations with Kalát could not view with indifference the threats of aggression which were constantly held over the Khán's subjects in Kej, and the expediency of putting a stop to these proceedings on the part of the frontier Persian authorities was impressed on the Minister of the Shah. A proposal was then made by the Shah that the boundaries between Persia and Kalát should be defined by Commissioners on the part of England, Persia, and Kalát. To this the British Government assented, and the Commissioners met on the frontier. The discussion terminated at Teheran by the acceptance by the Shah in September 1871 of the opinion contained in a memorandum by Major-General Goldsmid, the British Commissioner. According to this memorandum Panjgur and Parum and other dependencies with Kohuk Boleidee, including Zamiran and other dependencies; Mand, including Tump, Nasirabad, Kej, and all districts, dehs, and dependencies to the eastward; and Dasht with its dependencies as far as the sea, were declared to be beyond the Persian frontier.

# CHAPTER II.

Reason why Sir R. Sandeman was sent to Kalát. Reference requisite to the policy on the Sind, Panjab, and Kalát frontiers.

34. To fully understand how it came about that I was specially deputed on a Mission to the Kalát State, it is absolutely necessary to refer to the policy that existed on the Sind, Panjab, and Kalát frontiers prior to the Mithankot Conference, and which indeed caused the Conference to be held. Up to the year 1865, the policy our Government observed towards the hill tribes subordinate to Kalát was of a dual nature.

After the conquest of the Panjab, by inadvertance, some sections of the Gurchani, Mazari, and Marri tribes were not included in the country annexed.

35. The country in the Panjab known as the Province of Harrand Dajil belonged at one time to His Highness the Khán of Kalát. The Baluch tribes inhabiting this territory of Harrand Dajil are the Gurchanis, Mazaris, and Marris. These three important tribes have sections residing on the immediate frontier of the Panjab, yet not within its limits as defined at annexation. They owed no direct allegiance to the Khán of Kalát, because, owing to the provisions of the tripartite treaty of 1838, Harrand Dajil had been ceded to the Ruler of the Panjab by the British Government. Thus after the conquest of Sind the territories under Mír Nassir Khán, the Ruler of Kalát, did not include the Province of Harrand Dajil, which, as said, had been given to Runjit Singh by the British. It so happened that Runjit Singh's Government never was able to properly bring it under control, and after the conquest of the Panjab our Government declared the British frontier merely to extend up to the foot of the Suleiman Range in one direction and to the watershed of these mountains in the other. It thus happened that through an apparent inadvertence several very important sections of the Marri, Gurchani, and Mazari tribes were left to themselves in the hills, and were not acknowledged as subjects by either the Panjab, Sind, or Kalát Governments, and in consequence they were gradually recognised as independent. This was the state of affairs on the Deraját and Sind frontiers when I became connected with them. The Panjab officers managed their border as best they could, with lawless sections of tribes residing in the hills on its immediate frontier. This was no easy matter, as, owing to the straggling and ragged nature of the frontier as well as to the extent of country occupied by these independent tribes, when inclined to give annoyance and trouble, they were able to do so with much impunity.

Geographical position of the tribes on the Dera Ghazi Khán frontier, and the dual policy observed towards them.

36. I must for an instant turn to the geographical position of the tribes inhabiting the country above described. It is so peculiarly situated that the tribes named could first commit depredations in Sind, and if the authorities made residence on their frontier too hot for them they appeared on the Panjab frontier. It often in consequence happened that a noted robber was well known to both Panjab and Sind officials. It should be noted that the policy (if such it can be called) observed at this time by the officers of the two Governments was of a dual nature. The Sind officials were not brought into contact with the frontier tribes of Marris, Bugtís, Gurchanis, and Mazaris to nearly the same extent as the Panjab officers. This was owing to the fact that the Sind frontier, open to the depredations of the hill tribes, was only 90 miles in extent, moreover along the greater part of it the country beyond the border was inhabited by the Bugtí tribes, who acted as a buffer, so to speak, between the Sind frontier and the more distant tribes of Kalát. Moreover, the short stretch of Sind frontier was amply protected by a strong brigade of Sind Horse, who occupied posts in the Bugtí hills from Kashmor to Jacobabad

These posts kept the Bugtís in order, and at the same time completely defended Sind from depredations by hill robbers. On the other hand, the Panjab frontier that came to the Sikhs under the treaty of 1838, and from the Sikhs to the British, had, it has been previously observed, never been settled. Besides, the Panjab military force as compared with the Sind troops was very weak in numbers and had twice the extent of country to guard, while the tribes on its frontier had come to be recognised as independent hill tribes. Only very recently the Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab wrote of them as independent tribes, but they should never have been recognised as such.

Up to 1867 the Panjab had no official relations with the border tribes.

37. Up to 1867 the Panjab Government had no official relations with those border tribes. All communication between the British and the Kalát Governments was then, as it continued for some years later to be, in the hands of the Sind authorities, who, regarding the Marris, Bugtís, and other border tribes as subjects of the Khán of Kalát in the strict sense of the word, had always endeavoured to control their marauding and lawless propensities through the authority of their Ruler. The Panjab officials, on the other hand, contented themselves with protecting their own frontier, as far as possible, from the raids of the border tribes; and in case of outrage committed on British subjects, with claiming compensation through the Political authorities of Sind.

Depredations committed by Ghulám Husen, Bugtí. Preparations made to meet his threatened attack.

38. At the time of which I write, the year 1867, a noted hill robber by name Ghulám Husen, Bugtí, left the Bugtí tribe and took up his quarters with the Khetrans. From all quarters the discontented hastened to join him, and at last having collected round himself a band of hill men ripe for any mischief, he became so formidable that an expedition of regular troops to go against him and break up his confederacy was openly advocated. I saw the danger of his being allowed to remain longer in the hills undisturbed, and proposed that a joint expedition from the Panjab and Sind should move against him, as his depredations had by no means been confined to the Panjab frontier, but had extended to the Sind frontier also. The Sind officers did not see the necessity for sending an expedition against this notorious freebooter, but said I was at liberty to protect my own frontier in any way I liked. Ghulám Husen, finding he was left to do as he pleased, openly talked of making a descent on the Panjab. I placed with him trustworthy men who kept me informed of his movements. I soon found that his intentions to raid on the Panjab were real, and that the point he intended to attack was Harrand, the head-quarters of Sirdar Ghulám Haidar Khán, the Chief of the Gurchani tribe, with whom he had long been at enmity. The Gurchanis were formerly subjects of the Kalát State, and two of the principal sections of the clan, namely, the Lesharis and Durkanis, inhabited the country which was formerly a portion of the Harrand Dajil province of Kalát, but which had not been taken within the Panjab by Runjit Singh after the treaty of 1838, or included within British territory at the annexation of the Panjab. These two sections of the Gurchani clan were warned to be in readiness for Ghulám Husen's attack. The Chief of Tibbi Lundan, Mazar Khán, the head of a small but strong village near Harrand, was also warned to be ready with his clansmen to aid the Gurchani Chief, should Ghulám Husen make a descent on the Panjab. Altogether a formidable body of men was held in readiness to repel the raid in anticipation of its being made.

Ghulám Husen makes a raid on Harrand, and is killed with several of his followers.

39. Full details of the raid need not be given; it will be sufficient for me to note that Ghulám Husen, at the head of something like a thousand horse and foot, attacked Harrand and set fire to several of the Gurchani hamlets

situated on the extreme border. He was not, however, prepared for the onslaught of the Gurchani and Tibbi Lundan men who set on him and his following and in turn completely defeated them. The Harrand men were at a very critical juncture joined by a small party of the 5th Panjab Cavalry stationed at Harrand who rendered the Gurchanis very effectual help. The result was that Ghulám Husen's people were soon in full retreat. The outlaw was himself overtaken and slain with at least 260 of his followers, and 24 were made prisoners, these men chiefly belonging to the Marri clan.

Captain Sandeman ineffectually applies to the Sind officials for compensation in consequence of the Harrand raid. Position of the highland clans towards the Khán and the British explained.

40. The raid and its results were reported by me to the Panjab Government, and under instructions from that Government, I made an application to the Sind authorities for compensation for the losses sustained by Panjab subjects, owing to the unprovoked raid made by subjects of His Highness the Khán of Kalát. In reply the Political Superintendent (Sir H. Green) on the frontier wrote—

I have to acknowledge receipt of yours of the 10th instant, regarding a Marri raid and other frontier matters. With regard to the raid, the Marris being Baluch are certainly nominally subjects of the Khán of Kalát, and are held by him under the same control as the Afridis of the hills surrounding the Peshawar valley are by the Ruler of Kabul, and any complaint to the Khán would be of about as much use as the Commissioner of Peshawar bringing to the notice of the Amír of Kabul the conduct of the said Afridis.

In the same reply Sir Henry Green described the political position of the highland clans of Kalát as regards the Khán and the British authorities in the following words:—

The Marris now and then try a raid on my frontier, and I trust to the alertness and the activity of my frontier posts for their defeat, and to the influence of the Khán of Kalát if they succeed in carrying off my cattle. My native officials suffer, but I should certainly not complain to the Khán on account of the want of activity of my people.

These words speak for themselves, and show that during Sir H. Green's term of office on this frontier it was never contemplated to hold such tribes as the Marris responsible even for plundering British subject. (See Blue Book No. I, page 516.)

The Political Superintendent admits that Panjab officials should for the future make their own arrangements with frontier tribes. Previous policy on the Sind-Panjab frontier explained.

41. It will now be convenient to turn to letter No. 8, dated 11th January 1870 (Blue Book No. I, page 1), from the Commissioner of the Derajât, Colonel Graham, giving the political status of the Panjab directly after the Harrand raid. That officer observed that, although formerly no political relations with the tribes had been permitted by the Sind authorities of late in the common effort to preserve the peace of the frontier, this political barrier has given way, and relations have sprung up on the Panjab side (with the entire consent of Sind) which have led to our subsidising the hill Baluch portion of the Khán's subjects on this side, with results which have received the approbation of the Supreme Government and the Secretary of State. As the Political Superintendent was unable to render us effective aid to obtain compensation for the raid on Harrand, he admitted that it was only fair that we should help ourselves for the future and make our own arrangements for the protection of the Panjab with the hill tribes of Kalát. Prior to this the policy pursued on the Sind-Panjab frontier was for the Panjab officers to trust to the Sind Political Superintendent to obtain redress for all injuries done by the nominal subjects of the Kalát State to Panjab subjects. In the case of raids in Sind, if the raiders escaped the vigilance of the outposts defending that frontier, the Sind officials tried their influence with the Khán. Such being the condition of things, it naturally occurred to the Marris and other marauding hill tribes that the Panjab, with its more extended and almost undefended border, presented a more favourable field for operations

than Sind; and when, in the case of the Harrand raid, the Panjab officials found that they could gain no assistance from Sind in the matter of obtaining redress, but that the Political officers of that province disclaimed having any authority in the matter, they were thrown on their own resources to assert the power of the British Government. The district most exposed to attack from the Marris was that of Dera Ghazi Khán, and on me, as the Deputy Commissioner, it devolved to come to some arrangement which would preserve the peace of the frontier.

Direct intercourse between Panjab officials and Marris commenced. The Marri Sirdar meets Captain Sandeman at Mithankot. Disputes settled according to tribal custom.

42. With the defeat and death of Ghulám Husen our intercourse with the Marris with a view to establishing friendly relations with this powerful clan may truly be said to have commenced. Owing to the conduct of the clan on the Sind frontier its members were excluded from that province altogether. On the Panjab side little intercourse was kept up, and what little there was, was with the Chiefs of the sections residing nearest to the Panjab frontier. With the concurrence of the Political Superintendent at Jacobabad I invited the Marri Tomandar, Sirdar Gazzan Khán, and his principal Chiefs to come to Dera Ghazi Khán to meet me and to negotiate for the release of the Marri prisoners captured in the raid, amongst whom was a minor Chief of some position in the clan. After much discussion the Marri Sirdar attended at Mithankot with his principal Chiefs escorted by about 250 sowars. I found on inquiry that if we had cause of complaint against the Marris, they also had their grievances against our Chiefs. It appeared that for many years a system of reprisals had been carried on along the whole Panjab frontier. If the Marris stole cattle from the Gurchanis, Mazaris, Drishaks, Durkanis, Lesharis, or Legharis, a party of men from our frontier clans took the first favourable opportunity of retaliating, and this system had existed for many years. I formed a council (jirga) of the principal Marri and British Chiefs to consider the whole question. They seemed desirous of settling their quarrels, as much blood had been shed on both sides. According to the custom of the country these disputes were settled by an interchange of cattle and by marriage. The Mazari Sirdar Nawab Imam Baksh Khán married a sister of the Marri Tomandar, Sirdar Meeran Khán Drishak married a relation also of the Sirdar, and other minor alliances were arranged. In the interchange of cattle that was made it was found that a far larger number of cattle had been plundered from the Marri clan by our subjects than the Marris had taken from them, and our subjects had therefore a large number to return, which they gave back. At the close of our proceedings, with the approval of the Sind authorities, the Panjab Government authorised my taking a certain number of Marri sowars with the Chief himself into our pay. A regular agreement of service was drawn up, and the Marris left for their hills in a great state of happiness, declaring their intention to maintain friendly relations with our Government.

Position of the Marri tribe as respects the Panjab and Sind Governments, and with regard to their neighbours.

43. It is now desirable for me here to describe what was the actual position of the Marri tribe towards the Panjab and Sind Governments and with respect to their neighbours. I have already said that the Marris were excluded from Sind owing to their numerous evil deeds committed on that frontier. With the Panjab they were not at friendship, and they were at open enmity with the Khán of Kalát, their favourite plundering grounds being His Highness's province of Kachh-Gandáváh. With their neighbours, namely, the Bozdars, Musa Khels, Khetrans, Bugtís Hussanies, and the Kakar and other tribes of Bori, Thal-Chotiálí, and the Baro-

zais of Sibi, they were at deadly feud. Their depredations extended from the Panjab and Sind frontier to within 15 miles of Quetta. Several of the minor Pathan tribes had been absorbed into the Marri clan, and it was self-evident that until the raids of the tribes and their depredations on their neighbours could be put an end to, there could be no such thing as peace on the frontier, or security to trade.

Endeavours made by Sir R. Sandeman for the pacification of the Marri tribe, and the success attending them.

44. With the object of placing this tribe in such a position that it could no longer make depredations into Kachh, the Bolan Pass, Harnáí, Thal-Chotiálí, the Panjab and Sind with benefit to itself, I have exerted myself to the utmost of my ability for the last 15 years, and with the most encouraging results. The clan now finds that it cannot raid into any of the places above named excepting at certain disadvantage and loss to itself; it is therefore by degrees settling down to peaceful pursuits and taking to cultivation and the breeding of cattle for a livelihood, instead of the precarious but more exciting life of plundering its neighbours and living on the community at large. (See pages 1, 2, 3, Blue Book, Part I.)

The policy of taking the Marris and Bugtís into our service approved by the Sind Local Government.

45. The policy of taking the Marri and other clans into our service with the object of arranging them on the side of order most undoubtedly met with the approval of the Sind Local Government. (See Sir William Merewether's letter No. 52 of 26th January 1870, Part I of Blue Book, page 23, paragraphs 44 and 45, inclusive.) That officer recommended that the plan which had succeeded so far well on the Panjab frontier should be followed, *viz.*, that the principal Chiefs and certain members of the Marri and Bugtí tribes should be taken into our pay. The Bugtís had already some of their tribe employed in the service of Government on the Sind and on the Panjab frontiers, the Marris only on the latter. He proposed that, in addition to the above, fresh service should be assigned to the Bugtís, and that the Marris also should be in the same manner granted service. Under this plan he believed that there would be uninterrupted peace on the Panjab frontier from Sind to Dera Ghazi Khán. On the western side of the Marri and Bugtí hills the country would, he said, be freed from the harassing attacks of the hitherto inveterate marauders occupying those hills, while the trade line down the Bolan Pass and across the plains of Kachhi into Sind would be free from molestation, and the British provinces to the south would largely benefit by the trade, which would annually increase and follow that line to the sea.

Further views of the Commissioner in Sind as to taking the Marris into service.

46. Regarding the plan of taking the Marris into service, Sir William Merewether subsequently explained in his letter No. 337, dated 17th June 1870 (page 70, paragraph 5, Part I of the Blue Book), that as this clan resided in the hills behind the Bugtís and consequently further from Sind, the Marris themselves seldom interfered with the Sind province, except in joining in small bodies with the Bugtís in their attempts. This course he explained they also followed against the lower portion of the Panjab frontier. He considered the Sind frontier to be thoroughly and efficiently protected, but for some years past there had been complaints of aggression on the Panjab frontier by portions of the Marri and Bugtí tribes. Skilful management had however checked them. But he said these would recur unless some fixed and clearly defined system meeting all probable chances was established. He observed that he would prefer that the bold policy of General Jacob which had proved so successful on the Sind frontier should be continued in its integrity and extended to the Panjab frontier, but this policy was expensive, as it would call

for the presence of more disciplined troops in the Panjab, and the change of arrangements hitherto prevailing which by taking the tribesmen into our service had the advantage of cheapness. He observed also that the proposals made by him and explained in the last paragraph were an elaboration of the plan commenced by Captain Sandeman, *viz.*, the winning over of the Bugtís and Marris by taking some of their men into our service. (See paragraphs 14-15 to the end of the letter quoted above.)

The Amír of Kabul brings to the notice of the Government of India the treatment of Mulla Muhammad Raisani at the hands of the Khan.

47. Shortly after this the disturbed state of Kalát itself had been prominently brought to the notice of the Government of India by the Amír Sher Alí Khán. (See page 73, Blue Book, Part I, letter No. 287, dated the 8th September 1870, from the Panjab Government, to the Government of India.) The Amír complained of the treatment of Sirdar Mulla Muhammad of Saráwán at the hands of His Highness the Khán. This Sirdar had fled into the Marri hills and asked the Marri Chiefs to protect him, sending me word. I was called upon by the Panjab Government to state my views on the subject of Sirdar Mulla Muhammad's petition to the Amír which was sent me by the order of the Government of India with that object. My reply is given in my No. 578, dated the 2nd September 1870 (page 73, Blue Book, Part I). It was quite clear that Sirdar Mulla Muhammad had a real grievance against the Sind authorities and the Khán of Kalát. He was the next Sirdar in the Khanate to the Khán himself, had a larger influence than any other person over the hill tribes and Brahuis, and especially with the Marris, who acknowedged him as the head of the Saráwán Confederacy of which they formed part. But it was well known that this Sirdar had really restored Mír Khudadad Khán to the throne on certain terms. On the Khán getting firmly seated on the throne he declared that the promises he had previously given were obtained by fear and disloyal conduct on the part of the Sirdar, and not only would he not keep them, but he said he would revenge himself on Sirdar Mulla Muhammad, should the chance of doing so offer. The Sirdar threatened to rebel again and made attempts to collect the clans, Brahui and Baluch, who recognised him as their head. But before resorting to force he appealed to the Amír of Kabul and to the Sind Government (see my letter above quoted). In the letter just referred to I strongly urged on the Government a fair settlement of the whole of the affairs of the Kalát State, pointing out that the Marris, with whom Sirdar Mulla Muhammad had taken refuge, had appealed to me, and that I believed that the Khán himself, if properly managed and guided, could be influenced to do what was right (see page 75, Part I, Blue Book).

The Government of India convened a conference of Sir W. Merewether, Colonel Phayre, Sir H. Durand, and Captain Sandeman in view to deciding on a uniform line of policy for the Sind frontier, and settling other points.

48. It is desirable here to refer to Sir C. U. Aitchison's letter No. 5 in Blue Book No. I, dated Fort William, 6th December 1870. In that letter the Government state the case as known to them, and point out the difference of the views held by the officers on the frontier; Colonel Phayre, it was observed, held that the Khán was no more than the head of a Confederacy, and he considered that the present Chief had throughout his reign been steadily striving to make himself independent of the constituted form of Government. He believed that without the countenance of the British Government the Khán's rule would, owing to the unpopularity of His Highness and the pervading spirit of anarchy, soon be overthrown. These views the Government observed were generally shared by Captain (Colonel Sir Robert) Sandeman and Colonel Graham, the Commissioner of the Deraját. Sir William Merewether on the other hand and Captain Harrison, the then Political Agent at Kalát, believed in the supro-

macy of the Khán, and dissented from Colonel Phayre's opinion that internal disturbances dangerous to the supremacy of the Khán were fast culminating. On the contrary they adduced reasons for considering that a large majority of the nobles were well disposed to the Khán and that order prevailed generally in the country. They deprecated any change in the policy then being pursued towards Kalát. The Supreme Government called on the Bombay Government for an expression of opinion on these points, and asked that at the same time a reply might be given to the reference which had been made concerning the application of Sirdar Mulla Muhammad to the Amír of Kabul for aid in recovering his confiscated estates and lost position in Kalát. The Viceroy and Governor General in Council was of opinion that it would tend much to the settlement of the subjects then before the Government, if the Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab, Sir H. Durand, and the Commissioner in Sind were to meet during the cold season. Colonel Phayre and Captain Sandeman were to attend the Conference, and the Viceroy in Council trusted that when the questions at issue had been considered in all their bearings on the spot by the Lieutenant-Governor and the Commissioner in Sind, they would be in a position to make such proposals, both in regard to the treatment of the Marri, Bugtí, and other frontier tribes, and in regard to the States of the Khán of Kalát, and the members of the Baluch Confederacy, as would enable the Supreme Government to reconcile existing differences of opinion and to decide on a strictly uniform line of policy for the Sind and Panjab frontier.

The Conference meets at Mithankot. Relations with the Marri and Bugtí tribes placed in the hands of the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khán, being *quâ* these tribes under his orders.

49. The conference here ordered was held on the 3rd February 1871 at Mithankot in the Panjab. Those who took part in it, in addition to the Lieutenant-Governor and Commissioner in Sind, were the Secretaries to Government of the Panjab, in the civil and military departments, Brigadier-General Keyes, Commanding the Panjab Frontier Force, Colonel Phayre, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, Colonel Graham, Commissioner of the Derajât, and Captain Sandeman. It should be borne in mind that the system in force for the protection of the frontier, though admirably calculated for success, as far as the Panjab alone was concerned, could not from its very nature be expected to serve imperial interests regarded as a whole. There was no unity of action between the Panjab and Sind, and the Chiefs who had pledged themselves to respect one border did not consider their engagements binding on them as regards the other, and still less as regards the lowlands of Kachhi belonging to the Khán of Kalát. In these directions, as might have been predicted, their depredations spread, and finally the state of things was such that the Bolan Pass became quite unsafe for Kafilas, and the trade, by this old-established route, was almost brought to a stand-still. A case occurred in which a tribe was punished for its misconduct by being blockaded from Sind, whilst its Chief was in receipt of pay from the Panjab; and there was no communication on the subject between the officials of the two provinces. It had become, in fact, day by day more evident that the frontier must be regarded as a whole; and that combined action on the part of the officers of both Governments was essential to preserve the order which was so beneficial to both. This meeting resulted in one uniform policy in regard to the treatment of the hill tribes being adopted for the Panjab and Sind frontiers, and the management of frontier affairs in their relation to the Marri and Bugtí tribes was placed in the hands of one officer only, namely, the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to whom the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khán, in all political matters, *quâ* the Marri and Bugtí tribes, was placed in subordination. (See paragraphs 11 to 15 of letter No. 36-10, dated 4th

February 1871.) The Political Superintendent was to consider the requirements of the Panjab, Sind, and Kalát together, and to maintain a consistent policy towards the frontier tribes.

Divergence of views as to the constitution of the State of Kalát.

50. A second point referred for the consideration of the Conference was left undecided. It, however, demands some notice in this place, both on account of its intrinsic importance, and because it was formally adjudicated upon by the Government of India in their review of the proposals of the Mithankot Conference. As already shown in this Report (it will be convenient to again here refer to what has been previously said), the affairs of Kalát were in a state of confusion, bordering on anarchy, at the end of 1870; and the Government of India, being aware of the conflict of opinion among even the best-informed on the subject, were anxious to obtain such information, as regards the real relations of the Khán of Kalát towards the Sirdars of Baluchistan, as would assist them in shaping the lines on which the policy of the British Government in the future should be carried out, so as to preserve the peace of the country, and protect the interest of British subjects. Sir W. Merewether and Captain Harrison regarded the Khán as a supreme ruler, and the Sirdars as his subjects and feudatories. I, on the other hand, held the views set forth in the opening paragraphs of this Report, according to which the institutions of Baluchistan are those of a Confederacy. These views were shared by Colonel Graham, Commissioner of Derajât, and by Colonel Phayre, Political Superintendent of the Upper Sind Frontier. It is apparent that the view to be taken of the conduct of the Sirdars towards the Khán during the prolonged struggle between them, which involved so much loss of life and property, depends entirely on the answer to be given to this question. If the Khán were a supreme ruler, the Sirdars were rebels without excuse for their rebellion; but if the Khán were the head of a Confederacy, of which the sirdars were members, the latter must be regarded as men engaged in an earnest endeavour to defend their liberties and constitutional privileges. In submitting the proposals of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab for the consideration of the Government of India, the Secretary remarked that the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor and the Commissioner in Sind after full deliberation had decided to submit no joint representations on the subject of the internal condition of the Kalát State, and the relations of the Khán to his subordinate Chiefs and Sirdars. The direction of political relations with Kalát having always been conducted by Sind authorities, the Lieutenant-Governor had not sufficient information regarding them to enable him to offer an opinion. (See page 80, paragraph 21 of letter above referred to in Part I, Blue Book.) The view taken by the Government of India as to the relative positions occupied by the Khán and the Sirdars is to some extent shown in their decision as to the mode of payment of an additional sum of ₹32,040 a year which it was proposed to grant for the entertainment of certain horsemen of the Marri and Bugtí tribes for the purposes of protection. Three proposals had been made, (*a*) that it should be paid to the Khán; (*b*) that it should be paid to the Chiefs in the name of the British Government; (*c*) that it should be handed over to the Chiefs in the name of the Khán, and that it should be considered an addition to the subsidy of ₹50,000 paid to the Khán. The last course was the one adopted by His Excellency in Council.

The petition of Mulla Muhammad, Chief of the Saráwán, rejected.

The policy of supporting the Khán with respect to the Sirdars approved of.

51. The opinion of the Government of Bombay on the policy to be pursued towards Kalát is recorded at length. It was simply to the effect that the Bombay Government supported the Khán in his policy towards his Sirdars, no authority but that of the Khán's being

recognised, and the Chiefs being recognised in no other capacity than as his subjects, all interference otherwise than by counselling forbearance and consideration being abstained from, and any recognition of feudal rights being refrained from, as it would neither be for our advantage nor for the advantage of the country to perpetuate them. (*Vide* paragraph 29 of Sir S. Fitzgerald's minute, at page 85 of Blue Book No. 1.) The petition of Sirdar Mulla Muhammad of Saráwán submitted by the Amír of Kabul was rejected, and things were left with the exception of the settlement come to in regard to the Marri and Bugtí tribes in *statu quo*. The opinions of the Bombay and Panjab Governments were confirmed by the Supreme Government in resolution No. 2248 P., dated Simla, the 19th October 1871. In paragraph 2, however, the Government of India remarked :—

But looking to the sums that are yearly paid for securing the peace of the frontier and for the protection of trade and to the small results obtained for this outlay, His Excellency in Council is clearly of opinion that for the present the money sanctioned for the tribes is granted for one year only, on the distinct understanding that the whole question, connected as it is with the administration of the Sind and Panjab frontier, may be taken up shortly and discussed in all its bearings.

The Government of India concurred with the Government of Bombay in rejecting the petition of Sirdar Mulla Muhammad of Saráwán submitted through the Amír of Kabul, and the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind, and the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khán, were directed to shape their attitude towards the Khan's subjects in accordance with the policy announced by the Bombay Government. The resolution come to was communicated in letter No. 185, dated 31st October, to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Breaking out of hostilities in 1871 between the Khán and Sirdars.

Success of the rebellion. Government of India suggest that Khán and Sirdars should place their affairs in the hands of Commissioner in Sind as arbitrator.

52. The ink was hardly dry on this resolution, which was dated 19th October 1871, before the Government of India received tidings of fresh disturbances in Kalát. On the 31st October 1871, the Government of Bombay reported to the Government of India, in letter No. 5286, the breaking out of hostilities between the Khán and the Sirdars (pages 92 to 116, Blue Book, Part I). Disturbances had occurred at Quetta and Mastúng, which were at first believed to be merely local, and were for the time quelled without much difficulty. It soon became known that Mulla Muhammad Raisani, if not the actual instigator, was in correspondence with the leaders in the insurrection. At first the rebellion was reported to be of no importance. The results, however, were the reverse, and day by day it assumed increased vigour. Sirdar Mulla Muhammad returned from Afghanistan and placed himself at the head of the insurrection. This rebellion, although brought about by the intrigues of certain absent Sirdars, had been favoured by the proceedings of the Khán, in investigating the nature of some landed tenures in Kachhi. Mulla Muhammad was joined by Alladina Khurd and Wadera Adam Khán, Bangalzai. They overran the district of Kachhi and captured Bhág and Gandáváh. After these successes they opened negotiations with the Khán. Nurdin Mingal, thinking the time opportune, first applied to Azad Khán of Khárán to join him against the Khán; and, on his advances being repelled, leagued himself with Mír Jám Alí Khán, the eldest son of the Jám of Lus Beyla, and, in concert with him, invaded Lus Beyla and succeeded in capturing the capital and driving from thence the *naib*, who had governed the district on behalf of the Khán since the flight of the Jám into Sind in 1869. Hostilities against the Khán's authority also broke out in Kej, but at no time reached a formidable height. On the 11th January

1872 the Government of India (in letter No. 8 C.P., dated the 11th January 1872, to the Bombay Government) remarked as to the extent of the rebellion as follows:—

It appears that nearly the whole country is in the hands of the revolted Sirdars. Kachhi was in rebellion many weeks ago. Lus Beyla has fallen into the hands of Alí Khán Jamote. Within the last few days Kej has thrown off allegiance, and the position of the Khán's representative there appears to be untenable. His Excellency the Governor General views this successful rebellion with great anxiety, and considers the spread of disorder in Kalát as being most prejudicial to British interests.

The Government of India suggested that the Government of Bombay should consider whether it would not be proper that the Commissioner in Sind, when calling on the Sirdars to submit, should assure them that their complaints would be thoroughly inquired into, and that such rights as they might be found justly to claim would be secured to them by the Khán. At the same time the Governor General in Council considered that the Khán should be required to put his affairs entirely in the hands of the Commissioner and abide by his decision. Should he do so, the Government of India, on the condition just named, would not object to presenting the Khán with one lakh of rupees, or more if necessary, to enable him to meet his most pressing demands and give his administration a fair start. On the other hand, it was said that under no circumstances would His Excellency in Council consent to send a force to Kalát to assist the Khán or suppress internal revolt, nor could the Government of India give any help with money, unless assured that the Sirdars would receive proper treatment at the Khán's hands, and that their rebellions had not been caused by aggression upon their just and ancient rights. (See pages 116 and 117 of Blue Book, Part I.)

Views of the Bombay authorities on the situation.

53. The views and opinions of the Sind authorities on the state of affairs and the result of the Sirdars' successful rebellion, together with their recommendations which were concurred in by the Government of Bombay, are given in Blue Book No. 1 in full. These briefly were that pecuniary assistance should be given to His Highness the Khán; and that certain terms of peace which had been offered to the Sirdars by the Khán's vakil, who was also commandant of his army, should be rejected, as the demands of the Sirdars had not been respectfully asked for; moreover, they were arrogant dictations, which could not be accepted by a Sovereign without conveying a public acknowledgment that he was helpless and virtually abdicating his power and position as a Ruler. The Commissioner in Sind remarked that the Khán's views regarding the peace was the correct one, namely, that the conduct of Nawab Muhammad Khán, the Khán's vakil, regarding the terms of peace proposed between the Khán and the Sirdars had been to actually acknowledge Sirdar Mulla Muhammad and the rebels as the ruling powers in Baluchistan; that the Khán and his brother Nassir Khán had always considered themselves as dependents of the British Government; that if the Khán's country was of any value to us as a boundary to our own territory, the time had now come for us to take possession of it or give the Khán assistance; and that if we were indifferent as to what took place, the Khán would do the best he could, but might eventually have to seek protection from either Afghanistan or Persia. The Commissioner in Sind, with whom the Government of Bombay agreed, proposed that the Khán should be granted a lakh of rupees, to be expended in rewarding those who had assisted him, and recompensing others, and that he should be presented with 400 Enfield rifles and ammunition.

View of the Government of India, to the effect that to insist on the recognition by successful rebels of the Khán's extreme sovereign rights, without listening to complaints of the rebels, would be a policy the prudence of which would be doubtful.

54. At page 126 of the Blue Book, Part I, will be found the reply of the Government of India to the Government of Bombay and the recommendations of the Commissoner in Sind. It is very important that its contents should not be overlooked. Briefly it said that the inquiries made by the Commissioner in Sind appeared to establish two points—1st, that the rebellion, although perhaps mainly brought about by the intrigues of the exiled Sirdars, was to a great degree occasioned, or at least favoured, by certain injudicious and illiberal proceedings of the Khán, in investigating the nature and extent of the landed tenures of some of his influential subjects in Kachhi; and 2ndly, that the rebellion had so gained head that there was not much hope of the Khán being able to suppress it by force of arms without assistance. It was noted by the Government of India that the rebellion had extended to Kej, and that the Khán on his part had not been able to strike such a blow in any part of his dominions as to destroy the hopes which the marked successes of the rebels were calculated to inspire.

Under these circumstances the Governor General in Council can entertain little hope that the rebels in the flush of success will be induced to throw themselves on the Khán's mercy and surrender unconditionally as the condition antecedent to the inquiry into and redress of their grievances. Whatever may be the merit or demerit of their complaints, His Excellency in Council doubts whether it is wise or prudent, unless the Khán is confident of his ability to assert his authority and suppress the rebellion, to force the quarrel to extreme issues. To insist on the recognition by successful rebels of extreme and absolute sovereign rights which the Khán is unable to enforce, and the attempted assertion of which appears to be one of the main causes of the outbreak, and to listen to no statements in regard to their complaints, unless the rebels who have hitherto had no reason to anticipate the failure of their enterprise abandon their attitude of hostility, is a policy of which, to say the least, the prudence is doubtful and may only prolong a trial of strength to which the Khán apparently does not feel himself equal.

His Excellency in Council then stated that the terms on which the Government of India are prepared to aid the Khán to re-establish his authority are given explicitly in Foreign Secretary's letter of 11th January 1872, referred to in the last paragraph but one, and it was added that interference would not be undertaken unless the Commissioner was assured of the Khán's consent, and that the Khán should be told to weigh well the serious consequences of a refusal on his part to accept cordially the proposals which had been made. The Khán had remarked to Major Harrison, the Political Agent, that if he failed to obtain assistance from the British Government, he would have to apply to Afghanistan or Persia for aid. With reference to this, it was requested that the Khán might be reminded that under article 3 of the treaty of 1854, he was bound to enter into no negotiation with other States without the consent of the British Government. It was added that His Excellency could not aid him unless his Government was established on a just basis, that the rights of his subjects were properly cared for, and their reasonable grievances enquired into and redressed.

Some delay was experienced in obtaining the consent of the Khán to the proposed arbitration, and the Government of India directed the Commissioner to press terms as strongly as possible with the Khán, but not to enter on mediation with the Chiefs without the Khán's full consent. The Khán, however, gave his full consent to the arbitration of the Commissioner in Sind for the settlement of his own affairs in relation to those of the Sirdars. He entrusted Sir W. Merewether with full authority to act for him, and said that he would willingly give his approval and assent to all measures and arrangements adopted by the Commissioner. His Highness issued a proclamation suspending

hostilities, urging at the same time that he had not countenanced wrong to his subjects, or anything that endangered the safety of their persons or property, and that he had ever acted up to the treaty. It is desirable here to note that I was specially deputed to Jacobabad by order from the Foreign Secretary to attend on the Commisioner in Sind. The words of the telegram sending me there were that "Merewether was to hold conference with Phayre and Sandeman." The correspondence in the Blue Book on this subject is not complete. Sir William Merewether not only did not hold a conference, but he was very ill-pleased at the Government of India deputing me to Jacobabad on duty connected with Kalát affairs, and asked that I should be withdrawn. Sir W. Merewether said that had he been supplied with a copy of the order associating Captain Sandeman in the settlement of affairs, he would have immediately submitted to the Government of Bombay his—

respectful remonstrance against his being associated in any way excepting such as I saw fit to require in the present proceedings relating to the disturbances going on in the territory of His Highness the Khán of Kalát, and in which I hold it particularly inexpedient he should in any way interfere.

Directly I knew that he did not desire my presence, I left Jacobabad and got as far as Kasmor on my return journey, when I was ordered back by the Government, and was moreover told I had no right to leave until the duty on which I was sent was completed, and Government gave me permission to do so. Another point requiring notice is that Sir William Merewether complained bitterly that I had allowed Sirdar Mulla Mahammad to address letters to me from the Marri hills. I could not help receiving these letters, as the Sirdar was a refugee in the hills and addressed me through the Marri Sirdars. Moreover, on the receipt of the letters I sent them to the Government of the Panjab. I was certainly under the Commissioner's orders then, but if page 78 of the Blue Book, Part I, paragraph 12, be referred to, it will be seen that when the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khán was placed under the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind, it was distinctly acknowledged that the object aimed at was to secure a uniform system of policy on the frontier, but it was at the same time acknowledged by both the Lieutenant-Governor and Commissioner that the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khán had managed the tribes in the interests of the tranquillity of the Panjab border with great ability and success, and that although he was prepared to be placed under the orders of the Political Superintendent, it was by no means desirable nor intended that the interference of the latter officer should extend to matters of petty detail. His control would be general and only such as to secure a uniform and consistent policy of management. But the fact was that the Commissioner in Sind knew that both Colonel Phayre's and my views in regard to Kalát affairs were opposed to his own. Sir. W. Merewether wrote—

I am well acquainted with Captain Sandeman's views on Kalát politics. As far as they go, they are simply those of Colonel Phayre, which Government (*i.e.*, the Bombay Government,) have disapproved, and being so they can add no additional strength in carrying out any measures I may find it necessary to adopt.

This has already been referred to, and the Commissioner in Sind therefore asked the Government of India to remove me, and the Government of Bombay to remove Colonel Phayre from Jacobabad, which latter recommendation was acted on.

The settlement made by Sir W. Merewether.

55. The consent of the Khán having been obtained, both parties agreed to submit their differences to the arbitration of Sir W. Merewether, who proceeded to arbitrate between His Highness and the rebel Sirdars accordingly,

This arbitration marked a new departure in the policy of the British Government towards the Khán of Kalát. A review of the settlement made will now be given. Early in March 1872, the Commissioner in Sind convened a meeting at Jacobabad, which was attended by the Sirdars, and on the part of the Khán by the Shahgassi, Wali Muhammad. The Commissioner, after having explained to the assembled darbar that the British Government had empowered him to arbitrate between the disputing parties and bring about an adjustment of their differences, said that those who were aggrieved would be separately called upon to lay before him all points which they desired should be taken into consideration. This was done, and the claims of the Sirdars were recorded at great length. It was found that the Brahui Confederacy of the Sirdars of Saráwán numbered six:—

Sirdar Mulla Muhammad, Raisani.
" Shadi Khán, Bangalzai.
" Jundo Khán, Shawani.
" Syad Khán, Muhammad Shâhi.
" Dost Muhammad, Lehrí.
" Alladina, Khurd.

The Commissioner observed that all these six Sirdars belonged to Mastúng or its immediate neighbourhood, where also resided Sirdar Mulla Muhammad Raisani, the most influential of them all, the others having blindly followed his lead. This Sirdar, it was reported, had arrayed himself in hostile attitude to, and had attempted to coerce, the Khán into compliance with his demands, firstly in 1857, secondly in 1863, thirdly in 1865, fourthly in 1867, fifthly in 1869, and sixthly in 1871, while the Khán had been ever ready and willing to forgive past offences, and restore him to his old position. The only disaffected Sirdar in Jalawan was Nurdin Mingal, who would not attend the darbar and remained in hostility to the Khán. The Jám of Lus Beyla was under surveillance at Hyderabad during the disturbances, and in consequence of a letter displaying a desire to take advantage of the disturbances to return to Lus Beyla, he was sent to the Dekhan. The disturbances in Makrán were found to have no connection with the proceedings of Mulla Muhammad and his party. The claims of the Sirdars were nearly all of the same character; they asked for their hereditary lands in the hill country and in Kachhi, as possessed in the time of Mír Nassir Khán, the younger, to be restored to them, together with minor claims, such as annual allowances for service, &c. After carefully hearing the statements as to the claims of the Sirdars, together with the replies of the Khán's representative, the Commissioner in Sind assembled a darbar and told the Sirdars that they had assumed to themselves the right of deciding as to what was just, in a manner incompatible with good order and proper Government; that many of the petty circumstances which they styled grievances were not based on fair grounds; and that having grievances, fancied or real, they had rushed into rebellion. He told the Sirdars that they should bear in mind that the prosperity of the country depended on their unanimity and their support of their Sovereign, the only object of the British Government being that there should be a firm and stable Government in Baluchistan, and that there was no wish to interfere between the Khán and the Sirdars. After observing that the hereditary estates and grants asked for had never been resumed except when the Sirdars were in rebellion; that the allowances and honours claimed had been given when the Sirdars performed the duties for which they were originally provided; that the pillage of Kafilas in the Bolan by the Sirdars was an outrage for which there was no excuse,—still in the hope of future adherence to only a

loyal and true path, the door of clemency should be held open to them. The Commissioner decided that—

(*a*) Their lands should be restored to them, and all allowances should be accorded, as was the case in the time of Mír Nassir Khán, the younger, and that they should be allowed to reside peaceably on their estates, on condition that they paid due and proper allegiance to His Highness the Khán, their lawful Sovereign.

(*b*) That the property plundered from Kafilas be given up to their lawful owners.

(*c*) That all property seized during the recent rebellion by the Sirdars and their followers from the ryots of Baluchistan, whether in Khurásán or Kachhi, be restored.

(*d*) As regards Crown property, the Khán would generously forego such, and make no demand on that account.

The Commissioner represented that the Khán had suffered greatly during the rebellion from a pecuniary point of view; that he had liberally foregone any claim he had for Crown property; that while the calls upon him were heavy, his treasury was empty, and he recommended that a lakh of rupees might be granted to him. As to Sirdar Nurdin, the Commissioner considered that he had placed himself beyond the pale of mediation, and that the Khán was at liberty to act against him as he pleased; but shortly afterwards the Khán came to terms with him. The Commissioner considered that the Jám of Lus Beyla had sacrificed all claim to return to his country.

Approval of the Government of India of the settlement come to by the Commissioner in Sind.

56. The Government of India, in their letter No. 1214 P., dated Simla, the 30th May 1872, to the Government of Bombay, approved highly of the settlement come to by the Commissioner in Sind, and directed their cordial thanks to be conveyed to him. The Commissioner was directed to distinctly give the Sirdars to understand that the Viceroy in Council—

> wishes to see the Khán's authority firmly established throughout the length and breadth of his dominions; that the British Government will encourage him by their advice and countenance in all lawful endeavours towards this end; that they will favour with no countenance or support whatever, but, on the contrary, will regard with strong displeasure any of his subjects, whether Sirdars or ryots, who rebel against or endeavour to subvert his legitimate authority, and that the Sirdars will best consult their own interests and the interests of their ryots, and will most surely secure the favour of the British Government by assisting heartily in the establishment of peace and good order in protecting traders and putting down violence and robbery.

At the same time the Commissioner was directed to inform the Khán—

> that he will not be countenanced in any high-handed interference with the rights of his nobles and subjects; that if by any such proceedings they are driven into rebellion, he must not look to the British Government to save him from the result of his own misgovernment, although he may rely on receiving such assistance as the British Government may find it possible to give him with the view of maintaining his lawful authority; the best security for the stability of his throne is for him to treat his nobles and subjects in a kind and conciliatory way, respect their ancient privileges, honours, and rights, and gain a hold on their affection.

Failure of the settlement made by the Commissioner in Sind between the Khán and Sirdars. Proposals of the Mithankot Conference as to the Marris not carried out.

57. The settlement concluded by the Commissioner between the Kalát Government and the Sirdars did not achieve the results expected from it. To explain what occurred it is necessary to refer to the arrangements made for the protection of the Bolan. The British Government had granted the Khán R50,000 per annum, mainly in compensation for transit dues levied in the Bolan Pass; and some of the Sirdars considered themselves aggrieved by the Khán not having admitted them to a share in this subsidy. A particular plea was advanced in favour of the Marris, one section of which

tribe, the Mazaranis, had been selected to protect Kafilas proceeding through the Bolan. This arrangement excited the jealousy not only of the Khurds and Kákars, but also of the rest of the Marris, headed by Sirdar Gazzan Khán. I urged, and in this the Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab supported me, the examination and early settlement of the claims of the Marri and Bugtí tribes. The Panjab Government hoped for the effectual settlement by the Commissioner in Sind of the future relations of the Marri tribe in connection with the Khán. The jealousy with which the Mazarani Marris were regarded extended to the Mingals, who had previously shared in the tolls levied on Kafilas passing through the Bolan, and in April 1872 the Mingals made an attack on Sherdil Khán, the Chief of the Mazaranis, killed his son, and carried off much of his property. It was believed that the Khán had himself prompted the outrage, because he was discontented with the decisions arrived at under the arbitration of Sir W. Merewether at Jacobabad, and that he hoped that disturbances might lead to his being freed from the conditions imposed on him, as well as the Sirdars. In retaliation for the outrage on the Marris, Sherdil Khán collected a following of his clansmen, and attacked two unoffending Kafilas, one of which he succeeded in plundering, having previously anticipated with a foresight worthy of a better object that the Khán would be called upon to make good the losses that had been occasioned, and that in this way his tribe would be avenged for the outrage on themselves which they accused the Khán of having instigated. This calculation turned out to be correct, for Sir W. Merewether decided to hold the Khán responsible. In connection with these outrages I had pressed on the Commissioner the early carrying out of the plan proposed at the Mithankot Conference, as the peace of the frontier depended on it. This plan, it will be remembered, was to take a certain number of the Marris into our service, in view to which the Government of India had sanctioned the expenditure of a considerable sum of money, but Sir W. Merewether told me that it was manifestly a most inopportune moment, as he thought that matters had better settle a little, and that the property of the Kafilas should be restored before any negotiations were commenced with that tribe; otherwise a passing phrase would appear to be really true, *viz.*, "that any one had only to loot a Kafila to get what they wanted, and be made much of." Moreover, he objected to my going to Kahan, the Marri capital, to negotiate with the Chief for the surrender of property. The Commissioner in Sind informed Sherdil Khán that he must surrender the property plundered, and that on his doing so the Khán of Kalát would be moved to redress the injury he and the tribe had sustained at the hands of the Mingals. The Commissioner recommended the blockade of the tribe as a means of obtaining the plundered property. From the above it will be seen that owing to the conduct of the Marri tribe the Commissioner in Sind delayed to put in force the arrangements recommended by the Mithankot Conference and sanctioned afterwards by the Government of India. I think it is necessary to notice this, for I think it was the Commissioner's refusal to make a complete settlement that led to what afterwards happened. Writing nearly a year after the orders of the Government of India, the Commissioner in Sind said—

> Captain Sandeman informed me by telegram that the Marri Chiefs, apart from the Mazaranis, had agreed to give up all the property that could be collected and equivalent in money for the remainder; this being done removes all impediment to the execution of the Mithankot scheme.

He proposed to go in the course of some months to Jacobabad, and in consultation with others make arrangements for the expenditure of the money. The mischief caused by the Marris was however already done. In reviewing the correspondence which had taken place regarding the Marri tribe, the Gov-

ernment of India in a resolution on the subject said in 1872 that the money for the entertainment of members of the Bugtí and Marri tribes, *viz.*, R32,010, had only been sanctioned for one year, during which the arrangements proposed had not been carried out. His Excellency in Council thought that the time (*i.e.*, the latter portion of 1872) had arrived for carrying out these arrangements. As the experiment could not be limited to one year, His Excellency sanctioned the yearly expenditure of the money.

The Khán listening to the advice of evil-disposed persons first declines, but eventually agrees to give compensation for plundered Kafilas.

58. Other reasons were, however, found to be not wanting for thinking that the Khán was dissatisfied with the arbitration concluded by Sir W. Merewether between himself and Sirdars. After the arbitration the Sirdars proceeded to their homes for the purpose of fulfilling the engagements into which they had entered to restore certain plundered property and return to their allegiance, on the understanding that their estates would be restored to them. In consequence of the circulation of mischievous reports to the effect that the naib of Mastúng had received instructions from His Highness to attack them, they became alarmed, dispersed without collecting the plundered property, and subsequently advanced the rumour of the intended attack on them as an excuse for not adhering to the promise they had given to make restitution to the merchants. The Khán, listening to the advice of evil-disposed persons, came on the 14th June 1872 to an open breach with his Wazir, the Shahgassi Wali Muhammad, apparently because he was annoyed at the part the Shahgassi had taken in the arbitration at Jacobabad. Major Harrison, the Agent with the Khán, reported that His Highness had no intention of performing what was guaranteed in his name at Jacobabad; that the lives of the Wazir and the Sirdars were in danger; and that for the first time since there had been a British representative at the Kalát Court, the Agent's advice had been disregarded. Instigated and backed up by his evil advisers, whom the Khán when pressed by the Agent refused to remove, His Highness declined to make any arrangements for compensation on account of the Kafilas plundered by the Marris. The Commissioner considered that it was absolutely necessary to convey to the Khán in a most unmistakable manner that his proceedings could only be regarded as being distinctly opposed to the friendly relations previously existing between the two Governments, and at the same time he recommended that if His Highness did not conform to his treaty engagements and persisted in declining to give a clear assurance that he would cause restitution of the property plundered from Kafilas in the Bolan, the Political Agent at his Court should be withdrawn, as without the support of the British Government he would be helpless. The Commissioner further thought that the Khán should do justice to the Mazarani Marris, upon whom the raid of the Mingals had been perpetrated with his countenance, that he should restore the Shahgassi to favour, and that he should remove from his counsels the evil-disposed persons who had been misleading him. As affairs in Kalát again threatened to return to a state of anarchy, the Khán was reminded that, under the treaty of 1854, the British Government held him responsible for the safety of traffic, and he was warned that the payment of the subsidy of R50,000 would be suspended, unless the plundered property was recovered and compensation given for losses. The Khán, however, for some time continued to be recalcitrant, and his conduct remained so unsatisfactory that Major Harrison was directed to return to British territory from Kalát, unless there should be an immediate change in the policy and proceedings of the Khán. This threatened withdrawal of British support had the desired effect, and the Khán having delayed a final decision until Major Harrison was on the eve of leaving Kalát, eventually at the parting visit paid

to him by the Political Agent on the 15th September 1872, abandoned the position which he had taken up, dismissed his evil advisers, reinstated his Wazir, the Shahgassi Wali Mahammad, and entered into a written agreement, in which he promised to abide by his treaty engagements with the British Government and give compensation to the merchants. Compensation to the merchants was paid (*vide* despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 52 of 28th March 1873), and the evil advisers were removed.

Interview between the Viceroy and the Khán of Kalát at Sukkur, 1872.

59. While on tour, His Excellency the Viceroy held a private interview with His Highness the Khán of Kalát at Sukkur on the 5th November 1872. On the subject of the withdrawal of the Political Agent from the Khán's Court, His Highness was told that, although, on observing the willingness of the Khán to adopt a policy more in consonance with the views of the British Government, the orders for the departure of Major Harrison had been modified, it was far from probable that the same consideration would be shown on a future occasion. The object of the British Government, it was impressed on the Khán, was to secure entire freedom and security of trade through the Khán's dominions. While resolving scrupulously to observe the terms of the treaty with Kalát, it was incumbent on the British Government to insist that its provisions should be equally fulfilled by His Highness, and His Excellency hoped that the Khán by a considerate and conciliatory course of conduct towards his Chiefs might be enabled in future to avoid all chance of a recurrence of similar disorders. The Khán however dwelt on the necessity of harsh measures to restore order, in reply to which His Excellency said that there was no wish on the part of the British to interfere so long as peace was preserved on the frontier and treaty engagements fulfilled. The Khán asked for the reinstatement of his favourites, *viz.*, Shakar Khán, commandant of his troops, and the Munshis Saleh Muhammad and Gul Muhammad, owing to whose intrigues much of the recent complication was attributed. His Excellency replied that to reverse the dismissal of these men would only have the effect of weakening the Khán's authority, and that it was impossible for the British Government to countenance their restoration at that time, though subsequently the question might be re-opened.

Colonel Phayre leaves the appointment of Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

60. In the course of the correspondence on the disturbances in Kalát, it was found that the Commissioner in Sind and the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, Colonel Phayre, entertained different views as to the policy to be followed. The views of Sir W. Merewether were approved by the Government of India, and consequently, bearing in mind the embarrassments caused by the conflict of policy between him and Colonel Phayre and the fact that these differences of opinion were known to the Khán of Kalát and the Sirdars, His Excellency the Viceroy considered that it was not advisable that Colonel Phayre, then on leave, should resume the post of Political Superintendent. His Excellency expressly said that he had no wish to make any unfavourable reflections on Colonel Phayre, and in addition requested that he might be provided with employment in a more suitable post. Colonel Phayre was provided with another post.

Detention of Shakar Khán, Saleh Muhammad, and Gul Muhammad.

61. Notwithstanding what had been done, the country did not settle down. The Khán placed himself in opposition to the Political Agent, and at last the Commissioner in Sind imprisoned the commandant of the Khán's infantry and the two munshis, on whose advice, in preference to that of the Political Agent, the Khán was supposed to be acting. The Commissioner in Sind was directed to place them only under such surveillance as might be sufficient to prevent them from escaping or intriguing.

Circumstances leading to, and the withdrawal of, the Political Agent from the Khán's Court, 1873.

62. In February 1873 the Commissioner in Sind met the Khán at Shahpur for the purpose of discussing affairs, in view to placing matters in Kalát on a more satisfactory footing; but the interview which took place was entirely unsatisfactory. The Khán had come apparently with the sole intention of getting effected the release of the two munshis and Shakar Khán, whose detention has been previously referred to, and would not enter fully into any other subject. To no purpose the Commissioner explained to him that such a thing was impossible. When an attempt was made to discuss any other subject he would after a short time say that there was no use in his doing anything, and that he had no power in the country; he could not even protect and keep by him three poor creatures like Shakar Khán and the two munshis. It appeared that the ladies of the palace had been prompted to taunt him with the subject, and urge him to make a stand on it as the one thing that unless agreed to he could and would do nothing. The chief movers in the matter were the Khán's mother and sister, both of whom had been his worst advisers throughout. The interview had to be concluded without any good result being arrived at. There appeared to be no doubt that the Khán had certainly altered greatly, and that a change had come over him. The Shahgassi said that with the cordial support of the Khán he could easily have recovered all plundered property from the Saráwán Chiefs, but owing to his holding back, only a portion was recovered, the remainder of the compensation paid by the Khán to merchants having come out of the Khán's treasury. The Commissioner seeing that His Highness had withdrawn his confidence from the Shahgassi, it was impossible for that officer to carry on his duties, and that his intention to resign them was a wise one. The Commissioner then addressed the Khán by letter; after again saying that the three advisers of the Khán under surveillance could not be released, he went on to propose that a sum of R500 per mensem should be paid to Sherdil Khán, Maẓarani Marri, who was able and willing to protect travellers in the Bolan. This sum was to be paid in His Highness's name, together with R1,000 per mensem to the Chief of the Sarárwáns, with the same object. It was added that it was desirable that a portion of the Marri and Bugtí tribes should be taken into service, with a view to putting a stop to raids in Kachhi. The Commisioner then urged on the Khán the necessity for making arrangements in Lus Beyla, which had been left for many months without any official to maintain authority. As to Muhammad Khan, the vakil at Jacobabad, the Commissioner said that this man's conduct had seriously injured His Highness's interests and good name in misrepresenting matters and other ways, and he begged that another person might be appointed in his place. As to this official, the Commissioner had already decided to have nothing more to do with him, and had directed that no more business should be transacted through him. In reply the Khán uged that the three deported advisers had served him well, and that their removal had injured his reputation throughout the country. The hopes that he had entertained as to their release had not however been realised; he added that their treatment had disgraced his name. As to the money payments proposed for the Mazarani and Saráwán Chiefs, the Khán said that the Bolan would be safe when his Government was strong, and not till then, and that the Sarawan would expect to be subsidised. As to the Marris, he recommended harsh measures. The Khán excused himself for the state of affairs in Lus Beyla, from which country many outrages had been reported, merchants having been there plundered when following the high road, on the ground that he was otherwise fully engaged. He defended the Vakil Muhammad Khán, who had, he said, his full confidence, and said that if the Commissioner were not satisfied with him,

the British Government could appoint any person they pleased. The whole reply was most unsatisfactory, and conveyed nothing beyond an indifferent assent. The Commissioner on this addressed another letter to His Highness (dated 10th March 1873), further remonstrating with him, and conveying the following ultimatum:—

I must therefore ask your Highness to inform me simply whether you desire to act on the advice offered, or whether you decline to accept it, that I may be enabled to place the matter before Government in a clear and certain light, and that it may be seen what arrangements should be made for the future.

Shortly before this letter was written, the Khán had told Major Harrison in conversation "that he had no intention of ruling the country or taking any interest in its affairs until Shakar Khán and the munshis were released, and that the British Government, the Shahgassi, and Major Harrison might do what they liked." This officer also urged on the Khán to send troops to Lus Beyla, but the Khán said he could not manage it, and he added that "he himself was perfectly indifferent to all matters connected with the government of his country, and never intended to take any further interest in them." The reasons for the Khán's conduct were not clear. Major Harrison thought that it was due to not having been more thoroughly assisted in a pecuniary way to enable him to completely coerce the Chiefs and keep them down, and also to the exaggerated idea he had been led by evil counsellors to form of the importance of himself and his country to the British Government in connection with the Russian advance, and working on this idea he had only to oppose whatever was suggested to get much larger sums of money given him. Besides, he was much chafed at the increased interference in the affairs of his government that recent events had rendered necessary. It also seemed that he had not the energy and will required for the work of government, and preferred giving heed to any advice which suggested expedients to relieve him from his difficulties. In reply to the letter before alluded to, containing the Commissioner's ultimatum, the Khán wrote that he would willingly agree to everything that had been proposed. Although he was ready enough with assent and assertions of his desire to please, he did nothing to show that he would heartily carry out what was desired, and the Commissioner found it impossible to accept his assurances as being sincere, his actions having pointed to exactly contrary conclusions. Under the circumstances, the Commissioner directed Major Harrison to withdraw from the Khán's Court, until His Highness should, discarding evil advisers, endeavour to promote sound and good government in his country. This letter was dated 31st March 1873. The subsidy of ₨50,000 was withheld for that year from the Khán, and it was said that it would be withheld until he restored order in Lus Beyla, appointed a suitable vakil, and showed that he really intended to act up to the treaty under which the subsidy was allowed. Shortly afterwards it appeared that the Khán caused to be confiscated certain hereditary lands at Lehrí belonging to the Raisani tribe, in the possession of which they had been confirmed at the Jacobabad arbitration, thereby breaking the solemn pledge then given. On this the Commissioner warned the Khán that this breach of faith, the renewed complaints of misgovernment, and the general disordered state of the country, could not be considered with indifference by the Government of India. This communication was approved of by His Excellency in Council, who thought that (*vide* No. 1546 P. of 4th July 1873), considering the attitude assumed by the Khán, it was impossible for Major Harrison to remain longer at the Kalát Court. His withdrawal was approved of, together with the proceedings of the Commissioner in the matter. His Excellency thought that no interference should be exercised in Kalát, that the relations between the

Khán and the nobles should be left to adjust themselves, that no advice as to their course of action should be given to either party, but that the course of events should be carefully watched. The Commissioner's proceedings in withholding the payment of the subsidy were also approved of. The obligations of the Khán under the treaty to protect trade and secure the peace of the frontier remained in force however, and the Commissioner was told to tell him that in the event of any disturbances taking place on the frontier, the British Government would be compelled to take its own measures for preserving order, and further, that if satisfaction were not afforded by the Khán for outrages committed in Lus Beyla, it would be necessary to exact reparation in such manner as the British Government might deem most suitable. Of the measures for giving effect to the proposals of the Mithankot Conference, the only portion that had been carried out was the grant of R5,520 to the Bugtís. No further immediate steps were, it was decided by Government, needed. It was added that if the Khán did not soon assume a more friendly attitude, it would be necessary to make arrangements for the protection of trade, direct with the tribes. As to outrages in Lus Beyla, Government decided that if the Khán would not redress outrages, measures would have to be taken independently of him for the protection of the lives and property of traders.

The Commissioner in Sind represents the contumacious conduct of the Marris.

63. With respect to the service amounting to R5,520 per annum granted to the Bugtís, which has previously been referred to, it should here be noted that the Commissioner in Sind had summoned both the Marri and Bugtí Sirdars to Jacobabad in February 1873, in order to explain to them the details of the arrangements proposed for giving to both of them service. To stengthen the Khán's authority they were summoned through His Highness, and, besides, the Commissioner in Sind wished to make them understand that they were to look first and only to the Political Superintendent on the frontier and not to the subordinate officer at Dera Ghazi Khán, with whom, under the directions and orders of the Panjab Government, they held communications. The Bugtí Sirdars at first demurred to going to the Khán in Kachhi, and asked for advice from the Deputy Commissioner, in whose service the principal Sirdar was. On his advising them to visit the Khán, they went and then presented themselves at Jacobabad. Sherdil Khán, Mazarani Marri, also came, but Gazzan Khán and the other Marri Sirdars raised a variety of objections. Among other things, they wanted to have influential people to escort them in. To this the Commissioner would not agree, and service was not given to the Marris because they would not waive their demands. Sir W. Merewether, irritated by the action taken by the Marris in these particulars, and also by their conduct with respect to the plunder of Kafilas which Gazzan Khán had not given up, proposed, in February 1874, that arrangements should be made to blockade them from both the Panjab and Sind, and that the Commissioner should be empowered to inform Gazzan Khán that, unless he would present himself at Jacobabad within a given time, crave forgiveness, and show himself prepared to restore the property plundered by the Marris, he and his tribe would be considered to have forfeited the favour of the British Government; that all payments made for service of any kind would be stopped; that all members of the tribe should be debarred from entering British territory, and that any who did attempt to cross the border line should be seized and treated as enemies of the State. Should these measures fail, the Commissioner recommended that a well-selected force should be sent to the Marri hills to punish the tribes and enforce conditions which they would not be able to break in future.

In consequence of the Sassooli-Brahui raid, the Commissioner recommends armed intervention in Kalát, and the Government of India declines to sanction it.

64. Hardly had the recommendations mentioned in the preceding paragraph been made, when an event occurred which the Commissioner said "is decisive that further forbearance towards His Highness the Khán cannot be permitted, and that "immediate and vigorous measures should be adopted to compel a better observance of the treaty engagements entered into by him with the Government of India." On the 11th February 1874, a party of 200 armed men of the Sassooli-Brahui tribe made a raid on British territory, and carried off some of their fugitive slaves who had taken refuge in the Shikarpur district. The Commissioner designated the act an insolent and gross outrage, for which the ruler of the country must be held responsible. The Commissioner said that the inaction of the Khán and the absence of restraint, over the actions of his subjects rendered it necessary that he and the country generally should be shown that the Government of India would resent any act affecting British possessions. In order to restore order the Commissioner recommended that two light columns should be despatched from Karachi and Jacobabad to instil order into both the south and the north of Baluchistan, and prevent the Khán from attempting to escape at the last towards Seistan. The columns should he thought consist of :—

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|---|---|
| A field battery.<br>Two 10-inch mortars.<br>A regiment of Sind Horse from Jacobabad.<br>A wing of European infantry.<br>A regiment of native infantry. | The Karachi column. |
| A mountain train at Jacobabad.<br>A regiment of Sind Horse.<br>A wing of European infantry.<br>Jacob's rifles. | The Jacobabad column. |

The operations should, he proposed, be adopted solely to ensure the observance of the treaty by the Khán and to re-establish order in the country. The proposals of the Commissioner in Sind were discussed with the Panjab Government and gravely considered by the Government of India. His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab concurred with me that the opportunity for trying milder measures had not yet gone by. It was argued that the Marris had long since thrown off their allegiance to the Kalát State, and that this was the reason that Gazzan Khán had refused to recognise the summons to Jacobabad forwarded through His Highness. The Panjab Government had encouraged the same view in their dealings with the Marris; and the state of affairs on their frontier did not appear to them to be of a nature to justify our coming to an open rupture with the tribe. The officials of the Dera Ghazi Khán district had succeeded in building up friendly relations with the Marris; and a resort to force would destroy perhaps for ever the fruits of many years' patient labour, and would result in the border being harried for years to come in the future. Armed with such arguments as these, the Panjab Government recommended that I should be sent into the Marri hills on a friendly mission, and warn Gazzan Khán and his fellow Chiefs of the folly of running counter to the wishes of the British Government. Some months were spent in eliciting the views of the officials of both provinces, which I have briefly set forth in the preceding paragraph, and it was not until the winter of 1874-75 that the Government of India issued its instructions in the matter.* His Excellency in Council remarked that it

* The views of the Supreme Government will be found in two letters : (1) 2,314 p. of 9th October, 1874; p. 486, *et seq*, Blue Book No. 1. (2) No. 18A. p. of 5th January, 1875; p. 527, *et seq*, Blue Book No. 1.

was not advisable to have recourse to armed intervention with a view to the settlement of Kalát affairs:—

His Excellency in Council has long ceased to expect from the Khán any efficient action towards the establishment of even a respectable administration. During the last 17 years the British Government has done everything in its power to strengthen his hands and enable him to fulfil his treaty obligations. Extra subsidies have been given; he has received from us presents of money; we have by friendly mediation adjusted the quarrels between him and his Sirdars; he has had moral support from the presence and advice of a British Agent; he has been received by the Viceroy with distinction. In short, everything has been done by the British Government that could have been done to raise him in the estimation of his subjects, and to enable him to discharge all the duties which devolve upon him as the Ruler of the Kalát State. But all has beenof no avail.

After observing that the attitude assumed by the Khán appeared to result more from want of power to control his subjects than from hostility to the British Government, His Excellency remarked—

if we were to intervene in force to support his authority, it would be necessary to enquire into and guarantee the rights of those whose alleged grievances have driven them into what may possibly be a justifiable rebellion. On the other hand, if the Khán were removed from power, there appears to be no one in Kalát who has any prospect of ruling with greater success.

Armed interference, it was added, would commit Government to a military occupation and the government of the country. It was decided that it was not the duty of the British Government to settle by armed intervention the administration of Kalát, or to adjust the quarrels between the Khán and his nobles, or to help the Khán to assert nominal suzerainty over recalcitrant tribes; and that His Excellency in Council would only give moral and material support. The objects desired by the Government were the prevention of plundering and outrage within or near the British frontier, and secondly the safe transit of trade. The latter object could scarcely be looked for while anarchy was universally rampant in Kalát; it might however follow the re-establishment of peace on the frontier. The raid under consideration had not been followed by other raids, and it did not indicate any general disposition on the part of raiders to violate British territory. For these reasons an armed intervention was deemed unnecessary. In paragraph 9 of this letter the Government clearly stated its futurepolicy—

The policy of endeavouring to deal with the frontier tribes entirely through the Khán, and of giving them to understand that they are regarded solely as subjects of His Highness, has failed after long and patient trial. His Excellency in Council is therefore of opinion that the time has now arrived for having recourse to the alternative measure which has more than once been pointed out, but which has been deferred from time to time solely out of consideration for His Highness, the alternative, namely, of making our own arrangements direct with the frontier tribes without reference to the Khán.

His Excellency in Council did not consider that our relations with the Marri tribe, the most turbulent of all, were such as to preclude the adoption of such measures. The quarrel of the Marris was rather with the Khán than the British. The restoration of a portion of the booty taken on the part of Gazzan Khán indicated, His Excellency thought, a certain deference to authority which left room for hope that matters might still be satisfactorily settled. His Excellency declined to sanction a blockade which, in the opinion of Panjab officers, would entail more hardships on our own subjects than the Marris, and would involve a rupture with some of the friendly Marri tribes. The letter then goes on to state that—

the Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab is of opinion that before resorting to a blockade or other measures of coercion we should endeavour to bring about an amicable settlement with Gazzan Khán and the Marris. It has been suggested that the country should be visited by a

party of Sind and Panjab officials in the manner proposed in 1869, and that these officers should be empowered to arrange the necessary measures with Gazzan Khán, to explain to the tribes our desire for peace on the frontier and protection to trade, to carry out the details of the arrangements sanctioned for the entertainment of tribal levies (as arranged at the Mithankot Conference), and generally to endeavour to effect an adjustment of inter-tribal quarrels and arrangements for the safe transit of caravans. His Excellency in Council approves of these suggestions, and desires that you (*i.e.*, the Commissioner in Sind) will place yourself in direct communication with the Lieutenant-Governor with a view to arranging the details of the composition of the party, the route they should take, the escort by which they should be accompanied, and the instructions to be given them. When you have come to an understanding on these matters with the Lieutenant-Governor, I am to request that a full report may be submitted for the consideration and orders of the Government of India.

Disordered state of affairs in Kalát up to the time of the Sassooli-Brahui raid.

65. It will now be convenient to record the state of affairs in Kalát itself after the departure of the Political Agent. When Major Harrison left the Khán's Court, the Wazir, Shahgassi Wali Muhammad, not thinking it safe to remain with his master since the latter had so changed his views, accompanied the British representative to Sind. From this date the Commissioner in Sind said that there had practically been no government in Kalát. Sirdar Mulla Muhammad Raisani, fearing the hostility of the Khán, went to his Afghan retreat at Sibi. The Khán, it was said, had allowed matters to drift, following the advice of three men who had always shown strong feelings against the British Government, and who had throughout endeavoured for their own advantage to encourage the Khán in the adverse course he had adopted and to further increase the complications between the two Governments. These three men were (1) Abdul Aziz, naib of Kachhi, (2) Muhammad Hayat, Kazi of Bhág, and (3) Muhammad Khán, ex-vakil of Jacobabad. These three men, the Commissioner said, lost no opportunity of acting insolently to British officials on the frontier, and prompting their sovereign to maintain the dogged obstructiveness he had so foolishly entered upon. No Wazir was appointed after the departure of the Shahgassi. The post was offered to Atta Muhammad, the son of Darogah Gul Muhammad, who upheld the Khanate in 1840, but he refused the post. Notwithstanding that the Political Agent had been recalled, political relations with the Khán were not entirely broken off, it being necessary to maintain them in reference to any border differences that might occur. Frequent representations were made to the Khán as to frontier difficulties, but they were only met by the stereotyped reply that he was about to make arrangements for the restoration of order, but nothing was done from the date of the plunder of Kafilas in Lus Beyla in 1872, which has been previously referred to. On February 17th, 1874, the Commissioner addressed His Highness commenting on the indifference and supineness displayed by him in regard to outrages on the frontier, and the non-fulfilment of his promises to redress them, and it was at the same time observed that the only conclusion to be drawn was that His Highness had become wholly forgetful of his obligations under treaty. His Highness's attention was also drawn to the insecurity to travellers in his dominions, and to certain modes of uncourteous address which had been used by himself and his officials in writing to British officers. These letters received the approval of His Excellency in Council, and the Commissioner was told that if the Khán's replies proved unsatisfactory, the next letter should be a simple ultimatum, informing him that until he showed a proper appreciation of his position and obligations towards the British, no further communications would be held with him, and that failing the performance of obligations on the part of the Khán, the British Government would adopt such measures as circumstances might require for the defence of their frontier; that any of his people maltreating

British subjects would be regarded as common robbers; that no interference would be exercised in the quarrel between himself and the sirdars; and that no assistance would be given him in any difficulties in which he might be entangled. The Khán's replies to the above letter, the contents of which were communicated to him, were, the Commissioner said, thoroughly unsatisfactory, and were full of misstatements and empty promises, making no proper amends for the disrespectful style of writing adopted. His three advisers had, it was currently reported, urged him to do this. It was just about this time that the Sassooli-Brahui raid occurred, and it was this event, coupled with other circumstances, that induced the Commissioner to recommend that armed intervention in Kalát should be resorted to, but this advice was rejected by the Government of India, as has been previously related.

The Commissioner in Sind again represents his views on the subject of armed intervention in Kalát.

66. Sir W. Merewether on receiving the orders of the Government of India on his recommendations, and directing him in concert with the Panjab Government to arrange for the visit of a party of Sind and Panjab officials to Kalát, again represented his views at length to the Government of India. He said that serious injury to the interests of Government must follow on the increasing state of disorder in Kalát; that the Khán had gone the length of breaking the treaty by corresponding direct with the Amír of Kabul on the subject of the disposal of the Khán's country, showing thereby "a want of faith which would lead him to any other act adverse to Government;" and he urged that the Khán should be deposed for breach of treaty engagements; that the Brahui Sirdars should then be called on to elect a Sovereign, all proper rights being confirmed to the Sirdars; that unless something were done the Sirdars becoming desperate would adopt their own measures for their individual interests, and that the ensuing anarchy would result in plundering and the stoppage of trade. As to the Marris, the Commissioner recommended that they should be punished for their insolence and their aggression on the Khán's territory. The policy of dealing with them entirely through the Khán had never been carried out, and the Commissioner urged again that the blockade of the tribe should be instituted, that troops should proceed to Kalát, and should on their return to India punish the Marris if the blockade were unsuccessful. The reply to this letter will be presently noticed.

Captain Sandeman deputed in concert with Colonel Loch to report on the measures necessary to carry out the orders of the Government of India.

67. In the meantime I had been deputed by the Panjab Government, acting under instructions from the Government of India, to Jacobabad to draw up in concert with Colonel Loch a report on the measures necessary to carry out the orders issued. There were three points on which the Government of India required detailed information:—(1) the composition of the party and the escort to accompany it; (2) the route that the expedition should take; and (3) the instructions which should be issued to the officers composing the expedition. The first two points were of minor importance; with regard to the third point, there was much discussion and a great divergence of opinion. I considered that the basis of the instructions should be the policy agreed to at the Mithankot Conference, whereas Sir W. Merewether, in forwarding Colonel Loch's recommendations, said that "circumstances have greatly changed since the Mithankot Conference, and what was admitted by me then to be possible has ceased to be so." This Conference was designed, it will be remembered, to put an end to the raids committed by the Marris in the country of His Highness the Khán, by giving service to the clan in the manner which had proved successful on the Panjab frontier. No benefit however actually occurred to the tribe, and the conduct of the Khán was such as to cause the

Government of India to ultimately set aside his nominal superiority, and authorise direct dealings with the Baluch Chiefs. The Lieutenant-Governor agreed with me in thinking that an escape was thus opened from a position of embarrassment, and the real circumstances were made available as the basis of a new and simpler connection between ourselves and this isolated tribe. Sir W. Merewether was of opinion that subsidising the Marris, notwithstanding the injury that they had done to the Khán's country, and publicly withdrawing them from the allegiance which they had never themselves denied, must act injuriously on his position and that of any subsequent Ruler, and would have the effect of inducing the Sirdars to fly more and more away from the Khán's control, and to join a system manifestly more paying than obedience. The Commissioner thought that the treatment of the Marri tribe separately was wrong in principle and policy; he thought that the control of the Marris and the re-arrangement of the Kalát Government were inseparable, and that the former should follow rather than precede the latter. He urged that no expedition into the Marri hills should be attempted. I urged that under the directions of the Panjab Government I had several times visited Jacobabad with the avowed and well-known intention of taking part in peaceful negotiations with the tribes as laid down at the Mithankot Conference, but my visits had ended in my returning to my districts without anything having been done to accomplish this object, and that if I again visited Jacobabad with a similar result, the effect on the frontier of the Dera Ghazi Khán district could not but be a bad one, and would make future negotiations with the Marris even more difficult.

Opinion of the Panjab Government. Captain Sandeman and the Commissioner in Sind proceed to Calcutta.

68. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab recommended the Government of India to sanction Captain Sandeman's proceeding—

to Leghari Barkhan in the hills, or to such other place as he may deem convenient, with an adequate escort of the subject Baluchis, there to assemble the tribes and to discuss, and if possible settle, the terms on which the Marris shall be allowed to enter into engagements with the British Government. In the event of Captain Sandeman failing to obtain the acquiescence of the Marris in his terms, the question will remain whether the military expedition should not move against them in February next for the purpose of punishing them in accordance with the recommendations of the Commissioner in Sind.

In view to the settlement of the various questions raised, the Commissioner in Sind was directed to proceed to Calcutta to place his views before the Government of India, and I was also sent there to meet him and represent the views of the Panjab Government. On my way to Calcutta, I had visited the Lieutenant-Governor and had explained to His Honour my views and received the instructions of the Panjab Government as to my attitude when in Calcutta and as to my future action. The Secretary to the Panjab Government, in a letter conveying the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor on the points raised in the discussion, referred to my interview with His Honour. I therefore went to Calcutta to meet Sir William Merewether, knowing the views of the Panjab Government as set forth in this letter. Regarding Kalát affairs, the Lieutenant-Governor did not consider himself in a position to acquire reliable information, or to offer any opinion which could be weighed with that of Sir William Merewether, whose long and intimate knowledge of the State, and whose personal superintendence of its politics had given him unrivalled advantages. As regards the Marri question, His Honour thought—

that the resolution of the Government of India to make arrangements direct with the frontier tribes and without reference to the Khán has greatly simplified the situation, and he is strongly of opinion, that it should be firmly adhered to. The points on which we are most interested are—

(*1st*) Safety of the Panjab Frontier.

(*2nd*) Safety of Kachhi.

(*3rd*) Safety of Bolan and Thal-Chotiáli routes.

After remarking that the sanction of the Government of India had been already given to the grant of service to the frontier tribes, the Lieutenant-Governor went on to say :—

Delays and misunderstandings have since occurred mainly owing, in His Honour's belief, to the tribes not being dealt with by one representative of the British power. The resolution just referred to should terminate this dual management. It was a necessity so long as the impracticable theory of the Khán's inviolable sovereignty was maintained, but with that it should cease.

The letter then goes on to show—

that the interests at stake in the Panjab are greater than those in Sind, and the friendly influence which has been acquired should not lightly be thrown away. The contrast between the sustained jealousy of the Pathan tribes from the Black Mountain down to Vihoa with the comparative hospitality of the Baluchis should sufficiently assure us that such influence as it has not easily gained might be lost for ever by reversing prematurely the policy which has produced it. When indeed the little success our efforts to inspire confidence have met with on other parts of the frontier is remembered, it would be a matter of serious regret were our better relations with these Baluchis and the effects that may follow on their improvement without absolute necessity interrupted. Let the Sind authorities continue to take advantage of their topographical advantages and use their excellent cavalry in repelling raids. But let all intercourse and negotiations be conducted by the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khán, who should also be the sole source of benefits and privileges and the instrument of enforcing all responsibilities to the British Government, in which would be included all obligations undertaken in respect of Kachhi or the Bolan Pass.

In conclusion, the Lieutenant-Governor said he was not prepared to give his views about the protection of the Bolan Pass—

but His Honour believes that the opening of the route from Pishín to the Sakhi Sarwar Pass (Fort Munro) would tend more than anything else to the restoration of the security of the Bolan Pass; the accomplishment of this design can only be effected by communication with the tribes concerned, and possibly with the Amír of Kabul. But His Honour adheres to the proposal made in my (*i.e.*, the Secretary of the Panjab Government) previous letter that Captain Sandeman should proceed into the hills on an early date and bring the Marris to a settlement, and that no military expedition should start prior to the receipt of his report.

As before remarked, Sir William Merewether and I were summoned to Calcutta. When there, the question of war or no war with the Kalát State and the Marri tribe was discussed in all its bearings. The Government of India, after hearing the representations for war, and mine on the part of the Panjab Government urging a more pacific policy, at length decided against war and rejected Sir William Merewether's proposals.

Orders of the Government of India on the points in dispute.

69. On the 5th of January 1875, the Government of India, in personal communication with Sir W. Merewether, and after hearing the proposals of the Panjab Government, came to a deliberate conclusion as to the policy to be pursued on the Sind and Panjab frontiers. The Commissioner was told that his letter repeating his proposals for armed intervention and his communications had failed to convince His Excellency in Council of the expediency of modifying the views the Government of India had formed, and which have previously been given in extenso. While observing that Government had not determined that under no circumstances should a force be sent into Kalát, it would be a cause of deep regret if armed intervention had to be resorted to, and that nothing had as yet occurred to render that course necessary, and that any measures likely to embroil us with the tribes, and precipitate armed intervention, should as far as possible on our part be avoided. After considering the reports submitted by Colonel Loch and myself, with the opinions of the Commissioner and the Lieutenant-Governor, the Commissioner was requested to address the Khán by letter

setting forth the cases in which he had failed to grant redress for outrages committed in British territory or on British subjects.

He should be informed that, until such time as he manifests both a willingness and an ability to perform the duties of a good neighbour, we shall take our own measures, without reference to him, to protect our territories and the lives and property of our subjects; that any of his subjects who may commit offences in British territory and be apprehended there will receive the utmost penalty of the law, and that if they succeed in escaping back into Kalát territory, they will, whenever this may be practicable, be followed and punished, and satisfaction will be exacted from those who may shelter and aid them.

Sanction was given at the same time to the raising of a small police force for the Lower Sind frontier. As to the policy of the Mithankot Conference, it was observed that the suggestion of the employment of Marris and Bugtís then made, at a cost of ₹32,040 yearly, had not been acted on, but that in accordance with former arrangements certain men of the tribes had been continued in service on the Panjab side, and that this policy had been successful. His Excellency in Council decided that this dual management should cease, and that I, as Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khán, should be the medium of all intercourse and communications with the Marri and Bugtí tribes in all their branches, but that I should be under the orders of the Commissioner in Sind, to whom I should report, through the Political Superintendent, all matters affecting those tribes. With reference to other tribes than the Marris and Bugtís who had no direct intercourse with the Panjab, I was to take no action without previous reference to the Commissioner, and any action ordered was to be taken by myself and the Political Superintendent jointly. With these precautions His Excellency in Council was sanguine that the system of service, which had been already partially tried with some success on the Panjab border, might produce good results with reference to the Marri and Bugtí tribe generally. At any rate the plan deserved to be tried. I was accordingly instructed to use all my influence to effect a settlement of intertribal disputes, in view to carrying out the arrangements agreed on at Mithankot in their entirety, subject to the modifications noted as to my duties and position. The separate payments to the tribes were to be considered as a general arrangement, and misconduct on the part of the Marris and Bugtís was to be visited when necessary with cessation of service, and payment, on the Panjab as well as the Sind side. The engagements and responsibilities of, and the benefit and service granted to, the tribes were to be treated as a whole, and I was to enforce the responsibilities and confer the benefits under the Commissioner. I was directed to proceed to the hills and require the Marri Chief to make proper arrangements for the payment of the value of plunder withheld, and to pay his respects to the Political Superintendent, Colonel Loch. On these preliminaries being fulfilled I was to proceed to the arrangement of the other details before noticed. All Political officers were enjoined to endeavour by all practicable means to win the confidence of the tribes.

*The views of the Government of India reported to the Secretary of State.*

70. The introduction of the new measures was announced to the Secretary of State in despatch No. 13 of 1875 by the Government of India. It was observed that, apart from the immediate objections to the Commissioner's proposals, Government were unwilling to adopt high measures which might have the effect of arousing in Afghanistan suspicions as to our intentions. After explaining the views taken by the Government of India in detail it was observed that—

we are sanguine that the system of service tried with some measure of success on the Panjab frontier may produce good results. We have accordingly directed the arrangements agreed upon at the Mithankot Conference in March 1870 between the Commissioner in Sind and

the Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab to be carried out. The engagements and responsibilities of the tribes, as also the service and benefits they receive, will be treated as a whole, and misconduct on the part of Marris and Bugtís will be visited when necessary with cessation of service on the Panjab side as well as on the side of Sind.

The letter then goes on to say that Captain Sandeman had been directed to proceed into the hills and settle matters with the Marri clan, obliging Sirdar Gazzan Khán, the Marri Chief, to pay his respects to the Sind authorities, and return the plunder taken from a caravan in the Bolan Pass in 1872. This policy, the letter adds, had been settled—

in personal communication with Sir William Merewether, who, while expressing a decided preference for the stronger measures advocated in his written communications, is satisfied that short of armed intervention the course we have authorised is the one best suited to secure the ends the Government of India had in view.

In reply the Secretary of State said that the difficulties, present and prospective, attending on armed intervention in Kalát were of so grave a character that it could only be justified as a last resource when all other means of remedying evils endangering British interests had proved ineffectual. It was added that should the means reported produce their anticipated results, Her Majesty's Government trusted that an early opportunity would be taken of again placing the relations between the Government of India and the Khán on the friendly footing provided for by the treaty of 1854. If, on the other hand, failure should attend the efforts of the Government of India, it would be for His Excellency in Council to determine whether it might not be necessary to re-consider the whole question of the best mode of conducting relations with the Kalát State.

# CHAPTER III.

71. In the previous chapter it has been explained at length how, to secure unanimity of action in regard to the Marri and Bugtí tribes, a conference was held at Mithankot; how the control of relations with these tribes was placed in the hands of the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, in subordination to whom was the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khán; how an additional sum of R32,040 was sanctioned for the entertainment of members of these two tribes, in view to maintaining the tranquillity of the Sind, Panjab, and Kalát frontiers; how the measures decided on were never carried out in their entirety by the Commissioner in Sind; how in 1871, after the breaking out of rebellion in Kalát, the Commissioner arbitrated between the parties and effected a settlement; how the Mingals attacked the Marris, who in retaliation plundered Kafilas in the Bolan; how the Khán attempted to evade his responsibilities, threw himself into the hands of favourites, and displayed conduct which resulted in the withdrawal of the Agent from his Court; how the spread of disorder in Kalát, the contumacy of the Marris, and the raid of the Brahuis into British territory induced the Commissioner in Sind to urge armed intervention in Kalát, and the blockade of the Marri tribe, a line of action which the Government of India after mature consideration declined to adopt; and how as regards the Marris and Bugtís it was decided that the hitherto dual system of management must cease, that the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khán, was to be the medium of communication with them, and in that view was to open communications with the tribes. The carrying out of the orders of the Government of India, and the results produced, will now be described.

Introduction.

72. In accordance with the orders I received, I opened communications with Gazzan Khán, Chief of the Marris, which resulted in his submission, and in his visiting Jacobabad and paying his respects to Colonel Loch, the Political Superintendent, which, it will be remembered, he had previously evaded doing. I besides induced him to restore his share of the plunder of the raid of 1872, and to recover from certain of the tribesmen booty which they had persisted in retaining. I also succeeded in tracing and recovering the cattle stolen from British subjects and from the people of Sibi by Marri and Bugtí raiders. In reporting these proceedings it is observable that the Commissioner did not fully approve of my proceedings, but the Government of India, on the other hand, observed that the "results are not only creditable to Captain Sandeman, but give reason to hope that the arrangements, by which the conduct of our relations with the frontier tribes has been entrusted to that officer, will in time produce more substantial effects"—a hope, which it will be hereafter shown, was entirely fulfilled.

Submission of the Marri Chief.

73. The Marris, however, still continued to raid in Kachhi, and the disputes between the Marris and the Khán, which were closely connected with long-standing inter-tribal quarrels, had not as yet been touched upon by me. I represented to the Commissioner that the disorders then rife in Kalát were fomented by the Khán or his immediate officers, and the Commissioner admitted that this might be the case; and with regard to the prevention of the raids in Kachhi on the part of the Marris by giving them service, I recommended that the differences between the Marris and other tribes in the neighbourhood should first be settled at a meeting to be held by Colonel Loch. Until this could be effected

Revised orders as to the payment and stoppages of service.

I thought that payments to the Marris to prevent them from raiding in Kachhi would not be effectual. To any such meeting the Commissioner in Sind was opposed, as he considered that it would be unwarrantable, when political relations with the Khán were suspended, to enter his country and hold council with his Chiefs as to the part that he, the Khán, was taking in disturbances going on in his own country. His Excellency in Council entirely approved of my having abstained from offering additional service to the Marris, on condition of their committing no raids in Kachhi, there being little, if any, probability of such a measure proving successful. "When His Excellency in Council included raids in Kachhi among the conditions on which the Marris were to receive further service, he had every reason to believe that the only difficulties to be contended with arose from the weakness of the Kalát Government. The case is materially altered when there is ground to suspect that the action may, to some extent at any rate, cause the troubles which it is our desire to settle." As the condition of Kachhi greatly affected British subjects, the Government of India wished that every effort should be made to restore order across the border; but the principle was laid down that "the duties and responsibilities of the Government of India in reference to raids committed by the nominal subjects of the Khán of Kalát upon their neighbours in Kalát or other foreign territory are essentially different from their duties and responsibilities in the case of raids committed in British territory. His Excellency in Council does not consider that it would be right to terminate arrangements which have secured the peace of our own border, because our efforts to restore order in Kachhi are not successful." In modification, therefore, of previous instructions it was decided that if the tribes to whom payment for service was given committed outrages in British territory, or on British subjects on the Sind frontier, requiring the stoppage of service on the Sind side, service should at the same time be stopped on the Panjab side, and *vice versâ*. But penalties would not necessarily be inflicted on either the Panjab or the Sind side for raids or offences in Kachhi or elsewhere out of British territory.

**Means to be taken for the restoration of order in Kachhi.**

**74.** As to the means to be taken for the restoration of peace and order in Kachhi, in which country the Government of India had a special interest, because the boundary between Kachhi in Sind, being open country, disturbances in Kachhi were liable to spread to British territory, it was observed that the advanced posts in Sind might be expected to maintain a considerable degree of order across the border, and that they should accordingly suppress armed aggression. But beyond the point to which the power of the force extended, His Excellency in Council declined any responsibility for the protection of life and property. "While," it was remarked, "on the one hand the Khán of Kalát appears to be either unable or unwilling to enforce his authority in those districts, it is clear on the other hand that it is not the duty of the British Government to maintain peace and order in His Highness's territories." So far as the influence of frontier officers could be used to promote peace and order, whether among the tribes or between the tribes and the people of Sibi, or the Government of the Khán, His Excellency desired that they should be freely exercised, but beyond that he declined further responsibility.

**The orders given to Captain Sandeman on his first Mission to Kalát.**

**75.** Sir W. Merewether was of opinion that I should have nothing to say to political questions affecting the State of Kalát generally, which would, he said, be opposed to the spirit of my instructions generally, and must lead to serious complications, and that I ought to confine myself to preventing the Marris and Bugtís from raiding their neighbours either within or without British territory. He said that I

thought that I ought to have "communications and dealings with all and every of the tribes of Baluchistan, Brahui or other, and hold council in whatever part of the country he (Captain Sandeman) deems necessary"; and he added, "if Captain Sandeman's views were adopted, it would lead to most embarrassing complications in the Kalát State, and endless difficulties and differences with the numerous tribes of Baluchistan." The orders of the Government of India on the opinions here detailed of Sir W. Merewether were as follows:—

At present, the real causes of the quarrels and disturbances which prevail are but imperfectly known. Without fuller and more explicit information there is little prospect of the influence of the British Government being successfully applied to their settlement. His Excellency in Council therefore desires that Captain Sandeman shall proceed into the Marri hills, as early in the cold weather as practicable, in order (1) to procure all information he can respecting local feuds and quarrels among the Marri and Bugtí tribes, or between them and the Afghans, or between them and the Brahuis; (2) to endeavour as far as he can to bring about an amicable settlement of these quarrels; (3) to report, for the information of Government, through the Commissioner in Sind, his views on such as he cannot settle; and (4) to report on the general relations between the Marri and Bugtí tribes and the Khán's Government. Sir W. Merewether may, if he thinks fit, depute an officer from Sind to be associated with Captain Sandeman, but in subordination to him. Captain Sandeman will also enquire and report whether anything, and if so, what can be done for the protection of trade *viá* the Bolan, and whether a system of fixed tolls on caravans could not be arranged for, the proceeds of which would go to the tribes interested in the protection of the route. In respect to all or any of these objects, Captain Sandeman will have discretion to make any arrangements he considers to be advisable, within the total sum sanctioned at the Mithankot Conference, *viz.* R66,960.

Trade route *viá* Thal-Chotiálí to be undertaken.

76. The plan had been advocated of opening up an alternative route to Kandahar, whereby trade might be rendered to some extent independent of the Bolan, and therefore not liable to interruption by the feuds in Kalát. For this purpose His Excellency in Council empowered the Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab to take such measures as he might think practicable to open up the old trade route from Kandahar *viá* Thal-Chotiálí, and I was accordingly directed to undertake operations for the furtherance of this object.

The Commissioner in Sind remonstrates with the Government of India.

77. The opinion of the Commissioner in Sind, however, remained unaltered. On receiving the views of the Government of India, together with the orders I had been given, he renewed his complaints of the conduct of the Khán, and he did not approve of the policy adopted in respect to the Marris. The raids of this tribe, he said, proceeded almost wholly from their insatiate love of plunder, and the assurance they felt that they could carry it on with impunity; and he added that nothing but telling measures and severe punishment would induce them to withhold from deeds of violence, and that their arrogance would increase until they ceased to respect all obligations or any limits. It was not to be hoped, he said, that any good result could follow on the best peaceable arrangements, unless some check were placed upon their absorbing passion for violent acquisitiveness, and that something must be done to check them in their course of outrage. The state of affairs must become, he urged, and indeed then was, far worse than it had been before the Mithankot Conference, with the effect that Kachhi would be deserted, cultivation there would be none, Kafilas would not dare to pass across it, while even within our own border the spirit of adventure and love of plunder would re-awake in consequence of the success of the Marris. Kachhi being unsafe, Kafilas would adopt the Mastúng, Kalát, and Mulla Pass, or Raj road through Jalawan routes to the sea, exactly in accordance with the wishes of the Khán, as on that line he would be able to take all the duties himself, and the Sirdars who received portions of

these dues in the Bolan would be injured. As to the Thal-Chotiálí route, the Commissioner, while admitting that it might be opened, questioned the advantage or permanence of the measure. The Government of India had observed that the causes of the quarrels and disturbances in Kalát were imperfectly known. The Commissioner, however, said that there was not much more to be learnt, adding at the same time, "they are patent now, and he who runs may read," and he went on to recommend that he might protect Kachhi with the force at Jacobabad, any portion of the Marri tribe entering the plains for plunder being pursued and punished. The Government of India were not, however, induced, by a consideration of the points urged, to deviate from the policy which they had already adopted, and they issued no special orders on the Commissioner's remonstrances.

Information received regarding an impending revolution in Kalát.

77*a*. The next information received by Government with respect to Kalát was, that a revolution was imminent; the chief leaders of the Sirdars against the Khán being Nurdin, the Mingal Chief, in the south of the country; and in the north, Mulla Muhammad Raisani, the Saráwán Sirdar, who had been for some time in exile at Sibi; the object of the movement being to depose the Khán in favour of his son Mír Muhammad Khán. The Commissioner both by letter and telegram proposed to abstain from all interference in the rebellion, and the Government of India approved of this policy.

Events and opinions which led to the conduct of political frontier affairs being placed in Colonel Munro's hands.

78. Meanwhile I had, in accordance with the orders I had received, penetrated into the Marri hills, and thence to Sibi and Dhádar. I telegraphed on the 1st January 1876 that on entering Kalát territory I had received a most enthusiastic welcome from the Kalát Government, Chiefs, and people; that the Khán, in reply to a petition of the Marri and Brahui Sirdars for a peaceful solution of difficulties, had written to say that he would arrange with me for the protection of the Bolan traffic. I took with me the representatives of the Marri tribe, collected them and the Brahui Sirdars together, prevailed upon them and Mulla Muhammad Raisani to suspend their quarrels and their threatened action against the Khán, and finally opened up communications with His Highness himself in the hope of inducing the Khán to co-operate in the adjustment of those inter-tribal differences which were believed to lie at the root of the disturbances in His Highness's territory. What I did exactly will be explained in greater detail hereafter; it will be sufficient here to note my operations briefly, because I and the Government of India were of opinion that I had acted in conformity with my instructions, while Sir W. Merewether thought that I had exceeded them. The Commissioner in Sind adversely animadverted on my proceedings, but the Government of India, on learning the course taken by the Commissioner in Sind, directed him not to interfere with my execution of the orders that I had received from the Government of India, or my movements in the Marri hills, and particularly not to be hasty in condemning me. To this the Commissioner replied, and, in the words of the Government of India, "he erroneously asserted that Captain Sandeman's action was directly contrary to the policy laid down by the Government of India, in having not only visited Sibi and Dhádar, and held communication with the Brahui Sirdars, but also in having sent messengers to the Khán of Kalát, and in having entered the Bolan Pass, accompanied by the Sirdars." Sir W. Merewether added that the whole of this action was directly contrary to the instructions given to Captain Sandeman by the Commissioner, with many other strong expressions of disapprobation; and the Government of India were finally exhorted to keep Captain Sandeman to Dera Gazi Khán, and his own legitimate duties.

The instructions given by the Commissioner to me were, the Government of India thought, not in accordance with the wishes and orders of the Government of India, under which I was "deliberately invested by the Government of India with power to make any arrangements which he (*i.e.*, Captain Sandeman) considered advisable without the necessity of previous reference to the Commissioner in Sind." Government, in fact, were anxious to settle existing disputes, whereas the Commissioner wished to maintain peace by force of arms, and he forced Government to choose one of two courses—

"either to discountenance and recall the officer (Captain Sandeman) who was acting in accordance with our policy, and who appeared to be deserving of our support, or to uphold the Commissioner in Sind, from whose opinions on the action to be adopted in Kalát we have had frequent occasion to dissent, or to place Captain Sandeman, while entrusted with the conduct of these special duties, under our direct orders and control."

As it would have been in the opinion of the Government of India "inexpedient and even dangerous" to have allowed two Agents, at variance with each other, to work out a scheme of action, the views of Government were explained to the Commissioner, and he was told that they had "been reluctantly compelled to place Captain Sandeman, while on his present tour, under the direct orders of Government." I was directed to send my correspondence under flying seal through the Commissioner. As to the expected revolution, which fortunately, owing to the steps undertaken, did not occur, I was told not to interfere. After this Sir W. Merewether made remonstrances, showing that he was unable to accept the views of the Government of India, and owing to irreconcileable differences of opinion on the 10th of January 1876, the Commissioner in Sind was removed from the conduct of Kalát affairs, Colonel Munro was directed to assume charge of them, and I was placed in subordination to him. Colonel Loch was also relieved of all political responsibility. These measures were undertaken to ensure unity of policy on the frontier.

*The Commissioner in Sind makes further representations as to his action.*

79. In his telegram of the 9th January 1876, the Commissioner in Sind, anticipating the results of my first mission, telegraphed that I "was directly meddling (in Kalát affairs), and, as will be proved in the end, most mischievously initiating a double policy," and he ended by saying, "trust to result for rectification," and when informed of the decision to send Colonel Munro to relieve him, he telegraphed "as the administrative change proposed is such an extreme one, I would respectfully suggest it may be deferred, until result of Captain Sandeman's tour be seen." The Commissioner's expectations were however not fulfilled, as will be seen presently when my report on my first mission will be considered. During January 1876 the Commissioner addressed to the Government of India two letters, reviewing the state of affairs at great length, and praying that he might be absolved from the grave imputation that he had ever comtemplated deviating from a desire to carry out the orders of His Excellency's Government. This disclaimer was accepted gladly by the Government of India, but not until after the report on my first mission was received and approved of did the Government of India remark on the further points which Sir W. Merewether had urged. They then said that the further letters from Sir W. Merewether were principally directed to a recapitulation of the opinions he had previously expressed on Kalát affairs, and upon the mode of dealing with the Marris, which views had already been rejected by the Government of India. The Commissioner had said that he relied on the telegram he had received, saying that the policy of non-interference was approved; this telegram was however intended by Government to explain that no interference was intended with regard to the revolution then expected.

With respect to the expected revolution, the Commissioner had said that just as the Sirdars were about to take matters into their own hands, I had appeared on the scene and "spoiled all." The instructions (which, together with the effect they produced, will be detailed further on) the Commissioner had given to me were, in the opinion of Government, both in their particulars and their whole tenor, opposed to the letter and spirit of the instructions and orders of Government. It was at the same time observed that, if the Commissioner had doubts as to the instructions issued by Government, he should have telegraphed for orders, instead of ordering me back to my district, and it was observed that, under the instructions of Government—

Captain Sandeman was competent to take such steps as he might consider necessary for adjusting the quarrels between the Marris and Bugtís, the Afghans, Brahuis, and the Kalát Government, and for collecting information on the subject of the general relations between the tribes and the Khán's Government, and even for opening the way for the re-establishment of friendly relations between the British Government and the Khán. The scope of Captain Sandeman's action was intentionally made wide enough to admit of the full and free exercise of his good offices and influence for the above-mentioned purpose.

The Commissioner had not, it was said, advanced anything to lead the Government of India to modify the opinion they had expressed, "that his manner of dealing with Captain Sandeman was at variance with the instructions of the 16th October," and it was added that his duties would be confined to the civil administration of Sind.

Proposal by the Commissioner in Sind to transfer a portion of Dera Ghazi Khán territory to Sind.

80. It will here be convenient to note an important recommendation made by the Commissioner in Sind. That officer, after observing that his rule with the tribes had always been *parcere subjectis sed debellare superbos*, went on to make recommendation, the effect of which would be to take a strip of territory about 90 miles long from Dera Ghazi Khán, and join it on to Sind. He explained that the line of frontier from Peshawar to the sea was inhabited by Pathan tribes, on the northern portion and on the southern by Baluchis, Brahuis, and Sindis, and that the Baluch element commenced at Harrand, 90 miles north-east of the Sind border near Kashmor, whence for a distance of about 490 miles to Karachi, Baluchis or Brahuis lived on either side of the border, and he proposed that the 90 miles of frontier from Harrand to the Sind border near Kashmor, *i.e.*, to Khyra Ghari, should be annexed to Sind, and should be under a Political Superintendent and Commandant. The tract of country below Harrand between the hills and the river should, he added, be transferred to Sind, a line for this purpose being drawn from Harrand to Mithankot, communication with all people, Baluch or Brahui, being conducted solely through the Political Superintendent. The Government of India did not agree to this proposal, possibly however they may have been afterwards influenced by it when giving Colonel Munro jurisdisdiction from Harrand to the sea.

Captain Sandeman starts on his first mission.

81. It will now be necessary to go back a little and relate my proceedings on my first mission. In pursuance of the instructions I received I left Dera Ghazi Khán for the Marri hills on the 18th November 1875. I was accompanied by a large number of Baluch Chiefs, with a large following, together with a personal escort of regular troops. I was shortly afterwards joined by the Loharani and Bijarani Marri Chiefs, and by the Bugtí and Khetran Chiefs, and on my arrival at Káhan I was cordially welcomed by Gazzan Khán, the Marri Chief. This Sirdar was engaged with others in meditating a rising against the Khán, but the Chief said he was willing to make peace, provided the Khán would make it with all the Brahui Sirdars on

the terms that had existed in the late Mír Nassir Khán's reign. I told him that I would do the best I could to bring about the required understanding, and took with me from Káhan two representatives on his part to act for him. At Sibi I was joined by the Saráwán Sirdars, Mulla Muhammad Raisani, Shadi Khán Bangalzai, Alla Dina Khurd, Janda Khán Shahwani, the Khán of Sibi, the Khajjak Chiefs and others. At a conference of Marri and Brahui Chiefs no attempt was made to deny what I had previously heard, *viz.*, that the Khán and the Sirdars had each used parties of Marris to coerce each other, and hence ensued great injury to people in Kachhi. Both the Marri and Brahui Sirdars were unanimous in an earnest desire for peace, in view to which they gave me a written request, and I wrote to the Khán in order to further their wishes; and it was also arranged that the Brahui as well as the Marri Sirdars should accompany me to Quetta. As to the Bolan, they declared that neither the Khán nor the Sirdars could independently and separately keep the pass open. On starting for the Bolan the Khán's representative at Dhádar entreated me in His Highness's name to come to Dhádar. On arrival there a salute was fired, and the Chiefs and people appeared to be much gratified at my coming.

Captain Sandeman continues his journey to Quetta.

82. The Pánjab Government had instructed me to await the arrival from Kandahar of an Agent of the Amír to confer with me regarding the opening of the Thal-Chotiáli route. I then received at Dhádar a letter from the Khán, in which he said that if the Saráwán Sirdars would hold to the previous engagement made between him and them by the Commissioner in Sind at Jacobabad and would fulfil the conditions they had agreed to, he would gladly abide by the conditions made on his part. It will be presently shown that it was impossible for the Brahuis to fulfil the conditions made. On my proceeding through the pass the naib of Quetta met me with orders to treat me as if I were the Khán himself. At this juncture came orders from the Commissioner to avoid any communication with the Brahui Sirdars, and directing me not to go towards the Bolan or Sibi beyond the Marri hills, a revolution being imminent. I replied that I had left the Marri hills prior to the receipt of the letter, and that the contending factions had expressed a desire for peace. I was next met by the Dumar Kakar Chiefs, who declared their desire to join in arrangements for the protection of trade. At Quetta I was treated with every possible mark of honour, and I received there a letter from the Khán together with a message to say that he would agree to all my proposals. Up to this date my mission had prospered beyond my expectations.

Captain Sandeman proceeds to Kalát.

83. At Quetta I received orders from the Commissioner directing me to return to Dera Ghazi Khán. I sent a suitable reply to the Commissioner, informing at the same time the Foreign Secretary that the orders of the Commissioner clashed with those given to me by the Panjab Government, and I asked for orders. I received an immediate reply that I was to proceed with my mission, and that my reports were to be forwarded to the Government of India under flying seal through the Commissioner. The arrival of Jacobabad messengers was unfortunate, as it injuriously affected my position in the eyes of the Brahui Sirdars, and made them doubtful of the powers confided to me. At Quetta I met a large Kafila, the leaders of which were desirous of proceeding through the Bolan against His Highness's orders, who wished them to proceed *viâ* Kalat. The fort of Quetta covered the Kafila route, and it was plainly evident that what the Brahui and Marri Chiefs had told me was true, *viz.*, that, without the co-operation of the Khán, the Bolan could not be opened. On proceeding to Mastúng I received a message from the Khán, to the effect that His

Highness was most desirous of peace, offering to come to Mastúng, and regretting the misunderstanding between himself and the British. I, however, decided to go to Kalát, and on arrival there I was received with every honour.

The Khán's views on the situation.

84. After the usual ceremonial visits, the business in hand was discussed at a private meeting with the Khán, when I urged on him the necessity of making a permanent peace with the Marris and Brahuis, and arranging for the protection of the Bolan traffic. On my mentioning the conditions of the arbitration concluded at Jacobabad, with regard to the Sirdars, *viz.*, the restitution of the property taken from Kafilas and the restoration of all property plundered in the State during the rebellion, the Khán remarked with some force, that neither the Sirdars nor their children's children could fulfil them, in consequence of the great value of the property destroyed during the successful rising, and of the Kafilas plundered. The Khán, as to the Bolan, said that he could not be responsible for the traffic, but that he would co-operate in keeping it open, accepting a fair share of the Kafila fees. I could not however induce him to accept the terms of peace with the Marris and Brahuis, *viz.*, the same terms as had been granted by Mír Nassir Khán. The Khán had agreed to these terms when they had been stated by my messengers, but the receipt by me of letters from the Commissioner had caused him to disbelieve my authority to make peace, and he would not in consequence reiterate his former promise—a fact which the Khán himself admitted, saying that he could not enter on new agreements with the Marris and Brahuis, because if he did so, and if the Sind officers were to put the Jacobabad agreement into force, the Sind authorities would not help him (the Khán) to his loss and detriment. I told him that I was unable to make peace between him and the Brahuis, but I could between him and the Marris, but as the Bolan could not be opened to traffic until the Brahui quarrel with the Marris was settled, which was inseparable from the quarrel between him and the Sirdars, it was necessary to deal with the matter as a whole. The Khán replied that he had an office filled with papers advising him to pursue the policy he was engaged on, and that he could not alter his policy without the positive orders of the Government of India, which were, he understood to be, to reduce the country to obedience by force of arms. He thought apparently that Government were bound to give him money and arms to carry out the policy advised, which without help he could not do. On this matter however I had no authority to treat with him.

Conditional peace agreed to between the Khán and Sirdars.

85. A preliminary step towards peace was gained by my mission. The Khán received the Sirdars and Chiefs who had come with me in darbar with full ceremonies. I addressed them explaining the objects with which I had been sent, and that the terms of peace could not then be settled, pending a reference to the Government of India. The Khán, however, assented to peace on the terms granted by Nassir Khán, provided the Government of India would require him to make it. The Chief of the Saráwán formally asked for pardon on behalf of the others in open darbar. The Khán in reply explained the state of affairs and his desire to lay matters before the British Government, and eloquently, likening the Kalát constitution to a man, said that while he was the body, the Sirdars were the limbs; that no man would willingly injure the limbs, but that disease might necessitate the cutting off of a portion for the safety of the whole, and that if the Sirdars would act honestly he would make peace. With regard to the Marris, whom, he frankly said, nothing but the edge of the sword would cure, the Khan promised in darbar to forgive their conduct if they would abstain from evil acts. On this I said that Gazzan Khán had promised to be responsible for Kachhi if peace were made.

86. Immediately after this a report was received that the Khán's naib at Bhágh had attacked the Brahuis in Kachhi killing several, and plundering property. Sirdar Mulla Muhammad said that probably the Brahuis were in fault, and that this unfortunate circumstance need not prevent the conditional peace agreed to. The Khán regarded the occurrence as an every-day event, and believed that the Brahuis had brought punishment on themselves by misbehaviour, and as to this I observed that under such circumstances a permanent reconciliation could not be arrived at. I took letters from the Khán to the Viceroy and the Lieutenant-Governor, at his special request on my departure from His Highness's Court.

Report of an attack by the Khá.'s naib on Brahuis at Bhágh.

87. Just as I was leaving Kalát I heard that Sirdar Nurdin Mingal, who was there, but with whose coming I had no concern whatever, as he had separated himself from the Sirdars, and was said to be intriguing against the Khán, who would probably be put to death, and I was asked to send for him. While agreeing that he might come with me if he liked, I declined to summon him. This Sirdar conspired, it appears, to attack the Khán at Kalát; the Khan, getting news of the conspiracy, attacked the conspirators; in the struggle Nurdin was killed, and another leading conspirator, Muhammad Alí, while Atta Muhammad was wounded. Nurdin, it will be remembered, had been excluded from the mediation at Jacobabad, at which place he had refused to attend. He had also not joined the Sirdars at Kalát in trying to obtain terms from the Khán. There is no doubt that a considerable conspiracy had been organised, which possibly might have resulted in the Khán's destruction, at the very time that Nurdin was killed. The position would have been much more difficult had the Khán, and not Nurdin, been destroyed, and there being no room for two swords in one scabbard, it was I thought on the whole not entirely unfortunate that matters had ended as they had.

Death of Nurdin Mingal.

88. When on my return journey I arrived at Kirta, I received a letter from Colonel Loch, written by order of the Commissioner in Sind, again requiring me to forthwith return to the Panjab. It is unnecessary to point out how detrimental these proceedings were to the success of my mission. It will be seen that this was the view taken by the Government of India in reviewing my report and determining to send me on a second mission to Kalát.

Difficulties encountered on Captain Sandeman's first mission.

89. Briefly the results of the mission were that, although the Khán would not make peace with the tribes without reference to the Government of India as to the policy to be pursued, still he had sent submissive letters to the Viceroy and the Lieutenant-Governor, asking permission to represent his views. The Marri and Brahui Sirdars had agreed to peace on certain terms, and had professed a desire to protect trade, and the Marri Sirdar had agreed to be responsible for the prevention of raids in Kachhi. The causes of the disturbances in Kachhi were, and had no doubt been, due primarily to the conduct of the Khán, and the policy which, he said, he had been directed to pursue. That policy was stated by the Commissioner to be as follows :—His Highness the Khán is "the sole person in Baluchistan with whom we have any right to communicate; we are in no way entitled to interfere directly between him and his nobles and subjects, and to carry out this policy fairly and justly, it is above all things most important that it should in no way be shown that we are meddling in the affairs of the country, by identifying ourselves openly, with the cause of those who are acting in opposition to him." It was not, I thought, fair or right to hold His Highness personally responsible for the state to which affairs had arrived, as I believed

Results obtained by the mission.

that the condition of things was due to his efforts to act up to the advice given to him. The Commissioner in Sind had on former occasions admitted that the Khán was friendly and loyal to the British, and that he had not until lately rejected the advice of the Agent at his Court. A consideration of the state of affairs led me to believe that His Highness could be brought to a proper sense of his duty to his country and people, and that in the Khán's letter an opportunity had been afforded to Government of hearing what the Khán had to say, and enunciating to him the views of the Government of India. I saw no cause to prevent my again visiting the Khán, should Government accept my view of the case, with the virtual certainty that he would agree to put in force the arrangements contemplated by Government, to which he had already conditionally agreed. I begged that the action of the Marri Chiefs might meet with the favourable consideration of Government.

Colonel Munro forwards Captain Sandeman's report to Government.

90. In forwarding my report to Government, Colonel Munro explained that at Jacobabad the records of the office had been placed at his disposal. He recommended that the Shahgassi Wali Muhammad, should be removed from Jacobabad, as his presence there made him the rallying point of factions opposed to his former master. As to my proposal to re-open communications with the Khán, Colonel Munro said that no impediment existed, whereas our maintenance of an entirely passive attitude would be construed into an abandonment of interest in Kalát affairs, and would end in fresh troubles taking place. Never before, he said, were the Bugtís and Marris so well in hand, never before had their representatives been brought to the Khán's feet in open darbar by a British officer, and never before had so favourable an opportunity occurred for the renewal of friendly relations with the Khán. He added that much of the success obtained would be lost "if any less experienced and personally less influential hand" than Captain Sandeman's "attempted to cement the disjointed elements" in the Baluch tribes. "His personal influence over the tribes, and great interest in the work, point him out as the officer most fitted to carry it out." Colonel Munro went on to say—

It appears to me advisable that Captain (now Major) Sandeman should be put in immediate charge of all duties connected with the independent Baluch tribes beyond Sind and the Lower Panjab border, from Dera Ghazi Khan to the sea; and that the conduct of renewed relations with His Highness the Khán, if Government sanctions such renewal, should also be entrusted to Major Sandeman, who would discharge all duties hitherto performed by the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind frontier, relative to our communications with Baluch or other tribes within or without the frontier line, in so far as these concern border administration and political management.

Mr. Bruce was recommended for the post of his assistant, control being delegated to the Commissioner of the Derajat. The Commissioner went on to say—

Entertaining as I do much confidence in the influence and authority which Major Sandeman has personally acquired over the wilder trans-border Baluch tribes, and also in the good effects which his recent intercourse with the majority of the Baluch Sirdars has produced in demonstrating to them the real interests which the British Government takes in the tranquillity of the country, I think to ensure to that officer a good prospect of success there should be no opportunity left, in our communications with either the Khán or the Sirdars, for doubt as to the prospective objects of this final effort towards peaceful mediation.

In conclusion the Commissioner, Derajat Division, said—

It behoves me to notice, with commendation, Major Sandeman's enterprising exertions in conducting the mission to and from Kalát, through an inhospitable region rarely visited by Europeans. His earnest endeavours, under difficulties of no ordinary nature, to effect the objects contemplated by the Government of India, and the amount of the success which attended those efforts cannot fail, I trust, to receive their due meed of appreciation.

The Government of India issue further orders for the conduct of political relations with Kalát.

91. In the resolution which the Government of India recorded on the situation, it was pointedly observed, after detailing the orders that had been given to me, that "Major Sandeman duly carried out the above instructions." After remarking that the mission had been "by no means unsuccessful," it was added that "it proved, if it did nothing more, that the advent of a British officer as a mediator was most welcome to the Kalát Chiefs;" by all parties "Major Sandeman was received in a spirit of marked friendliness and respect." Regarding the unfortunate events that had taken place, the Government of India remarked, with reference to the outrage on the Brahuis by the Khán's followers, that "it need not probably be regarded as a serious obstacle to reconciliation." As to the death of Sirdar Nurdin, it was remarked that his advent to Kalát was in no way connected with Major Sandeman's visit; that his death was not in violation of the pledge of safety given by the Khán to the chiefs who accompanied Major Sandeman; that the honour of the British Government was not concerned; and that the Khán's story as to the conspiracy was probably correct. The Government of India had now to decide what course was to be pursued; whether to abandon the task of mediation, or to instruct Major Sandeman to proceed with his endeavours to effect a settlement. It was settled "that Major Sandeman should be allowed to endeavour to carry out, under more favourable circumstances, the objects for which he was deputed to the Marri hills; it is clear that he has not as yet had a fair chance of achieving success; there is, as far as can be judged, a desire on the part of all for the intervention of the British Government. Until therefore a renewed attempt at mediation shall have been made and failed, the Government of India is not prepared to abandon the line of action taken in October last." Colonel Munro was authorised to arrange for a meeting between myself and the Khán and his Sirdars in Kachhi or elsewhere, in view to making a renewed attempt at a general settlement of differences between the tribes themselves and between them and the Khán, and if the Khán should show a proper spirit to the re-establishing of friendly relations between him and the British Government. This was in accordance with the resolution of the 16th October 1875, in which it was said that should His Highness show a reasonable desire to co-operate for the security of trade in Kalát territory, "and return to a proper sense of his duties, it will afford the Governor General in Council great pleasure on receiving an expression of regret, for what has occurred, to restore the former subsidy, and re-establish the old friendly footing with His Highness's Government." I was to be allowed an escort and any officers I might think necessary. "In short the Government of India, having full confidence in Colonel Munro and Major Sandeman, desire that the latter be allowed, under the Commissioner's orders, full opportunity of effecting, under the most favourable circumstances, a settlement of Kalát affairs." In proceeding to consider what further measures were required for the management of the Kalát border, it was said, "His Excellency in Council now desires that it be clearly understood that the political jurisdiction of the Commissioner of the Derajat Division extends through the whole length of the Kalát frontier from Harrand to the sea, and that all information, reports, or political information of any kind received by the Sind police stationed at or near the Kalát frontier be furnished direct to Colonel Munro." The Baluch guides were placed under the Commissioner, Derajat Division, and it was said that the portion of Upper Sind known as the frontier district should be placed under the administrative control of the Panjab Government. In forwarding these directions it was remarked—

I am to request that you will convey to Major Sandeman an expression of the satisfaction of the Government of India at the manner in which he carried out the instructions con-

tained in this Office Resolution No. 2819 P. of the 16th October 1875. The acknowledgments of Government are also due to Captain H. Wylie and Dr. G. Thomson who accompanied Major Sandeman. The conduct of the Baluch Chiefs is also highly appreciated by His Excellency in Council, and you are authorised, in recognition of their services, to confer on them in His Excellency's behalf khillats.

In reply to the Khán's letter stating his desire to explain his views, the Viceroy replied that the British Government had always desired to maintain friendly relations with Kalát, and that the suspension of those relations was due to His Highness's conduct; that His Highness's desire for reconciliation was willingly accepted; that Major Sandeman would be sent to confer with His Highness and settle disputes, in the expectation that the Khán would co-operate sincerely and heartily in the adjustment of differences, and would listen to Major Sandeman's advice. The steps taken by Government as regards Kalát were communicated to the Amír of Kabul.

The second mission starts, and arrives at Mastúng.

92. In sending me the orders of Government, Colonel Munro said that I should embrace the earliest available opportunity of ascertaining the tendencies and desires of the Jalawan leaders, so that no doubts should remain as to them when submitting proofs of the readiness of the Khán and principal Chiefs to accept my arbitration. My escort was composed of troops of the Panjab Frontier Force and Sind garrisons, with 150 of the Baluch Guides, together with two guns. Captain Wylie and other officers were sent with me. I was supplied with R25,000, and was entrusted with a letter from the Viceroy to the Khán, to be presented in person on an opportunity offering. I was directed to effect a safe passage for caravans, already congregated, through the Bolan following in my wake. At the time I started hostilities in Kalát were suspended in anticipation of my visit. I was told to select a spot above the passes whence to open direct communications with the Khán and Chiefs. In accordance with these instructions I started on my second mission, and large caravans were allowed to follow me up the Bolan, and the Khán directed his officials to assist me in ensuring their safety, and to render me any aid required. I was joined on the march by the Brahui Sirdars of Saráwán, and was everywhere well received, the Khán himself inviting me to Kalát by letter. On the way through Kachhi cholera broke out, but the mission, beyond some delay, was not thereby interfered with. The caravans arrived safely at Quetta and left for Kandahar, the Brahui and Baluch Sirdars co-operating for the defence of the Bolan Pass, of which Mulla Muhammad Raisani was placed in charge. With Sirdar Gazzan Khán's consent, Brahui sowars were sent to Káhan to aid in preventing raiding; men were also posted in the pass with the same object with the Khán's consent. The disputes between the Mingals and Brahuis were settled, and an excellent spirit was found among the Brahui sirdars. At a darbar on the 24th April 1876, all the representatives of the Bolan tribes expressed a desire to keep the pass open. The Khán invited me to address the Jalawan leaders, which I agreed to do, and he said that he would be glad were the Bolan re-opened to trade, but at the same timē expressed a hope that the arrangements made would not be derogatory to himself. Arrangements were made with the Khán's naibs to place 100 Baluch Guides in Kachhi to keep open the road; and I went on to Mastúng.

The Khán's view of his case.

93. The Khán's view of his case was expressed in a letter from him to the Viceroy in reply to the one already referred to. He said that matters had prospered with him until the arrival of Major Harrison, when Wali Muhammad poisoned the mind of the Agent to the detriment of himself (the Khán), and that from the time he commenced to rule, the Brahui Sirdars had always been against him, and had gained

the confidence of Wali Muhammad and Captain Harrison. He expressed himself much pleased at the arrival of Major Sandeman, and hoped that the Brahui clans would be placed under him, promising to follow Major Sandeman's advice. He begged that the subsidy of ₨ 50,000 per annum might be restored, and that Shakár Khán and the two munshis, whose affairs have been previously explained, might be released.

Support given to Major Sandeman.

94. At Mastúng I received a letter from the Jalawan Sirdars, saying that they would heartily co-operate with me in arranging the terms of peace with the Khán; they asked for honourable terms and the restoration of their confiscated lands, and they asked for the release of the Jám of Lus Beyla, who was under detention in British territory. I then received intimation from the Khán that he would come to Mastúng to meet me, which he did. On the intelligence of these events being sent to the Panjab Government, a letter was addressed by the Lieutenant-Governor to the Foreign Secretary, saying that certain news that I had sent from Mastúng was re-assuring. I had telegraphed that at a long interview with the Khán, His Highness had agreed to be guided by my advice in coming to terms, and such being the case, Sir H. Davies urged that such prompt and complete support should be given me as might unmistakably demonstrate to the conflicting parties that I was supported by the full power of the British Government. It was recommended that I should be empowered to restore to His Highness, on a ratification of an agreement to observe the conditions and to follow the policy of the Government of India, the annual subsidy of ₨.50,000, for the restoration of which the opening of the Bolan was a sufficient reason. It was also suggested that a fixed subsidy might be allowed to Mulla Muhammad Raisani and the Marris for the protection of caravans, or that the Brahui Sirdars might be allowed to levy a tax on Kafilas. The Lieutenant-Governor observed " that Major Sandeman, so far as he has already conducted the negotiations with which he has been charged by His Excellency the Viceroy, has acted with great patience and discretion, and that the success which he has already achieved is eminently creditable to him." It was added that the negotiations could only be brought to a successful issue by making it indubitably clear that the entire confidence of Government was with the officer employed. On this a telegram was sent to Colonel Munro saying " you are to convey to Major Sandeman the Viceroy's congratulations on his having obtained the consent of the Khán as well as the Sirdars to the mediation of the British Government." It was added that I was to be scrupulously careful not to commit the Government to any line of policy. So wide and deep had the alienation between the Sirdars and the Khán become, " that many of them declared to him (Major Sandeman) that the country could only be pacified either by the deposition of His Highness, or the installation of a new ruler under the direct protection of the British Government, or else by this Government (*i.e.*, Government of India) openly assuming to itself the sovereignty of the whole Khanate,—an arrangement which they seemed disposed to urge on our adoption."

Hesitation of the Khán to come to Mastúng.

95. Prior to his coming to Mastúng, the Khán had shown some hesitation, owing, it was thought, to his fearing the Brahuis, who were in large bodies near Mastúng. It may also have been partly attributable to a not unnatural sentiment of personal humiliation at having to meet his rebellious Sirdars. Captain Wylie was sent by me to Kalát, where he delivered to the Khán the Viceroy's letter and obtained replies. Immediately after this, His Highness left for Mastúng. After the usual ceremonial visits, Sirdars on both sides were appointed to settle the terms

of peace. The Khán agreed to the terms, and said that when once made he would endeavour to prevent their being broken; and on this it was resolved to summon the Saráwán and Jalawan Sirdars to Mastúng to discuss the terms. Mír Jám Alí of Lus Beyla brought two grave complaints against the Khán, *viz.*, the invasion of Lus Beyla, and the occupation of the Kamal Khan estate. The Khán wished that the British Government should pay off a portion of money due to some merchants plundered in the Mulla. About this, further enquiry was necessary. As to Lus Beyla, the Khán requested that it should either be annexed by the British, or that he should be paid the expenses he incurred in taking it at the request of British authorities. If this could not be done, Jám Mír Khán should, he said, be released, and he seemed to be willing that this course should be taken on his guaranteeing to keep the peace.

Measures taken for keeping open the Bolan Pass.

96. In the resolution of the Government of India of the 16th October 1875, I was directed to report whether anything, and if so, what could be done for the protection of trade *viá* the Bolan Pass, and whether a fixed system of tolls could be arranged. In consultation with the Khán I made full enquiries into the matter. The chief tribes interested in the Bolan were found to be the Kurd Brahuis, the Mazarani, and Mandai Marris, the Mingal Brahuis, and the Dumar Kakar Pathans. The fees taken were of two kinds—customs dues and escort fees. The customs dues went entirely to the Khán, after deduction of a small portion for the Chief, Saráwán Sirdar. The escort fees were in the Khán's gift. I arrived at an agreement with His Highness by which the escort fees should go to those actually escorting Kafilas, and that Sirdar Alladina Kurd should be responsible for their distribution. Sirdar Alladina Kurd was placed in sole charge of the pass, on his agreement to keep men at Dasht, Kirta, and Abigum always on duty to protect travellers. The arrangements were to be supervised by Sirdar Mulla Muhammad Raisani. The total cost of the arrangements came to R18,000 per annum, which was defrayed out of the money sanctioned for the purpose. His Highness complained that under treaty he was obliged to take only 8 annas a maund, as customs fees, instead of one rupee, and that he was a heavy loser in consequence; this was a strong reason for wishing to keep open the Mulla Pass and Raj routes, on which he could collect the escort fees as well as the customs dues, besides avoiding the payment of anything to the Saráwán Sirdar. The objection to Kafilas proceeding by the Mulla and Raj routes and not by the Bolan was that the Bolan route was 150 miles shorter, while the route *viá* Kalát was exposed to extreme cold, and on it no forage could be procured, entailing on caravans loss of animals and great privations. I commended this grievance of the Khán's to the favourable consideration of the Government of India, suggesting that the Khán's subsidy might be increased, thereby inducing His Highness to co-operate in keeping open the pass. His Highness's consent to these proposals were somewhat reluctant. He suggested that the British Government should place all the Brahui Sirdars under him by force of arms, and that he would then undertake to keep all the trade routes open. I told him that the British Government would not assist him by force of arms, pointing out that he (the Khán) could not take on himself to keep the trade routes open and protect the passes, and that it would not be advisable for the British Government to do so, relieving him of the responsibility. The Khán eventually agreed to avail himself of my influence with the tribes.

Grand darbar of the 14th July 1876.

97. A committee of Sirdars was appointed, it has been already said, to arbitrate upon all complaints made. The Saráwán Sirdars brought 34 complaints, and obtained 29 decrees in their favour. Only one dispute, *viz.*, that regarding a tax on lucerne

grass, was not disposed of. The chief cases brought by the Jalawan Sirdars were that of the vacant chieftainship of the Zahris, and the case of the succession to Sirdar Nurdin Mingal. Nearly all the cases discussed were given in favour of the Sirdars, and the decisions were confirmed by His Highness; while Gauhar Khán was recognised in a grand darbar, which had been convened for the purpose on the 14th July 1876, as Chief of the Zahris, and Shakar Khán as Chief of the Mingals. Asad Khán was at the same time recognised as Chief of the Saráwáns. At the close of the darbar the whole of the settlement papers, and the terms of the peace concluded by the parties, were read out. These terms were, briefly, that the Saráwán and Jalawan Sirdars should submit to the Khán, His Highness having restored to them their ancient rights and privileges, and having promised to treat them with kindness and consideration on their continuing loyal and faithful to the State. His Highness granted several concessions—(1) Sirdar Asad Khán was confirmed as Chief of the Saráwán; (2) Sirdar Gauhar Khán was confirmed as Chief of Zahri; (3) Mír Shakar Khán was confirmed as Chief of the Mingals; (4) His Highness the Khán and the Sirdars sent a request to the Government of India that Jám Mír Khán, Chief of Lus Beyla, might return to Lus Beyla. The Brahui Sirdars, in the terms of the peace, agreed to abide by the decisions of the Khán on the recommendations of the committee. Both the Khán and the Sirdars agreed to abide by the terms of the written agreement for the protection of the Bolan. If disputes should arise between the Khán's officials and the Brahuis, it was arranged that they should be referred to the Khán, with an appeal to the British Government. The Khán agreed not to coerce the Sirdars by force before referring the point in dispute to the British. The oath to abide by the terms of the peace was sworn in open darbar. Some speeches were also made and khillats delivered.

Major Sandeman's remarks and recommendations.

98. All disputes between the Marris and the Khán could not be settled, and in view to doing so His Highness invited Gazzan Khán, the Marri Chief, to meet him in Kachhi. As the Khán's treasury was empty, and for the reasons previously recorded, I recommended that the R90,000 paid by him for the plunder of Kafilas should be restored. I proposed to send Captain Wylie to Dhádar to arrange for the safety of traffic in the Bolan. As to the lucerne tax, it was explained that the Brahuis, while not expecting entire exemption, desired that the size of the "tangar," or measure used for the levy of the tax, should be fixed (which was hitherto not the case), or that the tax should be levied in money. I thought His Highness's reason for the levy was his poverty. I was aware that the settlement I had made would not be permanent, if its maintenance were left to the unaided powers of the two parties, and I represented that both the Khán and the Sirdars looked to the British Government as the paramount power for the settlement of quarrels and difficulties. Until the peace was made, not one Sirdar, with the exception of the naib of Kej, had the least intercourse for good with the Khán's Government. The British Government had, however, the power to settle disputes; even the most recalcitrant of the Sirdars, when pressed by the British representative, accepted reconciliation with the Khán, and I thought that the direct supervision of the British Government was a necessary guarantee for the permanence of the results of my arbitration. Although the Khan and Sirdars had been separated for years, their estrangement was shown not to be incurable, both sides recognised that the interference of the British Government was necessary for the preservation of peace. The Kalát Government at the time of the peace consisted of the Khán and his naibs, who were the civil administrators; the army consisted of about 3,500 mercenary soldiers, 30 guns, and 500 cavalry. No Sirdar had any connection with the civil administration; all parties desired

the interference of the British representative; and the mention of my leaving the country was received by them with dismay. I thought that it should be impressed on every one that the British Government would view with extreme displeasure any departure on the side of His Highness's Government or of the Sirdars from the terms of peace. I found the Khán to be loyal and well affected towards the British Government, and I felt certain that the Viceroy's advice would not be unheeded by him, but to be lasting it was necessary that it should be impressive. I saw nothing about the Khán to make me believe that he was evilly disposed at heart, cruel, or in any way unworthy of the kindness and consideration of our Government. Wherever I went, in the words of the despatch sent by Government to the Secretary of State, I found the troops composing my escort regarded not as the emissaries of a foreign power, but as the natural friends and protectors of the people by whom they were warmly welcomed. During my sojourn in the country Kalát had enjoyed a period of repose or rather peaceful activity long unknown to this unhappy State. Villages destroyed by recent war were already beginning to be rebuilt; land left fallow by its owners, fearing attack, was already being brought again under cultivation; everywhere signs of reviving hope and confidence attested the reliance placed by the whole population of the Khanate in the efficacious continuance of our intervention. The unhappy condition of the Government of the Khán was, I thought, due as much to forces over which he had no control as to any other cause.

In forwarding the report, Colonel Munro said that Major Sandeman's deputation to Kalát had "been effected with an amount of success that could hardly have been anticipated," and "throughout the negotiations Major Sandeman appears never to have lost sight of the injunctions conveyed to him, which required him to do nothing calculated to fetter the future action of the Government in regard to Kalát affairs on the one hand, or to lower the Khán in the eyes of the Sirdars." After recapitulating the objects of the mission, he said "that Major Sandeman's measures to attain all these objects have been attended with remarkable success, cannot be gainsaid." As to the Khán, Colonel Munro observed that he had met our advances in a most becoming spirit, and had shown laudable deference to the views and wishes of Government,—more could hardly have been expected of him; and it showed the propriety of our reverting to our former friendly relations with him. Colonel Munro strongly recommended the continuance of the friendly relations which had been established, adding that nothing but the maintenance of the firm directing power of the British Government could prevent the discordant elements from breaking out afresh. The Commissioner concurred with Major Sandeman in recommending the continuance of the subsidy and the establishment of an Agent at the Khán's Court, and said that it was his duty "to allude to Major Sandeman's indefatigable earnestness and uniform success in conducting the affairs entrusted to his management to an issue so favourable and so in accord with the expressed wishes of Government. Much difficulty and many obstacles had to be overcome in securing the advantages already gained, and I can have no doubt that the conspicuous merits and services of this officer will receive due acknowledgment from the Government he has so zealously and successfully served." With respect to this, the Government of India were of opinion that "Major Sandeman's conduct of the negotiations commends our warm commendation. With great judgment he threw on the body of arbitrators nominated by the two parties the difficult and invidious task of deciding between their rival claims, skilfully reserving to himself the advantageous position of an impartial adviser to both parties in the dispute, rather than that of a judge."

Determination of Government to continue the policy of intervention in Kalát.

99. When the report of what had been done reached Government, it had to be decided whether the policy of intervention should be terminated by the conclusion of peace between the Ruler and the Chiefs of Baluchistan, or whether the task of prolonged intervention with all its responsibilities should be accepted by the Government of India. The interference which had been sanctioned in 1872 in Kalát affairs had, in the opinion of the Government of India, prevented what then promised to be a decisive trial of strength between the Khán and the Sirdars; and the Khán had continually complained that by arresting his hand at a critical moment, when he believed himself able to crush the Sirdars, and that by giving them a status prejudicial to his own, the British Government "had heavily increased his obligations whilst diminishing his power, had continued to hold him responsible for the exercise of an authority of which we ourselves had helped to deprive him, and had finally punished him for acts which we had left him powerless to prevent." The history of all previous mediations in Kalát showed plainly "that they had ended in confusion worse than that which mediation had attempted to remedy," and it was expected that a similar result would attend this last case if it were decided to withhold intervention. In view of the fact that all concerned were unprecedentedly eager to follow the advice and accept the award of the British mediator, the deleterious effect that the termination of intervention would have on the Khanate, and the opinions of the officers concerned in the mission, the Government of India considered that "we were constrained to acknowledge that we could not decline the position thus bequeathed to us by a long course of antecedent circumstances, without incurring the grave responsibility of deliberately plunging into renewed bloodshed and interminable anarchy a neighbouring and a friendly State which had urgently appealed to us for timely rescue from those evils;" and it was added, "we were also of opinion that the highest and most general interests of the Empire, interests no longer local but imperial, rendered it necessary to place our relations with Kalát on a much firmer, more durable, and more intimate footing than before." Alluding to Russian activity in Asia, it was observed that having regard to possible contingencies in Central Asia, and to evidence which had reached Government "of foreign intrigue in Kalát, which would be sure to become active in proportion to the anarchy or weakness of that State and its alienation from British influence, we can no longer avoid the conclusion that the relations between the British Government and this neighbouring Khanate must henceforth be regulated with a view to more important objects than the temporary prevention of plunder on the British border."

Deputation of Colonel Colley to Kalát, and ratification of the treaty of 1876.

100. It was observed by Government "that we deemed it expedient, before finally determining the permanent character of our future relations with Kalát, to place Major Sandeman fully and confidentially in possession of our views," now that he had, "by well-directed sympathy and unfailing patience, persuaded both His Highness and the Sirdars to meet each other half way in a rational and amicable spirit," and for this purpose Colonel Colley was deputed to Kalát. In personal communication with him the arrangements which had been made were modified to some extent, and the draft of a new treaty to be concluded with the Khán was laid before His Highness and provisionally agreed to by him, and arrangements were made for his meeting the Viceroy at Jacobabad, with a view to its formal ratification, which was carried out.

101. In the new treaty the provisions of the treaty of 1854 were re-affirmed, whereby the Khán agreed to oppose the enemies of the British Government, to act in subordinate co-operation with it, and to abstain from entering without permission into any negotiation with foreign States. By the 4th and 5th articles of the new treaty our Agency was established at the Court of the Khán, our Agent was authorised to use his good offices for the settlement of disputes between the Khán and Sirdars; and failing such settlement the arbitration of the Agent was to be accepted. By the 6th article of the treaty British troops were to be stationed in Kalát territory. The withdrawal of the troops which had accompanied Major Sandeman was discussed, but in view of the considerations that it would weaken the position of the Agent, and perhaps irretrievably alienate the confidence of the population which recognised in their presence the only practical guarantee for its continual peace and prosperity, it was decided not to withdraw them. In support of this it should be remembered that there was no reasonable doubt of the Khán's personal inability to enforce his newly re-acknowledged authority without some show of support from the British Government. In article 7 of the treaty provision was made for the construction of railways and telegraphs. In the 8th article freedom of trade was stipulated for, and in the 9th article it was agreed that the Khán should receive a lakh of rupees yearly instead of the half lakh formerly given him, in addition to R20,500 per annum to be paid for the establishment of certain posts and the development of trade routes. When the treaty was ratified the Viceroy impressed on the Khán the necessity of respecting the rights of the Sirdars, and abstaining from oppression, adding that the British Government expected that he and the Sirdars would follow the advice tendered to them, and that any further acts of rebellion on the part of the Sirdars would be regarded with extreme displeasure. The Khán and the Sirdars eagerly replied that they understood and accepted the obligations laid on them. At the same time the Khán was informed that Major Sandeman was to be the representative of the British Government at his Court, and that Shakar Khán and the Munshis Saleh Muhammad and Gul Muhammad would be released, and that the Jám of Lus Beyla would be set free on the condition that he would acknowledge the suzerainty of the Khán in accordance with ancient custom; that he would confirm the terms of reconciliation entered into by his son at Mastúng; and that he would accept as final the decision given by the Commissioner in Sind in 1869, whereby the Kamal Khán estate was awarded to His Highness the Khán. These terms were agreed to by the Jám, and he was released in the following month. The Khán was also assured by the Viceroy that the location of troops and the establishment of lines of railway and telegraph would not be undertaken without reference to him in Baluchistan.

*The treaty of 1876.*

102. For the location of troops in Kalát territory, Quetta was selected in preference to Kalát, on account of the strong military position, almost unassailable if occupied by well-armed troops, and its strategic advantages commanding the trade route from Kandahar to Kalát, and through the Bolan; also the routes *viá* the Kakar hills to Zhob, Bori, Thal-Chotiálí, and the Panjab. It was not considered advisable to locate troops in the Bolan, but another position was secured at Mitri. Instead of placing troops in the Bolan it was thought expedient, as has been previously related, to interest the Sirdars and tribes in the protection of the route. It was considered advisable that Quetta should be occupied by a detachment consisting of a mountain battery, a regiment of infantry, and a squadron of cavalry from the Panjab Frontier Force, whilst

*Troops stationed in Kalát territory.*

another detachment of a mountain battery, a regiment of cavalry, and a wing of infantry from the Sind Frontier Force was temporarily stationed at Mitri, with detachments. In consequence of the heat of Mitri it was decided to withdraw the troops to Jacobabad during the hot months, leaving a chain of posts only to watch the hills. In connection with the troops it became important that the telegraph line should be extended to Quetta from Jacobabad, and this was done. Dispensaries for Quetta and Kalát were sanctioned.

Policy with regard to the Marri and Bugtí tribes.

103. As to the Marri and Bugtí tribes, it was observed that they had given rise to past misunderstandings with the Khán; that although nominally they were the subjects of Kalát, no Khán had ever been able to effect an effective control over them; that the attempt to make him do so had been a source of weakness in the past policy of Government; and that for these reasons it was advisable to continue to deal with them independently of the Khán; to continue the service already granted to them; and to encourage them to take additional service under the British Government.

Visit of the Khán to the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi.

104. At the commencement of the year 1877, the Imperial Assemblage was held at Delhi, and among others the Khán of Kalát and his Sirdars were invited to the assembly, which they attended. To many of them British India was an unknown country, and they expressed enthusiastically their admiration of the railways, telegraphs, and other signs of civilisation which they saw, and for the first time they realised the strength of the British Government. It may be noted here that the position of the Khán with respect to the British Government is somewhat different from that of the princes of India, and consequently, when at Delhi, it was ruled that the Khán could not be admitted to the special circle set apart for the feudatory princes of India. The Khán, the Jám, and the Sirdars, by order of the Viceroy were accommodated in a place set apart for distinguished strangers. At first the Khán was inclined to resent this, stating that the princes of India were treated with far more dignity and honour than he was. He regarded it as an especial grievance that a banner, such as had been presented to the ruling Chiefs of India, many of whom were of inferior rank to himself, had not been presented to him. I was desired to assure His Highness that no slight of any kind was intended; on the contrary, the reason that he had not received a standard was that he occupied the position of a Sovereign Prince entirely independent of the British Government, with which he was connected only by his treaty engagements. The British Government considered him as a guest, whom they had every desire to honour. The Khán and the Sirdars were satisfied with this explanation. At the close of the ceremonies it was announced to the Khán that Her Majesty had been pleased to admit him to the rank of a Knight Grand Commander of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India; honours were at the same time conferred on several of the Sirdars; and in February 1877, the Khán with his suite returned to his own country, with a high appreciation at the kindly treatment he had received at the hands of His Excellency the Viceroy.

Issue of orders regarding the re-establishment of the Agency.

105. In the meantime the Government of India published its Resolution No. 379 P., of the 21st February 1877, in which the results of the late mission were briefly reviewed, and the orders for the re-establishment and extension of the Baluchistan Agency were issued. It will be convenient to quote in full those passages of the resolution bearing on the latter subject:—

The charge of the political relations of the British Government with the Kalát State and its dependencies shall be vested in Major R. G. Sandeman, C.S.I., under the designation of Agent to the Governor General for Baluchistan.

As Agent to the Governor General, Major R. Sandeman will be the representative of the British Government in Kalát and its dependencies; will correspond directly with the Foreign Department of the Government of India, and have custody of the Kalát records, now in the charge of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro; he will further be entitled to be referred to, and consulted by, the authorities of British districts adjacent to the Kalát border, whether in the Panjab or in Sind, in respect of administrative matters which may affect, or be likely to affect, the interests of the Khán or of his subjects; and the officers of the Sind Frontier Police will supply him with the reports and information now furnished to the Commissioner of the Derajat.

The Agent to the Governor General will have his head-quarters and ordinarily reside in Kalát territory, but he shall have general permission to proceed on duty to any part of British territory lying Trans-Indus, between Dera Ghazi Khán and the sea, for the purpose of conferring with the local authorities on matters connected with his special duties, in regard to which they will be expected to furnish him with any information he may require.

Until further orders, Major Sandeman will receive a salary of R2,500 per mensem, and take rank with Residents of the 2nd class in the Gradation List of the Political Department, but will retain for the present his place in the Panjab Civil List.

Subordinate to the Agent to the Governor General, there shall be three Assistant Agents; the head-quarters of the first will be, until further orders, at Quetta, whence he will supervise the arrangements for the protection of the Bolan Pass; the second will, for the present, have his head-quarters at Jacobabad and act as Commandant of the Baluch Guides, whom it is proposed to transfer from the Military Department and place under the orders of the Agent to the Governor General; and the third will remain in attendance at the Court of the Khán.

Until further orders, the First Assistant will draw a salary of R1,200 per mensem, and take rank with Political Agents of the 2nd class; and the Second and Third Assistants salaries of R1,000 per mensem, and take rank with Political Agents of the 3rd class; and they will further retain for the present a lien upon the appointments now held by them.

Mr. R. I. Bruce, Assistant Commissioner, Panjab, is appointed First Assistant; Captain E. S. Reynolds, of the Sind Horse, Second Assistant; and Captain H. Wylie, of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, Third Assistant.

In addition to the above officers, and in like manner subordinate to the Agent to the Governor General, there shall be a Medical Officer, to be designated Medical Officer to the Baluchistan Agency, who will reside ordinarily at Kalát, but may be employed under the orders of the Agent to the Governor General in any part of Kalát and its dependencies, and will supervise the dispensaries, which it is proposed, with the assent of the Khán, to establish at Kalát and Quetta; until further orders, he will receive the salary of a Residency or 1st class Civil Surgeon, together with an allowance of R350 per mensem, and will retain a lien on his present appointment. The Governor General is pleased to appoint Surgeon O. T. Duke, 3rd Punjab Cavalry, Medical Officer.

With regard to the Baluch Guides, the Military Department will be requested to arrange that Colonel Nuthall, Commanding the Sind Frontier Force, and Major Sandeman shall submit jointly proposals for effecting the trasfer of this corps from the Military Department of the Bombay Presidency to the Political Department of the Government of India, care being taken that such transfer is effected without prejudice to the interests of the men, and that provision is made for placing a number sufficient for duty at the outposts at the disposal of the Officer Commanding the Sind Frontier Force.

In communicating these orders to the Khán, the Viceroy wrote that Major Sandeman had been designated Agent and "that he has my entire confidence." As to a request His Highness made as to my being placed in administrative charge of Jacobabad, the Viceroy said that, while regretting that he could not accede to this request, he would secure the co-operation of frontier officers with me.

*The Government of India report the case to the Secretary of State.*

106. In reporting the state of affairs to the Secretary of State, the whole case was reviewed at length, and the Government of India said—

We feel assured that Your Lordship will appreciate the services of that officer (Major Sandeman) as we ourselves have done; and no less do we entertain the hope that the settlement which we have endeavoured to effect of an anxious and difficult question will receive the approval of Her Majesty's Government. Of one thing we feel certain. If it be conducive to

British interests, as we have no doubt it is, to influence the tribes and people who live beyond our border, we must be in contact with them.

And it was added that:—

If at length we succeed in binding more closely to us the people of Kalát by making them feel the benefits of peace, and the power for good exercised by the British Government, we shall have added an additional bulwark to our Empire.

107. In reply the Secretary of State traced the progressive steps by which the Government of India, after, in 1873, breaking off relations with the Khán, was ultimately led to the adoption of measures, which resulted in closer relations with the Ruler and Chiefs of Baluchistan than had previously prevailed. To justify the decision to re-establish friendly relations, it was observed that the other alternatives could not be followed. These alternatives were (1) total abstention from interference in Kalát, or (2) immediate intervention to the extent of deposing the Khán, and in all probability ultimately if not immediately annexing the Khanate to British territory. The temporary adoption of the first could not, it was said, have failed to necessitate the adoption of the second, and under all the circumstances of the case, Her Majesty's Government had "no hesitation in recording their cordial approval of the decision arrived at by Lord Northbrook's Government to continue their efforts at mediation, although that decision may have entailed upon the Government of India responsibilities not at the time contemplated." When Lord Lytton came to India, the second mission to Baluchistan had started; it had been previously intended to adopt a different policy towards Baluchistan, but in consultation with Her Majesty's Government His Excellency in Council "wisely resolved to aid and support the Agent selected by your predecessor." With regard to the considerations which the results obtained by the second mission involved, the Secretary of State said "it is a grave matter for the Indian Government to undertake the pacification or the control of any portion of the wild district which lies outside its frontier. It cannot lightly abandon responsibilities it has once acknowledged. It cannot recede at will from any position it has once occupied. Dangers and difficulties, of which the chances ought to be weighed before any advance is made, will not furnish subsequently a justification for a retreat; on the contrary, they may make it impossible to withdraw from an undertaking the inutility of which is recognised." It was added that the Government of India had been step by step forced most unwillingly to the conclusion that the anarchy in Kalát could only be remedied by the mediation of an Agent, "whose decisions should be sanctioned by the presence of a military force. In view of these ascertained conclusions it would not have been possible for your Excellency to withdraw from the policy of mediation. In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government you adopted, under the circumstances, the most judicious course that was open to you." After mentioning the terms of the treaty, it was observed that the amount now given to the Khán, *viz.*, one lakh of rupees per annum, was considerable, but that there was good ground for believing that many of his difficulties had arisen from want of money, and that the reduction of the duties on goods passing through Kalát, imposed upon him by the treaty of 1854, had caused him a loss of revenue, which had in the new treaty been allowed for. Her Majesty's Government entirely approved of all the provisions of the treaty. As to the troops, Her Majesty's Government saw no reason to question the propriety of the selection of Quetta instead of Kalát as the head-quarters of the force. It was added that it was of considerable importance that no step should be taken which might be construed by hostile critics as a menace to the independence of the Khán. It was also desired to take no steps that the Amír

Reply of the Secretary of State.

Sher Alí might object to. Government did not however admit that any cause of resentment would be offered to him by the presence of troops at Quetta, which should be regarded by him as a support rather than a menace. The Secretary of State directed that any course should be abstained from which could be held to indicate a resolution permanently to maintain British troops at Quetta. Approval was also expressed of the determination to deal with the Marris and Bugtís independently of the Khán; and also as to the administrative arrangements in connection with the re-establishment of the Agency. "The appointment of Major Sandeman to be Agent to the Governor General in Baluchistan is a merited recognition of the energy and ability shown by that officer in discharge of the mission with which he was entrusted by your Excellency's predecessor." And it was observed that "upon the tact and judgment of your Agent, and upon the extent and character of the influence which he may gain over the Khán and the Sirdars, must in the main depend the success of the measures reviewed in this despatch." It may be remarked that by these measures, in less than twelve months, the intestine struggle which had, for 20 years, devastated a large kingdom and checked all material progress therein, were settled—I hope it may be said, permanently. It was not many months since it had been proposed to march British troops from end to end of the country as the only means for its pacification, and to withdraw the subsidies from our frontier tribes for the part which they were taking in promoting disturbance in Baluchistan. Happily, the counsel of those prevailed who did not believe that the Khán was a despotic prince, to be supported against his rebellious subjects by the force of British arms, and who could see that the Chiefs were engaged in a desperate struggle, not from a mere love of plunder and disorder, but in defence of constitutional privileges, and in the attempt to recover cherished rights which had been wrested from them. Nothing can, in my opinion, prove more conclusively the soundness of these views than the fact that peace was restored by the mediation of a British officer, without a shot being fired or a blow being struck, and that the peace so made has not since been broken. I have now brought the narrative of events up to the date of the formation of this Agency, and I propose next to follow the course of events from that time to the beginning of the year 1882.

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# CHAPTER IV.

Introduction.

108. In the last chapter the unsatisfactory condition of affairs in Kalát which culminated in the resolution of the Government of India to send Sir Robert, then Captain, Sandeman on a mission into the Marri hills; the partial success of the mission, and the re-opening of friendly relations with the Khán of Kalát, which resulted in the despatch of a second mission, Captain Sandeman being vested with fuller powers, and more definitely-expressed authority; the complete success which attended it, the settlement of the disputes between the Khán and the Sirdars, and the terms of the peace agreed to by them; the negotiation, signature, and ratification of the treaty of 1876 with the Khán; the determination of the Government of India to send a body of troops to Quetta, and the despatch of the force; the complete opening of, and maintenance of security in, the Bolan Pass; the intention of the Government of India to deal with the Marris and Bugtis independently of the Khán; the visit of His Highness to the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi, and the establishment of an Agency and an Agent to the Governor General in Baluchistan, have all been explained in detail. In the correspondence with which the last chapter dealt, it has been remarked by Sir A. Lyall that—

> there was no doubt an ulterior object which is only glanced at in the published papers. We wished to exclude Afghan influence from Baluchistan, to substitute our own, and to obtain a point of vantage for operating from the political or military side, as might be required on South Afghanistan. It was with these two objects combined that we stationed troops at Quetta, which is unquestionably the place best suited for all our purposes.

In this chapter and the one which follows it, it will be clearly seen that the objects, which hitherto lay somewhat under the surface, during the Afghan war, manifested themselves; that the possession of Quetta, the opening of the Bolan Pass, and our friendly relations with the Khán, were of immense use to the British Government during the war which took place, in the course of which the districts of Thal-Chotiáli, Sibi, and Pishín were assigned to British Government, in order to strengthen the position which had been obtained at Quetta, to cover the flank of the line of communications with the Panjab and Sind, and to obtain a hold over the Marri and Pathan tribes. This chapter will be devoted to an explanation of the events which took place after the return of the Khán of Kalát to Baluchistan from the Assemblage at Delhi up to the period when the signature of the treaty of Gandamak brought the first phase of the Afghan war to a temporary conclusion.

Affairs after the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi.

109. After leaving the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi, the Agent to the Governor General proceeded to Calcutta; returning thence he arrived at Jacobabad on the 13th March 1877; from there he went to meet His Highness the Khán at Gandáváh; after which he proceeded to Quetta, where he arrived in the middle of April. During this time it should be remembered that negotiations between the Government of India and the Amír of Kabul, with the object of placing affairs on a more satisfactory footing, had been for some time unsuccessfully prosecuted, and that in consequence the relations of the British Government with the Amír were much strained. It may be here noted that for the escort of the Agent to the Governor General it was arranged in February 1877 that any requisition from that officer for 160 infantry, 50 cavalry, and 2 mountain guns should be complied with, without his being compelled to furnish the particulars required by Sections 1912—1915, Bengal Army Regulations.

110. It will now be convenient to explain the steps by which the Quetta district was handed over to the British Government. With a view to his own convenience and that of the British, the Khán proposed, in November 1877, that the realisation of the land-revenues, the fees on Kafilas, and the octroi dues of the cantonment of Quetta should be handed over to the Assistant Agent, and that a lump sum of R80,000 yearly should be paid to the Kalát Government in lieu of them. The Khán also wished to receive any dues in excess of this sum, should such excess be subsequently obtained. This sum was to cover compensation for the fort and land, which might be taken up for cantonments. The Khán further desired an increase on this sum, should the benefits of English rule bring about an increase in the revenue; and anticipating the acceptance of the proposal, His Highness agreed that if the British Government should at any time give up Quetta, he would take back the district and surrender all claim to the yearly payment. These proposals were forwarded by the Agent to the Governor General for the favourable consideration of Government in December 1877. In May 1878 a reply was received to the effect that the Viceroy would agree generally to entertain the proposals mainly on the ground that they were likely to be convenient to His Highness's administration, the details being left for settlement to His Highness and the Agent to the Governor General, and final assent being reserved pending the result of consultations with His Highness. It was decided that the transit fees on Kafilas were to remain in the hands of His Highness's officials. As to the system of the collection of the octroi taxes, and the rates in use, it was said that as little change as possible should be made, and that every endeavour should be used to ensure our management being felt as an improvement on that of the local officers, the sole object of the collection of the dues being the avoidance of petty disputes, and the satisfaction of the townspeople. As to the proposal for the farming of the land-revenues, the Government of India asked for particulars as to the basis on which the offer of a fixed payment was calculated, and also as to the rates and methods of collection, any methods or exactions obnoxious or distasteful to the people being avoided.

Proposals in view to the handing over of the Quetta Niabat to the British Government for administration, 1877, 1878, 1879.

111. The Agent to the Governor General said in reply to the Foreign Secretary that he had discussed the questions personally with the Khán, and that His Highness had said that he heartily agreed to our taking the Crown lands on same terms as those on which the Amír had assigned to us Pishín and Sibi at the treaty of Gandamak, (the circumstances leading to which will be explained further on,) adding that the Khán had said it would be for the convenience of both Governments that they should be managed by British officers. The Khán agreed in writing that the revenue of Quetta should be collected under the supervision of Sir R. Sandeman, and that after deducting the cost of management the balance should be annually paid to himself. The Khan wrote :—

The Khán agrees to the administration of Quetta being carried out by the British.

In order to carry out the administration of the district, I, of my own pleasure and free will, give the British Government full power to collect the revenue, administer the country, and dispose of disputes that may arise among the inhabitants during the period named above (*i.e.*, five years). I give my free consent to the British Government introducing any laws or orders which they may wish to issue for carrying on the administration of the district. I, of my own hearty pleasure, recommended that you (the Agent to the Governor General) may exercise the powers of Sessions Judge and Chief Civil Officer in the district, and that the First Assistant Agent, Quetta, and the First Native Assistant Agent, Baluchistan, may also exercise criminal and revenue powers; also that court-fees in civil cases may be levied, and any other procedure for the settlement of cases be introduced, that the British Government may consider desirable and necessary. These arrangements to be put in force from the commencement of the current official year, *viz.*, 1879-80. With reference to the income realised during the last two years,

namely, 1877-78 and 1878-79, I accept the accounts laid before me as correct, and the balance, as shown by these accounts of the two years, I accept in payment of all demands. Please inform the Viceroy of India of this arrangement, and communicate to me His Excellency's sanction to the proposals now agreed to by me.

Income of the Quetta Niabat for 1877-78 and 1878-79.

112. The total income of the Quetta Niabat* for 1877-78 was shown to be R13,137-8-3, while the total income for 1878-79 was shown to be R33,621-1. The total expenses incurred in making the collections was for these two years R5,056-13-4, leaving a balance of R41,701-11-11. These accounts were approved and passed by His Highness the Khán. The increase in 1878-79 was due to a rise in prices during the war. The Agent to the Governor General observed that by the taking over of the Niabat the position at Sibi and Pishín would be greatly strengthened, "and as the Sibi district extends a long way in the direction of Thal-Chotiálí, with little trouble the tract of country stretching from Harrand to Vitakri, and thence to Harnáí and Sibi, in the one direction, must, as a matter of course, gradually fall within British influence, and in the other direction also from Thal to Rahie, Smalan, Kowas, to Pishín."

* The Crown lands administered under the authority of the Khán by naibs are divided into several Niabats.

Cost of the proposed administration.

113. The Agent to the Governor General proposed to regard Quetta as a third class tahsil, the monthly establishment expenditure being calculated at R406, which with other items would reach per annum R5,512; the cost of the municipality being added, the total estimated cost of the administration of the Quetta Crown lands was R7,384. The Khán agreed to this expenditure. The Agent to the Governor General further said that a modified form of levying court-fees should be introduced, and that civil and magisterial powers should be given to himself and to his assistants.

Terms on which the Government of India accepted the administration of Quetta.

114. The Foreign Secretary observed that supplies to the British garrison should be exempted from taxation, and stated that the Government of India were—

not binding themselves to pay the Khán any fixed sum, or to accept the settlement at any particular rates, calculated for a term on the prices of produce, but that the revenue will be taken year by year as heretofore, upon the current rates and prices, . . . . . at the end of five years the Government of India may at their option continue to administer the lands, although the precise terms may possibly then be open to revision. The period of limitation is taken to refer, not to the British administration of the town and lands, but to the existing agreement as to the precise terms on which the administration is to be conducted. The Government of India will of course be at liberty, as in the cases of Pishín and Sibi, to debit to the revenue the whole cost of the civil administration, subject to no liability for rendering detailed accounts or explanation of the expenditure, provided that it be all employed strictly and in good faith for the administration of the town, and the lands made over to us. A notification will issue investing the officers of the Baluchistan Agency with requisite powers.

In communicating these orders to Sir R. Sandeman, it was added that "His Excellency the Governor General in Council considers that the whole arrangement has been concluded in a very satisfactory manner, and that it is creditable to your management of the affair."

Notifications conferring criminal powers on the Agent to the Governor General and his Assistants in Baluchistan.

115. Shortly after this, on the 4th July 1878, the Government of India issued notifications, with the consent of the Khán, empowering the Agent to the Governor General to exercise the powers of a Sessions Judge and a Magistrate of the first class over all persons within the district and cantonment of Quetta and Mihtrí. At the same time the Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General in charge of the district of Quetta was empowered to exercise the powers of a Magistrate of the 1st class within the district of

Quetta, the Second Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General was empowered to exercise the powers of a Magistrate of the 1st class over all persons in the cantonment of Mihtrí, while the Agent to the Governor General and the first and second Assistants were appointed Justices of the Peace, the Chief Court of the Panjab being the Court to which European British subjects were to be committed for trial. The Government of India, however, declined to give the revenue powers which had been recommended. His Excellency in Council also declined to issue any notification with regard to the powers of officers administering Pishín and Sibi, adding that—

the abdication of the Amír (the circumstances attending which will be presently related) has so materially altered our position, that no notification could at present give any proper legal basis for the exercise of judicial authority in those tracts. ... ... So far as Pishín and Sibi are concerned, I am to inform you that the sentences passed cannot ordinarily be carried out in British India. In special cases arrangements may be made for imprisonment in an Indian jail, or for transportation. The Government of India, however, understand that, under existing circumstances, the regular judicial powers of the officers wll be sparingly used, and that no attempt will be made to bring these countries under any stringent rules of criminal procedure, or to take cognisance of minor offences which the custom of the country would not bring before a Court.

The required powers were however afterwards given, as will be seen further on.

Principles held in view when selecting Quetta for the location of a British force, 1876.

116. During the year 1876, the presence of a British force in the Kalát State was determined upon in principle, and Quetta was selected as the head-quarters of the force. One reason for selecting this place was, that in not placing the troops at the capital, the hostility of critics, who might construe the step into a menace to the independence of the Khán, would be avoided. Among the objections to the selection of Quetta, it was urged that while strategically the force would be in a dangerous position, the presence of any force there might arouse the jealousy of the Kabul Government. Her Majesty's Government did not, however, think that the Amír would have any just cause of complaint, and that the groundless susceptibilities of the Afghans could not be regarded as justifying the abandonment of an arrangement desired by all parties in Baluchistan and beneficial alike to Baluch and British interests. The presence of troops at Quetta would not constitute a menace to Afghanistán as long as the Amír continued on terms of amity with the British, although they might be favourably posted in the case of Afghan aggression. The objects with which troops were placed at Quetta were, the preservation of peace in the Khán's dominions, the security of commerce in the Bolan Pass and the plain below it, and the safety of British Agents. When the troops were first sent to Quetta it was determined that the safety and health of the troops was to be provided for, no buildings or measures being adopted which would indicate a resolution on the part of Government to permanently maintain troops at Quetta, and no expenditure being incurred which would constitute an impediment to the subsequent withdrawal of the troops.

British troops sent to Quetta, and the fort placed at the disposal of the British, 1877.

117. Early in 1877 troops were marched up to Quetta. During May of that year, the Agent to the Governor General was informed at an interview by the Khán's Vakil that in consequence of the strained relations then existing between the Kabul and British Governments, the Amír was about to send 12,000 men to Pishín, and that in view to strengthening the position at Quetta, the Khan was anxious to send a body of his Pathan troops to occupy the fort and the Bolan Pass, as but little reliance

could be placed upon the Sirdars of the Confederacy. The Agent to the Governor General in reply said that the Khán had at one time tried to hold the pass, but had been compelled by the Sirdars to withdraw his troops, after which the pass had remained closed until opened by the intervention of the British, and that there was no hope that the Sirdars would agree to the Khán's troops being placed in the pass. As to the placing of the Khán's troops in the fort, the Agent to the Governor General observed that the Khán's Vakil had himself previously said that they were untrustworthy and inclined to throw in their lot with the Amír, that the British troops were in the valley for the protection of the Khán and the country, and that it was advisable that they should enter the fort. It was decided that the fort should not be occupied without the Khán's assent unless the Khán's troops tried to occupy it, which they could not be permitted to do. The Khán at first showed some disinclination to consent to the entry of British troops into the fort, or to its being put into a state of repair. With the acquiescence of the Khán's Vakil permission to strengthen the fort walls was obtained in June 1877, and the work was carried out. The objection entertained by the Khán to the entry of troops into the fort was eventually overcome, and in November 1877, the Agent to the Governor General telegraphed to Government that the Khán had said that the place was at the disposal of Government if required. The records show that a sum of R9,229-1 was paid as compensation for houses, plots of land, mosques, &c., within the fort, the land being required for a *banquette* and other purposes. The fort is situated in the cantonment, an account of the land taken up for which will subsequently be given.

Boundaries and description of the Quetta district.

118. As Quetta is constantly mentioned in this chapter, some account of the district is here necessary. The district of Quetta is bounded on the north and west by Pishín, and on the west by Sharod, while to the east is the country of the Zarghún Dumars. To the south lie the plain suggestively named the Dasht-i-be-daolat, and the Khán's khas or crown district of Mastúng. The valley in which the district lies comprises what was formerly the Niabat of Quetta, when the district was under the administration of His Highness, and is about 20 miles long by about 5 broad. Lofty mountains almost entirely surround it, with the exception of the southern extremity which opens into the valley of the Dasht, and the north-west extremity, where there is a broad gap, which opens into a long narrow valley, leading to the Kanak and Mastúng valleys in one direction and to that of Kuchlák* in the other. The main road from India to Pishín and Kandahar runs along the Quetta valley to the Ghazarband Pass, the road to Kanak, the Barak Passes, and to Kalát, branching off at Samungali, a small village in the Quetta district. The road to Kachh leaves Quetta by the Margha Pass; the Sarákhulá Pass also communicates with Kachh. The Han valley is a small glen running up northeastwards into the hills, the water flowing from which is one of the principal water-supplies of Quetta. The sub-districts of Quetta are Katir or Kuchlák-Barg, and Dulai Kuchlák and Barg are almost exclusively inhabited by sections of Sanatia and Sarghari Kákar Pathans. Han belongs to the Yasinzai (Ísá Khel) Sanatias, while the Kasi Afghans are the principal inhabitants of Quetta itself.

Former history of Quetta.

119. This district was originally—a part of the Duráni empire formed by Ahmad Sháh, but was ceded by him, together with Mastúng and Sharód to Nassir Khán I. of Kalát, surnamed the Great. This generous act was in grateful recognition of the services rendered by Nassir Khán and his contingent of Baluch

* The valley of Kuchlák is included in the Niabat of Quetta.

and Brahui warriors, in the campaign against the Persians in 1868-69.* The decisive battle of this campaign was fought in the neighbourhood of Mashad, and the Afghans would have been defeated but for Nassir Khán and his Brahuis, whose valour retrieved the fortunes of the day. The story goes that when Ahmad Sháh was distributing rewards to his Chiefs, on the return of the victorious army to Kandahar, he handed to Nassir Khan a sannad conferring on him the sovereignty of the districts above mentioned, saying at the same time, "This is your shawl (shál)." The district, before known as Rosulabad, is said to have acquired its modern name from this circumstance.

* The same Nassir Khán had defeated Ahmad Sháh's Wazir, Wali Khán, at Mastúng in 1758, but was afterwards himself defeated by Ahmad Sháh, who failed, however, to take Kalát. The peace then made was long and faithfully kept.

Quetta strategically considered.

120. Before the arrival of the British, Quetta was a small walled town dominated by the Miri, or palace of the Khán, which stands on an artificial mound. At that time, with the exception of a few scattered huts, there were no habitations outside the town, the surrounding land being cultivated up to the walls. Quetta, from a strategical point of view, has been described by Captain Maitland:—

Few officers can have travelled along the main road from Quetta to the Gazáband Pass without being struck by the remarkable strength of the position across the mouth of the valley between the northern end of the Chahiltan range and the Murgha Pass ridge. A line of redoubts, or other suitable works across this gap, would completely close the valley. The position cannot be turned; for the heights on which it rests are unscaleable, and the only road, or even path, within a great distance of either flank is that by the Murgha, which can be easily defended by a battalion and a couple of guns. The ground in front is a bare open plain, and offers no cover to a frontal attack, except such as may be found in the channels of the Lohrah, and of another stream running parallel to it. Under such conditions the position is theoretically impregnable. Moreover, while it completely covers Quetta and the line of communication *viá* the Bolan, an assailant would be placed at a strategic disadvantage, since his own line of retreat must either be by his own left flank, continually exposed to attack from the sallyport of the Murgha Pass, or else through the long and narrow defile of the Gazáband. If, therefore, the defenders were in a position to take the offensive after repulsing an attack, the consequences to the assailant could hardly fail to be disastrous. It should also be remembered that the Shál valley communicates with Kachh on the Harnáí line by the Sarákhulá road, and that no hostile General would venture to commit his army to the Harnáí route, which is practically one long defile, until he had secured his flank by seizing Quetta and the Shál valley. To mask the opposing force at that place would not be sufficient, since it might be reinforced by the shorter line of the Bolan until it had reached a strength enabling it to overwhelm the containing detachment and sever the enemy's communications.

Correspondence between the Amír of Kabul and the Khán, and the effect in Kalát of the proclamation of a religious war in Afghanistan, May 1877.

121. Allusion will now be made to some correspondence which took place between the Amír and the Khán. In July 1877 the Agent to the Governor General visited the Khán at Bághwánah, and there discussed the matter with him. During the year 1876, Sir R. Sandeman received trustworthy intelligence to the effect that after Major Harrison's withdrawal from the Kalát Court the Khán had made frequent overtures to the Amír of Kabul asking for help, and offering to become a tributary of the Afghan Government. Later on, Sir R. Sandeman was informed that the Amír had sent a special messenger to Kalát to the Khán, and that in reply the Khán was preparing to send the mustaufi, Fakir Muhammad, to Kabul. On this Sir Robert pointed out to the Khán that the intended visit of the mustaufi without the consent of the British Government was contrary to article 3 of the treaty of 1854. The Khán then agreed to refer the matter to the British Government; this was done, and Sir Robert was directed to use his best endeavours to prevent communications of such nature between the Rulers of Kabul and Kalát. Shortly after this another letter came from the Amír to the Khán, and the former was said to have advised the Khán, in all dealings with the British, to temporise as much as possible, and to obtain as high a price as possible for

each concession he might make. The effect of this letter was to make him discontented with the three lakhs which he had received from the British Government, and with which he had been previously pleased. Early in 1877 the sending of letters and special messengers between these two Rulers was reported to Sir Robert, and it was said that the Amír had exhorted the Khán to join him in a religious war against the British, "and to cast the recently concluded treaty and its terms to the winds." The Khán, encouraged by the Pathans of his army, is said to have sent messengers to several of the Brahui Chiefs to obtain an expression of their views, and to have pointed out to the Amír that he should, in evidence of his good faith, send troops from Kandahar to Pishín, and induce the neighbouring tribes to rise, while he, the Khán, would, after asking for arms and guns, garrison the Quetta Fort, and request that British troops might be withdrawn, on the plea that he was himself able to defend the country and keep the Bolan open. The Brahui Sirdars, however, gave a distinct and decided refusal to join the Khán or the Amír. Feeling that the only chance of overcoming the difficulties of the position, without at the same time wishing to press matters against the Khán, Sir R. Sandeman made a determined stand, and solicited the support of Government, which was granted, and the Amír at length sent to the Khán to say that he must cease all correspondence with him, as they were not in a position to act unaided contrary to the wishes of the British. The proclamation of a religious war in Afghanistan doubtless made itself much felt in Baluchistan among those immediately surrounding the Khán. The Saráwán Sirdars were, however, specially loyal to the British. In July 1877 Sir R. Sandeman went to Bághwánah to visit the Khán, who had of course heard of the complications which had arisen between the British Government and the Amír of Kabul. The Khán seemed to fear that in the event of war his troops, which mostly consisted of Afghan levies, might rebel and cause disturbances. Sir R. Sandeman mentioned the matter to the Khán in November 1877, and His Highness, writing to the Viceroy on the 23rd November 1878, said that he regarded the British Government as his suzerain, and that he would consider any act, such as an intrigue with the Amír, "as quite unworthy of the position I (the Khán) hold." The allegation that any such intrigue had been going on he attributed to bad characters, and he asked that the matter might be enquired into, and that his traducers might be punished. The loyalty of the Khán and the Sirdars throughout the Afghan war was conspicuous and genuine. After the defeat at Maiwand the Khán supplied 400 baggage animals to the army and large quantities of grain and forage. A portion of his Pathan troops rebelled, but the Khán was able to hold his own in Kalát. Further reference to this will be presently made.

Construction of the telegraph line from Jacobabad to Quetta, May 1877.

122. It has been previously mentioned that, under the treaty of 1876, it was proposed to make a telegraph line to Quetta from Jacobabad. The work was undertaken by the Public Works Department, and Mr. Pitman was placed on special duty to construct the line, the making of which was sanctioned in February 1877. By March of that year it was at Dhádar, and in May it had been made through the Bolan to Darwaza, and on the 17th May it was working up to Quetta. From Dhádar to the Dasht-i-be-daolat, much difficulty was experienced in placing it on the hills over which it passes. The Viceroy congratulated Mr. Pitman and his staff on the completion of the line. It was determined to entrust the line to a Royal Engineer Officer, who, in anything relating to dealings with the Bolan tribes, was to take orders from the Agent to the Governor General. For the protection of the line, a telegraph line protective establishment was organised, and in

addition to this, in consequence of frequent breaks on the line due to wilful damage, a maintenance establishment was sanctioned, as follows:—

| | R | a. | p. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 2nd grade Sub-Inspector on R25 rising to R40 per mensem . . . . . . | 36 | 4 | 0 |
| 4 Line-riders at R30 each . . . . . | 120 | 0 | 0 |
| 2 Line-men at R15 each . . . . . | 30 | 0 | 0 |
| Total . | 186 | 4 | 0 |

Construction of the telegraph line to Kalát, 1878.

123. The construction of a telegraph line to Kalát was considered by Government to be "a work of great importance as an element in the strength and safety of the Quetta division," and during 1878 it was constructed. In connection with it the road over the Sarak Baja Pass to Mastúng was improved. Subsequently the telegraph was laid down in several directions, arrangements for the protection of the lines being made with the Chiefs of the tribes through whose lands they passed. Further information will be found in a subsequent chapter.

Murder of Lieutenant Hewson and a Sikh sepoy by fanatics, 1877.

124. On the 26th July 1877 occurred one of the fanatical outbreaks which have from time to time taken place on this frontier, resulting in the murder of Lieutenant Hewson, R.E., Executive Engineer, and of a sepoy of the 4th Sikhs, and also the wounding of Lieutenant Kunhardt, R.E. The two officers were attacked by three fanatics while inspecting the Residency building works then going on at Quetta. Mr. Hewson died at once from dagger stabs. Mr. Kunhardt's assailant attacked him with a knife from behind; he at once turned on him and knocked him down. At that moment a Sikh sepoy ran up and attacked the murderers with a small axe. This gave Mr. Kunhardt time to escape. The sepoy, however, lost his life. About 250 yards from the spot where the outbreak took place, Captain Scott was drilling a party of men belonging to the 4th Sikh Infantry. On hearing the outcry which was raised on the attack being made, some of the sepoys ran up and began to assail the murderers with stones; in the meantime, Captain Scott came up, and on being attacked, killed the assailant with a bayonet. The second murderer then ran up, and he too was bayonetted by Captain Scott. By the third Pathan Captain Scott was slightly wounded. The two closed and fell to the ground; and the assassin was killed by the sepoys who were near. During the outbreak three Afghan labourers were seen to throw stones at the officers, two were killed, and one was taken prisoner, and afterwards transported.

Captain Scott awarded the V. C. for killing the murderers. Friendly disposition of the inhabitants of the country.

125. The immediate cause of the attack was the enforcing of responsibility on certain Bazais in consequence of the wanton destruction of some Government camels. The feeling, however, among the Brahuis, Baluchis, and Pathans generally was entirely friendly. One of the Sirdars, Mulla Muhammad, seized the fort and held it in British interests, pending the arrival of the regular troops which soon came into it, while others gave and offered their assistance and showed much sympathy. Captain Scott was rewarded for his personal and conspicuous gallantry with the Victoria Cross, while a suitable pension was bestowed on the family of Rajpal Singh, the Sikh sepoy, who was murdered. The outbreak was attended with the best results as regards the country generally, as it demonstrated clearly that the general feeling among the inhabitants was friendly to the British, and that the outbreak was not the outcome of any widespread hostility. Care was taken at the time of the outbreak that no unnecessary loss of life should be caused amongst the Pathan labourers who were witnesses of the outbreak, and that the innocent should not be punished for the dastardly acts of their guilty clansmen.

The first occupation of Quetta Fort.

126. It should be here noted that the Quetta Fort was at this time in the possession of the Khán's naib. Immediately on the occurrence of the outrage, Mr. Bruce, in the absence of the Agent to the Governor General who was at that time at Kalát, consulted with Captain Charles, commanding the troops, on the advisability of occupying the fort, and in concurrence with him sent British troops into it to take possession of it. He telegraphed his having done so to the Foreign Secretary, who replied that the fort should be secured immediately; it was occupied without any resistance, and from that date British troops have never left it.

Remarks of the Government of India.

127. In remarking on the proceedings the Government of India said—

it affords the Governor General in Council much satisfaction to record his appreciation of the valuable services rendered by Mr. Bruce throughout the events attendant on the outrage. The calmness and judgment shown by that officer at a difficult period of excitement is worthy of high commendation. The efficient manner, moreover, in which Captain Money and the men under his command performed their duties is extremely creditable to them.

I am to add that the Governor General in Council fully approves your own proceedings throughout, and considers that you have dealt with a peculiarly difficult task with care and judgment.

Attack made on Sergeant Gilbert by a fanatical Pathan, 1879.

128. As unprovoked murderous attacks have more than once occurred, while on this subject, an account will be given of the attack on Sergeant Gilbert. On the 31st May 1879, Sergeant Gilbert, of the Ordnance Department, was working near the fort at Quetta, when a Pathan attacked him from behind with a knife. The Sergeant grappled with the Pathan, and the two fell. Sergeant Gilbert's life was saved by Jemadar Sirdar Muhammad Khán, who ran to his assistance unarmed, and by Wariam Singh, of the Public Works Department, who killed the Pathan with an axe. The Pathan had no accomplices, and the probable motive for the outrage was simply his desire to become a Ghazi. Sergeant Gilbert, who was wounded, recovered, and rewards were given to the two men who assisted him.

Visit of the Agent, Governor General, to Kalát, November 1877.

129. In November 1877, Sir R. Sandeman paid a visit to the Khán at Kalát, and mentioned that Colonel Browne had come to select a route for a railway to Quetta, the construction of which had at that time begun to be mooted. His Highness was interested in the matter, and made eager enquiries as to the line likely to be selected. The Khán thought the Mulla Pass route would be the best, and said he would give every possible aid in the construction. At a darbar which was held the Agent to the Governor General congratulated the Khán and the Sirdars on the manner in which they had respected their agreement to maintain the peace, and the Khán replied that he would continue to maintain the agreement, adding many expressions of loyalty to the British Government. The Sirdars at the same time expressed their satisfaction with the arrangements which had been made at Mastúng. At a parting visit the Khán gave the Agent to the Governor General a photograph of himself for presentation to the Queen-Empress, and he addressed a letter to the Viceroy abounding in expressions of loyalty and regard.

Proposal to grant service to Kákar Chiefs, January 1878.

130. In January 1878, it was proposed by the Agent to the Governor General to grant additional service at a cost of R600 per mensem to certain Kákar Chiefs in the Quetta valley, and also in the hills beyond the Khán's territory on the route from Quetta to Thal. Colonel Browne, of the Public Works Department, was permitted by the Government of India to make small presents to Chiefs, but beyond that point Government declined to go without further information. Colonel Browne's services were at the same time placed at the disposal of the Foreign Department. Later on the Agent to the Governor General represented that it was very desirable

to take the opportunity offered by the then friendly attitude of the Kákars, to establish permanent relations with them by means of service. The Kákar Pathans, it appears, "inhabit the direct caravan route from the Panjab to Quetta, Pishín, and Kandahar. It is known to be the best, as it is the most direct route from Afghanistan and Baluchistan to India, and was only closed after the Sikhs had firmly established their sway over the Panjab, including the districts of Dera Ghazi Khán and Dera Ismail Khán, which up to that time formed a portion of the Dúrání empire." The Kákars, it seems, are distinct from Afghans proper, and the majority of them had never owned any allegiance to the Kabul Government. The chief Kákar tribes whom it was proposed to subsidise were the Banzais, Sarangzais, Dumars, and Panizais and also the Luni Pathans. As to the relations between the Kákar tribes and the Amír the Agent to the Governor General was of opinion that there was nothing in them to prevent service being given to the Kákars, and the establishment of friendly relations of a nature similar to those existing at the present moment between the British Government and the Kohat Afridis. During the summer of 1877 the Amír of Kabul had endeavoured to establish his influence over the Kákars; and the Agent to the Governor General thought that the advantages to be derived by Government from the expenditure proposed were—(1) the consolidation of the influence already acquired over the tribes; (2) the protection of the Kafila route from Quetta over the Gázaband Pass to the Amír's dominions; and (3) the opening up of the old caravan route from India to Afghanistan, and the establishment of British influence in the only piece of country between Dera Ghazi Khán and the sea where it had not previously been established.

Proposal of the Agent, Governor General, to invite the Kákars to a conference.

131. Should the measure be sanctioned, the Agent to the Governor General proposed* to summon a conference of all the British and Kalát Chiefs, inviting the Kákar Chiefs to attend, to consider the possibility of opening up the Thal-Chotiálí and other routes between Quetta and British territory. An endeavour would then be made to get the Kákars to undertake a postal service between Quetta and Dera Ghazi Khán, and to place postal chowkis along the routes.

* 7th May 1878.

Orders of the Government of India at the outbreak of the war.

132. On the 23rd September 1878, war with the Amír of Afghanistan being at that time imminent, the Agent to the Governor General received telegraphic orders to negotiate with the Kákars for the establishment of British influence and the exclusion of that of the Amír, and for securing communications by the Thal-Chotiálí route. Sir R. Sandeman was also empowered to summon the Chiefs if necessary, and to discuss terms with them regarding the question of the grant of service. He was further requested to invite the Ghilzai Chiefs who had been alleged to be anxious for British connection, and if they offered service giving adequate pledges, to report what practical form of support to their resistance to the Amír might be promised, and whether British officers could safely enter their country as had been proposed. Sir R. Sandeman was directed to explain publicly that the Amír, having committed open hostility, had forfeited our friendship and forbearance.

Service granted to the Kákars.

133. In order to put these orders in force a Committee was assembled, in October 1878, at Quetta to decide (1) as to the giving of service to the tribes in the neighbourhood of Quetta, and (2) to the tribes on the Thal-Chotiálí route. The Committee thought that the services of the Quetta Banzai Kákars should be thoroughly secured, including those living to the north and east of Quetta and the

Kákars of the Lohrah valley, and that they should be guaranteed from injury hereafter. The Committee considered that so long as the garrison of Quetta was maintained by the British Government, the services of the following Kákar Pathan tribes should be retained permanently :—Banzais, Panizais, Sarangzais, Yasinzais, Dumars, and Kasis, also the Dúránís. Service was given to the maliks of these tribes to the extent of R4,940, and agreements were passed by them in which a *quid pro quo* was recorded.

Question of giving service to tribes for the protection of the Thal-Chotiálí route, &c.

134. As to the Thal-Chotiálí route, the Committee thought that the effect of giving service to the tribes near Quetta should be ascertained before definite terms were offered for the opening up of that route. Regarding the visit of Adam Khán Ghilzai to Quetta, who professed that he had come to make overtures on the part of the Ghilzais of Afghanistan, the Committee were in doubt as to his authority to expound the views of the Southern Ghilzais, and that nothing could be done pending the arrival of his son who had been summoned to Quetta, and that British officers could not go to the Ghilzai country.

Settlement of cases between the Dera Ghazi Khán district and the Marri and Bugtí tribes, August 1878.

135. During the latter half of the year 1878, arrangements were made with the Panjab Government for the settlement of a number of cases between the Dera Ghazi Khán district and the Marri and Bugtí tribes, and with this view a Committee, consisting of the Agent to the Governor General, Mr. Fryer, and Mr. Dames, and five natives, sat. Several charges against the Marri tribes were made, involving a variety of payments in money. A number of charges were also brought against the Bugtí tribe, chiefly with respect to the restoration of stolen property. These matters were settled. The most serious consideration which came before the Committee was the fact that a large number of refugees from the Dera Ghazi Khán district had been harboured by the hill tribes, and these men taking advantage of their position there had committed depredations in British territory. As to these refugees, it was arranged that the Chiefs and their headmen should swear on the Kuran not to harbour refugees in future, and the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khán, undertook that if refugees were sent back to their tribes, no heavier punishment should be inflicted upon them than they might be liable to under frontier regulations. After this agreement was made most of the refugees came back to British India and settled down peaceably.

Prevention of a threatened attack on Quetta from the village of Huramzai, 1878.

136. An affair which took place at Huramzai will now be mentioned. Huramzai or Uramzai is a Kalát village 2 miles outside the boundaries of Pishín, covering in its extent nearly half a mile of ground and situated about 14 miles from Quetta. In October 1878, Sir R. Sandeman received information that in this village, which was situated on what then was the extreme frontier of Baluchistan and Afghanistan, the Afghan Governor of Pishín had placed some sowars, that the numbers of these had been increased, and that it was in contemplation to make from this place a sudden night attack on Quetta, for which purpose it was admirably situated. With a view to enquiring into this rumour, Sir R. Sandeman with a large following visited it, and found the state of affairs there to be very suspicious, the village being filled with armed men and horses. It should be borne in mind that the Government of India was at this time at the verge of war with the Amír. Early the next morning, in concert with Colonel Morgan, Commanding the Quetta garrison, the Agent to the Governor General, accompanied by 300 infantry, 150 cavalry, and 4 guns, arrived at the village at daybreak, summoned the headmen to his presence,

and induced them to remove the horses with which the village was filled (310 horses were found in the village), to surrender one Syad Khanan, whose conduct on the previous day had been insulting, and to give hostages for their future good conduct. These measures were taken in view of the damage and loss of life which these people might have caused by a night attack on Quetta. His Excellency the Viceroy expressed his approval of the results of this expedition. The whole affair was an outcome of the strained relations between the British Government and the Amír of Afghanistan.

Discussion as to the rectification of the north-west frontier, in 1879.

137. Both before, during, and after the Afghan war, the question of the rectification of the north-west frontier of India was much discussed, and early in 1879, in accordance with telegraphic instructions, Sir R. Sandeman submitted to the Government of India his views regarding the question of the rectification of the north-west frontier, which was then being discussed, together with his opinion as to the future disposal of the districts of Sibi and Pishín. The matter was, he observed, very important, as on the way in which the line of frontier was settled depended the future protection of India. As exponents of the diametrically opposite views which were at that time expressed on this subject, the Agent to the Governor General cited Lords Napier and Lawrence. Lord Napier, in view of the Russian advance and the consequent alarm of our neighbours and tributaries, considered that the British had remained quiescent long enough, and that there was less danger in advancing than in sitting still. Our grievance, he said, "has actually led the Russian papers to ask what we mean by going to Kalát or Quetta; that fact alone is sufficient to vindicate our right to be there." Lord Lawrence on the other hand thought that the Russian advance should be met as circumstances might dictate, but not by an advance of the frontier, for the reason that "the present frontier, as it now exists, is the best we can adopt, and His Lordship assures us that it is by no means a haphazard frontier, but one which the Sikhs who preceded us in the Government of the Panjab deliberately adopted." Sir R. Sandeman considered—

"that the interests of British India, as well as the interests of Kalát and Afghanistan, demand that such arrangements should be made for the future as will prevent the possibility of complications like the present ones arising, which have led to war with the Amír of Afghanistan (an account of which will be given further on). I trust to be able to show this result can only be secured by a rectification in this direction, not merely of the British frontier, but of the frontiers of the three kingdoms of India, Kalát, and Afghanistan, and that political and moral considerations have rendered this a necessity."

Results consequent on the line of British frontier dividing the lands of tribes on the Dera Ghazi Khán frontier.

138. The important statement of Lord Lawrence, that the Sikhs had not adopted a haphazard frontier, but a deliberately selected one, *viz.*, our present Panjab frontier, the Agent to the Governor General pointed out was not correct. Experience showed that the frontier line selected when British officers first occupied the country had proved to be disastrous to the frontier clans, and had rendered the administration of the frontier tract a matter of much difficulty. The frontier line selected by the British divided the possessions of the Lagari tribe on the Dera Ghazi Khán frontier, with the result that grave complications had arisen in the management of the people, and grievous loss had ensued to the tribesmen living outside British limits, who were not only denied the protection of the British Ægis, but were shut out from the assistance of their clansmen in British territory, who were prevented by the operation of British laws from assisting them. In consequence of the depredations of the Marri clan, the Nawab of the tribe Jamal Khán could not visit his birthplace at Barkhan, where lands inherited from his mother's side were situated. The fixing of a haphazard frontier here was unfortunate. The same remark, the Agent to the Governor General said,

applied to the country inhabited by the Gurchani tribe. To understand the state of affairs it must be remembered, as has been elsewhere previously explained, that the province of Harrand Dajil was formerly a component part of the Kalát State. The Sikhs seized Harrand, but the Gurchanis never submitted to them. The British became eventually masters of the Sikh possession, and the British frontier divided the lands of the Gurchani tribe, with the result of weakening them just as the Lagaris had been weakened, and seeing this the Marris and Bugtís attacked them, causing them more loss than would have been possible under the Sikh Government, because under British laws those tribesmen who were in British territory could not assist their comrades without it. The difficulties which occurred on the Dera Ghazi frontier were, it will be remembered, not lessened by the dual control under which the border was administered; still this difficulty would have been obviated had not the frontier here been fixed at haphazard. In like manner all the Baluch frontier tribes had been injured by the manner in which the arbitrary British frontier line had divided their lands. The results brought about by the fact of the British frontier line dividing the lands of the tribes have frequently been brought to the notice of Government.

Sir R. Sandeman recommends the retention of Sibi and Pishín.

139. Sir R. Sandeman, in view to the rectification of the whole frontier line, recommended that the districts of Sibi and Pishín should be detached from Kabul, placed under a British protectorate, and managed by British officers. The district of Sibi, it was explained, was merely a continuation of the Kachhi plain, situated more than 200 miles from Kandahar, and being detached from the country under Afghan rule, had been administered during the first Afghan war by a Political Agent. In 1842 it was offered to the Khán of Kalát, but he did not accept it. As to Pishín, the Agent to the Governor General represented that Nadir Sháh of Persia—

doubtless conscious of the value the Pishín valley must be to the Khán of Kalát's possessions, when rewarding him for service done in India, among other grants of land, included it in the Kalát State. The valley of Pishín, in much the same way that the Sibi district is part of Kachhi, is a continuation of the Quetta and Kuchiák valleys, while it is separated from Kandahar by the Khwájah Umrán range of mountains territorially, therefore it ought to belong to Kalát and not to Southern Afghanistan.

Political and strategical importance of Pishín.

140. The Khwájah Umrán range was, the Agent to the Governor General urged, the natural boundary which should separate Kalát from Southern Afghanistan. He added that—

under existing circumstances, in the interest of all concerned, there can be no question as to the desirability of including it in the Quetta protectorate. Doing so would secure the safety of our own empire and give our Government a strong hold on the country, which our acknowledged responsibilities in regard to Kalát and Afghanistan render it necessary for us to possess. With reference to these remarks, I will now briefly consider the strategical position of the Pishín valley, and describe the immense importance, from a military and political point of view, its possession is to the power who holds it. From Pishín all the chief routes leading to Kandahar, Ghazni, and Kalát set out, and were we securely established there, we could at any moment, as the Khojak Pass would be in our possession, descend on the plains of Kandahar, or advance to meet our adversary in the open field. We should securely hold the command of all the southern passes leading to the Panjab and Sind, and from Dera Ismail Khán to the sea, a distance of nearly 700 miles, our frontier would be securely guarded. In military possession of Pishín and Quetta, our position would in this direction be very strong indeed, while from it we can really secure our friends from the fear of aggression and render their countries equally so—no unimportant advantage as recent events have shown us. Were the arrangements I propose seriously contemplated by the Government, doubtless a great consideration would be the light in which the people and Sirdars of the two districts would regard their severance from Afghanistan, and the question the Government would probably ask is, would such severance be acceptable, or the reverse? I answer that the Sibi people will openly

rejoice at being brought permanently under the protection of the British Government, and so would in a lesser degree the people of Pishín also. I have every confidence in making this statement from the fact that the attitude assumed by the Sirdars and people of both districts has been most friendly, and the only consideration which has induced the people of Pishín to hold back, and which they have themselves expressed, is to them the all-important one, *viz.*, whether, should they cast in their lot with our Government and aid us heartily, they may not at the close of the war find themselves at the mercy of the Amír's officials, who would soon find means of punishing them for any assistance rendered at the present time.

The necessity of securing the country against aggression.

141. If Pishín were permanently placed under British protection, the safety of the Baluch-Afghan frontier would be secured in a way our present responsibilities absolutely require. The Khán of Kalát has actively aided the British in the present war against the Afghans. This act they will never forget or forgive, and it is therefore only right we should, in arranging for the future, secure this country from the chance of aggression.

The possibility of an attack on the Panjab by the Thal-Chotiálí route.

142. Another important consideration is that, although the military position at Quetta doubtless covers the approaches to Sind through the Bolan Pass, the Panjab is in no way protected, as Quetta could at any time be masked if an enemy were strongly posted at Kandahar and holding possession of the Khojak Pass. A descent could then be made on Dera Ghazi Khán and Dera Ismail Khán *viâ* Thal-Chotiálí and Bori, while Kalát itself could be threatened *viâ* Shorawak, Nushky, and the Mungochar valley.

Afghan policy from 1876-78. The Amír declared to be an enemy, 21st November 1878.

143. This report will be the more complete if some mention be here made of Afghan politics. During the time that the events described in the third chapter and those already mentioned in this chapter were unfolding themselves, strenuous efforts were being made to place the relations of the Government of India on a more satisfactory footing with the Amír of Kabul. In 1876, when Lord Lytton came to India, he was instructed to offer to Sher Alí the countenance and protection which he had previously solicited from the Government of India, *viz.*, pecuniary aid, recognition of his dynasty, so far as it would not involve active interference in the affairs of Afghanistan, and support in case of unprovoked foreign aggression. He on his part was to be asked to admit British Agents into his territories, where without prejudicing his authority they might obtain trustworthy information as to events in Afghanistan. Overtures were accordingly made to the Amír through Khanan Khán, and were rejected. The Amír enumerated his grievances in connection with his son Yakub Khán, the decision in the Seistan boundary question, the gifts sent to the Chief of Wakhan, and the previous rejection of his requests for an alliance. His own request that an Afghan envoy should meet Sir L. Pelly at Peshawar was acceded to, and Nur Muhammad Sháh was sent, but it soon became apparent that he was not empowered to accept the basis of the proposals, and advantage was taken of his death to break off the negotiations. What had previously been doubtful then became certain, *viz.*, that the Amír was alienated from the British Government, and he, moreover, having declined to receive a British envoy within his territory even temporarily, welcomed with every appearance of ostentation an embassy from the Czar, at a time when there were indications that an interruption of friendly relations between England and Russia might be imminent. As the Amír had then no longer an excuse for not accepting an envoy, it was proposed to send Sir Neville Chamberlain to Kabul in that capacity. The Amír was at the same time warned that a refusal to grant a passage to the Mission would be regarded as an act of hostility. Nevertheless it became plain that any attempt to enter Afghan territory would be resisted by force. In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, "by every bond of international courtesy as well as by the treaty engagements of 1855 existing between the two countries, binding him to be

the friend of our friends and the enemy of our enemies, the Amír was bound to a line of conduct the reverse of that which he adopted." On the rejection of the Mission, His Highness was addressed in temperate language, requiring a full and suitable apology within a given time for the affront he had offered, and he was required to accede to the reception of a Mission. The Amír was given to the 20th November 1878 to give an answer, and as no satisfactory reply was received, his intentions were considered to be hostile, and he was declared to be an enemy, in a proclamation issued on the 21st November 1878, in which the causes were recited at length which had forced the Government of India to declare that upon Sher Alí alone rested the responsibility "of having exchanged the friendship for the hostility of the Empress of India." Shortly, prior to the outbreak of the war, Lord Lytton wrote to the Khán, informing him that in consequence of the Amír's conduct it had become necessary to send reinforcements to Quetta, and that it might be necessary to send more troops for an advance into Afghanistan. He at the same time thanked His Highness for the co-operation in such matters that he had hitherto given.

Value of Bolan route, and of the Kuram valley.

144. For some time previous to the outbreak of the war the warning course of events on the north-west frontier of India had forced upon the attention of the Government of India the fact that all the passes from India to Afghanistan were in the hands of wild, independent, and more or less hostile tribes. One of the important points obtained by the treaty of 1876 with the Khán was the opening of the Bolan Pass, and the virtual placing in British hands of —

> the command of the southern passes, thus giving to India a strong frontier from the neighbourhood of Multan to the sea, a distance of about 500 miles. This arrangement, moreover, by restoring order and reviving trade and agriculture throughout Baluchistan, has been eminently beneficial to the Khán and his subjects, in whom the Government of India found loyal and useful allies during the late Afghan war.

When war broke out with Afghanistan the rectification of the frontier was not the least of the objects aimed at, and for this all that—

> was needed was the permanent command—not of passes extending far into the interior of the vast mountain tract beyond our border, but of those which piercing the extreme eastern edge of that tract as it rises immediately above the plains of India, constitute the only practicable approaches to our empire from beyond its northern and western confines."

For this the permanent command of the Kuram and Pishín districts was necessary.

Objects to be gained by advancing on Kandahar.

145. The Amír was attacked by three lines—the Khojak, the Khyber, and the Kuram. The force operating on the Khyber was commanded by General Sir Sam Browne, the command of the Kuram force was entrusted to General Roberts, while the operations against Kandahar were conducted by General Stewart. The longest line of operations lay in the direction of Kandahar, "and it was therefore necessary that the force operating in this line should be proportionally stronger" than on the Khyber and Kuram lines, as while its transport and supply were more difficult, the rapidity of its movements was less essential to the primary objects of the campaign. "In order to cripple the financial resources of the Amír," the Government of India said—

> it was deemed desirable to expel his authority from the richest districts of Western Afghanistan, and for this purpose the temporary occupation of Kandahar was clearly requisite. Such a measure, moreover, was dictated by two other considerations of a far more reaching character. In the event of the complete disintegration of the Kabul power, we could not allow Kandahar to fall into the hands of any Chief or State whose possession of it we had not previously approved on conditions dictated by ourselves; and in the event of re-established relations with the Ruler of a united Afghanistan, the power of restoring Kandahar to such a Ruler, also on our own conditions, could not fail to give us a most advantageous position from which to

negotiate the terms of peace. The permanent retention of Kandahar has never formed a part of our political programme.

146. On the 21st November, Sir Sam Browne attacked Alí Masjid, and afterwards advanced to Jallalabad. On the same day General Roberts entered the Kuram valley, and defeated the Afghans at the Peiwar Kotal. On the 23rd, the important district of Sibi lying on the line of communication close to the Baluch frontier was occupied by a British detachment. "Much political inconvenience," Lord Lytton's Government observed, "had been caused by the interposition of this small Afghan district in the midst of Baluch territory, with which it is almost entirely surrounded; and we had therefore determined upon its permanent withdrawal from the jurisdiction of Kabul authority."

Occupation of Sibi on the 23rd November 1878.

147. In consequence of the outbreak of war with Afghanistan, a force under General Biddulph marched to Pishín *viâ* the Bolan, and on the 1st December 1878, Sir R. Sandeman reported to the Foreign Secretary that he had, in accordance with orders received direct from the Viceroy, accompanied General Biddulph's force to Pishín, with the object of establishing friendly relations with the inhabitants of the valley, and that he had read to the troops the proclamation describing the causes which had led the Amír of Kabul to exchange the hostility for the friendship of the Empress. The troops then entered the Pishín valley, and encamped at Syed Yárú. The people of the village of Sadozai welcomed the advent of the British. The same feeling was also exhibited by the villagers near the Khojak Pass, and by the ryots in other parts of the valley; almost all of the Chiefs and the headmen of Pishín paid their respects to the Agent to the Governor General. Khushdil Khán's fort, the seat of the Government of the Amír, was found empty, with the exception of two chowkidars. With a view to preventing the affairs of Pishín and Sibi from falling into confusion, Sir R. Sandeman placed Nazim Nur Muhammad Khán in charge of both, with a naib under his orders in charge of Sibi, and he proposed to make both directly subordinate to the First Assistant at Quetta. "Sibi," the Agent to the Governor General said,—

First occupation of Pishín in 1878.

is really a continuation of Kachhi, but there is a difficulty in making it over to the Khán of Kalát, as was proposed in 1839, under somewhat similar circumstances, because the Barozai Chiefs favoured the Brahui Sirdars, during their late rebellion, and the Khán in consequence bears them bitter enmity. Pishín, he added, was once a Brahui possession, and is in a somewhat similar way a continuation of the Quetta and Dasht plains, but was taken from the Kalát Chief by the Dúrání King Ahmad Sháh. It is of great value for many reasons to Quetta. It acts, so to speak, as its granary, and has served as such since the occupation by us of the latter valley. It commands the principal roads into Kalát which it covers as well as the principal roads leading into the Panjab *viâ* Bori and Thal-Chotiálí on the one hand, and on the other those leading to Kandahar and Ghazni. I believe its strategical importance in relation to this portion of our frontier cannot be over-estimated, and that no ratification of that frontier would be complete without its being included in the tract of country directly within the influence of the British Government or administered like the Kalát State subject to treaty engagements."

148. The Agent to the Governor General thought that the salary of the nazim should be R300 per mensem; that the pay of the naib nazim should be R100 per mensem; that an establishment for Pishín should be entertained at a cost of R762 per mensem; and that the pay of the Sibi establishment should be R517 per mensem. This amount would be recouped by the revenue collected. The Government of India approved of the proceedings as reported.

Salaries recommended for the administration of Sibi and Pishín.

149. The Aitchakzai and Kakozai maliks offered their services as guardians of the Khojak Pass, making allusion to the posts they had occupied in the pass in 1839-42 during

The Khojak Pass at the close of 1878.

the first Kabul war. This offer was accepted by the Agent to the Governor General who visited the pass, and reported to the Government of India that there was nothing to prevent its being occupied.

Political communications between the Agent, Governor General, and Kandahar, 1878.

150. Before the outbreak of the war political relations with Kandahar were managed by the Agent to the Governor General. It had been customary for a considerable period before the outbreak of the war for the Agent to the Governor General to send weekly letters containing news from Kandahar to the Government of India for information. Shortly before the war began on the 1st September 1878, the Agent to the Governor General telegraphed that the Governor of Pishín had been intriguing with all the Kalát frontier tribes, but had been unsuccessful where Baluchis or Brahuis were concerned, and had met with but indifferent success with the Kákars and other Pathan tribes. On the 18th August the Agent to the Governor General telegraphed that the Amír's power and hold over Afghanistan was very much stronger than Major Cavagnari had given him credit for; "doubtless," he added—

there are many discontented, but a very strong party headed by the priests and the army generally is with him. In the event of rupture the whole of Afghanistan will at first side with the Amír; but one or two decided successes in arms would bring us many friends, and probably the whole of Southern Afghanistan would declare for us, but success in arms must first be undoubted. Unless something unforeseen occurs, Government can safely rely on the Baluchistan Sirdars and tribes joining us actively against the Amír if necessary.

Shortly after this the news of the Amír's refusal to admit the Mission under Sir N. Chamberlain was sent to the Agent to the Governor General, and he was instructed by the Government of India to "keep up and extend his friendly communications" as regards Southern Afghanistan. On the 4th October, the Agent to the Governor General heard from Government that a report, as to the result of his friendly communications with Kandahar, was awaited, and that the Government of India proposed telling Mír Afzal Khán, the Governor of Kandahar, under the Amír Sher Alí, to rely on the support of the British Government, both at that time and for the future, if he would keep Kandahar neutral in the quarrel between the British and the Amír. The Agent to the Governor General was told that this communication might be made whenever he thought fit, but that he should use discretion, "calculating measures for performance and avoiding engaging to act permanently." The Agent to the Governor General communicated the proposal to Mír Afzal, but he detained the messenger, pending the reply to a communication on the subject made by him to the Amír. The rupture with the Amír had taken place, and in consequence communication with Kandahar became very much retarded. It was, however, difficult for the Governor of Kandahar or the Kandahar Sirdars to show their hands until they were sure that they could act with safety to themselves and their families, or, as Mír Afzal remarked in words which lost none of their force by the figurative language in which they were expressed, "before I put on red clothing, I must first see that my white clothing will not be soiled." On the 31st October the Agent to the Governor General deprecated delay in advancing on Afghanistan, and on the 1st November the occupation of Pishín was sanctioned, about the same time that the ultimatum to the Amír was despatched. After this events rapidly followed each other—Sirdar Mír Afzal proposed to meet the British Force at Chaman on the Kandahar side of the Khojak Pass, to accompany the British Army to Kandahar, and to quietly hand over possession of the town. Ultimately the Sirdar did not see his way to this line of conduct, and on a re-consideration of our terms he rejected them and fled.

151. In December 1878 General Stewart reached Pishín and assumed command of the Kandahar expeditionary force. During the advance in the first phase of the Afghan war of General Stewart to Kandahar, it was arranged that he should exercise the supreme political authority in Afghanistan. Sir R. Sandeman thought that on account of his own previous connection with Kandahar and Pishín he ought, in the interests of the public service, to accompany General Stewart to Kandahar until after its occupation, as he felt certain that his withdrawal at that juncture would seriously prejudice the settlement of affairs, and prejudicially affect his own influence on the frontier; besides, he urged that many of the principal Chiefs of Pishín were in Kandahar, and it was advisable that the affairs of the two provinces should be settled together. Sir R. Sandeman's influence in Kandahar was considerable, and he represented that, unless he went to Kandahar, he could not satisfactorily utilise certain Sirdars in connection with Pishín affairs, "involving loss of political capital and of caste;" besides to deprive him of his Kandahar influence and connection "would be to sink three years of labour in creating it." The Agent to the Governor General said also that his chance of successfully administering Pishín would be increased were he to proceed to Kandahar, where several of the Chiefs were; besides up to date he had been in charge of British relations with Kandahar. The Government of India in replying to the Agent to the Governor General said, "Your influence and knowledge of the whole country from our border to Pishín is of the greatest value," and Sir R. Sandeman consequently did not proceed beyond the Khojak Pass on this occasion. General Stewart crossed the Khojak range with considerable difficulty owing to the want of roads. The communications were much improved subsequently, chiefly under the immediate supervision of Mr. Wells. Special arrangements were made by Sir R. Sandeman for supplies, postal arrangements, the protection of the telegraph line, the forwarding of convoys, and the feeding of camels.

The Government of India decide that Sir R. Sandeman cannot proceed to Kandahar on account of his influence in, and knowledge of, Baluchistan.

On the 9th January 1879 after a skirmish with the Amír's outposts in which the Afghan cavalry showed itself completely unable to make any stand against our own, General Stewart entered Kandahar. The town surrendered quietly. On the 21st January his cavalry had pushed as far as Kalát-i-Ghilzai, whilst Girishk on the Helmand was occupied by a force under General Biddulph. On the 26th February General Biddulph's cavalry distinguished itself in the repulse of an attack upon his rear guard when returning to Kandahar. With the exception of these engagements, the occupation of Kandahar and the reconnaissance of the Helmand were effected without resistance or any serious manifestation of national resentment at the presence of British troops.

152. The route of the Afghan army at the Peiwar Kotal, with the capture of Alí Masjid, and the expulsion of the Afghan garrisons from the Khyber Pass, shattered Sher Alí's power. Wholesale desertions from his troops took place, and the Amír's authority had then no longer any support. On the 19th December 1879 the news came that Sher Alí had fled from Kabul accompanied by the officers of the Russian Mission, investing, as his last act, his long imprisoned son Yakub with the regency. Early in 1879 the intelligence of the Amír's death was confirmed.

Flight and death of Sher Alí, 1878 and 1879.

153. Prior to and after the Amír's death, negotiations with Yakub Khán were carried on. Most of the conditions of peace he agreed to unhesitatingly, but he made strong representations as to the surrender of territory. The Government of India however thought—

Negotiations with Yakub Khán ending in the treaty of Gandamak, 26th May 1879.

that the withdrawal of our troops from their advanced positions in Southern Afghanistan without reference to the effect of such a measure on the country concerned would have probably

consigned all parts of the Amír's dominions to a condition incompatible with orderly Government or tolerable neighbourhood.

To negotiate the treaty afterwards concluded at Gandamak, Major Cavagnari was sent to that place. In the meantime the Shinwari tribe and the Khugianis were defeated at Deh Sarrak and Futtehabad, and Sir Sam Browne advanced to Gandamak, whither the Amír came. On the 26th May the treaty was signed. By this treaty the districts of Sibi, Pishín, and the Kuram were assigned to the British Government—

For the better protection and security of our frontier and for the proper maintenance of communications with our advanced garrisons, which will observe and command the three principal passes into India, it was essential that these three districts should remain in our hands. .........The passes of the Khojak mountains will be carefully kept under our control.

The words of article 9 of the treaty are—

In consideration of the renewal of a friendly alliance between the two States which has been attested and secured by the foregoing articles, the British Government restores to His Highness the Amír of Afghanistan and its dependencies the towns of Kandahar and Jallalabad with all the territory now in possession of the British armies, excepting the districts of Kuram, Pishín, and Sibi. His Highness the Amír of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees on his part that the districts of Kuram, and Pishín, and Sibi, according to the limits defined in the schedule annexed* shall remain under the protection and administrative control of the British Government, that is to say, the aforesaid districts shall be treated as Assigned Districts, and shall not be considered as permanently severed from the limits of the Afghan kingdom. The revenues of these districts, after deducting the charges of civil administration, shall be paid to His Highness the Amír.

* *Note.*—Omitted for the present.

After the signature of the treaty the Agent to the Governor General, in execution of the directions of Government, announced to the people of these districts that they were British subjects.

Murder of two camp-followers between Chaman and Spin Baldie in January 1879.

154. In January 1879, on the road between the Chaman post and Spin Baldie, two commissariat camp-followers straggled, were benighted, and were cruelly murdered by the people of the country. They were found by some troops with a convoy of stores for Kandahar, and discovering some men near the spot where the corpses were lying they took them to Spin Baldie. The officer there in reporting the case to the Officer Commanding at Chaman, made it appear that the convoy had been attacked, which was not the case. It was supposed that the followers of Lashkar Khán, the Alazai Sirdar, had made the attack, but enquiry showed this to be untrue, although there may have been some truth in the report that he had intended to do so.

Fight between Mr. Wells' party and Lashkar Khán's men.

155. It appears that Major Tulloch, on hearing of the hostile attitude of Lashkar Khán, sent Lieutenant Wells, R.E., with a small body of cavalry to summon Lashkar Khán to his presence. On the approach of Mr. Wells, most of the Alazais fled, but Lashkar Khán and his two sons fired on Mr. Wells and his party. A fight ensued, in which the Sirdar and ten men who remained with him were killed. The Agent to the Governor General thought that Lashkar Khán opposed Mr. Wells because he was not expecting a sudden visit of the troops, and because they were well aware that reports as to their intentions had been circulated by their enemies. Sir R. Sandeman proceeded to Chaman; he there collected the Nurzai, Alazai, and Achakzai Chiefs, and settled some disputes which had arisen between them; as to Lashkar Khán, he thought that his fate could not be much wondered at. Had the Nurzais not reported to the officer commanding that Lashkar Khan's people had committed the outrage, they would have themselves been held responsible for it.

Road made by General Phayre up the Bolan during the war in 1879, &c.

156. Early in January 1879, in consequence of the Afghan war which had some months previously broken out, a line of road was made in Kachhi, preliminary details with respect to it having been arranged with His Highness the Khán, in view to keeping open the military line of communications from Sukkur to Quetta. The Khan consented to the land being made over to General Phayre, who was in charge of the whole line of communications, on payment. In the course of his proceedings General Phayre wrote—

I have much pleasure in bringing prominently before the notice of Government the cordial assistance which I have received in all matters connected with the duty upon which I am employed from His Higness the Khán of Kalát, whose instructions to his naibs of Bhágh and other places to give immediate attention to my requisitions for aid, as far as it lay in their power to render it, has greatly facilitated the general progress made.

A cart-road was made up the Bolan under the superintendence of General Phayre. The money due for the land taken up was to be paid to the owners at rates fixed by a Committee. Immense quantities of war material, &c., were forwarded up this road during the war. In recognition of his efforts Lord Lytton wrote to the Khán—

I have received with much pleasure reports of the cordial assistance which has been afforded by your Highness to Brigadier-General Phayre in maintaining the line of communications between Sukkur and Quetta, and in all matters connected with the duty on which the Brigadier-General has been employed in your Highness' territories.

His Highness was profuse in his thanks for the letter, saying that he had placed his country and all the influence he possessed at the disposal of the Empress, adding that he was "always ready to place at the disposal of Government his life, wealth, and all he possessed."

The road was not however one of a lasting nature, as it was exposed to floods from the Indus and the Bolan stream down the Bolan Pass. In 1880 (May) it was handed over to the Public Works Department, in view to keeping it in repair. It may here be noted that a railway service cart-road was made by Colonel Lindsay along the Harnái route in 1880, and a cart-road from the north of the Chapar mountain to Quetta was made. It was proposed in 1880 to close the Bolan route in favour of that by Harnái, but this does not seem to have been done.

Outrages in Pishín committed by Achakzais and Kakozais, January 1879.

157. When General Stewart marched from Pishín for Kandahar, he left behind in Pishín a moveable column of troops consisting of 300 infantry, 1st squadron of the 8th Bengal Cavalry, and 2 mountain guns under the command of Major Keen, to aid Sir R. Sandeman in preserving the peace of the country. On the night of the 8th January 1879, at Arambi Karez a native infantry, commissariat guard, was attacked by men of the Achakzai clan, two sepoys and a commissariat official were murdered, and a non-commissioned officer and some Government property were carried off into the Umráu hills. On the following night an attack was made on a guard of the 1st Punjab Infautry at Killa Abdulla. The men were however expecting them, and although the attack was delivered from all sides at once the fire of the sepoys checked the assailants. The success of the sepoys was due to arrangements previously made by Subadar Faiz Talab.

Punishment and submission of the maliks of the assailants.

158. Besides these outrages news reached the Agent to the Governor General that a body of Achakzais and discharged sepoys of the Amír's Kandahar Army, in all about 2,000 men, had collected in the Gwajah Pass in front of Gulistán Karez to cut the line of communications. In order to check attacks from the Achakzais and Kakozais, the Agent to the Governor General called on Major Keen to march with the

column on the Arambi valley. The column was reinforced by Major Crookshank and 100 Goorkhas, and by a night march the village of Arambi was surprised, and the names of the offending villages ascertained. The column marched on them, but the maliks fled firing on the troops. The Government property plundered was found in the villages, and the hamlets of Mírs Kalam and Khushang were destroyed. The next day Maliks Kalam, Hakim, and Khushang surrendered to Sir R. Sandeman and brought with them the prisoner whom they had taken and three rifles they had stolen. The maliks said they had acted under the orders of the Governor of Kandahar who had directed them to rise against the British, and this statement the Agent to the Governor General believed to be true.

Mr. Duke's visit to Shorawak, May 1879. Resistance of the Barechis.

159. The question as to whether Shorawak and Sharod, two districts lying to the south-west of Pishín, belonged to Pishín or not has occasioned some correspondence and originally arose in the course of a discussion between Sir R. Sandeman and the Governnor of Bombay, as to whether it would be possible to take the railway by that route, and so turn the Khwájah Umrán range of mountains. Mr. Duke on his way to join the Agent to the Governor General went round by Shorawak and Sharod with an escort of 33 Panjab Cavalry sowars, and 182 infantry of Jacob's Rifles under the command of Major Humfreys. When the party arrived at Nushki Kaisur Khán, an influential malik of the Barechis, the inhabitants of Shorawak, visited Mr. Duke and was informed that the expedition of the troops was of a friendly nature. On arrival at Syadbut a village 4 miles beyond the Khán's border, it was apparent that there was something wrong, as the village was deserted, and a Brahui Sirdar was sent out to make enquiries; he was met by a Barechi force of 2,000 men who fired on him, and then approached the escort. A fight took place about 2 miles from camp, the Barechis losing more than 100 killed or wounded, while the escort did not suffer, with the exception of a few wounded men. The Chiefs then surrendered unconditionally and were kindly received. Pir Muhammad, Mandozai, was induced to submit with some difficulty. The people seem to have been much impressed by the ease with which they were defeated. Several of the Khán's sepoys who had deserted from his army, because he would not join the Amír of Kabul, were killed in this fight. After the encounter the march was leisurely continued to the Pishín border, where the party was met by Captain Wylie and a small body of men. It should be here observed that the Agent to the Governor General had told Dr. Duke not to advance beyond Nushki if there were any chance of his being opposed.

Mr. Duke's visit to Sharod. Opinion of the Agent to the Governor General.

160. From Shorawak Mr. Duke proceeded to Sharod, where no difficulties were experienced. In commenting on the correspondence the Agent to the Governor General remarked that he had inferred from Mr. Duke's demi-official letters that he would not run the risk of an advance towards Shorawak, should he have reason to suppose that he would meet with opposition. The Government of India remarked that —

the political management of the affair appears to be open to much comment; no reason is given in Dr. Duke's report for his omission to accord an interview to Sirdar Kaisur Khán, when that Chief appeared at Rahman Khán's village as a representative from the Barechís. The omission to receive Kaisur Khán seems to have been a cardinal error, for had the objects of the expedition been carefully explained to that Chief, and had Dr. Duke conducted the movement with the tact and caution which, in your original orders, were particularly enjoined, there seems good reason for the belief that the collision with the Barechís, which was certainly of no advantage to the British Government, might have been altogether avoided.

"I was disappointed," the Agent to the Governor General observed, "at the turn which affairs took, and concurred with the Lieutenant-General (Sir D.

Stewart) that Mr. Duke must withdraw (from Shorawak). I directed him to do so. This he accordingly did submitting a paper strongly urging, for reasons he gave, that Shorawak and Sharod should be considered part of Pishín. Captain Wylie, Assistant Agent, in charge of Pishín, also took the same view.

Description of Shorawak.

161. "Shorawak," Mr. Duke said, "is a strip of country which seems as if it had been redeemed from the sandy desert of Registan by the waters of the Lohrah floods." Shorawak is bounded on the north-east and west by hills, the northern boundary being a continuation of the Kwájah Umrán range. The plain between these hills is almost level, well cultivated in part. The Barechi population was estimated by Mr. Duke to be 15,000 souls, of whom about 4,500 were said to be fighting-men. There are a few Achakzáis in the valley with whom the Barechis are at feud. This officer also reported that—

the Barechis state that in ancient days their country was subject to the Moguls, that they themselves first came from Kandahar, and that they always enjoyed much independence.... ..... They were first placed under tribute by Kohandil Khán, the Barakzái Chief of Kandahar. The Kandahar Sirdars had invaded Kalát, and the Barechis had not assisted them with a contingent. I cannot help thinking that the Shorawak people, even to the present day, have always kept up a sort of understanding with Kalát.

Opinion of Sir R. Sandeman that Shorawak and Sharod should be considered as parts of Pishín.

162. Towards the close of 1879 Sir R. Sandeman wrote a memorandum on the subject of Shorawak and Sharod, regarding which places he had had much correspondence with Sir D. Stewart. The Agent to the Governor General said—

I understand Sir Donald Stewart to agree that Shorawak and Sharod were doubtless at one time administered from Pishín, but that, under the terms of the treaty of Gandamak, they could not be so considered, because at the outbreak of the war they were administered from Kandahar. I very reluctantly, as the letter I forwarded to the Foreign Secretary on the subject, if consulted, will show, agreed to this view of the situation; but at the same time I fully understood that before the question was to be finally considered as settled, it would be submitted to a Boundary Commission, who would be appointed to take the whole question of the boundary to be finally agreed upon between the Assigned Districts into consideration. I further understand that the question could, if necessary, be referred to the Afghan Government itself as to whether, on account of the position Shorawak and Sharod hold with reference to Pishín, it would not be more convenient, in the interests of all concerned, to place them under the Pishín administration.

Recently, however, General Stewart has sent a Governor to Shorawak, and a late telegram I have received from him states that, for political reasons, he objected to the 3rd Sind Horse being sent to Shorawak, a step I had recommended and which I would not have proposed had I considered that this part of the country was finally to be considered a part of the Kandahar administration. Moreover, recent affairs in Kabul have altered the present aspect of affairs in regard to Shorawak, and I cannot but think it would be a grievous mistake, without first thoroughly enquiring into the *pros* and *cons*, to take any important step leading to the belief that the question was at rest, or that I had renounced altogether my claim to Sharod and Shorawak being considered, for political reasons, a part of the Assigned District of Pishín. Under the above circumstances, instead of further discussing with General Stewart by telegram my reasons for desiring to send the 3rd Sind Horse to Shorawak, should they be obliged to march from Pishín, I have considered it desirable, as I am absent from my head-quarters, to place at once the present position of the question, as I understand it, before the Lieutenant-General for consideration, and this I desire to do in the shape of this memorandum. I freely admit that the interpretation by the Lieutenant-General put upon the treaty of Gandamak as to the position of the places referred to does seem correct, but at the same time, as the question is a most important one, more especially as a British Railway may eventually have to be taken through the district, it seems to me that it should not finally be set at rest until the question has been referred to Government. I will now here place on record why I consider this part of the country belongs to Pishín.

My reasons are—

*1st*—that when the Kingdom of Afghanistan was divided by the Barakzai brothers amongst them, Shorawak and Sharod were included in Pishín, and ultimately given to Khushdil Khán.

*2nd*—that the geographical position of the countries shows that they are part of Pishín.
*3rd*—that for administrative purposes, they are conveniently situated and form naturally a part of the Assigned District.
*4th*—that Sharod formerly belonged to the Kháns of Kalát, and that many Brahui families still reside there. On the other hand, it is most inconveniently situated with reference to Kandahar, as it is separated from it by fully 80 miles of barren country.

Its revenues are small, and they are not sufficient to permit of the Kandahar Government sending there a man of standing and position to administer the country. If this is not done, should it be finally decided to make the country over to Kandahar, the administration of the Pishín district which touches it will most certainly be injuriously affected, as all bad characters will naturally fly to Shorawak, where they will receive a secure asylum, and from their vantage ground commit depredations into Pishín. Altogether, I am strongly impressed with the belief that the interests of the Assigned Districts of Pishín as well as British interests generally, and more especially those connected with the Railway, require that the question should be submitted to the Government of India for settlement.

163. The efforts made on several occasions to open the Thal-Chotiálí route will now be recorded.

Efforts to open the Thal-Chotiálí route in 1875-78.

The Government of India, in Resolution No. 2819 P. of 16th October 1875, remarked on the advisability of opening the Thal-Chotiálí route as an alternative trade-route, should it happen that the Bolan Pass might be, for any reason, closed to traffic; and when Sir R. Sandeman went on his first mission to Baluchistan, the Panjab Government asked His Highness the Amír of Kabul to send an Agent to meet him in or near Quetta in view to discussing the question of opening this route, as has been mentioned in Chapter III. The Afghan Agent, however, never came, and it afterwards transpired that the Amír had declined to send one. In 1878 the war with Afghanistan broke out, and Sir D. Stewart reported that he considered the immediate opening of the route known as the Thal-Chotiálí route "to be essential to the maintenance of communications between India and Afghanistan;" and he considered that there was no doubt that the route *viá* Thal and Barkhan was the most direct that could be discovered. In view to opening up the route, General Stewart recommended the despatch of troops to Vitakri from the Panjab and from Pishín in the opposite direction. In considering the question of the rectification of the frontier, the Thal-Chotiali route was, in General Stewart's opinion, all-important, and he recommended that the political arrangements should be in the hands of the Agent to the Governor General. Among the objects to be gained by the opening of the Thal-Chotiálí route were the avoidance of the delay and inconvenience caused by the overflowing of the Indus, and the great heat on the plain between Shikarpur and Dhádar.

Description of the route. The Vitakri valley considered from a military and strategic point of view.

164. A brief description of the route it was then proposed to take will now be given. Starting from Dera Ghazi Khan the route crosses the Suleiman mountains at Fort Munro, and thence through the Barkhan valley over the Han Pass to Thal, the valley of Vitakri is a continuation of the Barkhan valley, which is entered from the Rakni plain, and troops, if there, would dominate the Khetrans, Marris, Bugtís, and the Tarin Pathan tribes of Thal-Chotiálí. The strategical importance of the Barkhan plains is very great, considered as a place where British troops should be cantoned in support of garrisons at Quetta and Pishín, as from them direct routes run to Dera Ismail Khán, Dera Ghazi Khán, Rajanpur, and Jacobabad in one direction, and *viá* Thal-Chotiálí to Quetta, Pishín, Ghazni, and Kandahar in the other direction. These routes lie for the most part through an open easy country and connect the valleys of Khurásán with the plains of the Panjab and Sind. In a

northerly direction these valleys flank all the passes leading from Afghanistan into the Panjab, as far as the Golari Pass in front of Dera Ismail Khán, while to the south they flank the Bolan Pass.

Decision of the Government of India to delay the exploration of the route.

165. The route from Khúshdil Khán Fort in Pishín, as far as Amadun, was reported on by General Biddulph. As to the rest of the route, the Agent to the Governor General reported that it went *viá* Chapar, Dirgi, Khost, Shárag, Gatchin, Harnáí, Wanechi, Reh, to Thal, giving all details, and observing that 30 miles of the way from Khúshdil Fort to Amadun, and 40 miles from Vitakri to Thal, had been already explored; and he recommended the exploration of the remainder. It was, however, decided that the exploration should be delayed,* as His Excellency in Council considered that there were strong objections to opening up the route in question with an armed force, observing that—

* Telegram Nos. 334P—335P. of 24th January 1879.

if the disposition and behaviour of the people is so unfriendly or doubtful that an armed force is required to open up the road, then the number of posts and convoys necessary to secure the use of the road is more than the Government of India would be prepared to maintain. If, on the other hand, the feeling of the country is so favourable as to make the road a safe one for convoys, then a Political Officer should not require a military force to accompany him through it. But His Excellency in Council is quite prepared to accept your (Sir R. Sandeman's) conclusion that, without a strong military escort, this route could not be safely or usefully traversed, and upon this ground the conclusion of the Government of India is that, for the present, the expedition would be premature, and would involve risks of embarrassment greater than its probable advantages.

Decision to open the Thal-Chotiálí route. The Agent, Governor General, visits Kandahar, 1879.

166. The question was, however, again re-opened during the year 1879, and it was decided to open the Thal-Chotiálí route. On receiving an intimation to this effect the Agent to the Governor General was directed by telegram to visit General Stewart at Kandahar in view to arranging with him accordingly. Briefly, the arrangements arrived at were, that (1) the troops returning to India from Kandahar, at the close of the first phase of the Afghan War, were to march back in three columns; (2) that they were to follow one another at intervals; (3) that the Agent to the Governor General should arrange for the supply of food and forage; and (4) that the political arrangements with the tribes were to entirely devolve on the Agent to the Governor General.

The force starts from Pishín.

167. On returning to Pishín the Agent to the Governor General collected supplies at Khúshdil Fort, and made further enquiries as to the easiest and best route for the troops to adopt. In consultation with the Chiefs of the neighbourhood and some of the Kákar headmen, it was decided not to march by Gwal and Amadun, over the Chapar mountain to Harnáí, but by Balozai, Usaf Kachh, Charri Momin, Chinjan, Sanjawi, Smalan, Baghao, Rahie, to Thal-Chotiálí, Barkhan, and Vitakri. This route was taken because the particulars regarding it obtained from the Kákars and other natives tallied with those obtained by Rai Bahadur Hittu Ram. Mr. Fryer, Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khán, was requested to proceed to Laghari Barkhan and to collect supplies there. He was also asked to provide for supplies at Thal-Chotiálí. The force consisting of 4 guns, 1 squadron of the 8th Bengal Cavalry, 1 squadron of the 2nd Sind Horse, and the 1st Panjab Infantry, marched to Sharin Karez, Balozai, and Eusaf Kachh, without either difficulty or opposition; on the next march, however, to Ispira Ragha on arrival at the Chari mountain, the Dumar Pathans who had armed themselves raised loud cries with the object of deterring the party from proceeding. The Agent to the Governor General persuaded the maliks however, that the march was a friendly visit to their country, and opposition was by this

means avoided. The march of the force was opposed on the crests of the Chari mountain by a single fanatic who had erected a barricade and declared that the British should not pass into his country excepting over his dead body. This fanatic was taken prisoner. Shortly after this the advancing party was fired at; and it was found necessary to make prisoners of a party of Dumars, who were disarmed to the number of 80 and brought into camp. After this it was settled that certain of the maliks should give hostages for future good conduct; it was also arranged that the 2nd column, then at Balozai, should have provisions, &c., brought for them. Posts were established to keep open communications. The first post was established at Dukan Kachh in the Dumar country. The Sarangzai, Panizai, and Mehtarzai maliks held themselves responsible for it; at this and in fact at each post there was a jemadar placed on R15 per mensem, and 15 footmen on R8 per mensem. The second post was placed at Ushtar, for which the Brahamzai and Sarangzai maliks were responsible, the third post was placed on the Chari mountain heights, and the Badanzai maliks were made responsible for it; the fourth post was established at Ubushki, the Chinjan and Dirgi maliks being responsible for it. The maliks in charge of the posts swore on the Kuran to be responsible for the safety of life and property, and the prisoners taken by the troops were released.

Advance of the force opposed. Close of the march.

168. From Chinjan, Chinali was passed, and Kachh was reached in safety, but at the Kandil Pass the force was stopped by armed men of the Aghbarg mountain; these, however, were dispersed by a couple of shells, and the troops then advanced over the defile into the Smalan valley. These men attacked Captain Campbell, of the rear guard, and his party. At Sanjawi the Agent to the Governor General halted and summoned the maliks of the Aghbarg hills and the Kandil Pass to come to him, which they did, and posts were established at Biani, Kandil defile, and Baghao. Arrangements were made for supplying General Nuttall and the second column. Shortly after leaving Sanjawi they found their progress opposed by armed men belonging to the Zhob and Bori districts. These men advanced against the British force. Several rounds were fired at them from the guns, the main portion of the enemy then retired, and two large bodies which advanced on the flanks were repulsed. Major Keene then advanced with the troops, and the enemy eventually fled, after about 200 had been killed and wounded, two or three sepoys were killed, and a few were wounded. Sháh Jehan of Zhob sent in a written submission, but excused himself on the plea of illness from personally submitting. Rahie and Thal were reached in safety. The Agent to the Governor General observed in the course of his report regarding what had been done, "My own belief is, there is nothing to prevent an understanding being come to with the people, including the Marri clan, for the British Government managing and protecting the country in the interests of all concerned, the Kabul Government included." Leaving Thal, Kot Shadozai and Chotiálí were reached in safety; at this last place the force was joined by 500 infantry and 300 cavalry under General Prendergast from Vitakri. At Barkhan the 3 columns and the Vitakri force met. Sir R. Sandeman accompanied General Biddulph to Fort Munro, whence he marched to Quetta, 200 miles, without tents, in seven days, escorted only by the Marri Chiefs. General Buddulph's column, it may be noted, diverged from the track here given at Chinjan and went down the Bori valley through the Ánambár gap, and across the Chamalang river to Baladaka, and thence to Barkhan. By this movement negotiations then in progress with Sháh Jehan of Zhob were interrupted as he and his Chiefs returned into the Upper Zhob valley. The whole force numbered 3,500 fighting-men.

Support by the Khán of the British cause during the war. Services of Sir R. Sandeman.

169. The Government of India when reviewing the results of the war in a despatch, dated 7th July 1879, said—

By the Khán of Kalát (with whom our relations four years ago were very unsatisfactory) the cause of the British Government throughout this war has been well supported beyond the frontiers of India. It cannot be doubted that the conditions of the treaty signed by the Amír at Gandamak in 1879 have been greatly facilitated by the results of the treaty signed by the Khán of Kalát at Jacobabad in 1876. Certain it is that the military difficulties of the war, and the political impediments to the peace, now happily concluded, would have been seriously aggravated by hostile or untrustworthy conduct on the part of the Sovereign and Sirdars of Kalát. For the fidelity with which the Khán has observed his treaty engagements, and for the uninterrupted sympathy and good-will of the Baluch tribes and Sirdars, we are largely indebted to the personal influence of Major Sandeman, and to the abilities with which he has discharged his important duties as Agent to the Governor General in Kalát . . . . . The policy applied during the last three years to the pass tribes of Baluchistan has already effected the complete pacification of even their most turbulent sections, and the Bolan, though unguarded by British troops, has been remarkably safe and quiet.

In despatch No. 27 of 7th August 1879 the Secretary of State, Lord Cranbrook, observed, when commenting upon the first phase of the Afghan war, "the services of Major Cavagnari and Major Sandeman in particular have been of special importance to your Government. The value of Major Sandeman's personal influence over the Khán of Kalát and the Baluch Sirdars can scarcely be overrated."

Major Sandeman promoted to the rank of K.C.S.I.

170. Shortly after the treaty of Gandamak Sir R. Sandeman was promoted in the Order of the Star of India to the rank of K.C.S.I. On this occasion he received the following telegram from Lord Lytton :—

In anticipation of my letter, accept my cordial congratulations on your well-deserved honours. I cannot too warmly express my high appreciation of your valuable services during the recent campaign, to which I attribute the thoroughly satisfactory state of our relations with Kalát at a very critical period. Pray, present my most friendly regards and congratulations to the Khán.

In addition to this His Excellency the Viceroy subsequently wrote :—

I have performed few such pleasant duties during my Viceroyalty as of recommending you for the K.C.S.I. and as Grand Master of the Order I cordially welcome you to your present place in it as a brother Knight. From the signature of the Jacobabad treaty up to the present moment, your management of our relations with the Khán and his Sirdars has not only been most successful, but has been marked by an ability, energy, and judgment, which place you conspicuously in the first rank of our frontier political service.

The Foreign Secretary at the same time sent him warm congratulations. When Lord Cranbrook moved the vote of thanks to the army in the House of Lords after the treaty of Gandamak, he said, with reference to Sir R. Sandeman's services—

Perhaps as I am speaking of civil services, Your Lordships will allow me to say one word of another officer, Major Sandeman, who had charge of the negotiations at Kalát. It was necessary that these should be in perfect harmony with what was done elsewhere, and the satisfactory condition into which the country has been brought is in no small degree due to the admirable qualities which Major Sandeman brought to bear upon the Mission he had in charge. I have therefore thought it right to mention him also before I pass to consider the special services which were rendered by the officers.

Darbar for the bestowal of the Queen's portrait on the Khán, and the Order of C.I.E. on certain Sirdars, August 1879.

171. On the 19th August 1879 a darbar was held at Kalát by the Agent to the Governor General for the purpose of conferring on the following native gentlemen the Order of the C.I.E. :—

(1) Mír Mahmud Khán, eldest son and heir of the Khán.
(2) Mír Jám Alí Khán, eldest son and heir of the Jám of Lus Beyla.

(3) Sírdar Assad Khán, Chief of the Saráwán Brahuis.

(4) Sírdar Gauhar Khán, Chief of the Jalawan Brahuis.

Mír Jám Alí Khán was, however, absent on a pilgrimage to Mecca. The occasion was one of importance, because at this darbar the cordial thanks of Government were conveyed to the Khán publicly, in consideration of the assistance he had rendered to the British during the Afghan war, together with 3 lakhs of rupees as a gift in recognition of the aid he had cordially accorded. The Queen-Empress had moreover given her command to Sir R. Sandeman in person to present to His Highness a picture of herself, and the presentation was accordingly made on this occasion. Several British officers and 24 Sirdars and others were present. The Khán had among other things placed at the disposal of the Agent to the Governor General 20,000 maunds of grain for the troops. When the picture was presented, Sir R. Sandeman said, he had been commanded to assure the Khán that—

so long as he remained loyal to the British Crown, and true to his treaty engagements, His Highness could rely on the power of England to maintain him secure in the possession of the dominions over which he is now ruling. These were, as far as I can recollect, Her Most Gracious Majesty the Empress' own words, when signifying to me it was Her Majesty's Gracious intention to accede to the Khán's request to obtain a picture of Her Majesty. This request I had personally the honour to convey to the Queen at Windsor Castle, at the time when I presented to Her Majesty by desire of the Khán His Highness's picture.

At this Darbar Sirdar Assad Khán was confirmed in the possession of an estate known as Mahram, as to which there had been a dispute. The Khán, when expressing his gratitude for the favours he had received, turning to the Agent to the Governor General said—

My best thanks I give to you, Major Sandeman, who, ever since you have been in my country, have worked unceasingly to settle disputes, and maintain the peace of the State, which has been established purely owing to your kindness.

It may here be noted that the conclusion of the treaty, signed between the Viceroy and Khán of Kalát at Jacobabad, set Sir R. Sandeman free. He had previously applied for leave to Europe. Lord Lytton, however, wrote:—

I am not surprised to learn from Colonel Burne that, after your trying labours of the last nine months, you feel the need of rest. I need not say that on this point I am most anxious to meet your wishes, but I feel so strongly that just at present, and indeed so long as our relations with Russia and Afghanistan remain in their present ambiguous and critical condition, your continued presence and influence in Kalát are absolutely necessary to secure and confirm the results of the recent treaty, that I anxiously trust that it may be compatible with your convenience not to withdraw them till matters are still more settled.

# CHAPTER V.

Introduction.

172. In the last chapter mention was made of the arrangements under which the district of Quetta was handed over to the British; of the principles held in view when selecting that place for the location of troops; the discussion as to the rectification of the frontier; the circumstances under which the Amir of Afghanistan was declared to have exchanged the friendship for the hostility of the Empress; and the attack on his dominions by the Khyber, the Kuram, and the Khojak passes; the occupation of Sibi and Pishín; the flight and death of Sher Ali; the negotiations with Ayub Khán, his son and successor, resulting in the treaty of Gandamak, by which Sibi and Pishín were assigned to the British; the outrages committed by the Atchakzai and Kakozai tribes; the expedition to Shorawak and Sharod; the efforts made to open the Thal-Chotiálí route; the conspicuous loyalty of, and the support of the British cause rendered by, the Khan of Kalát.

In this chapter it will be seen that the British Envoy at Kabal was murdered, and that the war broke out afresh, and while noticing what occurred in Afghanistan, an account will be given in detail of the events which took place during this period in Baluchistan and the assigned districts of Pishín and Sibi. In the latter district Thal-Chotiálí and Barkan were included, and all were under the control of Sir R. Sandeman.

Outbreak at Kabal resulting in the death of Sir L. Cavaguari on the 3rd September, 1879.

173. The treaty of Gandamak was signed on the 25th May 1879. The arrangements entered into with Yakub Khán were the best that could then be made, although it was at the time foreseen that they might be impaired by the disloyalty of the Afghan princes. The Amir had accepted the condition of subordinating his foreign relations to British control, as well as the subsidiary one requiring him to admit British officers to reside in Afghanistan. It had not been the intention of the Government of India that a British Envoy should live at Kabul, and it was in deference to His Highness' wishes that Sir L. Cavagnari was sent there, under the safe conduct and public guarantee of the Amir, with an escort of 25 cavalry and 50 infantry. The Envoy entered Kabal on the 29th July 1879, with every possible demonstration of honor and respect, the Russian Envoy having been previously dismissed. After his arrival, as far as the Government of India could judge, there was no tendency towards a re-action against the British alliance. Some difficulties were expected from Sirdar Yahia Khán, the Amir's father-in-law, who had great influence with His Highness, and from the general discontent caused by the mal-administration of the previous Kabal Government; but matters proceeded satisfactorily, and the last telegram from Sir L. Cavagnari concluded with the words "all well." The following day a mutiny occurred among the sepoys of the Amir's regiments, who were discontented at not receiving their full pay, and they turned on the Residency, which they set on fire. The defenders, amongst whom was Sir L. Cavagnari and other officers, perished after a desperate resistance. Immediately General Roberts was sent to Kabal, General Massy was instructed to re-occupy the Shutargardan Pass, and General Stewart, whose troops were on the move towards Pishín, to return to Kandahar. Just prior to the murder of the British Envoy, Sir R. Sandeman had proceeded to Kandahar, under orders from the Government of India, to take over political charge from Sir D. Stewart, and was actually with the General in the act of doing so when the intelligence was received. The attack on the British Residency at Kabal had no immediate bad effect on Baluchistan; Sir R. Sandeman telegraphed that the country round Quetta was quiet, that the good disposition of the chiefs and the people had been

unaffected by the event at Kabal, and that His Highness the Khán of Kalát had offered to assist the British Government to the utmost of his power. The shock of the news was, however, subsequently felt through the whole of Baluchistan, and became intensified when in the following winter General Roberts' force was shut up in Kabal. The mullas urged and incited the people to disturb the communications between Sibi and Kandahar.

Abdication of Yakub Khan on the 12th October 1879.

174. On the 6th October, Sir F. Roberts fought a successful action with the Afghans on the heights near Charasiah, a few days after he entered the Bala Hissar, and on the 12th October Yakub Khan declared his resolution to abdicate, which was followed by his deportation to India. The British army moved into Sherpur, where it was besieged; but the Afghan forces were eventually dispersed by General Roberts, and Kabal was re-occupied. The disturbed state of the Baluchistan frontier was shown in the attack and murder of Captain Showers and in various outbreaks which will subsequently be described. General Stewart, who was at Kandahar, where Sirdar Sher Ali Khán was formally recognised as ruler, on the 19th May 1880 marched to Kabal, fighting a successful action at Ahmed Kheyl on April 19th, 1880, and taking the city of Ghazni. It had been the policy of Lord Lytton's Government to sub-divide the Kingdom of Afghanistan, on the grounds that no chief could be found sufficiently strong to rule the whole country; and secondly, that it was necessary that a strategic position should be secured on the line of Quetta, Kandahar, and Herat. But Mr. Gladstone's Government objected to this policy on the ground chiefly that it would entail the provision of military force to support the separate Kingdom of Kandahar. After General Stewart left Kandahar, the command of the force there was under General Primrose. After the abdication of Yakub Khán, a successor had to be found; and in this view negotiations were opened with Abdul Rahman, which ended on the 22nd July in his being formally and publicly recognised by Her Majesty's Government at a darbar as Amir of Afghanistan. This darbar was held by Sir D. Stewart, who had marched to Kabal. A few days after came the news of the defeat of General Burrows at Maiwand; it did not, however, affect the political position in Northern Afghanistan, whereas in Southern Afghanistan it showed that the rule of the Wali, who was completely helpless and inactive after the mutiny of his troops (which occurred shortly before the battle of Maiwand) and prior to the dispersion of Ayub Khán's army by General Roberts, could not be re-established; and Mr. Gladstone's Government were of opinion that the establishment of a military post or a military protectorate at Kandahar as a measure of defence against a power far more formidable than any Afghan race, was inexpedient and should be deprecated. Sirdar Sher Ali Khán withdrew to Karachi from Kandahar at his own request, made in October, 1880, and was there granted a pension. During August 1880 the Kabal field force was withdrawn under the command of Sir D. Stewart, notwithstanding the reverse at Maiwand. The posts at Lundi Kotal and in the Khyber were, however, for a time retained. Since the retirement the Government of Kabal has been conducted by the Amir Abdul Rahman; with this introduction what went on in Baluchistan will now be mentioned.

The work performed by the Agency in October 1879.

175. As the officers of the Agency will be frequently mentioned in this chapter, it will help to make matters more plain if the work of the Agency and the distribution of the officers be here noticed. In October 1879, the Agent to the Governor General observed that the duties of the Agency were (1) those connected with the observance of the treaty of 1876; (2) the administration of the assigned districts; (3) the duties at the Court of His Highness the Khán, including the affairs of South-Western Baluchistan; (4) the treasury at Quetta; (5) the affairs of the

Marri and Bugtí tribes; (6) the affairs of Lus Beyla, the Karachi frontier police, and the Mekran coast; and (7) the Baluch Guides, tribal levies, and the postal and telegraph sowars. For the conduct of these duties there were three assistants to the Agent to the Governor General, a Political Agent at Gwadar, the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khán, quâ the management of Baluch tribes conterminous to the Punjab frontier, the Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General in Pishín, Captain Showers, on general political duty, Mr. Biddulph, in charge of the treasury, and the District Superintendent of Police at Karachi quâ police duties. The Agent to the Governor General represented that the duties of the Agency had since its commencement much increased in consequence chiefly of the revenue work in the assigned districts and Quetta, the garrisons in Pishin, Sibi, and elsewhere, and the extension of the railway from Sakar in the direction of the Bolan.

Distribution of the officers.

176. For the management of Jacobabad affairs, the administration of land belonging to the Khán irrigated by the Indus canals, matters connected with the railway, and the affairs of the Bugtí tribe, Captain Reynolds was placed at Jacobabad. Captain H. Wylie was placed in charge of Pishín, and of the affairs of the Kakar and the Atchakzai tribes. Captain Curzon Wyllie was employed in Quetta, Sibi, and the Bolan Pass; the officer in charge of the treasury being placed in subordination to him, with magisterial powers for the trial of offences. Captain Showers was placed in command of the Baluch Guides, the control of which had been hitherto divided between Mr. Bruce and Captain Reynolds. The affairs of Baluch Guides will be explained in another place. Captain Showers had charge of the line of communications from Jacobabad to Chaman. The duties at the Khán's Court were entrusted to Dr. Duke, in addition to his work as a medical officer. Mr. Dames was in charge of Barkan and Vitakri and the surrounding country.

Agreement made with the Marris with respect to service, 13th March 1880.

177. About the month of March 1880, Sir R. Sandeman inspected the railway works which were at that time going on at Nari Gorge, where several thousand coolies were engaged on the works. The labourers had been somewhat insufficiently supplied with military protection, and bearing this in mind, it was essential to come to a good understanding with the Marris below Spintangi, as between that point and the Nari Gorge the railway and the telegraph wire extended through a series of valleys which, although situated in the Sibi district, had for many years been held by the Marris. With this object the Agent to the Governor General summoned the Marri chief, Mehrulla Khán, and some other influential chiefs and executed an agreement with them providing not only for the security of the railway and telegraph, but also for the carriage of mails, the keeping open of communications, and the general safety of life and property. Under this arrangement there were to be five posts at Killat-i-Killa, Gandakin Daff, Kuchali, Zindgiaf, and Dallujal. The total proposed expenditure on account of service was to be R2,350 per mensem; all salaries were to be paid by Mr. Duke, the Political Officer, who had left Kalát, and under whose immediate orders the sowars were to be; the management of the Marri service being in his hands, much trouble was experienced in reconciling the Marri sirdars to the presence of the British in the hills, as they dreaded that the organization of the tribe would be broken up by British intercourse. For the safety of the telegraph R800 per mensem was sanctioned, and the balance of the sum of R2,350 was to be met by the railway authorities.

Circumstances leading to the murder of Captain Showers, March 1880.

178. On the 24th March 1880 occurred the murder of Captain Showers—an outrage which was the outcome of the unsettled state of country induced by the arrival of the news

of the murder of Sir L. Cavagnari in Afghanistan, and the abdication of Yakub Khán. The chief of the Panizai Kakars was Faiz Muhammad Khán, and he was the only man who declined to make his submission to the British, after they were fairly established in the country. In the winter of 1879-80 the Harnài route was selected for the proposed railway to Pishín and Kandahar, some posts were in consequence established, and more attention than had previously been the case was paid to the Panizais and Sarangzais who commanded the whole of the new line from Gwal to Sharag. From one account it appears that Faiz Muhammad, bearing in mind that Alladina Kurd was receiving a large sum annually for service in the Bolan, seems to have thought it expedient to assert himself and make his presence felt; and an attack was made on Captain Showers, the Commandant of the Baluch Guide Corps, in the Udapasha Pass leading to Quetta from Harnái.

Details of the murder of Captain Showers.

179. At Harnái, which Captain Showers passed *en route*, it was known that he intended to go to Quetta by the then unexplored track lying through the Dumar country. It is a well-ascertained fact that Captain Showers was warned that the road was unsafe, and that if he persisted in proceeding by it he would be attacked; however, he ascended the pass with a slender following, through a rugged ravine leading to the crest which is about 2,000 feet above the Zawar valley at Dargai, about 3 miles from which the path descends along a nalla, and while walking along this, Captain Showers was suddenly fired at by a party of Panizai Kakars concealed behind some rocks, by whom, from all accounts, he was killed by a volley. At the same time several of the Baluch Guides were killed and wounded, and those who could, dispersed in all directions. The leader of the ambuscade was Koidad, a nephew of Faiz Muhammad and most of his followers were Panizais.

Gravity of the position. Troops march to punish the tribes.

180. The news of the outrage reached Sir R. Sandeman at Harnái, and he received a letter purporting to have been sent by Faiz Muhammad and Hakim Khan, the Panizai leaders, stating that they had murdered Captain Showers, and defying the Agent to the Governor General to continue his march over the Chapar route, unless he wished to share a similar fate. He also heard that the Panizai tribe, besides declaring hostility, were holding the road against the British, and had attacked a railway survey party in Pishín under Lieutenant Fuller, R.E., wounding a European Sergeant and two sepoys, killing three of the followers, and plundering the camp. The position was one of considerable anxiety. Unfavourable accounts were heard of the Pathan tribes in the Babián valley which separates Harnái from Spin Tangi; below Spin Tangi there were Marris to be considered, and it had to be borne in mind that any retrograde movement would be attributed to weakness in troops and fear of the Panizais, and would inevitably lead to a general rising; moreover, the position of several thousand railway labourers in the Nari Gorge had to be thought of, there being but very few troops for their protection. In view of these considerations, the Agent to the Governor General marched to Chapar, with his escort of 150 infantry and 80 cavalry, applying at the same time to Generals Burrows and Stewart for more troops. Reinforcements were obtained, and 300 infantry and 80 cavalry in all, under the command of Colonel Durand, started from Sháhrig. The march of these troops tended to dissipate disquieting rumours from Kabul, and the efforts that had been made to induce the people to rise by circulating captured property among them.

The Panizai gathering dispersed.

181. During a reconnaissance on the 2nd April a party of Panizai Kakars were unexpectedly met, who fired from a fortified position on the Chapar mountain and wounded Sir R. Sandeman's Jemadar of chaprasis in the shoulder, and sent a bullet

through the Agent to the Governor General's hat. The Jemadar at the time was endeavouring to cover Sir R. Sandeman from the effect of the fire. The enemy, however, lost several men, with the beneficial result that the Panizai gathering dispersed, and parties of other clans who were with them returned to their homes. On arrival at the Panizai village of Dirgai, the village towers were blown up, and the crops used for fodder. A few days after this the Agent to the Governor General received information from the Government of India that it was most important at that time to avoid military operations. In the meantime what had transpired at the place where Lieutenant Fuller's camp was attacked should here be noted. A mallik in Government's employ had gone to the spot to recover what he could, and on leaving it left some Pathans in charge. Captain Humfrey with some men of the 10th Bombay Native Infantry, who were not far off, marched to the spot, and seeing some Pathans in charge, opened fire, killing a sowar and a zemindar of Gwal and wounding another man; the rest fled.

Proceedings taken in April 1883 for the settlement of the Panizai Kákar case.

182. At the end of April 1883, the Agent to the Governor General held a conference with General Phayre, who had then just come back from Kandahar to command the line of communications, and to decide on the nature of the proceedings which should be taken to obtain a settlement of the Panizai Kákar case, and the punishment of those persons who took part in the attack on Lieutenant Fuller's camp and the murder of Captain Showers and his followers. It was then agreed to march a body of troops to Khawás and Chínah, two revenue-paying villages in Pishín, the inhabitants of which had taken part in the opposition to the troops, and that terms should be offered to the headmen. The proposed movement was carried out, the names of the murderers were ascertained, and rewards were offered for their arrest. The headmen of the Panizais surrendered to the Agent to the Governor General, and were put on their trial at Quetta, where they were acquitted for want of evidence. The lands of the ringleaders were attached. A letter, it will be remembered, was at an early stage in the affair received by the Agent to the Governor General, to the effect that the murder had been perpetrated by Hakim Khán and Faiz Muhammad. Hakim Khán surrendered unconditionally; Faiz Muhammad was eventually offered terms (the authenticity of the letter was never actually established), *viz.*, that on his surrender and payment of a fine of ₨1,000 he should be pardoned, provided that he could clearly show that he had not actually aided in Captain Showers' murder; it was at the same time stipulated that if it should be proved that he had taken part in the murder, he would with the other murderers have to stand his trial. Taking into consideration the poverty of the man, the poorness of the country, and the fact that the village towers had been destroyed, together with the crops, the punishment was a severe one. The headmen of the Khawhás valley, chiefly Tarins, declared that the revenue was collected by the Panizai headmen, who had compelled them to join in the disturbances; and to dispose of this plea as an excuse for future misconduct, the Agent to the Governor General placed the Khawhás valley on the same footing as the villages of Pishín; security for good conduct was also taken from the headmen. The villagers of Amadan and Kachh had joined in the attack on Lieutenant Fuller's camp, and it was decided for the future to regularly assess the villages which had formerly paid a small sum in cash. On this as well as on other occasions during the war the Brahui Sirdars did excellent service. Sirdar Bahi Khán, a Pathan chief, through whose country the railway works were progressing, joined the Agent to the Governor General soon after Captain Showers' murder. Syed Afzal Shah after the outbreak tried to stir up the Marri chiefs against the British, but he surrendered to the Agent to the Governor General. These proceedings

received the approval of Government. Faiz Muhammad, together with others, took refuge in Zhob, and refused to accept the terms which had been offered to him. It will shortly be shown that he eventually submitted.

Captain Wylie proceeds to collect revenue from the villages, 1880.

183. In July 1880, Captain H. Wylie, then in political charge of Pishín, started with a strong escort to collect the revenue of Khawhás,* Kachh,* Amadan,* Mangi, and Dargai, which had formerly been collected by the Panizai malliks, but on which, in consequence of the outbreak, it had been determined to levy revenue at the rate of one-sixth of the gross produce. Those villages which had not taken part in the rising were to be exempted altogether for the current season. The village of Dargai was exempted as the crops had been destroyed by the troops. While, however, Captain Wylie was engaged in collecting revenue, renewed troubles took place at Kandahar, which brought his proceedings to a termination.

* These villages were subsequently placed under the Political Agent of Thal Chotiálí.

Submission of Faiz Muhammad.

184. On the return of the troops from Kandahar, General MacGregor was directed to reduce the Marris to submission, as will be narrated further on. While on this subject, subsequent events may here be anticipated. On the 8th January 1881, after the Marris had been induced to submit, Faiz Muhammad with the Panizai and Sarangzai headmen came into Sir R. Sandeman's camp, then at Mandai, the chief surrendering himself on the terms which had been offered to him in April; on his death in jail immediately afterwards in March 1881, his son Ibrahim Khán was recognised as chief. Since that time the country has been quiet. Service has been given to the Eastern Panizais to the extent of R462 per mensem.

The Quetta fort in May 1880.

185. About the time that Captain Showers was murdered, the Quetta fort engaged the attention of Government. When reporting on it in May 1880, the Commandant, Major Crawford, R.A., observed that it had been proposed to build a new fort on the plea that that in existence was constructed of mud, and was commanded by slopes to the east; but he said that in his opinion a mud fort had two important advantages—(1) damage done to it in action could be easily and quickly repaired, and (2) during action no splinters are made by shot. As to the fact that it was commanded, he remarked that there was no shelter on the plain for hostile guns, and that taking into consideration the high trajectory of modern guns, it mattered little whether they were fired from a horizontal plane or not. He recommended that it should be armed with long-range shell guns, which were already in the Quetta arsenal. The then armament consisted of smooth-bore guns; he also recommended that certain earthworks should be undertaken, and that a magazine should be constructed.

Opinion of the Agent to the Governor General as to the maintenance of the Quetta fort.

186. The Agent to the Governor General, while pointing out the strategical importance of Quetta as commanding the approaches to the Bolan, Gazabánd, Khojak, Gwaja, Hánah, and Sarákhulá passes, observed that it dominated the entire country east of the Khwáját Umrán range of mountains, and, together with Sibi and Pishín, guarded the frontier from Dera Ghazi Khan to the sea; that it was favourably situated for a cantonment, more so indeed than Kasimka-Killa in Pishín which had been proposed as an alternative place, for the location of troops; that a magazine, lunettes, banquettes, and a well had been made in the fort; that, medically speaking, Quetta was not an unfavourable place for troops; that the bad political effect of abandoning it would be much to be deprecated, as during the first phase of the Afghan war the tribes in the neighbourhood had been quiet, and that both the Quetta fort and cantonment should be maintained.

187. During a protracted period much correspondence took place regarding the placing of troops at Vitakri, which will now be noted. For good frontier management it is essential to keep the tribes from fighting among themselves, and to enable them to settle down to cultivation; as experience has shown that any disturbances amongst them vibrate across the border, and indirectly in many ways affect British territory. In former times the British border suffered much in consequence of the plundering habits of the Durkanis, Lasharis, Hadianis, Marris, Bugtís, and Khetrans. In consequence of the disturbed state of affairs in Kalát, nearly all control over the Marris, Bugtís, and others was at one time lost; after the occupation of Quetta more intimate relations with the independent tribes were entered into, many of the clansmen were enlisted in the service of Government, and posts composed of these men were placed within our borders as well as those of His Highness the Khán, also at the head-quarters of the different tribes, and other selected important points. By entering into these relations an opening was given to visit and obtain a knowledge of the lands inhabited by these tribes, to become acquainted with their feuds and quarrels, and to settle them by arbitration or compromise. By these means the protection of the lives and property of our own subjects was secured, as well as the safety of communications. The Khetrans were not originally a predatory tribe, but they were obliged to become so in self-defence. By settling their quarrels the tribesmen were given an opportunity of resorting to cultivation as a means of livelihood, of which they gladly availed themselves. Some outlying sections of the tribes were, however, not sufficiently benefited by our arrangements to be able to cultivate their lands, while they were prevented from obtaining a livelihood by plunder in certain directions, the result of which was that they plundered in other directions, and, *inter alia*, in Sibi and the adjacent districts. In order to extend British influence over the Marris, Musa Khels, Khetrans, and others, a central position, such as Thal-Chotiálí or Vitakri, was considered to be necessary, as a Political Officer stationed at either of these places would be able to prevent these tribes from fighting amongst themselves, and to induce them to take to cultivation.

Relations with the frontier tribes. Reasons for the importance of a post at Vitakri.

188. In August 1878, Sir R. Sandeman proposed to place a new camp in the valley of Vitakri. The Agent to the Governor General visited Vitakri, and there formed a Committee of officers, who had been sent for the purpose, to select the best position for a camp. The position selected had many military and political advantages, commanding the Khetran valley, and dominating the Marri and Bugtí tribes, and the approaches to Thal-Chotiálí and the Bolan. The hill chiefs and the Khán expressed much satisfaction with the proposal. The Khán was, however, afraid of the opening of the Thal-Chotiálí route, and a consequent loss of revenue to himself. As to supplies, no difficulty was to be anticipated; in view to this it was proposed to entertain 50 extra tribal sowars in order to assist Mr. Fryer, Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan (who had been deputed by the Panjab Government), in collecting them. Troops, it was proposed, should come *viâ* the Chachar Pass, a road through which was commenced. For the immediate accommodation of troops, Nawab Jamal Khán, who claimed certain lands at Vitakri, said he was quite ready to give up the fort at Laghari Barkhan, for the force sent to Vitakri. Colonel Peters was sent to construct buildings in 1879, and work was begun accordingly. In 1879 it was determined to withdraw the force, and the Agent to the Governor General then proposed that it should, as an outpost, take the place of Harrand, Dirgi, Vidore, and other minor frontier posts, and he deprecated the removal of the troops just after a considerable sum had been spent on the place, and their removal would, he thought, create an unsettled feeling along the

Site for the location of troops selected at Vitakri in August 1878.

whole frontier. All that was required was, he said, a strong post, not a cantonment, for the maintenance of the peace of the country. Since Pishín, Sibi, Quetta, and Kachhi had been garrisoned, the Agent to the Governor General urged that some alteration was necessary in the positions of the posts held for the protection of the Sind and Pishín frontiers. Vitakri had been reported to be unhealthy, but the Agent to the Governor General did not admit that it was so, and believed that reports which had been sent in with respect to this had been much exaggerated. Sir R. Sandeman recommended that the whole question of the position of the posts on the Sind and Panjab frontiers should be taken up in relation to the assigned districts, and discussed from a military and political point of view.

Determination to review the system of posts on the Panjab and Upper Sind frontiers.

189. In October 1879 (No. 4683 K. of 24th October 1879) the Government of India decided that the retention of the post of Vitakri was no longer needful, and that it had been determined that the garrison should be withdrawn. It was observed that it would be necessary, in communication with Sir R. Sandeman, Sir R. Temple, and Sir R. Egerton, to review the whole system of posts on the Panjab and Upper Sind frontier above Jacobabad, in connection with our altered position in Baluchistan, and our assigned districts of Sibi and Pishín.

Sir R. Temple visits Baluchistan with Sir R. Sandeman, November 1879.

190. Since such troops as might be required would probably have to be supplied by the Bombay Army, the Governor of Bombay visited the districts in the charge of Sir R. Sandeman, together with that officer. Sir R. Temple observed that whereas up to 1877 the British frontier garrison had been at Jacobabad, it had by the close of 1879 moved forwards, and the situation had been changed by the assignment to the British of the districts of Pishín and Sibi, and also by the construction of the railway. These circumstances opened up two questions—(1) the control of the Marri tribe; and (2) the pacification of the assigned districts. With regard to the Marris, the Governor observed that for generations they had exercised a predatory power of the worst kind over the districts of Kachhi and Thal-Chotiálí, and had subjected their neighbours to murder, rapine, and devastation—

"Mounted on the enduring horses bred in their hills, these Marri horsemen, in bands many hundreds strong, march long distances during the night and surprise at daybreak the villages destined to pillage. In this respect they resemble the Maratha hordes which appeared in India two centuries ago. In the plains of Sibi, in the valleys pertaining to the river system of the Nari, in the plateau of Thal-Chotiálí all cultivated and inhabited tracts overlooked by the Marri hills, the villages are generally square mud forts, with one strong gateway, and with loop-holed towers at each corner, evidently constructed for defence against sudden attack. The fields have square towers standing alone into which a man can enter from the top by an escalading apparatus, and shut himself up in the interior, saving his own person, while the marauder sweeps away his flocks and his cattle. These towers may sometimes be observed studding lines of country from point to point for miles and miles together. Notoriously these towers are built and maintained as precautions against raids by the Marris. They are to be found more frequently dotting the fields in front of those passes whereby the Marris penetrate from the hills into the valleys inhabited by their victims. Frequently villages are found decimated or partly ruined by these raids, and sometimes villages wholly wasted and depopulated. There is not a village, nor a clan,—hardly even, I believe any large family,—which has not stirring stories to tell of bloody resistance to Marri attacks. Sometimes even within very recent years there are authentic instances of regular fights, the people defending their homes against the Marri aggressors, with some hundreds killed on either side."

Improvement to be expected among the Marris.

191. The consequence of the Marri raids was to render the people of the neighbouring districts regardless of settled government and disinclined to submit to authority. In Harnái territory round the Nari and its affluents, British authority had at

that time been imperfectly introduced, and it was necessary to provide armed escorts for the surveys of the railway, to compel the people to conform to rules for internal order, and to shield them from external attack. The Marris had already, Sir R. Temple said, "through the exertions of Sir R. Sandeman," shown a remarkable improvement in behaviour; and "it is probable," it was added, "that after one generation passed under good management, the Marris will become so well behaved, that those who shall then see them may scarcely credit the history of misdeeds of the tribes."

Post recommended for Harnái. Defence of the Han Pass.

192. The Agent to the Governor General and the Governor agreed that a strong post of Native infantry should be placed at Harnái, an important station on the proposed railway line, to guard the railway staff and to watch the Marris. They also thought that the post then at Sibi might be reduced, that a small force should be kept up in Pishín. It may be here noted that Thal-Chotiálí was included within the Afghan district of Sibi, and Sibi was assigned to the British by the treaty of Gandamak after the close of the first phase of the Afghan war. The Governor observed that the districts of Sibi and Thal-Chotiálí "had to be administered fiscally, that its people had to be protected from aggression, and certainly it is a place full of resources, financial and other, the possession of which for administrative purposes the Government of India will never regret." As British authority had to be introduced into it, the Governor and the Agent to the Governor General considered that a force ought to be located at Thal to watch the Han Pass, whence Marris had frequently devastated the Thal-Chotiálí plateau from Káhan, and in order to do this more effectually, a post should, they considered, be placed in the Han Pass.

Retention of Vitakri recommended. Forces required for Harnái, Thal, and the Han Pass.

193. As to the post of Vitakri, they concurred in thinking that it controlled the Marris and dominated the eastern end of the district of Thal-Chotiálí. It moreover watched the line of communications to Dera Ghazi Khan and Harrand, and that politically and administratively it fulfilled all local requirements. For these reasons they recommended the retention of the post, notwithstanding a desire on the part of the Military Department to abandon it. In case of the abandonment of Vitakri, the establishment of the Han post was recommended. In making proposals as to the force required, especial stress was laid on having 2 guns of a mountain battery, as the neighbouring villages could not be taken by infantry alone without loss of life. The total force necessary for the three posts of Harnái, Thal, and the neighbourhood of the Han Pass was 2 squadrons of Native cavalry, 2 mountain guns, and 1 regiment of Native infantry.

Garrison required for Sibi, Thal-Chotiálí, and Pishín.

194. It was at the same time represented that the districts of Sibi, Thal-Chotiálí, and Pishín formed an elongated and narrow strip of country between Kalát and Afghan territory, the greater part of their borders being conterminous with the hills of predatory and martial tribes; that their population was for the most part unwilling to submit to anything but military force, although it might be anticipated that in time they might become good subjects; and that it had been proposed to make a railway through 120 miles of their country. For this territory only five military posts had been recommended, with a garrison consisting of 2 regiments of Native infantry, one regiment of Native cavalry, and 4 mountain guns. The Government of Bombay and the Agent to the Governor General did not think that order could be maintained with less troops.

Recommendations as to the cavalry posts on the Sind frontier.

195. With regard to the cavalry posts on the Sind frontier at Guranari, Toj, Shahpur, and Sunri, it was propsed that they should be dispensed with, and that one post

should be placed at Sangsila, to prevent a gathering of the Marris and Bugtís for a raid; together with 2 lesser posts at Sui and Lehri. For the garrison of Quetta 1 squadron of Native cavalry, 2 guns, and 2 regiments of Native infantry were recommended; with an increase, if the garrison of Kandahar were withdrawn. Sir R. Sandeman observed that in his opinion a retirement from Vitakri would have a very disturbing effect on the tribes, who would regard it as a sign of weakness.

Proposal to place troops on the Sham plain.

196. With regard to a proposal to place troops on the Sham plain to protect the Panjab frontier, Messrs Gladstone and Dames were requested to record their views. It was pointed out that the Lesharis, Durkanis and Haddianis might be considered as British subjects, and that it was desirable that they should no longer be considered as independent tribes; and in addition they recommended the establishment of posts at Nahr-ka-kot, Laghari Barkhan, and Rakni, and the disestablishment of all other posts on the Panjab frontier except at Bandawala, and Mangrota. The personal escort of the Agent to the Governor General was at this time left in Thal-Chotiálí.

Sir D. Stewart requested to provide troops and fix on posts in concert with Sir R. Sandeman.

197. The Foreign Department considered that in addition to the troops already at Sibi and Harnáí, a post should be placed at Thal strong enough to furnish a small flying column, or, if necessary, to occupy a post in the direction of the Han Pass; also that the cavalry stationed on the Sind frontier should be dispensed with, one strong post being placed at Sangsila. The subject of re-arranging the Panjab frontier posts was referred to that Government. Sir D. Stewart was instructed to fix on the posts in concert with Sir R. Sandeman, and to provide troops to anticipate any action on the part of the tribes.

Arrangements made by Sir D. Stewart with regard to Thal and Harnáí, 5th March 1880.

198. Sir D. Stewart said that in arranging the distribution it was necessary to remember that the troops detached from Quetta to serve on the Agent to the Governor General's escort were in occupation of Thal-Chotiálí and Harnáí. With respect to this the Agent to the Governor General observed that the withdrawal of his escort to Quetta from Thal-Chotiálí had been a cause of anxiety, as he had thereby been prevented from making a settlement with the Lunis, whose conduct had not been satisfactory. It was arranged with Sir D. Stewart that the Thal garrison should be 6 companies of infantry, 3 troops of Sind Horse, and 2 guns; while the Harnáí garrison should be 2 companies of Native infantry and one troop of Sind Horse. These posts were placed under Colonel Roome, with orders that troops were not to be moved across the frontier offensively excepting under orders from head-quarters, and that detached posts, small guards and escorts were to be as much as possible avoided. As to these orders the Agent to the Governor General said that, however advisable under ordinary circumstances they might be, they were not applicable to the then position, as the troops had to protect the railway which ran through the Marri country. Sir R. Sandeman referred this question to Government in view of the difficulties which might be experienced by him in consequence. The Government concurred generally, and permission was given to settle all cases as they arose.

The positions at Chotiálí and Sangsila.

199. Sir D. Stewart said that he had asked Colonel Roome to report on the position at Chotiálí, and that it was better to have a few strong posts than several small ones. In reply, the Agent to the Governor General said that the Thal-Chotiálí district had been assigned to the British at the treaty of Gandamak; that it had to be administered; that the people had to be protected; and that these objects could not be gained without the support of a military post at the east end of the

valley. Sir Robert further pointed out that General Phayre had withdrawn the garrison, and that troops should be sent there, there being none at that time at the Sangsila post.

Extra troops appointed for the protection of the railway.

200. For the protection of the railway an additional regiment of Native infantry was appointed, and the Agent to the Governor General recommended that two companies of these should be sent to the Sangan Valley, two companies to Harnái, and the remainder to the Pishín side of the Chhapar mountain. Sir D. Stewart recommended the establishment of the head-quarters of a brigade at Gwal. The Agent to the Governor General thought the garrison at Quetta very small, *viz.*, 1 battery, 1 regiment and 4 companies Native infantry, a squadron of Sind Horse, and 2 guns of a mountain battery. He also thought the Pishín garrison too small, and he urged the advisability of maintaining a moveable column there, which was agreed to.

Writing on the 3rd June 1881, on the subject of the troops required for the military control of Quetta and the assigned districts, the Government of India said that after the withdrawal of the British force from Kandahar the question might depend on the further development of the actual political situation in South Afghanistan. But it was observed—

"It is our intention, if political circumstances permit, to reduce the force to be maintained at Quetta and in Pishín, after the next cold season shall have set in, to a normal strength of 1 battery (garrison), 1 mountain battery, 1 regiment cavalry, 2 regiments of Native infantry and 1 regiment European infantry."

With regard to the line of communications it was said that—

The military authorities attach great importance to the stations on the road *viá* Harnái because, as has been already explained, it turns, covers, and protects the Bolan Pass, besides offering easy access at all seasons from Sibi to Quetta and Pishín."

As to the troops at Thal-Chotiálí, it was observed that they were not included in the garrison detailed above, since it would be more convenient to deal with them in considering the question of arrangements for the permanent protection of the Sind border. It will now be necessary to look back at events in India, where a change of Viceroys had taken place.

Departure of Lord Lytton from India, June 1880.

201. Lord Lytton, just about the termination of his tenure of office, writing to the Khán on the 10th June 1880, said—

"I thank you for the friendship which you have shown towards the British Government during my tour of office, and I hope that the friendly relations which have so long continued with benefit to your State and to the British Government will be strengthened under my successor."

The Khán sent a suitable friendly and complimentary reply.

Assumption by Lord Ripon of office on the 8th June 1880.

202. On the 8th of June 1880, Lord Ripon assumed charge of office at Simla; and in announcing the fact to the Khán, His Excellency said—"It is my earnest desire that the friendly relations which have so long existed between Your Highness and the British Government may during my tenure of office be preserved and strengthened." His Highness the Khán replied that he "continued to regard Her Majesty the Empress as his paramount Sovereign," and that he had on all occasions been ready to serve the British Government with his whole heart, placing his life and property at its disposal. Shortly after Lord Ripon's assumption of office he was called upon to deal with events of a serious nature in Afghanistan, which will now be mentioned.

Ayub Khán threatens Kandahar. Despatch of General Burrows to the Helmand, and reinforcements to Kandahar, June 1880.

203. During the month of June 1880, the Government of India received information that Ayub Khán was ready to make an attack on Kandahar from Herat, and thus threaten the military position in Southern Afghanistan, and it was consequently determined to send a British brigade in the direction of

the Helmand to oppose him, and to send reinforcements to Kandahar, to the extent of a brigade consisting of a British infantry and 2 Native infantry regiments, a battery of artillery, and a regiment of Native cavalry. General Burrows, who commanded the brigade sent to the Helmand, reached the river on the 11th July, and a few days after defeated the troops of the Wali of Kandahar which had mutinied, after which he fell back to a position at Khusk-i-nakhud, covering the roads from the Helmand to Kandahar. Whilst these movements were going on, reinforcements were being pushed on to Kandahar as quickly as possible, in spite of delays which were occasioned by the breaking of the railway between Jacobabad and Sibi by floods. In view to the repair of such breaks, Colonel Lindsay was requested to place himself in communication with General Phayre, and also to assist in passing troops over the Nari river. On the 7th July General Phayre telegraphed from Kachh that the breach in the line of railway was about 3 miles long, and that he hoped to get the two Native regiments with the artillery and the 15th Foot across it soon; he at the same time added that the Marri and Pathan tribes were giving trouble. On the 10th July the Agent to the Governor General telegraphed to the Government of India that the march of the Herat army to the Helmand had "caused much excitement in the country," and that four railway coolies had been killed near Nari Gorge by Marris; the chiefs, however, promised to surrender the murderers. Of the reinforcements, the first detachment consisting of the head-quarters and 270 men of the 4th Bombay Native Infantry reached General Primrose at Kandahar on the 13th July, and others followed in as quick succession as was practicable, up to the time when communications with Kandahar were interrupted in consequence of General Burrows' defeat. In reporting these circumstances to the Secretary of State, the Government of India said :—

"We consider that much praise is due to General Phayre and Sir R. Sandeman for their exertions in despatching these reinforcements under circumstances of considerable difficulty, owing to the frequent interruption of railway communications and other causes."

*Affairs up to the defeat of General Burrows at Maiwand.*

204. When the news of the mutiny of the Wali's troops reached Sir R. Sandeman, he recommended that the Thal-Chotiáli garrison should be relieved by troops from the Panjab to enable it to act as a moveable column along the Gwal-Chaman line of communication; and on the 22nd July he telegraphed that he had received information that Ayub Khán was going to attack General Burrows, and that he would also try to cut the communications in Gulistán from Shorawak; adding—

"There is much excitement among the tribes; mullahs of influence are moving about preaching a Jehad. The movement in Ayub's favor is more extended and determined than I think is believed in Kandahar. With reference to the above and the present state of affairs, I would strongly recommend, for the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief, that General Phayre should concentrate a brigade or flying column, according to his judgment or further political news, either at Chaman or Killa Abdulla, as he may decide; the troops to be taken from the line between Sibi and Gwal, but on no account should the regiments under orders for Kandahar be interfered with, as the chief line of communication is the Bolan *viá* Quetta."

Sir R. Sandeman called on General Phayre at his house to deliver the news, and General Phayre sent it to General Primrose. General Primrose was directed to arrange for the column at Chaman, or Killa Abdulla if necessary; at the same time the railway plant between Sibi and Harnái was to be protected. On the 27th July General Burrows unexpectedly encountered the whole of Ayub Khán's army at Maiwand and sustained a defeat, and General Primrose evacuated the cantonments and retired to the citadel in Kandahar.

*Arrangements made consequent on the battle of Maiwand.*

205. When General Phayre at Quetta heard of the defeat, he and the Agent to the Governor General telegraphed to Government concerning arrangements, as they heard that Chaman would be attacked obliging them to push troops up to the

Khojak. The telegram reached the Government of India when assembled to debate on General Burrows' reverse. The Foreign Secretary wrote:—"Our trust is now mainly in you and Phayre, who are both experienced and courageous frontier men;" and he added—

"Your telegram was read with universal applause. The Viceroy cordially recognises your exertions, and has much reliance on your energy and experience for aid in holding our ground and recovering it. In writing yesterday to the Queen about this unfortunate affair, Lord Ripon mentioned that you were displaying zeal and intelligence."

General Phayre commenced withdrawing the troops from the railway line by retiring the Thal-Chotiálí force on Harnáí, whence it marched to Pishín, collecting on the way the troops on the Harnáí line, and making the railway property over to the malliks of the tribes. It was intended that troops should be sent from India to arrange for the protection of the railway line, and the Agent to the Governor General was informed that "the Viceroy relies on you to co-operate with Phayre in relieving posts and pushing forward reinforcements." On the day after the defeat, telegraphic communication was broken between Chaman and Kandahar. Immediate arrangements were made for the despatch of troops from India by the Sibi railway and the Bolan and Khojak passes, and a strong force, subsequently famous for its brilliant march, was despatched under General Roberts from Kabal to Kandahar. The effect on the country produced by the abandonment of the railway line, the raid on the Kuchali railway convoy, the destruction of the stores entrusted to the malliks of the tribes, and other incidents will be found described further on. On account of the misconduct of the Marri clan, whose country from Dhadar to Bibinani bordered on the Bolan, the Agent to the Governor General brought to the notice of General Phayre that the posts in the Bolan were too weakly held. General Phayre could not, however, spare more troops for the communications; and both he and the Agent to the Governor General asked for another Native infantry regiment for this duty. A regiment of infantry from Meerut was ordered up for reinforcement, and arrived in due course.

Conspicuous loyalty of the Khán, after the defeat at Maiwand.

206. The instant the Khán of Kalát heard of the reverse at Maiwand, he sent the Agent to the Governor General the following telegram:—

"I am certain that the enemy will get their due reward soon. I am glad to afford help: my head and my all belongs to the British. I shall never draw back. 150 camels and 100 horses are ready at Mastúng just now; inform me and I shall happily send them to you immediately. Musa Khán left this (Kalát) 3 days ago for Quetta with 100 camels. Whatever grain or money is required by the British I am ready to supply."

To this telegram the Viceroy replied—

"Please convey at once to His Highness the Khán of Kalát the Viceroy's cordial acknowledgments of the friendship and loyalty towards the British Government attested by his prompt and valuable offer of co-operation."

And subsequently a telegram came to request that the Khán might be informed that Her Majesty the Queen had expressed her satisfaction at the news of the Khán of Kalát's loyal offers of assistance.

Disturbed state of the country between Kandahar and Quetta.

207. The garrison of Kandahar numbered 5,068 men of all ranks, but after the line of telegraph to them was cut, all communication with the force became very difficult, the country between Kandahar and the Khojak Pass being in a state of insurrection; and on the 30th July the Agent to the Governor General reported that the Kakars and Atchakzais were collecting; adding "but in a few days I trust we shall be strong enough to hold the country from Quetta to the Chaman post." On that day detachments came in to Chaman. The crest of the Khojak was occupied in force by troops under General Phayre on the 1st August; and

on the 4th August that officer reported some skirmishes with the Atchakzais, and said that a convoy of carts had been attacked near Dinar Karez by Kakars on the 3rd August. A detachment of Baluch Guides and Native infantry were sent after these Kakars by the Agent to the Governor General and General Phayre, and it was plain, the General said, "that the Pathan tribes of the Khojak and adjacent country are determined to molest our communications between Chaman and the Gazáband Pass, and that they must be secured by strong detachments." On the 7th August the tribesmen collected in the defile between Chaman and the Khojak, whence they were driven with loss. The country was in fact in a disturbed condition. The Agent to the Governor General reported that he had received news from Shorawak that men were assembling under Pir Muhammad Baretchi, with the object of attacking the British posts in Pishín, and that an attack in force was meditated on Kalát through Shorawak, with the object of seizing the Khán's treasure said to amount to 30 lakhs. The Brahui Sirdars, however, expressed themselves ready and anxious to help the Khan if anything of the kind were attempted. The Agent to the Governor General offered the Khán assistance, for which His Highness sent his thanks. The Thal-Chotiálí garrison marched without any opposition from the people, about the 5th of August. On the 13th August the Agent to the Governor General telegraphed that Ayub Khán was intriguing with the Atchakzais in the neighbourhood of Toba and Chaman. On the 16th August the post at Kachh Amadan was attacked by Kakars. An account of this will be found further on. Sirdar Assad Khan was of considerable use in moving stores from Quetta to Killa Abdulla; he contracted to move 10,000 maunds of commissariat stores from Quetta to that post, and the Agent to the Governor General reported that the contract was "loyally carried out by the Sirdar at a time of much difficulty." On the 24th August was received a letter from Kandahar describing the sortie which took place on the 16th, in which General Brooke and several officers and men were killed.

*Rising of the Khán's troops at Kalát.*

208. On the 25th August a partial rising among the Khán's troops at Kalát took place; the mutineers, of whom there were a considerable number, did some damage and then left Kalát, taking the road by Shorawak, to join Ayub Khán at Kandahar. As soon as the Agent to the Governor General heard of the occurrence, he offered the Khán assistance, and His Highness replied that the mutineers had begged him to join in fighting the British, and had threatened him if he did not. The Khán telegraphed as to this affair—

"I being a sincere ally of the British Government, gave them (the mutineers) a decided reply that I would not. Some of the sepoys were from the Narwai, and some from the Shahnawazi regiments, and amount in all to 200 men. They mutinied last night about 10 o'clock, broke open the jail and carried away 30 prisoners, taking the Chhapar-Ziarat road. No other damage done. I have my other troops ready, and have sent my Brahui sowars after the mutineers. I am expecting the return of these sowars. The mutinous sepoys are residents of the British district of Pishín and of Kandahar. If you can send a force to intercept them I shall be glad."

The Agent to the Governor General recommended that troops should be sent to Kalát. On hearing the news the Viceroy telegraphed to the Khán that he was—

"gratified to learn that the mutiny of a portion of the Khán's troops had no serious consequences, and that the Khán may be assured of the readiness of Government to afford him assistance and support."

*Defeat of Ayub Khán at Kandahar.*

209. On the 23rd August General Roberts arrived at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, and on the following day Ayub Khan broke up the investment of Kandahar, and retired to the Arghandab valley. About this time General Phayre was ready to march from

Chaman, and the Agent to the Governor General, as the Atchakzais of Toba were still threatening as well as the Shorawak people, asked General Phayre to place a moveable column at his disposal in Pishín to keep open the communications between Quetta and the Khojak Pass. The column was provided under General Walker. On the 1st September General Roberts attacked and completely defeated Ayub Khán's army, which was dispersed, and his guns were captured. On the preceding night General Phayre started for Kandahar, and Ayub Khán endeavoured to negotiate with him before his defeat. As far as Chaman the jurisdiction of the Agent to the Governor General extended; beyond that point Captain H. Wylie was sent as Chief Political Officer, with Captain Loch as an assistant. At the same time Captain Curzon Wyllie was deputed to Kandahar with all letters and telegrams for Colonel St. John, the Political Officer at Kandahar. Mr. Jennings, Political Officer in charge of Thal-Chotiálí, relieved Captain H. Wylie, who was in charge of Pishín. Major Reynolds came to Quetta, and Captain Martelli went to Jacobabad. Telegraph wire and poles were sent from Quetta for the repair of the line to Kandahar. Shortly after the news of the victory became known, the Agent to the Governor General telegraphed to the Government of India—" I have received hearty congratulations from the Khán on Roberts' victory." After a short stay in Kandahar, Sir F. Roberts left the city, handing over command of the troops there to Sir R. Phayre on the 16th ~~October~~ 1880.

Letter from Ayub Khán to the Khán of Kálát after Maiwand, July 1880.

210. The loyalty of the Khán of Kalát during the successes of Ayub Khán has already been noticed, but it should here be noted that in July 1880, after his success at Maiwand, Ayub Khán wrote an account of what he had done to the Khán of Kalát, and said—

"I have written this for your information. Be comforted, God favours us, and all our objects will be gained. To-day, Monday, I start for Ahmedshahi (Kandahar), and we will slay all the remaining infidels in Kandahar. You also with your cavalry, infantry, and tribesmen should, for the sake of God, declare and wage a religious war, in order that the unbelievers may be turned out of the Muhammadan kingdom."

On receiving this letter the Khán telegraphed to the Agent to the Governor General that he proposed to reply that if Ayub was his friend, he should acknowledge the supremacy of the British Government. Sir R. Sandeman, however, advised His Highness to send no answer; and the Khán accordingly dismissed Ayub Khán's messenger without reply.

Arrangements for making a road from Chaman to Abdul Rahman on the road to Kandahar, August 1880.

211. It may conveniently be here noted that on the 13th August 1880, a meeting was held at Quetta to decide as to which would be the best route between Chaman and Kandahar for the immediate establishment of a permanent line of communication and a good cart road. Of several lines of communication, General Phayre recommended the adoption of the most westerly, and it was arranged that after the departure of his advanced force from Chaman, the 3rd Brigade should advance with telegraph stores, &c., and should lay down a telegraph line. It was suggested that Major Twemlow, R.E., with Lieutenants Davidson and Jennings, should be left at Chaman with the object of constructing a cart road, and establishing posts. The Agent to the Governor General, however, brought to notice that the jurisdiction of the Baluchistan Agency ended at Chaman, and that their services could only be temporarily lent pending a reference to Government; this arrangement afterwards received the sanction of Government. Between Chaman and Kandahar it was proposed that six posts should be placed, and it was arranged that the Baluchistan Agency officers should perform the work from Chaman to Abdul Rahman, whence operations would be begun by the Royal Engineers, and the military protection of the workmen was provided for; the estimated cost was R18,678.

Carriage of stores through the Bolan under arrangements made by Political Officers, 1880.

212. During the year 1880 the arrangements for the carriage of Government stores up the Bolan Pass were as follows: In the early part of the year the whole of the traffic was successfully managed by Mr. R. I. Bruce, to the satisfaction of General Stewart. Later on the management of the local carriage was handed over to the Transport officers, but from a variety of causes it was impossible for them to carry all the stores without assistance from the tribes, which had to be arranged for through the Political Officers. After the reverse sustained by General Burrows, the difficulties of transport and of supplying forage for the animals was very severely felt. Recourse was again had to local carriage, and to a contract managed by the Political Officers which was arranged and carried out, at the instance of Sir F. Roberts; stores, except such as were very bulky, were carried by Brahui camels. Some correspondence arose afterwards as to the proposed reversion to the system under which the carriage of stores should be transferred to the Transport officers; but the charge of the transport was left in the hands of the Political Officers.

Food for the troops at Quetta and Kandahar carried by Brahui camels.

213. After the defeat of Ayub Khán at Kandahar, Sir F. Roberts met Sir R. Sandeman in Pishín, and on arrival there, expressed considerable anxiety as to the possibility of feeding his army. At his request Sir R. Sandeman sent to Kandahar and Quetta on Brahui camels six months' supplies from the base at Sibi. General Roberts both at the time and subsequently recognised the importance of these arrangements, and wrote to the Agent to the Governor General—

"During the late campaign the Brahuis and their camels were of the greatest use to me; they were simply invaluable. Carts were, as you know, quite useless in the Bolan Pass, and if you had not succeeded in inducing the Brahuis to come to the rescue, the troops at Quetta and Kandahar would have been badly off."

Sir R. Sandeman's night ride through the Khojak Pass.

214. After making arrangements with General Roberts for the punishment of the Atchakzais, Sir R. Sandeman went, at his request, to Chaman to meet General Baker, and to communicate to him the measures agreed upon. General Baker said that he would undertake the duty at once, and an account of what was done by him will be presently given. Leaving General Baker, Sir R. Sandeman had to pass through the Khojak Pass at night, and finding it held by robbers had, at imminent risk of life with a small escort of cavalry, to force his way through them, which he succeeded in doing with difficulty, and arriving at the nearest British post, a body of cavalry was at once despatched by the commandant in pursuit of them, as they had, in addition to closing the pass, attacked a convoy.

Expedition to punish the Atchakzais of Toba, September 1880.

215. In September 1880, Sir R. Sandeman met Sir F. Roberts at Gulistán Karez, as he was marching down from Kandahar, and discussed with him arrangements necessary with respect to the tribes which had been causing trouble to the British during the Afghan war. The eddies of the commotion caused by the reverse at Maiwand were not without effect on the frontier tribes of Baluchistan, who had been in an excited state for some time. General Roberts received instructions from the Quarter Master General to send an expedition to punish the Atchakzai tribe, a powerful Durani clan residing in Toba and the Umrán range of mountains, where to a considerable extent they led a pastoral life. It was then arranged that General Baker's brigade should march *viá* Toba. Captain H. Wylie was deputed as Political Officer with the forces, and instructions were given him to make such a settlement with the Atchakzai tribe as, without being unnecessarily severe when their poverty was considered, should ensure their complete submission to British authority, as well as teach them a lesson which

they would not soon forget. During the autumn of 1880, when the British were besieged in Kandahar by Ayub Khán, the Atchakzais had been hostile.

"They attempted to seize the Khojak, and Chaman was for a few days completely isolated, but they were driven off the pass, the crest of which was strongly held by British troops. For several weeks, however, skirmishes were of frequent occurrence, and the Atchakzais continually fired by night on the pickets, and by day on parties and convoys. It was also understood that they were prepared to sweep down on Pishín as soon as General Phayre's divisions should have marched to Kandahar."

Their plans were defeated by the battle of Kandahar with Ayub Khán.

General Baker's force starts.

216. Accordingly a considerable force under General Baker marched from Chaman on the 21st September 1880 for the highlands of Toba, the inhabitants of which, in addition to raiding in Pishín, had attempted to close the Khojak Pass, and had cut and carried off much of the telegraph wire. Sheep and goats were taken during the expedition in large numbers. In the Arambi defile a Sikh sepoy was murdered, and the people were punished by the destruction of some small hamlets. The tribes were induced to sue for peace without much difficulty; all the chief malliks presented themselves before Captain H. Wylie, and submitted unconditionally. That officer arrived at the conclusion that the losses inflicted on the British amounted to about R16,941, while the losses inflicted on the Atchakzais by the seizure of cattle and flocks amounted to about R18,222. These losses had been inflicted by General Baker and also by Political Officers, up the Arambi and Machki valleys from Killa Abdulla Khán to recover stolen property. The malliks swore in darbar that they would in future obey the orders of the British, and gratefully agreed to pay a fine of R600 imposed on them by Captain Wylie.

Service granted to the Atchakzais.

217. For the protection of the posts between Gulistán and Chaman across the Khojak Pass, the Atchakzais were given service, and were charged with the protection of the posts of Durra, Killa Abdulla, and Khak Jalal. The Agent to the Governor General thought that the expedition had been eminently successful, and that Captain Wylie's arrangements were deserving of praise.

Abandonment of the Harnái route by General Phayre in 1880.

218. The fact of the abandonment of the Harnái route and the Kuchali raid has been noted. What occurred will now be described. The disaster at Maiwand occurred on the 27th of July 1880. General Phayre's first act on learning that Ayub Khán was before Kandahar, and that the posts on the road to that city had been obliged to fall back to Chaman, was to direct the abandonment of the Harnái road and the railway works on it. The temptation given to the Marris by this precipitate abandonment of the railway line, coupled with the news of events at Kabal and Kandahar, in the opinion of the Agent to the Governor General,—

"afforded foundation for widely-spread reports that the military power of the British Government had received a blow equal to that dealt to it in 1842. The impression arose that Kandahar had been taken from us, and that we were for ever abandoning our Sibi possessions. This belief was strengthened by the fact that in the previous year the Marris had witnessed at a critical period our withdrawal from Vitakri, and the reduction of troops on the Dera Ghazi Khan frontier to no less than one-half their original number. It is not therefore to be wondered at that a disbelief arose in the stability of the British Government."

It should be here noted that by order of General Phayre, the troops below Harnái fell back to Sibi. Those at that place and above it, together with the Thal-Chotiálí garrison, were ordered to advance and concentrate at Killa Abdulla Khán, in view to protecting the line *viâ* Sibi, through the Bolan to Kandahar, and this was done. At this juncture the whole country was ripe for mischief again, the spirit of adventure was abroad, which showed itself in rumours of

hostile gatherings, and eventually in serious outbreaks, one of which resulted in the loss of several lives and a large amount of treasure.

The Railway convoy marches from Sháhrig.

219. It appears that General Phayre directed Colonel Roome on the 28th July 1880 to evacuate Thal-Chotiálí and march to Spin Tangi, *en route* to Pishín, picking up the Spin Kach, Sinarai, and Harnáí detachments, and making over the railway and other stores to certain malliks for custody at Sháhrig, Dargai, Chhapar and Kachh. The Railway Officers then on the spot were Colonel Lindsay and Major Peters; the Political Officers were Messrs. Duke and Jennings. It seems that Major Peters at Sháhrig lent some of his carriage to Colonel Lindsay at Dargai, and awaited its arrival from Dargai; and he then loaded the carts very heavily with a variety of effects, among which was a sum of R1,73,500 in cash. The convoy left Sháhrig and arrived at Spin Kach on the 4th August: it was here found that the river near this place was swollen and could not be crossed. It had been arranged that the Officer Commanding the 23rd Native Infantry was to act in concert with Colonel Roome at Sháhrig, and when the latter arrived at Spin Tangi he was to move down to Sibi. There was apparently some mistake in carrying out these orders, as, instead of Colonel Roome bringing with him railway stores and Government property, including the treasure, the convoy was moved from Sháhrig in charge of a weak detachment of 114 men of the 23rd Native Infantry, and 25 sabres of the 1st Sind Horse. Colonel Roome met them *en route* to Sibi at Spin Tangi, and left them there, continuing his march to Pishín.

The convoy leaves Spin Tangi.

220. On the morning of the 6th August, the convoy, consisting of a large number of laden carts, with sick soldiers, all the treasure except R50,000 handed over to Colonel Roome, and about 1,000 coolies, escorted by 25 Sind Horse and 82 effective bayonets, marched from Spin Tangi. Awaiting their arrrival at Kuchali were some carts, about 500 more coolies, about 500 followers of sorts, and 19 transport, telegraph, and other subordinates. The officers with the convoy were Lieutenant Tobin of the 32nd Native Infantry, Major Peters, R.E., and Captain Bowles of the Transport.

Excited condition of the Marris.

221. The Marris were now in a very excited state, which had been some time before stimulated by a quarrel with the Sind Horse, who in revenge for an assault on a syce, killed 6 Phirdadani Marris, whose heads they cut off. The enraged Marris attacked some Brahuis, who were said to have taken part in the affair; the Brahuis in retaliation seized some cattle, and Rai Hittu Ram was enquiring into the affair when the orders for the abandonment of the railway works was received, and the enquiry could not be concluded. The Marris then were thoroughly aroused when the convoy marched on the 6th August.

The attack of the Marris on the column.

222. Soon after the start, attacks were made on the rear of the convoy, but were driven off by Lieutenant Tobin, who was suffering much from a wound which he had very recently received in an affair which took place at Sinari, when he was on the march to join the railway convoy. By this time the head of the column of coolies got into a mountain gorge leading from Kuchali, and here about 100 Marris charged into the column; and many of the coolies were killed. About the same time the European subordinates in rear of the column were attacked, and some of them were killed. The column, however, pushed on notwithstanding that the Marris crowned the heights and kept firing into the troops. By degrees the carts were abandoned, the bullocks of which could not be got on, and the treasure was left behind, engaging the attention of the Marris who desisted from further attacks. It is said the robber chiefs called out "Drop the honey and the bees will stick to it." The post at Gandakin Daff was relieved *en route*,

and the convoy pushed on to Kalát-i-killa. The military losses were 13 killed, 10 wounded, and 2 missing, and there were 10 railway, transport, and commissariat employés killed.

The Agent to the Governor General recommends the despatch of a force to the scene of the outrage.

223. In this affair it was unfortunate that the carts were so heavily laden, and that instead of making over to Colonel Roome the treasure, the convoy took over some of his sick soldiers. Another unfortunate circumstance was the delay which took place in despatching the convoy from Shahrig. It should have started on the 1st August. The delay in waiting for the carts from Dirgai ended in the column not arriving at Spin Tangi until the 4th August, whereas, had the convoy arrived there on the 3rd and passed on before Colonel Roome, the misfortune perhaps might not have taken place. The Agent to the Governor General recommended to the Government of India that, at the conclusion of the campaign in South Afghánistan, a light force should be sent to the scene of the outrage to obtain from the Marris the return of the treasure and compensation for the injury done. The actual attack of the Marris was confined to the Tingani, Khalwani, Chilgiri, and Shahija sections, led by a few celebrated bad characters. The Bijarani Marri chief Karm Khan was close by at the time of the outrage, and presided over the distribution of the plunder. Khair Baksh Khan, the son of the Marri chief Mehr-ulla Khan, was sent by his father to meet Mr. Duke, the Political Agent; but he was not allowed by the headmen to join that officer and prevent the outbreak, the news of which he sent to his father in characteristic fashion. The message gained redoubled force from the figurative and expressive manner in which it was conveyed. Blackening a piece of paper on both sides with ink, Khair Baksh Khan sent it to his father charging the messenger entrusted with the mission to say that thus had the tribesmen blackened both their faces, in the presence of their neighbours, in the estimation of the British, and in the eyes of the Khan's Darbar.

The Marri chief not himself implicated.

224. There were several reasons for thinking that the Marri chief was not himself implicated in this outrage. In the first place, Kahan was so far off that it was very improbable that news of the movement of the treasure could have reached him in time to enable him to take action, even supposing him to be inclined to do so. Moreover, if the chief had encouraged the raid, it would not have been confined as it was to those sections in the vicinity of the scene where it took place. Some of the influential headmen were on the day on which it occurred actually in Sibi on business. Sir R. Sandeman believed that no one more deeply regretted than the Marri chief what had occurred, but that he was unable to compel the tribesmen to disgorge their plunder without the help of the British.

Marri raid on the village of Mall.

225. After this successful attack, the Marris continued to assume an openly hostile attitude. On the 20th August a large number of them made a raid on the village of Mall in Sibi, from which they carried off a large number of cattle, which were in the course of a hot pursuit mostly recovered. Two of the pursuers and several of the Marris were killed; and when on the next morning they were surprised by Major Douglas and some infantry, they made off in confusion, leaving their property and mares behind them. Most of the leaders on this occasion had taken part in the Kuchali raid when the treasure convoy was attacked and plundered. About the same time reports were rife that the Marris intended to make an attack on the Dera Ghazi Khan district in the Punjab, which resulted in the Deputy Commissioner making arrangements for the defence of the border.

226. On account of the serious misconduct of the Marri tribe, who numbered about 4,000 fighting-men, and occupied a mountain tract, formidable on account of its inhospitable character, the obstacles it offered to an army traversing it, and the necessity which existed for importing from India supplies for the maintenance of a force at considerable expense, it was determined to send a military expedition to punish the tribe, to place our political relations with them on a sounder and surer basis than they had hitherto held, to secure the railway line from attack, to afford safety to the men working on it, to obtain compensation for the persons killed during the raid, and to exact restitution of the money which had been plundered. Advantage was taken by the Government of India of the return to India of the Kábal-Kandahár field force, to instruct General Roberts to send a brigade under General MacGregor into the Marri country. Sir R. Sandeman offered the following terms to the Marris—(1st) restitution of treasure and bullocks plundered from the railway convoy, (2ndly) Rs. 20,000 fine to compensate private losses, and (3rdly) blood-money, according to tribal custom, for those slain. If they accepted these terms, the troops were merely to march through the country by Kahan and Harrand. The Government of India decided that the surrender of the leaders of the raid was not to be insisted on. Sir F. Roberts informed General MacGregor that he was to await the result of these negotiations at Quát Mandai. Mehrulla Khán, the Marri chief, had not however sufficient authority to enforce the terms offered, nor would he come to Sibi, as he would have thereby lost what influence he had with the tribe, who would not agree to surrender on the terms proposed. In the meantime General MacGregor, leaving a garrison at Quát Mandai, marched for Thal-Chotiálí. Information sent him as to the negotiations carried on by the Agent to the Governor General did not reach him, and he erroneously understood that news had not been sent him at all, which was not the case. General Roberts was with Sir R. Sandeman, and was himself instructing General MacGregor, all his orders were from General Roberts direct, and not through the Agent to the Governor General. Sir R. Sandeman remained with General Roberts for some days after General MacGregor had marched through the Marri country. Immediately afterwards Sir R. Sandeman, under direct instructions from the Viceroy, went to Kandahár with Sir A. Lyall. At no time did General MacGregor receive direct political instructions from Sir R. Sandeman, and the Agent to the Governor General could not accompany him as he was obliged to go to Kandahár. On the 17th General MacGregor started for Thal-Chotiálí, and on the 20th October he received a letter from the Marri chief to the effect that he (the chief) was then on his way to make his submission at Quat; the General replied that he was marching to Thal, and thither the chief followed him, reaching the place on the 2nd November. Karam Khán, the Bijèrani Marri chief, made his submission, and the two chiefs accepted the terms imposed on them by General MacGregor, *viz.*, the payment of two lakhs of rupees, of which R50,000 were to be paid at Káhan. To ensure the payment of the balance, Quát Mandai was to remain in the hands of the British, and 3 hostages were at the same time taken. The 3 hostages were Karam Khán, Akhtaran, and Khudadad. The R50,000 were paid at Káhan, and General MacGregor's force returned to India.

General MacGregor's brigade ordered into the Marri country, 1880.

227. It appears, however, that when the force was in the Quát Mandai valley, there were then crops standing, the value of which was estimated at from R55,000 to R70,000. Sir R. Sandeman urged that the crops should not be destroyed, and the Government of India concurred in this. General MacGregor had, however, instructed Colonel Anderson to destroy the crops, and burn the

Destruction of the crops in the Quát Mandai valley.

villages of Quát and Mandai, unless by the 31st October he received further instructions. The orders as to the non-destruction of the crops did not reach the military authorities in time, and the destruction of the crops and villages was carried out in a very unfortunate manner, for, before it was done, the Marri chief had surrendered, and the people were thus left almost entirely without food. The Agent to the Governor General recommended that some of the money due by the Marris should be remitted in view of the loss they thus sustained, and eventually R25,000 were remitted by the Government of India from the total amount payable. It was somewhat unfortunate that the force could not be marched to Neelee and Bajer Kach, where many of the refractory members of the Marri tribe were to enforce their submission at the request of Mehrulla Khán, the tribal chief.

Sir R. Sandeman marches with a strong escort to Thalli. Payment of money by the Marris.

228. The Agent to the Governor General, after the departure of the troops, received the Marri chief at Sibi, but the leaders of the Kuchali raid did not come with him, and as it did not appear that they were coming, and as the chief said that armed help was necessary to make them submit, Sir R. Sandeman, under the orders of the Government of India, marched with a strong escort to Thalli, with a most beneficial effect. As to this it has been stated in one of the books which have been printed that Sir R. Sandeman "made a sudden requisition on Brigadier-General Henderson for the escort allowed him by Government," as the "settlement made by Brigadier-General MacGregor appeared to have been not wholly satisfactory." The fact is, "the Viceroy visited the frontier, and it then turned out that the settlement agreed to at Káhan between the Marri Chief and General MacGregor could not be fulfilled, as the Marri clan refused to be bound by their chief sirdar's promises. A large amount of money (with cattle) was paid in to the Agent to the Governor General, and eventually the leaders of the Kuchali raid appeared, and surrendered, and money or its equivalent in kind was paid up, making a total of R1,25,000. Owing in great part to the burning of the two villages, considerable difficulty was experienced in obtaining from the clan full redress. The balance of the two lakhs was to be paid from the Quát Mandai crops after deducting the sum remitted by Government; for the payment hostages were kept, and a post which had been at Bahdra Brahui was removed to Quát Mandai, a post was at the same time placed at Gandakin Daff of 100 infantry and some cavalry. It may be here observed that Quát Mandai remained pledged to the British Government for the payment of the money, and its revenue has from that time forward been collected by British officers.

Re-organisation of the Marri service.

229. The system of service among the Marris was re-organised by a committee in view to obliging the tribe to abandon their marauding habits, and take to the cultivation of their lands. By this arrangement a sum of R3,000 per annum was to be distributed amongst them. The committee recommended that one officer should be specially charged with the duty of dealing with Marri affairs, and Mr. Duke was entrusted with this business. For his services the Agent to the Governor General recommended that Rai Hittu Ram should have the distinction of Bahadur given to him, and this title was conferred upon him by the Viceroy.

The authority of Mehrulla Khán maintained.

230. In this affair it has before been observed that only a portion of the tribe was to blame, the chief Mehrulla Khan not being implicated. In his history of the Marri Baluch tribe Mr. Bruce observes—

"I believe this is the first instance on record in our connection with the north-western frontier that a military force was sanctioned for the purpose of maintaining and enforcing the authority of a semi-independent chieftain, and the results which were eminently satisfactory, and approved of by Government, prove that it was a very wise procedure. In managing the

affairs of wild and uncivilised tribes like the Marris, it must not be considered that the chief is all powerful. The head men of sections have much power, and when the council of elders consider the honor or usage of the tribe at stake, the chief is obliged to give way."

On this occasion Sher Muhammad Khan, the chief's nephew, headed a faction in the chief's family, and weakened his influence—

"There are few chiefs, either Baluch, Pathan, or Brahui, who have not got in their own families feuds of a similar nature to contend with, and unless they receive the judicious support of the political authorities from which their power and influence for good is chiefly derived, their authority is in danger of being completely subverted."

Satisfactory reduction of the Marris at the close of the Afghán war.

231. By degrees, the Agent to the Governor General pointed out, the Marri tribe had been shut off from their customary plunder—*firstly*, on the Punjab and Sind frontiers; next, on the Bolan Pass and Kachhi direction; then on the Sibi side; and later in the Thal-Chotiálí quarter. Throughout the Afghán war they had been an important matter for consideration when making arrangements for the safety of the line of communication. At the close of the Afghán war they were reduced to complete submission, and since the time when friendly relations were re-opened with them, *i. e.*, since March 1881, few events of any importance have taken place with regard to them.

Re-occupation of the Harnai route after the Kuchali raid.

232. When General MacGregor marched down to the Marri country *viá* Harnai, Mr. Duke was sent with him for the purpose of re-establishing the military posts between Pishin and SpinTangi; but he was directed not to proceed with the force beyond Harnai. Mr. Duke reported that the deserted villages along the line contained large quantities of stores; bungalows, &c., had been damaged, but much telegraph wire and railway plant were recovered. It was reported that the Marris had burnt the whole of the immense store of sleepers that had been collected by Colonel Lindsay for the railway at Kuchali. Mr. Duke was requested to do his best to quiet the country about Harnai, and to induce the headmen to come in, to let bygones be bygones, and to smooth over matters as quickly as possible. By the second week in October all the Harnai malliks hád returned to their villages whence they had fled. A considerable amount of the property which they had plundered was by degrees recovered. Mr. Duke reported that the defeat of Ayub Khán at Kandahár had induced a general improvement in the tone of all classes. Posts at Mangi, Durgai, and Harnai were eventually established.

Murder of a mali of the Thal-Chotiálí Garrison, April 1880.

233. In April 1880 news was brought to Mr. Jennings, Assistant Agent to the Governor General in Thal-Chotiálí, that a mali of the garrison had been murdered. On discovering that the murderer was in the village of Khaim Khán, he summoned that mallik, who, however, refused to come. Mr. Jennings then applied to Colonel Roome for a detachment of troops and surrounded the village. A gun pointed at Mr. Jennings from the gate was snapped, but missed fire. A couple of mountain guns were then brought up, and the gate was opened. Mr. Jennings burnt the gate, and made a prisoner of the headman, together with another mallik. This had the effect of inducing Sirdar Samandar Khan to beg that the Lunis might be released, and to promise to make every endeavour in view to seizing the murderer, failing which the murderer's property, valued at Rs. 400, was to be confiscated to Government.

Military arrangements made for recommencing work on the Hárnai railway line, November 1880.

234. In September 1880 the Director General of Railways telegraphed to the Agent to the Governor General that the officers and men then on the railway line to Pir Chowki were to proceed to Nari Gorge, and resume work there, provided that sufficient military protection could be arranged for. In consultation

with the Agent to the Governor General and Captain Martelli, then Political Assistant at Sibi, it was arranged, in November 1880, that a strict watch should be kept over the safety of the working parties of coolies on the line of railway, and that for this purpose a body of infantry should be kept near Nari Gorge, and that small parties should be detached to wherever coolies were at work. Mr. Duke, then at Sibi, was informed accordingly.

The destruction of the villages of Kach and Amadun, August 1880.

235. It has been previously noted that the Kach post was attacked; an account of the affair will now be given. On the 16th August 1880, information was received that the Kach post had been attacked by a large number of Kakar Patháns, and a force accompanied by Major Mosley, Commandant of the Baluch Guides, proceeded to the spot. The chief instigators in the attack were Shah Jahan of Zhob and Faiz Muhammad; with some others from Brahiman. About daybreak on the 17th August the force was fired at, and as the approaches to Kach were held by large number of the enemy the post was not reached on that day. On the 19th August a steady advance, opposed by the tribes, was made on Kach, which was found to have been entirely deserted, and Major Mosley ordered it to be burnt. He then proceeded with troops to Amadun, the advance to which place was contested by the enemy. This village which was also deserted was partially burnt, no casualty occurred, but several of the enemy were seen to fall.

Visit of Captain H. Wylie to Kach.

236. Captain H. Wylie visited Kach on the 22nd accompanied by troops, and endeavoured to open negotiations with the chiefs, but failed. At Amadun some of the malliks came in. Captain Wylie reported that the news of General Burrows' defeat, the withdrawal of the British from the Nari route, and letters received from Ayub Khan's emissaries, "all combined to make the Kakars believe that our power had collapsed, and that we were leaving the country; they therefore assembled to loot the only outpost we had left in their country, and attacked it on the morning of the 16th instant with a force of some 2,000 men composed of the Sarans of Zhob under Shah Jahan and Saifulla and the Syadzai and Brahimzai Sarangzais, and the Panazais of Chinna," with a few Dumars and Chilgerris. On their repulse Shah Jahan and the Sarans returned discomfited to Zhob, and the others dispersed. The Agent to the Governor General, while regretting the necessity of burning a portion of the village of Amadun, said that under the circumstances it was unavoidable. The attack on these villages had the best possible effect; the tribes found that although the British had met with reverses at Kandahár, the tribal forces could not hold their own against them. The country has since been quiet.

Troops that could be subsisted in Quetta and Pishin on the local resources of the country.

237. In October 1880 the Government of India asked the Agent to the Governor General for information as to the force which could be subsisted in ordinary times in Quetta and Pishin. The Agent to the Governor General replied that Pishin alone could support at least 6,000 troops of all arms, and from 2,000 to 3,000 camp-followers, besides 2,000 baggage animals. It was also calculated that Quetta and the surrounding valleys could supply the requirements of 4,000 troops of all arms besides the usual amount of camp-followers; much help could also be got from Sibi and Dadar, and with this the Agent to the Governor General, in conjunction with Sir F. Roberts, calculated that a force of from 10,000 to 12,000 men of all arms, with their followers, could be supported.

Darbar at Jacobabad—Khán invested with the G. C. S. I., November 1880.

238. In October 1880 Lord Ripon wrote to the Khán to say that he was about to visit Jacobabad, where he would meet His Highness to thank him personally for his "loyal co-operation during the recent operations in Southern Afghánistan; arrangements were made accordingly. On the 10th

November His Excellency arrived at Jacobabad, where he was met by the Khán; they then proceeded to Pir Chowki and the Bolan Pass. At Jacobabad a darbar was held at which the Khán was invested with the order of the G. C. S. I. A large number of Baluchistan Sirdars, officials of the Khán, chiefs of the Assigned Districts, and Native gentlemen attended the ceremony.

Salute of 21 guns granted to the Khán, 1880 and 1881.

239. In May 1880 it was ruled by the Government of India that as "His Highness the Khán of Kálat continues to give proof of his stedfast loyalty to his alliance with the British Government by the effective aid and support which he has never failed to render to our political and military operations upon his frontier, and to the opening of the Kandahár Railway through his territory," he should be entitled to a salute of 21 guns from British troops within his own territory, his salute in British India remaining as before, *viz.*, 19 guns; but in 1881 his personal salute in British territory was raised to 21 guns.

The Agent to the Governor General deputed with Sir A. Lyall to Kandahár, 1880. Opinion of Sir R. Sandeman on the position of affairs.

240. During the last quarter of the year 1880, Sir A. Lyall and Sir R. Sandeman were deputed to Kandahár to report on the position of affairs. The opinion of the Agent to the Governor General on the subject is given in extenso as follows:—

"I understand that the chief military reasons, brought forward by military men in favor of the retention of Kandahár, are briefly as follows:—The recent marches of General Stuart from Kandahár to Ghazni and Kábal, and of General Roberts from Kábal to Kandahár, and of Sirdar Ayub Khán from Herat to Kandahár, have shown the possibility of moving considerable armies through Afghánistan. It is argued that, were the British to hold Kandahár with an army, the power of the future Amirs of Kábal would be hopelessly destroyed; and as I heard an officer, who was arguing for the retention of the country, express it, the backbone of the country would for ever be broken. It is further considered desirable to keep a strong force within striking distance of Kábal and Herat, for it is believed that, were the Afgháns to feel themselves within our power, they would cease to be a dangerous enemy, and by degrees we should overcome the determined hostility they have everywhere from Kandahár to Kábal shown towards us. Finally, it is said that the retention of Kandahár by the Liberal Cabinet would satisfy the Conservative party, and put a stop for ever to the chances of the Afghán war again breaking out with a change of ministry."

Evacuation of Kandahár recommended.

241. "Whatever may be the value of these arguments, one thing is certain. The British Government cannot now lightly give up the possession of Kandahár; and, if it does surrender it, this ought only to be done after such arrangements have been made with the Afgháns themselves as will secure to the British Government much that it has fought for, and for which it has expended much blood and treasure. I would, therefore, be in no hurry to evacuate Kandahár, although I would endeavour to arrange a programme that would enable me finally to give to the Amir Abdul Rahman the richest portion of his late grandfather's kingdom which he must feel is needful to secure his hold upon his throne, and to place his alliance with the British Government in the eyes of his countrymen on a sound footing. It should not be forgotten, in considering this, that the people of Afghánistan did not object to the Amirs Dost Muhammad and Sher Ali receiving a substantial subsidy at the hands of the British Government. Friendship, accompanied by substantial material aid, the country would not reject. The Amir himself, whoever he may be, can never be our friend so long as the most valuable portion of the Afghán kingdom is in our possession. It is, therefore, from every point of view desirable, if we intend Abdul Rahman to be a strong and successful ruler and one acceptable to his people, to place his power on such a foundation as would enable him really to feel that we are the true friends we profess to be of himself and his country. With this object it seems necessary to maintain our hold on Kandahár until the chance of further attempts on the part of Sirdar Ayub Khán to regain his brother's lost kingdom is over. We should certainly lose no time in making Muhammad Ayub Khán feel that his hold on Herat is a most insecure one. I would begin this by encouraging the present Amir, by every means in our power, to make a bold attempt to recover Herat. It would doubtless be very necessary to break our views, with regard to the restoration of Herat and Kandahár, cautiously to the Amir; but if he is worthy of our support, I would certainly give it heartily, and introduce a policy that would have for its

aim the placing of our relations with the Afgháns on such a footing that we would secure their friendship instead of their hostility."

242. With our improved military position at Quetta and in Pishin, and with Kandahár in our possession, to be disposed of at our will, we ourselves as well as the Afgháns must be different from other races if we fail to come to an arrangement that will secure to both sides what they have so determinedly fought for."

Arrangements which would be satisfactory to British and Afgháns.

243. "The English Government, whether Conservative or Liberal, has declared that Afgháuistan must be friendly to England, or cease to exist as an independent kingdom. The other power has shown, by great sacrifices, its determination to be independent. A great many will say the friendship of the Afgháns is impossible; that we have gone too far, and can never make them our friends. I can only say, in reply to this argument, that I do not agree with them. The people showed no determined hostility towards us until we deported their Amir Yakub Khán and created a ruling prince at Kandahár. Since then, at the latter place, the change in the attitude of the people towards us has been so marked that there can be no longer a doubt as to Wali Sher Ali having been unanimously rejected by the people as their ruler. Late events, in addition to this unpopularity, have doubtless convinced the Government of India of the impossibility of re-establishing, with any chance of success, the late Government."

Possibility of creating a friendly Afghánistan.

244. "If this supposition is correct, as a preliminary step, and before surrendering on a fixed agreement the country to Amir Abdul Rahman, I would summon the principal chiefs of the three most important clans, namely, the chiefs of the Barakzais, Papalzais, and Alkazais, and consult them as to the future; but I would do it in such a way as to leave no doubt of our intention to support the Amir we have recognised. I would also employ them, where possible, as long as we remain at Kandahár, in administering the country. I have heard it argued that there are no leading chiefs to summon. The facts are, however, the reverse of this. In no country are there so many leading chiefs and heads of families as in South Afgháuistan, as is shown by the list which accompanies this note. When Sirdar Sher Ali was created from being Governor under the ex-Amir Yakub Khán to be a despotic prince, the chiefs and heads of the great families were never consulted. A prince was thrust upon them. There were many reasons why Sher Ali was distasteful to the Papalzais as well as to Barakzais, and only those who wilfully blind themselves to this most unpopular act of our government wonder at the whole country crying out against it, and calling in Ayub Khán to aid them to drive Wali Sher Ali and our small contingent of troops from the country, for one and all believed that the force left at Kandahár by the British Government was given to Sher Ali to enable him to rule over them, and was not a British army of occupation in the proper sense of the word. Directly the Amir becomes strong enough, I would make over the country to him on terms to be fixed between his Government and the British. The real difficulty in surrendering Kandahár to the Amir Abdul Rahman is the almost certainty, under present circumstances, that directly we had marched from Kandahár, Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khán would make another effort to possess himself of the country. Until he is driven from Herat by Abdul Rahman, or, at all events, until the extent of his power becomes known, it seems to me almost impossible to surrender our military hold on Kandahár."

Advisability of consulting the Afghán chiefs.

245. "It is now necessary for me to say a few words with reference to the carrying on of the government of the province until affairs are ripe to enable the British Government to hand it over. I have already shown the undesirability of again placing the Wali Sher Ali in power. Without examining too closely into the motives that induced Sher Ali, the late Governor under Amir Yakub Khán, to accept the province as a gift from the British Government, we may well here consider briefly past events from the time of his assuming the government until now. These events have shown, and at the time of the Wali's instalment there were many who prognosticated that they would do so, that the country was greatly startled by what we had done. Outrages at once became frequent along the line of communication, culminating in the brutal murder of Major Waudhy, the Road Commandant, who had gone to Dubrai to meet certain malliks who had been heavily fined by the Wali for having been concerned in an outrage. Some said that the fine imposed by the Wali was so heavy that the people had become desperate, and many had joined the enemies of the British Government who took the opportunity offered of murdering a British officer. We, however, continued to trust the Wali implicitly, and bestowed on him arms and munitions of war, besides a battery of guns and some money. Having raised an army, he proceeded with it to Girishk to

Unpopularity of the Wali—Method of carrying on the government after his retirement.

meet and repel the advance of Muhammad Ayub Khán from Herat. It soon, however, became evident that he was entirely unable to cope in the field with Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khán, and the next demand the Wali made on our Government was for assistance in troops, which we gave."

Effect of giving troops to the Wali.

246. "I need hardly allude to the fact that, by complying with the demand of the Wali for the support of our troops, we split into two bodies the Kandahár garrison—one portion was sent to the Helmand to support the Wali, the other portion being retained at Kandahár, thus offering to Muhammad Ayub Khán the opportunity of defeating our troops in detail. As the Helmand was fordable at many places, it is difficult to understand why our troops were there at all, and why the Wali did not, instead, retire from Girishk on finding this to be the case. I have seen no explanation of the causes that led to our action in this matter."

Action of the Wali after Maiwand.

247. "I pass over briefly the disastrous results of these moves. Suffice it to say the Wali's troops mutinied, were attacked by our troops, and a number killed, the guns (our gift) captured, and it was believed the Wali's army had, to a great extent, dispersed. Subsequent events have shown that this was not the case. Our force then retired to a position some distance from the Helmand, fought Ayub Khán at Maiwand, and was defeated. The Wali fled from the field, and on reaching Kandahár visited General Primrose, and advised that officer to retreat at once and surrender the country to Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khán."

Impossibility of restoring the Wali to power.

248. "Under present circumstances it is surely very desirable to consider carefully these occurrences and the true value we are able to place on the Wali as a ruler, before we again restore him to power. It is well known that the whole of the surrounding country, in addition to the Wali's army, took part in the battle of Maiwand, and it is generally admitted that the leading men of Kandahár had, for months, been in correspondence with Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khán, who had been invited by them* to advance from Herat with the object of overthrowing the Wali's government. In short, the rising in the country amounted to a general insurrection."

Despatch of troops by General Phayre before the reverse at Maiwand to Kandahár.

249. "The military situation at Kandahár, after the defeat of Maiwand, would have been very serious indeed, had it not been for the alarm previously taken by General Phayre at the state of affairs in the country. He had despatched from the line of communications, some days previous to the defeat at Maiwand, the 4th and 28th Bombay Native Infantry to Kandahár, where they arrived just in time to replace those killed at Maiwand."

The Wali resigns his post.

250. "To finish my short narrative of events, it is desirable to add that General Primrose did not adopt Wali Sher Ali's advice. He was besieged by Muhammad Ayub Khán until the arrival of General Roberts' force within a short distance of Kandahár. After the battle of Mazra, in which Ayub Khán's forces were defeated and dispersed, the Wali asked to be relieved of his Waliship. I am informed that he was requested to take charge of the city, but refused to do so, and that Major Protheroe was appointed to carry on the duty of provisional governor of the town."

The Wali an enemy of Abdul Rahman.

251. "The events here briefly recorded should, of themselves, teach us the great danger of again putting up Wali Sher Ali. But in restoring him there would be also an entirely different danger to be met, if we care to examine and probe deeper into the politics of the country. Wali Sher Ali is not only an old adherent of the late Amir Yakub Khán, but it is well known that he and the present Amir Abdul Rahman are, for reasons unnecessary to record, bitter enemies. It is to be presumed that Sher Ali and the Amir to some extent know our views and intentions with regard to the permanent retention or not of Kandahár, the wealthiest province of the Afghán kingdom. Both fully know the past. Our action at the present time is, therefore, of vital importance. If we restore Wali Sher Ali, with a view to leaving the province in his hands when we retire, it amounts to placing the country actually at the disposal of Ayub Khán, for there can be little doubt that this would be the result of such a step. The present Amir will then have to meet in the field his enemies, Sher Ali and Ayub Khán, the former strengthened by the influence and money he must have accumulated during the time we have placed the country and its revenues at his disposal. Should the

* Surteep Nur Muhammad headed a large party. Had such chiefs joined the Wali, the heads of Popalzai and other families might have been induced to do so also. Muhammad Ayub was only induced to march on Kandahár on hearing that the country was ready to join him. I was, however, told at the time that the Kábal troops would not fight for Ayub Khán for reasons given me, and the result proved the truth of the statement made.

result prove fatal to Amir Abdul Rahman, we will have the knowledge that through our own acts we have destroyed our own work at Kábal. The position is not an enviable one in whatever way we may consider it, but common justice to the Amir whom we have recognised, if not care for our own interests, should prevent us from again trusting to the broken reed the late Wali Sher Ali has proved himself to be. If not very careful, we may destroy Abdul Rahman, and injure, in consequence, our own influence and position in the country, as it was injured during the first Afghan war. Moreover, to put it mildly, justice towards the Amir should prevent our committing an act that must of itself weaken him, and may possibly result in ultimately driving him from Kábal."

252. "In the interests of all concerned, I think it very desirable that the Government of India should lose no more time in announcing to the country at large, from a general point of view, their intentions with regard to the disposal of Southern Afghánistan. I believe the continued reticence of our Government as to what their ultimate intentions really are with regard to the disposal of the province must prove detrimental to the very important interests at stake."

Desirability of an expression of the intentions of Government.

253. Lord Lytton's Government in January 1880, when considering the events which terminated in the occupation of Kábal by Sir F. Roberts, the dissolution of Yakub Khán's Government, and the annulling of the treaty of Gandamak, proposed to establish the province of Kandahár as an independent and separate State, but interference on the part of the British Government was not contemplated. With regard to the districts of Sibi, Pishin, and Kuram, which had been assigned to the British by the treaty of Gandamak, and which were being administered by British officers, the Government of India observed—

The views of Lord Lytton's Government as to the retention of the assigned districts, January 1880.

"We had under consideration the restoration of Sibi to Kandahár under its new constitution, and of transferring Sibi to the Khán of Kalát in recognition of his loyal services during the late and present military operations. It appears to us, however, that there are objections to placing under a Native ruler populations that have once been under our own administration. Furthermore, Sibi and Pishin are both on the line of the proposed Sind-Kandahár Railway, which will run for a considerable portion of its course through these districts; and while the fact of its running through territory administered by us will undoubtedly facilitate the working and construction of this line, it seems also right and desirable that we should reap such profit and advantage as accrues from the development of the districts traversed by a railway constructed at our cost. There are also political advantages in interposing a belt of territory under British administration between the Afghán and Baluch provinces. For these and other reasons we do not recommend any present change in the status of the assigned districts."

254. Not long after this was written, the Liberal Government came into power, and they were of opinion that Kandahár should not be separated from the Kábal Government, and Lord Hartington, writing in May 1880, said—

The views of Mr. Gladstone's government as to the retention of the assigned districts, May 1880; and the views of Lord Ripon's government on the same subject.

"The necessity of retaining the posts in Pishin will be materially affected by the policy which may be decided on with reference to Kandahár, and it is probable that for the present, at all events, the maintenance of them will be desirable."

It was further at the same time said that the question of the permanent tenure of the advanced military positions acquired by the treaty of Gandamak must be determined mainly upon military considerations, and should not be affected by announcements made under different circumstances. The Government of India, while accepting in principle the severance of political connection with Pishin and Sibi when circumstances might permit, were of opinion that the occupation of those districts could not be terminated without risk of great injury to the interests of the people, and that its continuance for the time being, while of no disadvantage to the British Government, need not

involve serious political embarrassments. Similar representations were made to Lord Hartington by Sir R. Sandeman, then in England. The opinion of the Agent to the Governor General will be now referred to.

The Agent to the Governor General's opinion that it would be a mistake to relinquish Quetta and Pishin, 15th November 1880.

255. In 1880, on the accession of the Liberal party to power and the change of policy inaugurated by them, the retirement of the British from Pishin and Quetta as well as from Kandahár was discussed. Sir R. Sandeman, although in favor, under certain conditions, of the surrender of Kandahár to the Amir, considered that it would be "a fatal mistake both in the interests of the Kalát State and of the British Government to relinquish the position we have held of late years at Quetta and in Pishin." The Agent to the Governor General after reviewing at length the past history of the country of Baluchistan, its relations with the British Government, the constitution of the State, and the causes which led to our interference in Kalát affairs, went on to remark on the success which had attended our policy, the unmistakeable friendship of the Khán, his chiefs and people, openly, actively and demonstratively given throughout the war, when, notwithstanding that the loyalty of the people was severely tried, the Bolan Pass had been as safe as any part of British India, and notwithstanding that, after the battle of Maiwand, Ayub Khan made many attempts to shake the stability of the alliance with the Khán, calling upon him in the name of Islam for assistance, the tie that bound the British to His Highness remained unshaken.

Hostility existing between the Brahuis and Baluchis and the Afghans.

256. With reference to a remark at that time frequently heard that the Khán owed allegiance to the Amir of Kábal, the Agent to the Governor General said that the statement was entirely mistaken, the fact being that at one time the Khán was subordinate to the old kings of Kandahár, but that—

"On account of the bitter hostility that exists between the Brahui and the Baluch on one side, and the Afghán on the other, the dread of falling again in any way within the grasp of an Afghán power has invariably struck terror into the heart of the Khán, his chiefs and people. Recent events have shown that the hatred between the races is as decided as ever."

The reason why Mehrab Khán, the father of the present ruler, would not accompany Sir A. Burnes to Quetta was his dread of becoming subordinate to Kábal; and as neither the Khán nor the Sirdars would agree to make submission to Shah Shuja, they then held aloof from alliance with the British.

Interference only granted in accordance with treaty engagements.

257. The presence of the British at Quetta did not, Sir R. Sandeman said, interfere with the constitution of the Kalát State which was moreover upheld on its former basis by our presence, interference being only granted when invoked by the Khán or the Sirdars in fulfilment of treaty engagements to which both sides were equally parties.

Legitimate right to Sibi and Pishin.

258. As to Sibi and Pishin the Agent to the Governor General wrote:—

"I would here desire to observe that Pishin and Sibi, in which I include Thal-Chotiáli, have quite legitimately fallen to the British Government; neither belong geographically to Southern Afghánistan. It is certain that formerly the valley of Pishin, including Shorávak and Sharód, belonged to the Brahui Kháns of Kalát.* The family vaults, in which the ancestors of the chief Sarawan families are buried, are still in existence at Kowas in Pishin.

* General Stewart, in a demi-official letter dated the 21st May 1879, from Kandahar, to my address, wrote:— "The Government has, I fear, been waivering about the retention of Pishin; anyhow I have done my best to show how much our position is strengthened by the retention of that district, which enables us to do what we like with the Kakars; whereas, if we are cooped up in Quetta, we could only tackle them through a very difficult and hilly country. In point of fact if we withdraw from Pishin, our advance from Quetta will have been a huge blunder from first to last, and a sacrifice of blood and treasure for absolutely no purpose."

R. G. SANDEMAN, *Major*,
*Agent, Governor General*

*16th November 1880*

Holding Sibi, Thal-Chotiálí, and Pishin, up to the Khojak Pass, in no way interferes with Southern Afghánistan proper, for these places are separated from Kandahár by a desert from 70 to 80 miles long, and by the Amran range of mountains. On the other hand, their possession is of the utmost value to the British, as they enable our Government to concentrate our troops at a strategical point, thus giving, instead of a long and straggling position, a stable and solid one. At the same time holding Quetta enables us to carry out our treaty obligations towards the Khán and his Sardars, and to continue to foster the material prosperity of the country by maintaining peace. I firmly believe that no greater reward could be bestowed on the Khán and his Sirdars, for their loyalty to us during the recent war, than a continuance of the generous and wise policy we have so successfully adopted of late years towards Kalát, and which has so amply repaid us during the war. Neglect of the teaching of the past will most assuredly again lead, sooner or later, to anarchy, which must result in more decided interference hereafter than that which now takes place, and will probably culminate in the annexation of the country to British India."

Value of Sibi with respect to the Marri country.

259. "In General MacGregor's recent telegrams, describing the result of his march against the Marri clan, he states that one of the causes which led to the successful issue of his expedition against the clan was the fact of his having occupied from Sibi and Pishin, Mundai and Thal-Chotiálí, as he was thus enabled with ease to surround this powerful clan, which occupies the country from Harrand in the Punjab to within a few miles of Sibi. Another result of the occupation of Quetta is security to trade, for of late years the Marris have ceased to devastate Kalát territory, and the principal highways traversing it have become safe to traffic."

Military value of Quetta and Pishin.

260. "I think also that it is, in considering this matter, desirable to remark briefly on the improved military position given to us by our holding Quetta and Pishin. The occupation of Quetta, as I have remarked above, gives us on this frontier a great increase to our military power. With our frontier troops concentrated at Quetta, we can hold Pishin in much the same way as it was held by the Amir of Kábal. He never had troops permanently stationed there, as it was too far from Kandahár for him to be able to garrison it. A small contingent of British troops at the head-quarters of the district is all that is necessary, as these could at any moment be reinforced from Quetta. Apart therefore from the successful settlement of the Kalát State, there are many considerations of an imperial nature, rendering it very desirable that we should continue to hold Quetta and Pishin. We concentrate our military power enormously on this frontier by the move, for we give up a most unhealthy and demoralizing position at Jacobabad for a strong and healthy one at Quetta."

The opinion of Sir R. Sandeman as to the giving up of our position in Baluchistan, January 1881.

261. In a letter dated 17th January 1881, the Agent to the Governor General reveiwed the proceedings which had been taken for the pacification of the Marri clan, which had been going on for a long series of years, and the beneficial results which had been obtained by his first and second missions, and by the efforts to that end that had been made since the establishment of the Baluchistan Agency. Peace and prosperity to the Khán and the tribes had taken the place of civil war and poverty, while the general condition of Baluchistan had improved in every way. Sir R. Sandeman added:—

"A consideration of the past shows that our holding entirely aloof had the worst results, while a healthy interest in the affairs of the country, and of the tribes inhabiting it, has been attended with the most beneficial results. If the Government of India should now abandon the legitimate control thus established by treaty over the countries and tribes, the present state of peace and prosperity will assuredly disappear, and anarchy will shortly again reign supreme. The Marri tribe, like the other clans, is quite capable of being controlled and influenced for good. If left to itself, it will again become savage in its pursuits."

The Agent to the Governor General pointed out that other tribes, such as the Chilgris, had been incorporated into the Marri clan, and had given trouble in raiding, and he added that—

"The possible similar embodiment of other tribes into the clan was obviously a real danger in the future, which present arrangements have entirely averted."

The Agent to the Governor General further urged that a comparison of the state of affairs a few years previously on the Kalát, Sind, and Punjab

frontiers, with the present condition and future prospects of the frontier peoples, would justify the maintenance of the control which he had established over the Marri clan. As to Quetta and Pishin, Sir R. Sandeman remarked that, after the treaty of Gandamak, the people had been informed that they were British subjects; that during the second phase of the war they had, with few exceptions, conducted themselves as such, and that it was—

"in our own interests and their interests impossible to desert them, or to repudiate what was so deliberately done under the orders of Government. Further my entreaty is that the Khán of Kalát and the tribes should be permitted to persevere in well-doing. We have now in Kalát a happy and contented prince instead of a discontented and unreliable chief who was never able to understand our aims or objects as he never felt their benefit."

The good will of the Brahui clans and sirdars had been secured, and the Marris were fast following the examples of others. Had not the making of the railway diverted the attention of the Marris from the Bolan to the Nari route, "a natural result of the withdrawal of our troops from the Bolan route would have been its invasion by the Marris," and the carrying off of stores. At one time during the war there were only 120 infantry in the Pass, who would have been unable to repel raiders, as the garrison in the Bolan had been sent towards Kandahár, when, after the reverse at Maiwand, the troops on the railway marched in the direction of the front. Had the security of the Pass been destroyed, communication with the front must have in a measure been cut off.

"If we abandon," the Agent to the Governor General said, "the control now established over the country, the old state of anarchy must return, and with it the scourge and plague to all, which the Marri clan has been for many generations of men. I can conceive no greater calamity occurring to this country at large, and to the actual frontier of British India, than a discontinuance of the control the treaty with the Kalát State cemented. The policy," he continued," is a wise, humane and generous, and at the same time politic one, as it turned enemies into friends, and secured peace and prosperity to every part of the country where I was permitted to establish it."

Opinion of the Agent to the Governor General as to holding Thal-Chotiálí, December 1880.

262. When submitting to the Government of India the views expressed in the previous paragraph, Sir R. Sandeman forwarded a memorandum on the occupation of Thal-Chotiálí, which has been given below in extenso:—

*Memorandum on the occupation of Thal-Chotiálí.*

"Thal-Chotiálí was occupied by British troops after an inspection of the assigned district of Sibi, of which it forms a part, by the Hon'ble the Governor of Bombay and myself.

"Sir Richard Temple placed his views on the subject on record in his minute, dated the 1st December 1879.

"My chief reasons for desiring this portion of the assigned district of Sibi to be permanently occupied by British troops are as follows:—

(*a*) It commands the principal entrances to the Bijerani Marri country, and secures a safe route to the Punjab from Quetta and Kandahár *viâ* the Sakhi Sarwar and Chachar Passes.

(*b*) Its possession separates the Pathán tribes from the Baluch, and dominates that part of the country.

(*c*) Holding it protects the line of railway, and prevents the chance of inroads from that direction.

(*d*) It is a splendid position for cavalry, as there is an abundant supply of forage, while the place is very healthy and situated at an altitude of 3,000 feet above the sea.

"General MacGregor at Thal-Chotiálí obtained ten days' supplies for his army, numbering not less than 8,000 men, including camp-followers and 4,000 baggage animals.

(*e*) But the most important reason in my opinion for holding Thal-Chotiálí is that its possession enables the British Government to command the great highway between Kandahár, Quetta, and the Punjab, and maintain, in security, an alternative route to India in case the direct road between Shikarpore, Jacobabad,

and Sibi should, at any time, be submerged by the breaking of the Kusmore Bund. Holding the Nari route covers the Bolan Pass, and secures its safety to trade. General Phayre, in his report describing the late attack by Kakar Pathâns on the Katch-Amadan military post situated on this line, said that the repulse had secured the safety of the Upper Bolan Pass and Quetta, and of this there can be no doubt.

(*f*) Finally, the position is one of much strategical importance, securing, as it does, at any moment, easy communication between the Punjab and Quetta. The maintenance of troops there would preserve the peace of the country, and General MacGregor, in his telegrams describing the late expedition against the Marri clan, attributed its result partly to the fact that his holding possession of Thal-Chotiálí had cut off the retreat of the Marri clan in that direction.

"It has been argued that the Nari route has one great disadvantage as compared with the Bolan, for, by adopting it, we leave the Baluch country for that of the Pathán; an examination of the subject will, however, show that we do nothing of the kind—all we do is to adopt a better line of country which is occupied by the same tribes as those residing to the right of the Bolan Pass.

"For example, from Pir Chowki to Bibi Nani, the right of the pass is occupied by the Marris. In the same way, from Nari to Spin Tangi, the road passes entirely through the assigned district of Sibi, which is flanked by the Marri country. From Bibi Nani to Durwaza, the Dumar Kakars flank the Bolan, while from Hurnai to Pishin we come in contact with Panazais and Dumar Kakars. But the Panazais also occupy the country near Quetta. An examination of the subject, therefore, shows that the Bolan Pass and Nari route, as far as the tribes are concerned, are not, to any great extent, differently situated, and with Thal-Chotiáli in our possession, as well as the Nari route, it is not too much to say that the safety of the Bolan Pass is doubly secured.

"A satisfactory settlement of the Marri case would enable the Government of India to fully consider and amend the great injury inflicted by the tripartite treaty of 1839 on His Highness the Khán of Kalát and the Baluch clans, residents of Hurrand in the Punjab, who were, at that time, his subjects and under the government of the Naib of Hurrand Dajil. The late Sir Henry Durand, in his recently published book describing the first Afghán war, emphatically describes the injury done by the tripartite treaty to the Khán of Kalát. I have myself brought the fact to the notice of the Foreign Secretary, and urged that the occupation of the assigned district of Sibi, for the reasons I gave, would, with the aid of the Punjab Government, in time, rectify the acknowledged evils, and at the same time give us a strong and well-defined frontier. I also sent for inspection, in original, an order signed by King Ahmed Shah, Durani, in which he describes the districts that were included in the province of Sibi. The long wars that have taken place since Hurrand Dajil was separated from Kalát, between the frontier tribes resident partly in the Dera Ghazi Khan district, and partly in the Kalát State, demonstrate the necessity, as a mere matter of justice to them, of fully considering the very important question at the present time. Suggestions for the settlement of the Kalát and Punjab frontier question I last year submitted to the Government of India and the Punjab Government. A re-distribution of the troops now garrisoning the Dera Ghazi Khan and Jacobabad frontier would secure the object referred to above, and supply a very valuable support to Quetta at Thal-Chotiálí, and at the same time secure the peace of the country and frontier from Dera Ghazi Khan to Pishin in one direction, and Karachi to Quetta in the other direction."

Sir R. Sandeman's opinion on the British political and military position on the Baluch frontier, January 1881.

263. Together with the memorandum quoted above, Sir R. Sandeman sent to the Government of India a memorandum on our political and military position on the Baluch frontier, and being an important paper it is quoted below in *extenso*:—

"In a recent memorandum I have given my reasons, at length, for considering it to be of great importance to retain possession of Thal-Chotiáli.

"I propose in this memorandum to record my reasons for considering that the provisions of the treaty of Gundamak, which gave us possession of the Pishin and Sibi district, should, in the interests of the Kalát State as well as in those of the British-Baluch frontier, be maintained, more especially as, by a re-distribution of our frontier troops, this can be done without entailing additional expenditure on the British Government.

"By our recent treaty with the Kalát State we have promised the Khán and his Sirdars the protection of the British Government so long as they remain loyal to their treaty engagements, and with this object we established a British cantonment at Quetta. The possession of Quetta was, moreover, of the highest value to the British Government during the late war, as it gave us "a strong military hold on the country, and a secure base for our troops" from which to operate.

"The treaty of Gundamak enabled the Government of India to advance the British frontier from its unhealthy and straggling position, stretching from Dera Ghazi Khan to the foot of the Baluch hills, at Hurrand in the Punjab and Kusmore in Sind, and from thence to Jacobabad to the line it now holds.

"On this line, which is the direct route from Kandahár to Dera Ghazi Khan, for the last year we have occupied Thal-Chotiálí. From thence the route goes to Hurnai, to Kushdil Khan Killa, the Khojak Pass, and Quetta.

"By the move Jacobabad is now situated ninety miles to our rear, and Hurrand, the nearest point on the Punjab frontier, about 140 miles. All that is now required to consolidate our military hold on the country from Dera Ghazi Khan to Quetta is to connect Thal-Chotiálí with Dera Ghazi Khan by frontier posts, in the same way as Sibi and Hurnai are connected with Jacobabad and Quetta. For many years previous to my becoming Agent to the Governor General for Baluchistan, and since then, I have, on several occasions in my reports on the frontier, pointed out to the Government of India and the Punjab Government that the frontier line, which separates Hurrand-Dajil from the Kalát State, was, at the time of the annexation of the Punjab to British India, quite incorrectly defined; that its present definition causes a chronic war to exist between the Baluch tribes of Kalát and the Punjab, as by it we have divided the same tribes into two divisions, and caused thereby entire tribal and territorial derangement which has led to a state of anarchy, which is fully described in the annals of the Punjab Government.

"Moreover, Sir Henry Durand's recently published history of the first Afghan war explains this, as it clearly points to the tripartite treaty of 1839 as responsible for this grievous state of things. By this treaty the British Government deprived the Khán of Kalát of the Hurrand-Dajil Province of his kingdom, which we handed over to the Maharaja Runjeet Sing. The Sikh Government took possession of it, occupying the country as far as Legari Barkhan, where the lines at one time occupied by their troops still exist. At the annexation of the Punjab we did not extend the British frontier beyond the first range of hills, believing it to be the main range, and we thus split the tribes of Gurchanis and Legharies into two sections, leaving a portion of each tribe in Kalát and a portion in the Punjab. This arbitrary demarcation led to many evils, which, when Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan, I fully reported to the Government of the Punjab.

"The Government of India, after much serious deliberation, decided that the existing frontier, between the Kalát State and the Punjab, must, in a measure, be rectified, and this view of the case was adopted by the Home Government, and orders were issued to me to carry out the views of Government, in communication with the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan.

"The Afghán war has prevented this piece of justice being carried into effect, but the orders of the Home and Indian Governments regarding the rectification of the Punjab and Kalát frontiers ought at the present time, on no account, to be lost sight of.

"I may here mention that a telegram I received, only the other day, from the Secretary to the Punjab Government brought to my notice that the tribes on the Hurrand frontier are again at war.

"Hostilities between the hill sections of the tribes referred to must continually break out, so long as they reside half within Kalát and half within Punjab territory.

"The best way to properly and satisfactorily rectify the evils complained of, is to maintain our quite legitimate possession of Thal-Chotiálí, and connect it with the Punjab at Barkhan and Hurrand in the same way as Sind is connected with Sibi and Hurnai.

"The Punjab frontier line need not be advanced one yard, but it is absolutely necessary for the peace of the tract of country lying between Thal-Chotiálí and the Punjab at Hurrand, which is within Kalát territory, and within my political jurisdiction, that military control over it should be established.

"I will now proceed to show how this control can be established by the troops and local levies (in which I include the corps known as the Baluch Guides, and the Dera Ghazi Khan and Rajanpur Militia) now garrisoning the frontier. I believe they are sufficient to ensure the peace of the Punjab and Sind frontiers if properly distributed, as well as the whole tract

of country lying between the Punjab and Sind, from Dera Ghazi Khan to Quetta in the one direction, and Jacobabad to Quetta in the other direction.

"In fact all I propose to do is, instead of holding a long and unhealthy frontier line extending from Dehra Ghazi Khan to Hurrand and thence to Kusmore and Jacobabad, to permanently substitute military posts connecting Dehra Ghazi Khan with Thal-Chotiálí and Hurnai, and thence to Kushdil Khan and Quetta. This line gives a much more concentrated and a shorter frontier to defend, situated at a healthy elevation, while at the same time it connects the Punjab by easy marches with Quetta *viâ* Thal-Chotiálí and Hurnai. I am aware that the road between Hurnai and the post at Thal-Chotiálí, a distance of about sixty miles, requires at one place making, but the expenditure of a few thousands of rupees would accomplish it. When the railway reaches Spin Tangi, it will be distant from the Thal-Chotiálí valley only about forty miles.

"I have said that I see no reason why maintaining our military power at Thal-Chotiálí to Dera Ghazi Khan at Hurrand should add to the cost of our frontier defence more than was the case when Sibi and Kutchi were occupied by our troops from Sind. The circumstances are identical. The troops for the Sibi and Kutchi posts were taken from the Jacobabad garrison, because by reason of the advance into Sibi and Kutchi, it was found possible to reduce the posts along the Sind Frontier. In the same way, I see no reason why the posts at Hurrand and Drigri should not be advanced to Leghari Barkhan. This ought to be quite easy, if we consider that the communications with Barkhan from Dera Ghazi Khan can easily and securely be kept open by the Frontier Militia, and the service we now give to the hill tribes of Haddianis, Durkanis, and Khetrans, who reside within my jurisdiction. There is no more difficulty in securing the peace of the country from Dera Ghazi Khan to Thal-Chotiálí, and thence to Pishin and Quetta, than there is in securing it between Jacobabad, Sibi, and Hurnai to Quetta; Hurnai is only sixty miles from Thal-Chotiálí, and the whole tract of country from Dera Ghazi Khan to Thal-Chotlálí, and thence to Hurnai and Sibi, is exactly the same tract, presenting the same features, and inhabited by people similar in condition and character. This was specially proved to be the case during the late invasion by Ayub Khán. In fact, the Thal-Chotiálí people behaved better than the Baluch and actually preserved uninjured the barracks and some of the stores, &c., made over to their charge.

"In a re-adjustment of the frontier garrisons and posts from Dera Ghazi Khan and Jacobabad to Thal-Chotiálí and Hurnai, I see no reason whatever why the troops should not be so redistributed as to enable them to garrison Thal-Chotiálí without imposing an additional farthing of cost on Government.

"There are now garrisoning the Dera Ghazi Khan, Rajanpur, and Jacobabad frontier three regiments of infantry, five of cavalry, and a mountain battery. From these troops I would take for Thal-Chotiálí one infantry regiment from Dera Ghazi Khan, one regiment of cavalry from Jacobabad, as well as a portion of the mountain battery. It is a great mistake, if we take up the question from an unbiassed point of view, to say that the occupation of the proposed frontier with part of the Dera Ghazi Khan and Jacobabad garrison weakens the frontier defence. I emphatically assert that our military strength being concentrated at Quetta, instead of being scattered over an extensive line of country, consolidates our hold over the people and tribes inhabiting our frontier, including the new posts, more especially as recent measures have given us a friendly Kalát State, instead of a very disturbed one as it admittedly was until within the last few years. I believe that the result, hereafter, if present measures are persevered in, will prove the truth of this statement, seeing that what I propose would establish the military power of the Baluchistan Agent over every part of his jurisdiction, and enable him to influence, to an enormous extent, the conduct and action of the tribes residing on that part of the Punjab frontier also, but within his jurisdiction. Were such a step taken as the one I recommend, I have no hesitation in saying that I would be responsible for the entire peace of the Punjab and Sind frontier, from Dera Ghazi Khan, and even beyond it, to the sea. The statement is no longer tenable that the tribes about Thal-Chotiálí, Hurnai, and Pishin, are of a determinedly hostile character, and from their numbers are a great and formidable danger. The reverse is the case as was proved during the late invasion by Ayub Khán. Already our influence, through the presence of British officers, is everywhere felt, and is extending daily with the best results to all concerned. I emphatically assert that the whole tract of country from Dera Ghazi Khan and Jacobabad and Sibi to Thal-Chotiálí, and thence to Hurnai and Quetta, is easy of management. The country itself is capable of much improvement and development which peace would bring to it. Even its present resources are far more than sufficient to provide an ample supply of food for the garrison, which I recommend should

permanently hold Sibi, Hurnai, and Thal-Chotiálí in support of the British cantonment at Quetta."

Views of the British Government as to the retention of the assigned districts in 1881.

264. Writing in April 1881, regarding the retention of the assigned districts, Lord Hartington, the Secretary of State for India, said—

"While therefore Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to change their opinion as to the inexpediency of the permanent retention of the assigned districts, they recognise the difficulties in the way of immediate or early withdrawal from them, and they are fully sensible that in this respect their policy must be influenced by considerations which did not apply in the case of Kandahár."

The people, it was added, had no doubt been encouraged to believe that British rule would continue; their relations with British officials had been conducted on that assumption, and their behaviour had been generally good during the war. On these considerations any announcement as to final retirement from these districts had been abstained from. The Secretary of State said, however, that he relied on the Viceroy to take care that no step might be taken which might place any permanent obstacle in the way of retirement, and he at the same time remarked on the largeness of the force at Quetta and on the line from Sibi to Chaman, which he said might tend to a belief that it was designed for purposes of possible future intervention in Afghánistan, an intention which was then equally opposed to the views of both the Indian and British Governments.

Retention of a considerable force in Pishin after the retirement from Kandahár.

265. As to the forces in Pishin the Government of India explained that sanitary exigencies had compelled them to retain in Pishin during the summer a large proportion of the force returning from Kandahár, and that it had no connection with the future maintenance of an advanced military position towards Afghánistan. The Government of India thought that as the districts had been taken in 1878, and assigned to the British in 1879, the interests of the inhabitants, who had been assured as to our protection, should be consulted; and it was added that, if a friendly and settled Government were not established at Kandahár, it would not—

"be either to the interests of Pishin or to our own interests and credit that we should choose such a time for abruptly abandoning this district, our departure would expose us to disorder and our friends to the consequences of having dealt faithfully with the British. Moreover, we are bound to recollect that our responsibilities for the protection of friends and allies, from the possible consequences of any confusion that may follow directly upon our recent withdrawal, are not confined to Pishin. From the Khán of Kalát and from his leading sirdars we have received the most unreserved and valuable support during the whole of our operations across the Afghán frontier of Baluchistan. That frontier has a long border line with the lands of Pathán tribes; while Quetta itself is more or less surrounded by Afghán or independent territory. It is thus of importance that at Quetta we should, for the present, be in a position to assist effectually in keeping the peace and in securing the Khán's territory against incursions or reprisals, and for these objects the advantages of continuing our military and political occupation of the broad valley which interposes between Quetta and the Amran range appear to us incontestable. Our attitude will be entirely precautionary and defensive; but if any troubles are impending in Afghánistan, we should be far better able to hold ourselves clear of complications by confining all disorder to the western side of the range than by allowing it to overflow up to the Baluch frontier. In short, we consider that some prolongation of our present tenure of Pishin and Sibi is necessary, not only for the acquittance of our obligations to those districts, but also in order that, during a period of uncertainty, we may be able to retain our present influence over the tribes of that frontier, and generally to fulfil the treaty engagement whereby, in return for the subordinate co-operation which we have a right to demand from the Khán of Kalát, and which he has very freely given to us, we are bound to protect his territories from external attack. With regard, therefore, to the extent of country to be temporarily retained under British control, our proposals are to keep the districts of Pishin and Sibi, with any strip of intervening territory that may be clearly necessary for

maintaining the communication between the two districts. Their administrative boundaries are so inaccurately defined, and have so often varied, that it is not possible to determine positively whether the two areas actually meet at any point. But in the records examined at Kandahár the Sibi district is described in leases as Zama, Sibi and Thal; while the Baroza sirdars, who have long been the grantees of Sibi, always lay claim to Harnai and Thal-Chotiálí. The Zama of the Kandahár records is the valley stretching from the lower end of the Chapper mountain by Spin Tangi down the Nari river; as a matter of fact, however, the Afghán Government had, for many years before our latest occupation of Sibi, exercised little or no jurisdiction in the district; the constant incursions of the Marris, and the lawlessness of the lesser tribes, kept the upper valley in confusion, and the lower valley suffered greatly from their depredations. But since the British Government took possession of the district in 1878, our posts have been established along the open tract which runs by Spin Tangi, Harnai, and Kach, up to where the Chapper hills close in upon it. This tract has now been brought regularly under our administration, and its revenue is quietly collected; while the position of our posts along the northern border of the district, in a climate healthy for the troops, maintains order among the petty Pathán tribes beyond the line, keeps the peace in the country within it, secures our communication with Pishin and Quetta, and effectually preserves the Bolan Pass from molestation. The occupation of this border has also opened out an excellent road from India by Sibi toward Pishin and Kandahár, which is already very largely used by traders in preference to the Bolan route. We consider it advisable, for these reasons, to retain our posts upon the Harnai line, and to treat as included within the Sibi district, for the purpose of temporary control and management, the plain country up to the foot of the hills beyond that line, and all the country within it, over which we now exercise jurisdiction. The appended sketch map will show roughly the northern boundary up to which it seems necessary, for the proper protection of Sibi and the Bolan Pass, for restraining the Marris and other border tribes, and for the general political supervision of Baluch frontier toward Afghánistan, that our authority should, for the present, be maintained. It will probably be found difficult to withdraw, for some time to come, the troops now stationed at Thal and Chotiálí on the frontier of Sibi toward the north-east. But the object of these posts is exclusively to check and coerce the powerful Marri tribe, by taking up points whence their country can be easily entered, and their retreat cut off, if they attempt any marauding expeditions; and as the arrangements for controlling the Marris must be settled with reference not only to the Sibi administration, but also to the proper system of defence for the Indian border, and the Khán's territory adjoining the Marri country, it would not be convenient in this letter to deal finally with the question of keeping stations at Thal or Chotiálí. From Your Lordship's Despatch upon the subject of the settlement recently made with the Marris, we infer that our intention to postpone final decision upon these provisional arrangements, until our general position upon the border shall have been permanently determined, will be approved."

Evacuation of Kandahár by British troops on the 21st April 1881.

266. During November 1880, negotiations were opened with the Amir Abd-ul Rahman for placing Kandahár under his government. The offer was entertained by the Amir, who asked for arms and materials of war. Ammunition was supplied to him, together with ten lakhs of rupees, in the beginning of 1881. After some delay the Amir determined to send troops to Kandahár; and on the 12th April 1881, the march of the British troops under General Hume, Commanding at Kandahár, having been fixed, Colonel St. John formally transferred the administration of the province to Sirdar Shamsh-ud-dín. After the arrival of the Kábal troops on the 21st April, the cantonments and citadel were finally evacuated, and thus the second period of the direct administration of Kandahár, lasting about seven months after the defeat of Ayub Khán, was closed. The rear column reached Chaman on the 27th April 1881.

Proposal to send some of the troops from Kandahár to India by the Thal-Chotiálí route.

267. For the troops marching *viá* Thal-Chotiálí as was proposed, down from Kandahár, the Agent to the Governor General was requested to collect forage, grain, and firewood. No difficulties with the Marris were anticipated, but Mr. Duke was directed to arrange with the Marri Sirdar for the protection of Government stores, and the Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General at Thal-Chotiálí and in Pishin were directed to make arrangement for the laying

in of such supplies as could be obtained locally. Similar arrangements were also made in communication with the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khan. The troops did not, however, march until the end of the hot weather of 1881.

March of the Bozdar column to India under General Wilkinson, at the close of 1881.

268. In October 1881, the Foreign Secretary asked the Agent to the Governor General if there were any political objection to the march of a small column to India *viá* Thal-Chotiálí, Chamalang, and through the Bozdar country and the Sourah Pass to Dera Ghazi Khan. The Agent to the Governor General replied that there was not: and 1 battery of artillery, 4 companies of the 63rd Foot, 2 regiments of Native Infantry, 1 company of Sappers and 1 squadron of Sind Horse were told off for this duty under the command of General Wilkinson. At the same time a second column of troops marched for India *viá* Sibi, and Mr. Duke was told that all the military garrisons in his district, with the exception of Kach, Thal, and Shahrig, would be withdrawn. The posts abandoned were Spin Tangi, Harnai, and Chapar. The object of the expedition of the Bozdar column was to explore what was at that time almost an unknown country. Mr. Duke was deputed to go with the column, his political jurisdiction ceasing in the Bozdar country. The column marched *viá* Quetta, Kuchlak and Gwal to Kach, and thence traversed the Kakar, Tarin, Marri, Pathán, and Luni districts, to Thal; supplies were on the march obtained in plenty. Beyond Chotiálí, the head mallik of the Lunis was taken with the force, and messages were sent to the Musakhel tribe to ensure their not taking alarm at the approach of the troops. The Luni tribe, Mr. Duke reported, had once been strong, but had dwindled down; this tribe behaved well in the Chamalang valley. The march was successful, and the troops were entirely unmolested throughout the route, until *viá* the Sourah Pass they reached Dera Ghazi Khan territory. Colonel Waterfield, then officiating as Agent to the Governor General, remarked that Mr. Duke's intimate knowledge of the country had given him a facility for dealing with the tribes which was evidenced by the success of the result, and the Government of India concurred in this opinion.

Mention of Sir R. Sandeman's services in the House of Commons.

269. During the second phase of the Afghán war, Sir R. Sandeman was in charge of the line of communications from Jacobabad to the KhojakPass, and was subordinate to no General Officer, but was entirely responsible for the peace of Baluchistan, and of the Sibi and Pishin districts extending to within 5 marches of Kandahár. He received the brevet rank of Lieutenant-Colonel for his services, but in any case he would, in the ordinary course of events, have attained that rank in the staff corps, a few months after he actually received it by brevet. Regarding his services however, Lord Hartington, then Secretary of State, when proposing a vote of thanks in the House of Commons to the army, said :—

> It has not been usual in votes of this character, and I have not thought it necessary, to make special mention of the services rendered in this campaign by the political officers. But it would not be right that I should conclude without reminding the House that, in wars of this description, the services which are rendered by the Political officers are not only of the highest importance, but are frequently attended by personal risk. Of the political officers and the services rendered by them, I can only speak in the most general terms. The services of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and the Governor of Bombay have been recognised by the Government of India. Sir R. Sandeman, our Agent in Baluchistan, rendered services of the most signal and valuable character. He has preserved with great ability the best relation between our Viceroy and the Khán of Kalát, who has shown loyalty to our allies, and has on several important occasions rendered the greatest services to our army. Sir R. Sandeman was also placed at the head of the whole line of communications, and the value of his services cannot be over-estimated.

# CHAPTER VI.

Scope of the Chapter.

269A. In Chapter IV of this report an account was given of the handing over by the Khán of the Quetta niabat to the British Government, the arrangements in regard to which were negotiated with His Highness by Sir R. Sandeman. The terms on which the Government of India accepted the administration were also detailed. The principles held in view when selecting Quetta for the location of a British force, the boundaries of the district, and its physical features, its history, and the strategical value of the valley, were all noted. Further details in respect to these points will not therefore be necessary. In this chapter will be given an account of the extent of land taken up at Quetta for Government purposes; the arrangement under which it was settled that the revenues should be collected by the British Government, a sum of money being paid to the Khán in lieu of them; the amalgamation of the district of Quetta with Pishín; the duties devolving on officers in the Baluchistan Agency; the public health; together with a variety of proposals which have from time to time been sanctioned, and which, as they affect more or less all the agencies under the direct control and supervision of the Agent to the Governor General, have been included in this chapter for the sake of convenience. A brief notice will also be given of Kandahar and Afghanistan affairs which have from time to time come under the notice of the Agent to the Governor General.

Officers who have held the post of Agent to the Governor General, and First or Personal Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General.

270. It will here be convenient to give a list of the officers who have held the post of Agent to the Governor General in Baluchistan since the establishment of the Agency :—

Agent to the Governor General—Colonel Sir R. Sandeman, K.C.S.I., from 21st February 1877 to 31st December 1877.

Officiating Agent to the Governor General—Mr. R. I. Bruce, C.I.E., from 1st January 1878 to to 26th July 1878.

Agent to the Governor General—Colonel Sir R. Sandeman, K.C.S.I., from 27th July 1878 to 21st February 1881.

Officiating Agent to the Governor General—Colonel E. S. Reynolds, from 22nd February 1881 to 30th April 1881.

Officiating Agent to the Governor General—Colonel Sir O. B. St. John, K.C.S.I., R.E., from 1st May 1881 to 13th November 1881.

Officiating Agent to the Governor General—Colonel W. G. Waterfield, from 14th November 1881 to 17th May 1882.

Officiating Agent to the Governor General—Major J. Biddulph, from 18th May 1882 to 24th November 1882.

Agent to the Governor General—Colonel Sir R. Sandeman, K.C.S.I., from 25th November 1882 to present time (August 1885).

The officers who have held the post of First Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General and Personal Assistant, as the post has been sometimes called, are—

First Assistant—Mr. R. I. Bruce, C.I.E., from 1st February 1877 to 31st December 1877, from 27th July 1878 to 28th September 1879.

First Assistant—Captain W. H. C. Wyllie, from 29th September 1878 to 21st October 1880.

Third Assistant—Captain T. Hope, from 22nd October 1880 to 6th May 1881.

Third Assistant—Mr. H. S Barnes, from 7th May 1881 to 16th May 1883.

First Assistant—Mr. J. R. FitzGerald, from 17th May 1883 to 4th January 1885.

First Assistant—Captain I. MacIvor, from 5th January 1885 to present time (August 1885).

The officers who have held the post of Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General for Quetta are—

Captain Martelli, from 18th August 1880.
Lieutenant Ramsay, from September 1880.
Lieutenant Kennedy, from 24th May 1880.
Lieutenant Jennings.

This post is no longer occupied, as Quetta and Pishín are now under a Political Agent.

Extent of land taken up at Quetta for Government purposes, and the tenure on which it is held.

271. Between the years 1877 and 1883 land was taken up at Quetta for Government purposes on various different occasions whenever it was required for the occupation of troops or for other purposes, claims for compensation being discharged as opportunity offered. Up to November 1883, the total amount of land taken up was approximately 3,754 acres, of which 3,496 acres were included in the cantonment; the remaining 258 acres were included in the civil station. Of this land, 3,274 acres were purchased, while for 310 acres watered by the Tazi Karez, comprising the whole of the civil station as well as a portion of the cantonment, His Highness the Khán of Kalát was entitled to a fixed annual rental of R2,516, and for 170 acres of land watered by the Habib Karez, His Highness was entitled to a quarter share of the produce.

Total expenditure in the cantonment and civil station.

272. The total expenditure incurred was R2,59,476-11-1, of which R2,15,201-3-2 was the cost of the cantonment land, and R39,646-15-0 was the cost of the civil station. As a considerable portion of the cantonment consisted of stony land of no immediate value, while the whole of the civil station land was valuable, a considerable disproportion appeared in the total sums paid for the plots of land respectively. The cost of the cantonment land included the following charges :—

(*a*) A sum of R13,000 for the Durani Karez to provide the cantonment with water, together with R5,000 paid for cleaning and repairing it.

(*b*) A sum of R2,000 for the erection of mud walls.

(*c*) A sum of R2,325-11-4 for a tank in the Hanah stream, a portion of the water of which supplies the cantonments.

(*d*) A sum of R300 spent on improvements to the Tazi Karez, the water of which supplies the cantonments and the civil lines.

The cost of the land in the civil station included the sum of R1,200 spent in improvements on the Tazi Karez, and R2,916-8-0, the cost of land in the Agency compound at Kalát.

Total amount sanctioned.

273. The sanction for the expenditure of this money was granted at intervals between the years 1877 and 1883, and amounted* to a total of R 3,16,000; the total expenditure up to November 1883 was R2,54,848-2-1 ; there was, therefore, at that* time an unexpended balance of R61,151-13-11.

(* August 1885).

Correspondence which is now going on shows that a sum of R4,628-9-0, was inadvertently omitted in the account of the expenditure incurred in the purchase of land in Quetta. The total expenditure was R2,59,476-11-1.

Water rights acquired.

274. The water rights acquired by Government were the Durani Karez, the Gurna Karez, and shares of the Hanah stream and Tazi Karez. In acquiring these rights, purchasing the land, and awarding compensation, every effort was made to keep the expenditure as low as possible.

275. In July 1884 the Government of India asked for information in view to a proper determination of the expenditure incurred, and its division into four different budgets, *viz.*, (*a*) Military Works, *i.e.*, land taken up in direct connection with military works and buildings; (*b*) Military, *i.e.*, land taken up for cantonment purposes other than those mentioned in (*a*); (*c*) Public Works, Civil Buildings, &c.; (*d*) Civil, *i.e.*, land taken up for the civil station for purposes other than those under (*c*). The Political Agent, Quetta and Pishín, and the Secretary to the Agent to the Governor General in the Public Works Department were directed to report accordingly. They came to the conclusion that no land, either in the civil lines or the cantonments, was taken up for any particular building or road, the land being merely purchased *en masse* for the sites of the civil and military stations; no charges for the purchase of lands could therefore be included under the heads of Military Works or Civil Buildings. Certain charges could, it was observed, be classed under the heads of Military Works and Civil Buildings other than the purchase of lands. The total charges included under the head Military Works were R24,245-11-4. The charges debited to Military for purchase of land were R1,90,955-7-9. The charges debited to Civil Buildings were R1,200. The charges debited to Civil for purchase of land were R38,446-15-0. This report was submitted to the Government of India on 8th May 1885.

Expenditure divided into budgets.

276. Early in the year 1885, the boundary of the Quetta Cantonment was fixed by the military authorities; the positions of the eleven pillars which demarcate the limit were described and published in the *Gazette of India*, dated 6th March 1885.

Boundary of the Quetta Cantonment.

277. During the commencement of the year 1882 it was proposed to levy on the Harnái route dues similar to those levied under treaty by His Highness the Khán in the Bolan Pass; and the question of the desirability of farming the revenues of the Quetta District and the Bolan dues from the Khán was raised. Owing to freedom from taxation, the safety enjoyed by traders, the facilities for feeding beasts on the Harnái route, and the improper exactions of the Khán's officials on the Bolan route, trade had partially deserted the Bolan for the Harnái route, resulting in loss to the Khán from transit dues. In order to ascertain the amount which could fairly be offered to His Highness, it was necessary to know the actual value to the Khán's revenues as well as to the Sirdars who shared with him the transit dues passing through the Bolan, especially the share due to Alladina Kurd. Government were prepared to impose on the trade through the passes dues sufficient to cover the sums payable as compensation to the Khán and Sirdars: there was never any intention of obtaining a profit by the tax.

Question of the farming of the revenues of the Quetta District and dues in the Bolan Pass.

278. With respect to the proposed payment to the Khán of a sum of money as quit-rent for the Quetta District, the Agent to the Governor General recommended that R25,000 per annum should be paid, that sum being the average surplus which His Highness might expect to receive after defraying the cost of the Civil Administration. This recommendation was approved by the Government of India and accepted by His Highness the Khán.

R25,000 to be paid to the Khán for the Quetta District.

279. As regards the question of the purchase of His Highness the Khán's right to levy tolls in the Bolan Pass, Mr. Bruce was deputed to draw up estimates of the sums actually received by the Khán and the Sirdars. The figures given showed that for six

R30,000 to be paid to the Khan for the Bolan Pass dues.

years, from 1876 to 1881 both inclusive, the Khán had realised annually an average income of a little over R26,000. For one of these years, 1882, the income was R48,545, due to the cessation of the war, and the consequent release from work of a large number of Government camels, which were at once employed in trade. This, however, was counterbalanced by the consideration that, but for the war, the Khán's receipts would have been greater in 1879 and 1880, and also by the fact that all Government supplies and stores for the troops had passed up the Bolan, free of duty; this concession had caused loss to the Khán owing to the facilities it had afforded to traders to smuggle their goods through to Quetta and Kandahar. It was also borne in mind that, but for the war, trade would have probably increased. The increase in trade, it was observed, had, since the Harnái route had been used, been astonishingly great, probably in great measure due to immunity from taxation over the Harnái. Taking all these points into consideration, the Agent to the Governor General recommended that R30,000 per annum should be paid to the Khán for his right to levy tolls. This sum was sanctioned by the Government of India and accepted by His Highness the Khán.

R13,000 to be paid to Sirdars Assad Khan and Yar Muhammad.

280. As regards the sums to be paid to Sirdar Assad Khan and Sirdar Yar Muhammad Kurd for their shares of the Bolan Pass fees, the Agent to the Governor General recommended that Sirdar Assad Khan should receive R3,000 per annum, while R10,000 per annum should be paid to Sirdar Yar Muhammad Kurd. At the same time the Agent to the Governor General proposed to fix the exact sums to be paid in connection with the scheme for the organisation of certain levies (the details of this scheme will be found elsewhere), as both of these Sirdars would have to perform service in consideration of the sums to be paid. The total sum to be paid to the Sirdars, *viz.*, R13,000, was sanctioned by Government.

Levy of tolls sanctioned by the Government of India, and agreement between the Khán and the Government.

281. As to tolls being levied by the British Government, the Agent to the Governor General said that he was opposed to them as tending to discourage trade, which had many difficulties to contend against; at the same time, in view of the fact that goods would probably only take the rail at Shikarpore, he recommended that a small tax of R1 per laden camel, 8 annas per bullock or pony, and 8 annas per laden donkey, going and coming, might be levied. These recommendations also received the approval of the Government of India. An agreement in respect to all these points was signed by the Khán and the Agent to the Governor General. The Quetta District was made over to the British Government in perpetuity with full sovereign rights from the 1st April 1883. At the same time, full civil and criminal jurisdiction was ceded to the British Government within the Bolan Pass, and also on land purchased at Rindli for a railway station. The agreement was ratified by the Viceroy on the 12th September 1883.

Levy of the tax for a few months, and its subsequent removal.

282. For the collection of the fees to be levied in the two passes, the Government of India, in September 1883, sanctioned an establishment in the Bolan, costing R130 per mensem, and for the Harnái route an establishment costing R257 per mensem; a small police force was also sanctioned as a temporary measure. A six months' trial of the arrangements made showed that R38,431-4-0 had been realised. The Agent to the Governor General was, however, of opinion that it would be desirable to free the trade from taxation. In this opinion the Government of India agreed, and orders were issued in May 1884 for the removal of the tolls and the breaking up of the establishments, and accordingly the levy of the tolls was discontinued from the 15th May; the total sum collected from the 1st October 1883 up to this date was R51,436-4-0.

283. In connection with the question of paying R25,000 to the Khán as quit-rent for the Quetta District, the Agent to the Governor General pointed out how important it was to place an officer in administrative charge of Quetta and Pishín. Improvement had been retarded both by divided authority and by the constant change of officers, who had not had an opportunity of becoming acquainted with the people. It was pointed out that the districts were so interlaced with one another, and ethnologically so intimately connected, that they would be far more easily administered together than separately, and that with careful administration the revenues of both would be much increased. The sum required for the salary of the officer appointed was to be provided, it was proposed, from the surplus revenues. The proposals met with the approval of Government, and the appointment of a 3rd class Political Agent for the two districts on a salary of R1,000 per mensem and travelling allowance of R180 per mensem was sanctioned in April 1883. Mr. H. S. Barnes was appointed to this post, and he has held it up to the present date (June 1885).

*The Quetta and Pishín Districts placed under the charge of one officer.*

284. In January 1883, the Agent to the Governor General submitted to the Government of India a memorandum in which he reviewed the duties which devolved upon the officers of the Baluchistan Agency. These may be briefly described as the administration of the Thál-Chotiálí, Harnáí, Sibi, Pishín, and Quetta Districts, the maintenance of peace in Kalát territory, the protection of trade with British India, the opening out of the Thal-Chotiálí trade route, the settlement of disputes between the Khán and the Sirdars, the carrying out of the details of the peace made at Mastúng, the maintenance of tranquillity among the tribes on the Sind and Punjab frontiers from Dera Ghazi Khan to the sea, the supervision of the Gwadar Political Agency, and of the Public Works, and Woods and Forests Departments. The Deputy Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, was also under the Agent to the Governor General with respect to political affairs. In consequence of these numerous duties it was found, when the Afghan war broke out, that the duties of the Agent to the Governor General's Assistant at Quetta became those of a Personal Assistant, and arrears of work accumulated, chiefly in consequence of the Afghan war. The close of the first phase of the Afghan war considerably increased the duties of the Agency, as by the treaty of Gandamak the districts of Sibi and Pishín were ceded to the British, in consequence of which a fourth Assistant was appointed to the charge of Pishín, and the officer with the Khán of Kalát was sent to Thal-Chotiálí. Prior to the commencement of the year 1883, the affairs of Pishín had fallen into disorder owing to its being placed in the hands of a tahsildar, there being no officer available for completely supervising the work done there; two inspectors of police had been dismissed from the district, while minor officials had been tried and punished, and raids from Shorawak were perpetrated. The affairs of Lus Beyla and the Karachi frontier could not be properly attended to, owing to the want of an officer; none of the Assistants having time to look after the work in that portion of Baluchistan. Disturbances also arose in Panjgur, where Azad Khán, Chief of Kharan, attacked and defeated the Khán's naib. Quarrels had also broken out among the Bugtís and Marris owing to the interference of a non-commissioned officer of the Sind Horse, who, at the request of a Bugtí, tried to apprehend two Marris. In a notification (No. 43G. of 6th January 1883) the officers of the Agency were redistributed, and as the Agent to the Governor General was not consulted in the matter, he then represented his views.

*Duties devolving on officers in the Baluchistan Agency.*

285. It will here be convenient to show the footing on which the Agency

State of the Agency in 1881, after several additions had been made.

was established in 1877; and secondly, the state of the Agency in 1881, after several additions had been made. The schedules below have therefore been quoted in full:—

## SCHEDULE A

Showing the Agency, as originally established—*vide* Appendix to Foreign Office Resolution No. 379P., dated 21st February 1877.

*1.—Agent to the Governor General—*

| | Per mensem. R | Per annum. R |
|---|---|---|
| Office Establishment— | | |
| English and Vernacular Office | 670 | 8,040 |
| Jemadar on R12, and 4 peons at R8 each | 44 | 528 |
| Tentage at usual rate up to a maximum of | ... | 2,400 |
| Darbar allowances (presents) | ... | 5,000 |
| Cost of entertaining Chiefs, and contingencies | ... | 4,000 |
| TOTAL | | 19,968 |

*2.—Assistant at Quetta—*

| | Per mensem. R | Per annum. R |
|---|---|---|
| Office Establishment— | | |
| Office | 100 | 1,200 |
| Two peons, at R8 each | 16 | 192 |
| Tentage up to a maximum of | ... | 2,160 |
| Contingencies | | 360 |
| TOTAL | | 3,912 |

*3.—Assistant in charge of Baluch Guides at Jacobabad—*

| | Per mensem. R | Per annum. R |
|---|---|---|
| Office establishment— | | |
| Office | 75 | 900 |
| Tentage up to a maximum of | | 1,800 |
| Contingencies | | 240 |
| TOTAL | | 2,940 |

*4.—Assistant with the Khán—*

| | Per mensem. R | Per annum. R |
|---|---|---|
| Office establishment— | | |
| Office | 100 | 1,200 |
| Two peons | 16 | 192 |
| Tentage up to a maximum of | ... | 2,160 |
| Contingencies | ... | 240 |
| TOTAL | | 3,792 |

*5.—Medical Officer—*

| | Per mensem. R | Per annum. R |
|---|---|---|
| Dispensary establishments and charges as per estimate framed by Dr. Duke, up to | | 3,624 |
| Tentage | | 1,800 |
| TOTAL | | 5,424 |

The Agent to the Governor General is further authorized to incur expenditure not exceeding R10,000 in providing camp equipage for himself and subordinates, taking as a general guide the scale of camp equipage allowed for Political Agents, and to incur expenditure not exceeding R5,000 in building, furnishing, and providing outfit for dispensaries at Quetta and Kalát.

SCHEDULE B.

Giving the state of the Agency when I* left it in 1881, and showing the additions to the charges since the formation of Agency.

* Sir R. Sandeman.

1—Agent to the Governor General.—Office as before.

2—Assistant at Quetta (employed solely as Personal Assistant).

3—Treasury Officer, Quetta (employed also on district duties previously performed by Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General at Quetta, but quite unable to cope with the work).

4—Assistant with the Khán.—Vacant.

5—Assistant at Jacobabad (as before, with Native Assistant in charge of Sibi).

6—Gwadar Political Agency.—Vacant (work intended to be performed by Assistant with Khán, but that post also being vacant, the Deputy Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, was asked to perform the duties temporarily).

7—Assistant in Pishín.—Office as before.

8—Assistant in Thal-Chotiálí and Harnáí.—(Appointment held by Kalát officer.)

9—Commandant, Baluch Guides.

10—Medical Officer.

Difficulties experienced in consequence of paucity of officers.

286. The Agent to the Governor General added a note to Schedule B which will now be quoted:—

"Thus, instead of five appointments in the Agency when first established, there were when I left (on furlough) no less than ten. Two of these had been provided for by the appointment of a Commandant, Baluch Guides, and an Assistant for Pishín. But for three, *viz.*, the Assistantship of Quetta, the Assistantship at Thal and Harnáí, and the Political Agency, Gwadar, with all the connected duties in Southern Afghanistan, I received no extra help. The Treasury Officer at Quetta was temporarily placed in charge of all the Quetta duties, but he was quite unable to do the work, and it is impossible to give him these duties again without the risk of serious failure. Indeed, he could never have got through the work at all, but that towards the end of the war some extra officers (since removed), *i.e.*, Captains Martelli and Loch, Lieutenant Kennedy, Mr. Biddulph, and others, were temporarily given to assist him. The Personal Assistant is quite unable to do any of the Quetta work. He is away from Quetta half the year, and that alone is sufficient to prevent him being responsible for the administration of the district; and even if he were in Quetta the whole year, his time is so entirely occupied with office work, that it is totally out of the question for him to attempt to do anything else. This fact is proved by the experience of the last three years. Neither Captain Curzon Wylie nor Captain Hope, when my Personal Assistants, were able to undertake any portion of the Quetta administration. Since their time the English work of my office has exactly doubled,† and the vernacular work has increased in still greater proportion. Mr. Barnes endeavoured for a short time to assist Mr. Ingle in clearing off the judicial arrears, but was ultimately obliged to relinquish the work. Colonel St. John attempted to meet the difficulty by bringing in the Pishín Officer, Mr. Jennings, to Quetta for the winter months, but this plan did not succeed, for Pishín affairs were in their turn neglected. Finally, so complete was the deadlock in the administration, that during last summer Major Biddulph thought it best, as the least of two evils, to leave Jacobabad temporarily without a special officer and to remove Mr. Ramsay to Quetta, where he was placed in charge of all the civil and criminal work, the revenue administration being still left to the Treasury Officer, Mr. Ingle. In addition to this, Major Biddulph directed Rai Bahadur Hittu Ram, who was then on special duty, to remain a month in Quetta and assist in clearing off the arrears of civil work, some of which was more than a year old; as Government is aware, a Munsiff was also appointed simultaneously for the same purpose. Finally, foreseeing how disastrous it would be to again leave the Quetta work either to the Treasury Officer or to the Personal Assistant (it had never been more than nominally with the Personal Assistant), Major Biddulph specially asked that Mr. Ramsay might be retained in

† The figures of the issues and receipts are as follows:—

| | 1880. | 1881. | 1882. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Issues | 1,852 | 2,248 | 4,131 |
| Receipts | 2,354 | 2,166 | 3,715 |

Quetta on special duty till I was able to propose some permanent arrangement. It is true it was proposed at the same time that Mr. Ramsay should temporarily conduct the Treasury work, and that Mr. Ingle should, while still in charge of the revenue administration of the valley, devote his spare time to clearing off the arrears of accounts, but the chief motive for the request was the one I have given. Similarly, the Deputy Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, was temporarily placed in charge of the Mekran border in 1879, but he is merely 'a channel of communication,' and I am not able to use him, owing to his other duties, in any active political work. The Harnái work, including the charge of the Marris and Bugtís, was also temporarily provided for by transferring the officer from the Khán without providing any substitute in his place; all these temporary arrangements, I would observe, were only made by me under protest, and I repeatedly urged the Foreign Office to send me more officers."

## SCHEDULE C

Giving the state of the Agency when the Agent to the Governor General took charge in November 1882, will now be quoted.

*1.—Agent to the Governor General*—With revised office, details of which it is not necessary to give.

*2.—Political Agent, Jacobabad*—

| Office— | R |
|---|---|
| 1 Head Clerk | 125 |
| 1 2nd Clerk | 55 |
| 1 3rd Clerk and Munshi | 45 |
| 3 Chuprasis, at R8 each | 24 |
| 1 Khallasi | 8 |
| TOTAL | 257 |

*3.—Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí*—

| Office— | R |
|---|---|
| 1 Clerk | 75 |
| 2 Chaprasis, at R8 each | 16 |
| TOTAL | 91 |

*4.—Political Agent, Pishín*—

| | R |
|---|---|
| 1 Clerk | 100 |
| 1 Clerk and Munshi | 50 |
| 2 Chaprasis, at R8 each | 16 |
| TOTAL | 166 |

*5.—Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General.*

*6.—Commandant, Baluch Guides.*

*7.—Medical Officer.*

*Note to Schedule C.*

This is the new arrangement sanctioned by the Resolution of Government No. 43G, of 6th January 1883, which has recently appeared in the Gazette. It will be observed that for administrative work it only gives me one more officer than I possessed five years ago, on the first establishment of the Agency, although Pishín, Sibi, Thal-Chotiálí, the Railway in Kalát territory, and the political work of the Gwadar Agency and Southern Baluchistan have been added to my charge. Only this one addition, too, is given, although the Agency now yields a considerable annual revenue to Government. Five years ago the work of the Agency was not administrative, and no revenue was collected. Now the total receipts from the assigned districts alone average 2½ lakhs of rupees, and another half lakh is realised from the lands in

Kalát territory watered by Sind canals. Altogether the revenue of the Agency may be estimated (exclusive of Quetta) at 3 lakhs a year. If the new distribution is looked at in the light of the remarks made at the foot of the preceding schedule, it will be seen that it fails to provide—

(1) for the Quetta work,
(2) for the work at the Court of His Highness the Khán,
(3) for the work of the Gwadar Agency and Southern Baluchistan.

Assuming that the Kalát officer could also look after the Mekran Coast, it will be seen that I require at the very least two more officers, *viz.*, one for Quetta and one for Kalát. Moreover, I can only manage with so few by making special arrangements, *i.e.*, by employing my attaché, who is really in charge of the Intelligence Department, as an Assistant Political Officer in Pishín, and by giving the Political Agent, Jacobabad, an area of country to look after which will require that the officer employed should be specially selected for active and energetic habits.

Additions recommended to the Agency.

287. The Agent to the Governor General then recommended that several additions should be made to the Agency at a total cost of R42,096 per annum, the additional cost being met from the revenues collected by the officers of the Agency, which amounted at that time to about 3 lakhs per annum and was on the increase. The chief additions asked for were an Assistant Political Officer at Jacobabad, with an office establishment, together with an increase to the establishment of the Political Agent at Jacobabad; an increase to the establishment of the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí; an Assistant at Thal-Chotiálí, with an office establishment; and an increase to the establishment of the Political Agent, Pishín.

Fresh proposals made in April 1881.

288. Before this letter was replied to, the Agent to the Governor General went to Simla in April 1883, and there made proposals as to the administration of the Agency in consultation with the Foreign Secretary. It was then proposed that there should be—

(1) a Political Agent at Jacobabad,
(2) a Political Agent at Thal-Chotiálí,
(3) a Political Agent at Kalát, who should have charge of South Baluchistan,
(4) a Political Agent in charge of Quetta and Pishín,
(5) an Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General,
(6) a Superintendent of Levies,
(7) an Assistant Superintendent of Levies and Assistant Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí.

Arrangements made with regard to Pishín and the Levies.

289. The Political Agent, Quetta and Pishín, was to draw R1,000 per mensem, a travelling allowance of R180, and to rank with 3rd class Agents; the whole to be charged to the revenues of Quetta. To assist him, an additional Native Assistant should, it was proposed, be appointed, on a deputation allowance of R150 per mensem, and travelling allowance of R90. The Superintendent of Levies was to draw the pay and allowances of the Commandant, Baluch Guides, whose appointment would be thus absorbed. The Assistant Superintendent of Levies was to draw a staff allowance of R200 per mensem and R150 per mensem travelling allowance. Additions to the office establishments were at the same time proposed, the total increased cost per annum being R27,948.

Appointment of an officer for Quetta and Pishín, and the establishments for Quetta, Pishín and Thal-Chotiálí sanctioned.

290. The appointment of an officer to take charge of the districts of Quetta and Pishín on a salary of R1,000 per mensem and a fixed travelling allowance of R180 per mensem, to be paid from Quetta revenues, was sanctioned by the Government of India in letter No. 727E., dated

19th April 1883; and in letter No. 768E., dated 24th April 1883. The Government of India sanctioned the scale of establishments quoted below for the Political Agent of Thal-Chotiálí, and the Political Agent in charge of Quetta and Pishín:—

THAL-CHOTIÁLÍ AND HARNÁÍ.

| | R Per mensem. |
|---|---|
| 1 Head Clerk | 125—150 |
| 1 2nd do. | 70 |
| 1 3rd do. | 65 |
| 1 Sherishtadar | 100 |
| 1 Muharrir | 55 |
| 1 Accountant | 80 |
| 1 Record-keeper | 50 |
| 1 Jemadar | 15 |
| 4 Chuprassis | 40 |
| Total | 600—625 |

PISHÍN AND QUETTA.

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 Head Clerk | 125—150 |
| 1 2nd do. | 65 |
| 1 Sherishtadar | 100—125 |
| 1 Revenue Mirza | 125 |
| 1 Accountant | 100 |
| 1 Record-keeper | 50 |
| 1 Jemadar | 15 |
| 3 Chaprassis | 30 |
| Total | 610—660 |

The Government of India, however, declined to sanction an office establishment for the attaché which had been proposed.

Captain Gaisford appointed as Assistant Superintendent of Levies, May 1883.

291. Sanction to the appointment of an Assistant Superintendent of Levies was given in letter No. 967E., dated 14th May 1883, by the Government of India, on a staff salary of R250 per mensem, with a travelling allowance of R150 per mensem, on the understanding that at least half the charge for staff salary and travelling allowances would be provided for by savings in the redistribution of the grants made for tribal service in Baluchistan. Captain G. Gaisford, B.S.C., was gazetted to this appointment and was granted the powers of a 3rd class Magistrate, together with authority to hear suits up to the value of R50.

Increase of work which has of late years taken place in the Baluchistan Agency Office.

292. Of late years in the Baluchistan Agency Office there has been a rapid increase in the amount of work done, as testified by the receipts and issues for the following years, as below:—

| 1881. | | 1883. | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Receipts | 1,039 | Receipts | 1,934 |
| Issues | 944 | Issues | 2,413 |
| **1882.** | | **1884.** | |
| Receipts | 1,907 | Receipts | 2,900 |
| Issues | 2,217 | Issues | 3,968 |

The causes of this increase in the correspondence are the establishment of the Thal-Chotiálí, Quetta and Pishín, and Jacobabad Agencies, the revival of the

Kalát Agency, and the exercise of more complete supervision over the different officers. There is every likelihood that as the administration becomes more assimilated to that of an Indian province, the work will increase. From time to time changes and increases in the staff of clerks in the Agent to the Governor General's office and in the offices subordinate to him have been sanctioned.

Deputation allowance for the Baluchistan Agency Offices, 1880-1885.

293. In October 1880 the Government of India sanctioned for the office establishments of the Baluchistan Agency a deputation allowance of 30 per cent. on the salaries of the clerks, as a temporary measure; this addition to their pay, however, has been necessarily from time to time renewed. In 1883 the Government of India requested that the matter might be considered in view to the reduction and ultimate withdrawal of the deputation allowance. On the representation of the Agent to the Governor General, however, the allowance was continued to the establishments in and above the passes, an allowance of 20 per cent. only being granted to those serving below the passes. During the present year (1885) it has again been proposed to withdraw the allowances. The cost of living in Baluchistan is, and has been, in comparison with the rates obtaining in India, very high; in addition to this, the unpopularity of the country is to some extent due to the rigour of the climate above the passes, and the expense of the transit of goods from the railway terminus to Quetta, Pishín, Kalát, &c. This, coupled with the limited hope of promotion which can be held out to the incumbents of posts, has from time to time occasioned some difficulty in filling up vacancies which have occurred. The whole question of the reduction of the deputation allowance is still under consideration in connection with a scheme for improving financially the position of the ministerial and other establishments under the Agency. Sir R. Sandeman is "convinced that unless some inducement in the shape of allowances or better rates of pay than those ruling in India is offered, it will be a difficult matter to secure the services of good and capable officials in a country like Baluchistan."

Officers who have held the posts of Cantonment Magistrate and Treasury Officer at Quetta.

294. The officers who have held the post of Cantonment Magistrate at Quetta are Mr. W. A. Ingle and Captain F. H. Forjett, who has officiated for him. The officers who have held the post of Treasury Officer are—Mr. C. E. Biddulph, Mr. W. A. Ingle, and Mr. Ramsay; Mr. W. A. Ingle now holds both the posts of Cantonment Magistrate and Treasury Officer.

The Quetta Treasury.

295. A treasury was established at Quetta, the head-quarters of the Baluchistan Agency, on the 19th July 1879. Mr. Biddulph had charge of it, and continued in charge till the 8th December of the same year, when he was relieved by Mr. Ingle. Mr. Ingle was placed on special duty in connection with former accounts on the 9th November 1882, when Lieutenant Ramsay took charge. Mr. Ingle again took over the treasury on the 4th May 1883, and is still in charge. In October 1884 he took two months' privilege leave, and rejoined in December. During his absence on leave Captain Forjett officiated for him.

Sub-Treasuries in Pishín and Sibi.

296. The sub-treasuries in Pishín and Sibi were established in 1879, and their accounts incorporated with those of the head treasury in February 1880. A small establishment was at first sanctioned for the Quetta Treasury, but in 1881 it was revised, and again in 1885.

Treasury buildings.

297. The building first used as a treasury was an out-house. In 1882 a pucka-domed building was erected, and fitted with proper iron-lined bins for holding coin. The

bulk of the coin in Quetta during the war was kept in a building which was constructed for a granary, and which was situated inside the fort. Subsequently in 1883 another brick-domed building, similar to the one in the Treasury Office in the civil lines, was erected in the fort and fitted with bins, where the bulk of the specie is always kept.

Transactions of the Quetta Treasury, including the Sub-Treasuries.

298. The transactions of the Quetta Treasury, including those of the Sub-Treasuries, have been as follows:—

*Receipts.*

| Year. | R |
|---|---|
| 1879-80 | 42,66,255 |
| 1880-81 | 1,33,13,733 |
| 1881-82 | 88,14,429 |
| 1882-83 | 58,47,122 |
| 1883-84 | 68,45,295 |
| 1884-85 | 1,19,56,076 |

*Payments.*

| Year. | R |
|---|---|
| 1879-80 | 40,65,263 |
| 1880-81 | 1,16,17,739 |
| 1881-82 | 89,93,348 |
| 1882-83 | 54,86,418 |
| 1883-84 | 77,90,529 |
| 1884-85 | 1,21,50,650 |

The separation of the Treasury and Agency Offices at Quetta, February 1881.

299. In February 1881 the Government of India sanctioned the complete separation, for the first time, of the Treasury and Agency Offices (the previous union of which had caused considerable trouble and inconvenience), with beneficial results in respect to the keeping of the accounts. At the same time attention was paid to the more regular keeping in order of papers in the Agent to the Governor General's Office.

Entertainment of a barkandaz establishment for the Quetta Jail.

300. In September 1883 the Political Agent, Quetta and Pishín, under a misapprehension that the Panjab Jail Manual applied to Baluchistan, reported that five barkandazes had been entertained for the Quetta Jail. The Agent to the Governor General was satisfied that, owing to an increase in their duties, and with regard to the number of prisoners in the Quetta Jail, that the efficiency of the police force in Quetta would be impaired by having to perform the duties of barkandazes, and application was made to the Government of India for the introduction into Baluchistan of the Punjab Jail Manual. This was sanctioned, with the proviso that no extra expenditure was to be incurred without the orders of Government. The Agent to the Governor General then recommended that the Political Agent, Quetta and Pishín, might be empowered to entertain a jail establishment as prescribed in the Punjab Jail Manual with retrospective effect from the date on which the men had been entertained. It was also recommended that the pay of the Jemadar should be R15 per mensem, and that of the barkandazes R10, exclusive of clothing allowance, but inclusive of batta; the average number of prisoners in the jail being 40. In May 1884, the Government of India sanctioned the entertainment of an establishment of barkandazes within the limits prescribed in paragraph 329 of the Punjab Jail Manual, with effect from the 20th September 1883; the pay of the Jemadar was fixed at R15 per mensem and that of the barkandazes at R10 each.

301. In 1878 the Government of India sanctioned for three years, for the

Sanction granted for R600 for the maintenance of the Residency house and grounds for a fixed period.

maintenance and repairs of the Residency house and grounds at Quetta, an expenditure of R600 per annum. The grant was subsequently renewed to the close of the financial year 1883-84, and granted for a further period of three years, from the 1st April 1884, before the close of which period a further report has to be submitted, in view to the grant being placed on a more regular footing, if its continuance be still found necessary.

Tax on water-supply in Quetta.

302. The sources of water-supply in Quetta are as follows :—

(1) The Durani Karez.
(2) A share amounting to $\frac{4}{25}$ ths of the Hanah stream.
(3) A portion amounting $6\frac{1}{3}$rd shares out of 15 shares of the Habib stream or karez.
(4) A share amounting to half of the Tazi Karez.
(5) The Gurna or Bruce Karez.

These water rights were from time to time purchased by Government. Of the five sources of supply, the first three entirely, and $\frac{1}{8}$th of the Government share in the Tazi Karez are allotted to the military cantonment; the remaining $\frac{7}{8}$ths of the Tazi stream are utilised in the civil bazar and station. Considerable correspondence with the Political Agent, Quetta and Pishín, took place in regard to water-supply, and eventually the Agent to the Governor General having reported to the Government of India that a water tax was unobjectionable, Notification No. 542E., dated 14th April 1885, was issued in the Foreign Department, under which it was notified that on and after the 1st May 1885 a rate of R1 per mensem should be charged for an hour's supply daily of water taken from the undermentioned streams or karezes, for the irrigation of lands and gardens, situated within the cantonments of Quetta :—

(1) Durani Karez.
(2) Hanah River stream.
(3) Habib stream or karez.
(4) Tazi Karez.
(5) Gurna or Bruce Karez.

The hire of camels, 1884 and 1885.

303. Considerable difficulty has been from time to time felt in Baluchistan in consequence of officers of different departments acting independently of one another in respect to the hire of camels, of which only a limited number exist, for camel transport, with the result that one department had bid against another, and rates had been largely increased to the loss of Government. United action being the only remedy for this state of things, the Agent to the Governor General summoned a committee, at which it was agreed that the Government of India should be asked to authorise the issue of orders by the Agent to the Governor General, prohibiting the possible seizure of camels, and fixing a schedule of rates. Accordingly, in June 1884, the sanction of the Government of India was solicited by the Agent to the Governor General, who at the same time observed, as to the seizure of camels, that—

"it was obviously only right that it should be prohibited. In case of emergency, such as in time of war, it may be impossible to prevent camels being seized, but if they are absolutely required for military purposes, and cannot be obtained from the people with their free will, the seizure should be effected through the Political Departments, who would be careful to seize the camels of local owners and not to interfere with through traffic from Afghanistan to India. During the late Afghan war, camels engaged in this trade were never interfered with."

The Government of India replied that the seizure of camels should be prohibited, except under circumstances of great emergency, when it should only be conducted by the Political authorities. As to the question of a fixed tariff, it

was observed that it should merely be treated as a guide. Orders have been issued that—

"except under most exceptional circumstances, camels and other animals belonging to traders and cultivators shall on no account be impressed for either public or private purposes."

304. The powers of the Agent to the Governor General are those of a Court of Session in respect of all offences regarding which jurisdiction is exercised by the Political Agents and Native Assistants to the Agent to the Governor General, all sentences of death being referred for the confirmation of the Governor General in Council, appeals from the Sessions Court lying to the Governor General in Council. The Government of India have said that—

Powers of the Agent to the Governor General, and the views of Government with respect to the administration of justice, May 1883.

"it is not considered desirable to require in the districts of Sibi, Pishín, Thal-Chotiálí, and Harnái too rigid an adherence to the technicalities of the Indian codes of law, either civil or criminal, in cases in which only natives of those districts are concerned. In such cases the administration of justice should be ordered as much as possible in accordance with the customs of the country. Where Indian subjects of the British Government are concerned, they should of course be dealt with in accordance with the laws of India. In order to bring the orders on this subject into harmony with the formal powers granted above, I am to say that the Political Agents are empowered, in any case in which the complainant (if any) and all accused persons are not British subjects, who are natives of India, to decline jurisdiction."

305. Prior to the middle of the year 1883, the appointment of a Political Agent to Kalát was discontinued; in August 1883, however, it was determined to re-establish it, and the Government of India asked the Agent to the Governor General for detailed proposals on the subject, and with regard to the office establishment absolutely necessary for the Political Agent. It was at the same time observed that the cost of the Agent might be met by savings effected by the discontinuance of an arrangement temporarily sanctioned, under which the Deputy Director of the Persian Telegraphs had discharged political duties on the Mekran Coast. The Agent to the Governor General recommended the appointment permanently of an officer to the Khán's Court, his duties being to conduct, under the Agent to the Governor General, British relations with His Highness, and to enquire into disputes which arise from time to time between the Khán and the Brahui Sirdars. His Highness the Khán represented that the want was felt of an adviser with whom he could freely confer at Kalát. For the office establishment one clerk, one muharrir, and three chaprassis were proposed at a total cost of R196-8 per mensem. The Government of India decided to re-establish the Kalát Agency from the 1st March 1884, and Surgeon Major O. T. Duke was posted as Political Agent from the 1st March 1884. Sanction was given at the same time to the entertainment of—

Re-establishment of the Kalát Political Agency, from 1st March 1884. Duties of the Political Agent.

| | R per mensem. |
|---|---|
| 1 Clerk on . . . . . . . | 80 |
| 1 Munshi on . . . . . . . | 40 |
| 3 Chaprassis, each . . . . . . | 10 |
| TOTAL . | 150 |

The duties of Political Officers are not unfrequently rather executive than political. In the case of the Agent at Kalát, they may be said to be entirely political; the object of his appointment being to enable the Agent to the Governor General, "so to speak, to keep touch of the Khán with regard to all matters affecting the British and Kalát Governments, and to carry out the treaty engagements existing between them." The Political Agent reports to the Agent to the Governor General on all matters of importance occurring at Kalát, affecting the Khán, the Brahui Sirdars, and the British Government. Weekly diaries regarding minor matters are submitted. All causes of dispute between

the Khán and the Sirdars are specially reported, which appear to be likely to lead to an infringement of article 5 of the treaty of 1876. Such quarrels are not taken up, enquired into, or disposed of, unless the Political Agent is specially requested to do so by the Agent to the Governor General. The case of any Sirdar having a grievance against the Khán is reported fully to the Agent to the Governor General for orders; together with any opinion expressed to His Highness the Khán, on any matter of importance.

Officers who have held the post of Political Agent, Kalát.

306. The officers who have held the post of Political Agent at Kalát are—

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Surgeon Major O. T. Duke, | from 21st February | 1877 to 14th May | 1877. |
| Captain H. Wylie, | from 15th May | 1877 to 18th December | 1877. |
| Surgeon Major O. T. Duke, | from 19th December | 1877. | |
| " " " | from 1st March | 1884. | |
| Captain T. Hope, | from 22nd December | 1884 to 9th May | 1885. |
| " H. M. Temple, | from 9th May | 1885 to the present time (August 1885). | |

Since the restoration of the late Mir Nasir Khán to the throne of Kalát, a Political Agent has been on duty with the Khán, who values his presence, and he aids the Khán, when required, with advice in all pending matters between the Governments. He receives his instructions from the Agent to the Governor General, and holds now the same position as that held by former Political Agents.

The respective positions occupied by the Agent to the Governor General and the Public Works Department in Baluchistan, July 1883.

307. During 1883 some discussion arose as to the course which should be taken by officers of the Public Works Department in Baluchistan, when constructing public works. In letter No. 701 M.W., dated 28th July 1883, it was ruled that works such as those then being carried on in the Bolan Pass, *viz.*, the construction of the high level road, should be carried out under the orders of the Inspector General of Military Works, but that all arrangements, such as the engagement or management of gangs of labourers employed on the works, the police arrangements connected with them, and all other matters having a bearing on the peace of the country, and the security of the officers and others employed upon the works, should be carried out in communication with the Agent to the Governor General, and subject to his approval. The Superintending Engineer, Baluchistan, was to consult the Agent to the Governor General freely upon all such matters, and act upon his advice, whenever the recommendations made by the Agent to the Governor General were not in distinct contravention of the orders the engineer might have received—a contingency which, it was observed, there was no reason to suppose would occur. At the same time Notification No. 176, dated 26th July 1883, was issued, in which Major W. P. Tomkins, R.E., Superintending Engineer, Class III, sub *pro. tem.*, was appointed to officiate as Superintending Engineer and Secretary to the Agent to the Governor General for Baluchistan in the Public Works Department in respect of civil works.

Jurisdiction in the Bolan Pass, July 1883.

308. During July 1883 the Cantonment Magistrate at Quetta reported that he was unable to try a case that had been handed over to him by the Commissariat Department, as it had taken place at Bibinani in the Bolan Pass within the jurisdiction of the Khán of Kalát. The Government of India ruled that the case should be handed over to Rai Bahadur Hittu Ram, who was at that time in subordination to the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí, in administrative charge of the Bolan, for trial, in the name of the Khán of Kalát. It will, however, be shortly seen that jurisdiction in the Bolan Pass was ceded to the British by His Highness the Khán.

309. For the high level road which was constructed through the Bolan

Construction of a high level road in the Bolan Pass, and the entertainment of a police force on the route, 1882-83.

Pass, lands had to be taken up, and application was accordingly made by the Agent to the Governor General to His Highness the Khán. This high level road was necessitated by the floods which had damaged the road then in existence, and late in 1882 it was decided by the Government of India that it would be useless to endeavour to keep the then roadway in repair. Owing to the state of the road the post was delayed, and great difficulty was experienced in getting goods up the pass. The Agent to the Governor General urged the necessity of getting the road expeditiously completed, as it was urgently required, and the road made by General Phayre, to which allusion has been made in a former chapter, was constantly broken by floods, and had to be continually re-made. He also called attention to the Harnáí route, on which a high level road had been constructed in parts, and where food and forage could be obtained, whereas they were both almost unobtainable in the Bolan. By using the Harnáí route, moreover, one line less of telegraph would be required; in fact Sir R. Sandeman was of opinion that it was for many reasons a far better route than the Bolan. It had been argued that the Harnáí route was more subject to the attacks of Marris than the Bolan; this, however, the Agent to the Governor General showed was a fallacy, as the Marri country extended to the Bolan, and the only chief of any importance near the Harnáí route was Shah Jahan, of Zhob, who could easily be held in check by the Thal. Chotiálí and Pishín troops and by the occupation of the Bori valley. The Agent to the Governor General said, however, that as the Bolan route had been selected, a grant-in-aid for the work should be sanctioned, and all available men should be sent to complete the work, in order that, *inter alia*, more money might not be fruitlessly expended in repairing the low level road; application was at the same time made to Government for a civil officer to be invested with magisterial powers for the preservation of order in the Bolan Pass. Subsequently Sir R. Sandeman urged the necessity of metalling the road, and of bridging the Bolan stream. In July 1883, in consequence of crimes which took place among the labourers collected on the Bolan route for the making of the road, for which a considerable sum of money was sanctioned, the Agent to the Governor General applied to the Government of India in view to negotiating with the Khán for the cession of jurisdiction on the route; the Viceroy, however, desired that arrangements should, if possible, be made without the formal cession. This information was sent by telegram, but the Agent to the Governor General represented to the Government of India that it had come too late to be acted on, and that the Khán had already cheerfully agreed to the cession of jurisdiction; and he urged that (1) either the Bolan Pass works should be placed under him, or (2) that the Inspector General of Military Works should correspond with him direct, and (3) that a special Magistrate should be placed in charge of the pass with a police force, as crime at that time continued to be reported in the pass, where 4,000 or 5,000 workmen were collected together without control or restraint, from all parts of the frontier, and encouraged to commit crime by the impunity they enjoyed. In consequence of the state of affairs in the pass, the Agent to the Governor General employed a police force temporarily pending the formal sanction of Government, which was given in letter No. 1661E., dated 30th July 1883, in which the following police force was sanctioned :—

| | R |
|---|---|
| 1 Daffadar | 32 |
| 4 Sowers @ R25 | 100 |
| 1 Sergeant | 25 |
| 3 Head constables @ R10 each | 30 |
| 30 Constables @ R8 each | 240 |
| Total | 427 per mensem. |

The force was to be entertained only as a temporary measure, the expense being debited to the general cost of the construction of the road, under the orders of the Inspector General of Military Works. The police force in Baluchistan has been considered in connection with the levy scheme, an account of which will be found in another place. Rai Bahadur Hittu Ram, C.I.E., was appointed for a short time to the magisterial charge of the works, in subordination to the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí, Mr. Bruce, C.I.E. The expense of the deputation of Rai Bahadur Hittu Ram on special duty was not to be debited to the Military Works Branch in connection with the cost of the construction of the road. Subsequently Major Mosley was sent as Superintendent of the Bolan Pass, to supervise administrative matters, sanitary arrangements, and to conduct police enquiries; any cases were to be committed to Mr. Bruce for trial. The force was posted at a point between Kandilani and Pir Chowki, at Kirta, Dunjan, Bibinani, between Ab-i-gum and Bibinani, and at Mach.

Postal arrangements to Quetta, October 1877.

310. When the Agency was first established in Baluchistan, the business of forwarding letters was undertaken by Captain Reynolds at Jacobabad. Sir R. Sandeman suggested that the Post Office should undertake the business of making up and distributing the mails at the two termini, Jacobabad and Quetta. The Director General of the Post Office directed that this should be done; the road service was, however, to be performed, as before, by the Baluch Guides and others. In 1877 a Post Office, under the supervision of the Postal Department, was opened at Quetta, but upon the outbreak of war in 1878, Field Post Offices were established at most of the outposts in the Bolan, in the Pishín, and on the line between the Khojak and Kandahar. Between Jacobabad and the Khojak the mails were carried by sowars recruited from the people of the district; these sowars were not subordinates of the Post Office, but were placed immediately under the Political Agent in whose district they worked. On the whole, the mail service was efficient and safe. In 1879 a postal line between Quetta and Kalát was organized, and in the beginning of 1880 other lines were opened between Sibi and Thal-Chotiálí *viá* Gandakin Daff, and also between Sibi and Quetta *viá* Harnáí and the Chapar Rift. At present there are 383 miles of mail lines on which sowars are employed, and about 70 miles where runners are engaged. Both sowars and runners are subordinate to the political authorities. The Post Offices, of which there are now nineteen, are all Imperial, being subordinate to the Deputy Postmaster General, Sind, to whose circle Baluchistan was added in 1881.

Postal money orders.

311. The introduction of the Postal Money Order system in 1880 was greatly appreciated by the army then occupying Baluchistan and South Afghanistan, so much so, that nearly two lakhs of rupees were remitted to India monthly, almost entirely doing away with the system of "sepoy's remittances." At present postal money orders amounting to over two lakhs of rupees monthly are remitted to India, chiefly by sepoys, camp followers, and coolies engaged on railway work. Large remittances are made during the months of April and May from India to Quetta and to Pishín by Pathan merchants, who prefer sending the proceeds of the sale of the merchandise taken to India by their kafilas by postal orders to carrying the money about their persons, or submitting to the very high percentage charged for hoondies by the Shikarpuri bunyas.

Use of the post by natives of Baluchistan.

312. In 1879 neither Baluch nor Pathan availed himself of the Post Office, letters being invariably sent by special messenger. At present there is a considerable correspondence kept up between India and Baluchistan, so much so, that it has been found necessary to provide special arrangements for the delivery of letters to

villages in the Pishín district. It may be here noted that an account of the sowars kept up for the carrying of the post will be found in the sections on the subject of the levy reorganisation scheme in this report.

Conveyance of the parcel post between Rindli and Quetta, Sibi and Thal, Quetta and Kachh, and Quetta and Pishín, 1884 and 1885.

313. In 1884 the cost of the parcel post which then existed between Rindli and Quetta was drawn in a contingent bill, and the Government of India directed that proposals should be made for the entertainment of a permanent establishment. Pending the submission of proposals, the Agent to the Governor General asked for a supplementary grant of R600 for the conveyance of the parcel post from Rindli to Quetta *viâ* the Bolan for the year 1884-85. This proposal was sanctioned by the Government of India. The Agent to the Governor General, in letter No. 5833, dated 20th December 1884, explained that there were three lines on which a banghy post was maintained, *viz.*,— (*a*) between Rindli and Quetta, (*b*) between Quetta and Kachh, (*c*) between Quetta and Pishín. Light parcels were sent up with the ordinary mails; others were sent bi-weekly by a hired camel, the cost of which was charged in a contingent bill. No establishment was maintained. The Government of India, however, directed that application for an establishment should be made; on this the Agent to the Governor General represented that the maintenance of a permanent establishment would involve a cost considerably in excess of the then average monthly expenditure, and the Government of India under the circumstances sanctioned a continuance of the existing system, requesting that full particulars as to charges should be entered in the contingent bills. The Agent to the Governor General had also proposed the maintenance of a weekly parcel post between the Sibi and Thal-Chotiálí Cantonments at a total cost of R50 per mensem, and he had pointed out that there were then some 16 or 17 officers permanently quartered at Thal-Chotiálí. Consequently it was considered necessary that a weekly service should be permanently established for their benefit. In the special circumstances represented, and having regard to the amount of the parcel traffic on the line in question, the Governor General in Council sanctioned the establishment, costing R50 per mensem, of 4 camels and 1 driver. The cost involved was to be charged in the establishment bills of the Agency. These orders cancelled an arrangement which had been previously made, under which an expenditure of R20 per mensem on account of a fortnightly service had been incurred and entered in a contingent bill.

Proposals for the establishment of a tonga dâk up the Bolan, 1880-85.

314. It was first proposed to establish a tonga dâk in the Bolan Pass in 1880, and 14 tongas, with harness for the purpose, were handed over to the Agent to the Governor General under the directions of the Government of Bombay, and arrangements were made for the supply of 140 ponies. They were not, however, utilised, as it was eventually found that the scheme was impracticable. The proposal to start a tonga dâk was revived in 1881, and detailed proposals for its establishment were made in 1882 by the Agent to the Governor General to the Government of India, but sanction to the proposed scheme was declined. In 1885, however, the establishment of a tonga line was ordered, and the Director General of Post Offices was authorised to start the dâk, as a temporary measure, in the Bolan Pass, as it was at that time contemplated that an army corps might be sent to Quetta. A hitch in the arrangements, however, occurred, and the orders were countermanded; but the Agent to the Governor General urged the necessity of the establishment of the service, adding that if it were not started, additional cost would have to be incurred in providing extra sowars to carry the post; it was also noted that considerable time would be saved in transit by tonga of the mails. While this correspondence was going on, the Transport Department

arranged for the draft of tongas up and down the pass, 81 mules being employed on the duty, and the charge per seat in the tonga being R15 for Europeans and R8 for Natives. With regard to the alternative proposal in lieu of a tonga, that the number of sowars in the Bolan Pass should be increased, the Foreign Department asked for information as to the number of sowars between Rindli, and the duties on which they were employed, together with similar information regarding the line between Quetta and Chaman. From information supplied by the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí, it appears that the following is the postal establishment in the Bolan :—

*Rindli.*

1 Inspector.
1 Jemadar.
1 Daffadar.
20 Sowars.

*Kundilani.*

1 Daffadar.
20 Sowars.

*Kirta.*

1 Daffadar.
20 Sowars.

*Bibinani.*

1 Daffadar.
18 Sowars.

*Abigum.*

1 Daffadar.
20 Sowars.

*Sir-i-Bolan.*

1 Jemadar.
1 Daffadar.
20 Sowars.

*Dasht.*

1 Daffadar.
20 Sowars.

*Sir-i-ab.*

1 Daffadar.
20 Sowars.
Total cost R3,435 per mensem.

The following is the establishment between Quetta and Chaman :—

*Quetta to Pishín.*

2 Jemadars.
12 Sowars.

*Pishín to Chaman.*

1 Jemadar.
12 Sowars.
Total cost R780.

Both the Political Agents of Thal-Chotiálí and of Quetta and Pishín have recommended an increase to the establishments in consequence of the weight of the mails and the heavy work. The Agent to the Governor General considered it to be desirable from every point of view that the tonga dâk should be established, and begged that his proposals might be favourably considered. The matter has not yet (July 1885) been finally decided.

The introduction of horse-breeding operations into Baluchistan, 1884.

315. In October 1883 the Government of Bombay informed the Agent to the Governor General that orders had been issued to the Superintendent of Horse-breeding Operations at Bombay to supply 4 stallions to Baluchistan in view to improving the breed of horses, and that Baluchistan had been included within the field of horse-breeding operations under the supervision of the Bombay Government. It was at the same time stated that the mares served were to be branded. In March 1884, prior to the arrival of the stallions, the Superintendent of Horse-breeding Operations visited Sibi and Quetta and branded several fine mares. Soon after this the four stallions arrived, one of which was located in Quetta, one in the Thal-Chotiálí district, and two at Sibi, which were subsequently sent to Quetta and Thal. One of the stallions proved to be entirely useless, and was sold for R515. The covering season was almost at an end before the stallions arrived, and consequently but few brood mares remained to be covered. At Sibi and Thal, however, 59 mares were covered, while at Quetta 24 were served. The owners of the mares availed themselves eagerly of the services of the stallions, and doubtless had the stallions arrived at the beginning of the brooding season, the number of 60 mares (prescribed under rules) might easily have been covered by each horse. The Baluchis made no objection to having their mares branded, and were quite alive to the advantage of improving their breed

of horses. A large proportion of their mares are fine animals, and the breed is noted for its hardiness, endurance, good temper and docility; mated with suitable stallions, the mares are eminently fitted to produce light cavalry remounts second to none. The Baluchis themselves possess no good stallions of their own, owing to the scant care they take of them, their attention being paid to fillies. In reporting the results to the Government of India, the Agent to the Governor General observed that, as far as the experiment had been tried, every encouragement had been given for its continuance, and he recommended that the attempt made to improve the breed of horses should be persevered in.

Horse fair at Sibi, 1885. Advantageous results to be expected from horse-breeding operations in Baluchistan.

316. In January 1885 a horse fair was held at Sibi. The mares shown were highly extolled by the judges. No difficulty was found in purchasing 10 first class remounts for the 1st Bombay Lancers, at the very moderate average price of R180 each. The political effect was good, as the tribes were brought into friendly rivalry with one another. The Agent to the Governor General did not think that it would be advisable to charge a fee for the services of the stallions, as no fee was levied in Jacobabad, Dera Ghazi Khan, and other places in the Panjab. It was added—

"It is true that a fee is imposed, but only for unbranded mares, and the amount charged—R20—is meant to be prohibitive, so as to force zemindars to have their mares branded when they are served gratis. The imposition of a fee here would be invidious, and might render the stallions unpopular among the people, who are for the most part poor * * * I am decidedly of opinion that the expenditure incurred in these operations will be vastly counterbalanced by the advantages gained in improving for ourselves such a promising field for supplying our cavalry with cheap and excellent remounts. I apprehend also excellent results politically both in improving the circumstances of the wild tribes under my charge, in increasing our popularity among them as they come to know us, and recognise our efforts for their benefit. But the former advantages, I would respectfully submit, are sufficient of themselves to induce us to continue the operations apart from all political considerations.

Very lately* the Government of India addressed the Government of Bombay to the effect that every effort should be made to foster and develope horse-breeding operations in Sibi, Quetta and Thal-Chotiálí, and requested that instructions might be issued for the introduction into Baluchistan of horse and mule-breeding. Sufficient time has not yet elapsed for effect to be given to the scheme.

* No. 574D., dated 10th June 1885.

Establishment of a brewery at Quetta, 1884-85.

317. In August 1884 the Murree Brewery Company proposed to construct a brewery at Quetta, at which place they had contracted to supply the troops with beer locally brewed, for 5 years. Some difficulty was experienced in providing a suitable water-supply, as the best which existed was close to a ziarat. Water rights are being purchased by the Brewery at Karani, near the Quetta Cantonment, for R18,000, and the matter is at present (July 1885) being arranged.

The Baluchistan Volunteer Rifle Corps, 1882-85.

318. The proposal to raise a Volunteer Corps in Baluchistan was first made by the Commandant of the Sind Volunteer Rifle Corps in May 1882, and Major Biddulph reported to the Government of India that there were 39 residents in Quetta willing to join a corps which should be kept distinct from the Sind Corps. In March 1883 the formation of a Volunteer Corps was sanctioned by the Government of India. The arms provided for the corps were Martini-Henri rifles with accoutrements complete. The name of the corps is "The Baluchistan Volunteer Rifle Corps," the head-quarters are at Quetta, the Honorary Colonel is Sir R. Sandeman. Major Mosley was the first Commandant, and it was proposed that the corps should be divided into mounted infantry and infantry; this proposal was not, however, approved by the Gov-

ernment of India. The appointments of Honorary Colonel and Commandant were notified in the *Gazette of India,* the admission of natives of India into the corps was sanctioned, and also of soldier signallers on the unattached list, and arrangements were made for an armoury, a Sergeant Instructor's quarters, and a rifle range was constructed. For administrative purposes the Government of India decided that the corps should be placed under the Agent to the Governor General, Baluchistan, and appointments to commissions in the corps are made accordingly. Early in 1884 the corps had increased from small beginnings to about 100 members, and became entitled to the following complement of officers:—1 Major (Commandant), 2 Captains, and 4 Lieutenants. A store-room on the rifle range was built. A first class Sergeant Instructor and two drill instructors have been sanctioned for the corps, together with an advance of money to cover the cost of clothing, the sum expended being recovered from capitation grants. The officer at present (August 1885) in command of the corps is Surgeon Fullerton, the Residency Surgeon.

Appointment of, and powers granted to, Mr. Ingle, Cantonment Magistrate of Quetta, January 1884-85.

319. In January 1884, Mr. W. A. Ingle was appointed as Cantonment Magistrate of Quetta, with the powers of a first class Magistrate, a Justice of the Peace, and a Small Cause Court Judge. About the same time the Cantonment Act was extended to Quetta, the High Court, for all the purposes of the Act, being the Court of the Agent to the Governor General in Baluchistan. Shortly afterwards the rules and regulations framed under Act XXII of 1864 were extended to the cantonment of Quetta; the words "Local Government" in the rules and regulations meaning "the Governor General's Agent in Baluchistan," with certain exceptions. For the audit of cantonment fund accounts the rules of the Civil Account Code apply, the Comptroller of Indian Treasuries being the Provincial Accountant General. Mr. Ingle is Secretary of the Cantonment Committee.

Acts extended to the cantonment of Quetta.

320. The following Acts have been extended to the cantonment of Quetta:—(1) Act No. XI, regarding the mufassal Courts of Small Causes, as far as applicable, the Court of the Agent to the Governor General being the High Court; (2) Act No. III, regarding cantonments, with certain restrictions and modifications; (3) Act No. XXI, regarding foreign jurisdiction, sections 4, 5, and 6. Under Act XI as to the mufassal Courts of Small Causes, section 3, a notification constituting a Court of Small Causes has been issued. Under Act III, regarding cantonments, section 5, by notification the pecuniary limit of the jurisdiction of the Court is fixed at R500. Under the same Act, the provisions of the rules and regulations framed under Act XXII of 1864 have been extended to the cantonment. A notification declaring who is the "Local Government" under the above rules and regulations has been issued. Under Act XXI, the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, sections 4 and 6, the Cantonment Magistrate has been appointed to be a Justice of the Peace, and commitments of European British subjects have been directed to the Chief Court of the Punjab. Under Act XXI, the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, the powers of the Agent to the Governor General under the Criminal Procedure Code have been notified.

Orders respecting the control of the sale of arms and ammunition, September 1882.

321. For the control of the sale of arms and ammunition in Baluchistan and the assigned districts, the Agent to the Governor General has directed that no one will be allowed to deal in these articles, without a license signed by the Magistrate of the district, for which a fee of R10 shall be charged annually; that the number of licenses should be carefully limited in accordance with requirements of places, and should only be granted to shops or dealers of established reputation; that any increase to the number of licenses should be notified for the Agent to the Governor General's inform-

ation; that all licensed dealers should take receipts for arms and ammunition sold, submitting half-yearly to the Magistrates of districts the receipts, the names of purchasers, and the amounts purchased; that the officers of the Agency should understand that as complete a control as possible should be established over the trade in powder, percussion caps, lead, rifle cartridges, and ammunition capable of being used for military purposes; that of such ammunition no dealer should be allowed to import more than a limited quantity at a time; that applications for the import of arms and ammunition from India for retail sale should be submitted to the Agent to the Governor General through the Magistrates of districts; and that should the trade in native-made arms, such as swords and jezails attain considerable dimensions, reports on the subject should be submitted. From time to time licenses have been issued for the export to Baluchistan of arms and ammunition, but not to a large extent.

Extension of the Court-fees and Stamp Acts to the Baluchistan Agency.

322. In the month of May 1883 the Government of India authorised the use of stamps in Baluchistan and in the assigned districts of Sibi and Pishín,—*vide* No. 893E, dated 7th May 1883, from the Foreign Department. In March 1885 the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act (Act I of 1879), so far as they might be applicable, were extended to the districts within the Baluchistan Agency. At the same time the provisions of the Indian Court-fees Act (Act VII of 1870) were similarly extended to the Baluchistan Agency.

Statistics of stamps for the years 1882-83 and 1883-84.

323. The following table is a statement of stamps statistics for the years 1882-83 and 1883-84:—

| Year. | Receipts. Judicial stamps. R a. p. | Receipts. Non-judicial stamps. R a. p. | Total. R a. p. | Charges. Discount and establishment. R a. p. | Charges. Refunds. R | Charges. Charges. R | Charges. Total. R a. p. | Net receipts. R a. p. | Cost of supervision. R |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1882-83. | (a) 1,006 9 2 | (b) 877 1 1 | 1,833 10 2 | (c) 25 2 6 | ... | ... | 25 2 6 | 1,858 7 8 | ... |
| 1883-84. | 8,942 2 0 | 2,653 6 0 | 11,595 8 0 | (d) 152 14 9<br>(e) 216 12 5 | ... | ... | 369 11 2 | 11,225 12 10 | 7 |

(*a*) Credited on account of Court-fees realised in cash. (*b*) Value of receipt stamps. (*c*) Discount on receipt stamps. (*d*) Discount on account of receipt stamps and non-judicial stamps. (*e*) Allowance to treasurer and his assistant.

The stamps used in the district of Quetta have the word "Quetta" impressed on them, and separate accounts of their sales are kept. The sale of stamps has been as follows:—

| | *Quetta District.* | R |
|---|---|---|
| 1883-84 | . . . . . | 6,670 |
| 1884-85 | . . . . . | 12,555 |
| | *Sibi and Pishín Districts.* | R |
| 1883-84 | . . . . . | 4,105 |
| 1884-85 | . . . . . | 11,466 |

Dispensaries in the Baluchistan Agency, 1882-84.

324. The two first dispensaries established in Baluchistan were located at Quetta and Kalát. In October 1882 the Government of India sanctioned the establishment of civil dispensaries at Gulistán, Khúshdil Khán, Thal-Chotiálí, and Kachh, as follows:—

| | R Per mensem. |
|---|---|
| One Hospital Assistant, Gulistán . . . | 50 |
| Ditto Khúshdil Khán . . . | 50 |
| Ditto Thal-Chotiálí . . . | 50 |
| Allowance to Hospital Assistant at Kachh . . . | 10 |
| Contingent expenses . . . . | 100 |
| TOTAL . | 260 |

The Gulistán, Khúshdil Khán, and Thal-Chotiálí dispensaries were opened on the 1st April 1883. In February 1883 the civil dispensary at Thal-Chotiálí was placed under the medical officer of the garrison, who was granted an allowance of R50 per mensem, from 1st April 1883. In July 1883 the dispensary at Khúshdil Khán was transferred to the new cantonments in Pishín, as the troops were transferred thither; the civil dispensary was also moved from Kachh to Sháhrig. In September 1884 the Government of India sanctioned the entertainment of a Hospital Assistant at Sháhrig on R50 per mensem.

Since this was written a full report on the subject of the dispensaries has been submitted by Dr. Fullerton, the Residency Surgeon, containing much valuable information. It will be found *in extenso* among the appendices of this report.

Dispensary in the Bolan, 1883-84.

325. In June 1883 the Government of India sanctioned the appointment of a Hospital Assistant for the Bolan in connection with the work-people then employed on the road at that time under construction in the pass, for such period as his services might be required, up to a limit of two years. In 1884 the civil dispensary, which was temporarily closed, was re-opened, and a 2nd class Hospital Assistant was appoined to it in November 1884.

Dispensary establishments at Quetta and Kalát, and travelling dispensary establishment, 1883.

326. In 1883 the Government of India sanctioned the entertainment of dispensary establishments at Quetta and Kalát, at an aggregate cost of R3,156 per annum, and also the entertainment of a travelling dispensary establishment to accompany the camp of the Agent to the Governor General—

"the total cost of which shall not exceed R468 per annum, I am further to say that the Government of India is pleased to allow discretion to the Agency Surgeon to apportion the salaries of the dispensary servants, in accordance with the requirements of the case, from time to time, on the understanding that the total amounts now sanctioned are exceeded."

News-writers at Kandahar, at Herat, 1881-84.

327. Some information will be given in this and the succeeding sections with respect to the affairs of Kandahar and Afghanistan which have from time to time received the attention of the Agent to the Governor General. On the withdrawal of the British troops from Kandahar Colonel St. John arranged with the Amirs' officials that Sayyid Mir Hashim, a Farsiwan, who had frequently been employed by Colonel St. John in a similar capacity, should be left behind in the city as British news-writer, on a salary of R200 per mensem for himself, and R60 for the entertainment of four messengers. At the same time Colonel St. John made a similar arrangement, costing R200 per mensem, for the transmission of similar news from Herat. The effect of a victory obtained by Ayub Khán at Karez-i-Ala was to bring the Herat news to an end, and oblige Mir Hashim to go to Chaman from Kandahar. From the 1st January 1882 the Government of India sanctioned the entertainment of news-writers as follows:—

| | R Per mensem. |
|---|---|
| Kandahar news-writer's pay | 200 |
| 4 Kasids | 60 |
| Herat news-writer's pay | 150 |
| 4 Kasids | 60 |
| | 470 |

Muhammad Taki Khán was employed as news-writer at Herat. From the 1st June 1884 his allowance was increased from R150 to R200 per mensem.

Compensation to Sayyid Mir Hashim for losses incurred.

328. When Sayyid Mir Hashim left Kandahar, after the entry into that city of Ayub Khán, in 1881, his house was sacked, and he was subjected to considerable loss; and on a subsequent occasion he was attacked by Atchakzai robbers,

who plundered his property, both on this occasion and during his flight from Kandahar; he narrowly escaped with his life. His losses were calculated at R4,000, and this sum was paid to him by the Government of India in 1883.

Arms and ammunition presented by the Government of India to the Amir of Kabal, 1881-84.

329. From time to time, since the close of the Afghan war, arms, ammunition, and treasure, presented to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan by the Government of India, have been forwarded to Kandahar through the Agent to the Governor General, Baluchistan. In May 1881, Colonel St. John, at that time Officiating Agent to the Governor General, handed over to the Amir's officials at Killa-Abdulla, 3,000 rifles with bayonets, 300,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, and 29 boxes of shot and shell for guns. In December of the same year Colonel Waterfield supplied the Amir with half a million rounds of Enfield rifle ammunition with caps, 3,000 rounds of smooth-bore 6-pounder ammunition, with about 700 projectiles, fuses, and tubes. At the same time, for want of carriage, a balance of ammunition remained in Quetta of half a million rounds of Enfield rifle cartridges, with caps, &c., 3,000 rounds of smooth-bore 9-pounder ammunition, 1,400 6-pounder projectiles, and 900 12-pounder projectiles. In February 1882 another large consignment was sent from India to Quetta. In July 1884, 602 packages of ammunition and 25 packages of small arms were handed over to the Amir's officials. Shortly afterwards 423 packages of ammunition, consisting of 92 boxes of small arm ammunition, 19 barrels of cartridges for field guns, and 312 boxes of shell, shot, and case for field guns were also handed over to the persons sent by the Amir to receive them. Five lakhs of rupees have at different times been paid to the Amir.

Siege train, &c., and ten lakhs of rupees presented to the Amir, 1885.

330. During the early portion of the year 1885, the Amir of Afghanistan, at the invitation of the Viceroy, paid a visit to Rawalpindi, where it was decided to present him with 10 lakhs of rupees, and a siege train with ammunition for the transport of guns and howitzers, of which up the Bolan Pass from Rindli to Chaman 376 bullocks and 1,258 camels were required. On the 22nd May the 10 lakhs were paid over to the Amir's Agent, and the guns, &c., were sent to Cháman.

Refugees from Kandahar to Karachi, 1881-82.

331. After the evacuation of Kandahar by the British, several influential men, who were banished by the Amir, were deported from the city and took refuge in British territory. In December 1881 they arrived at Gulistán on their way to join the ex-Wali of Kandahar, Shere Ali, who was then a pensioner at Karachi. An account of the circumstances under which he became Wali, and eventually resigned that post, will be found in a preceding chapter. The number of the party was 150 in all; and for their subsistence a temporary allowance of R80 per diem was made by the Government of India. The family of Sirdar Muhammad Hussan Khán found an asylum in the Durani village at Quetta, and a temporary allowance of R6 per diem was given them. One of the Sirdars, Ghulam Muhammad Khán, proposed to proceed to Persia, and in order to enable him to do so, the Government of India consented to pay his expenses for the journey. For those who proceeded to Karachi and remained with the ex-Wali there, allowances aggregating R670 per mensem were sanctioned, in addition to allowances of R2 and R4 per diem to Shere Ali, nephew of the Sartip, and Azizulla, respectively.

Wish of the Wali of Maimana to be recognised independent, 1882.

332. In 1882 the Wali of Maimana wrote to the Agent to the Governor General to the effect that he had become a dependent of the British Government, and requested that instructions might be sent to him in order that he might be assured of independence, with respect to his neighbours. It further appeared that he had refused to pay revenue to the Amir pending the receipt of instructions. The

question was referred to the Foreign Office. The Government of India were not, however, prepared to recognise the independence of Maimana, or to enter into direct relations with the Wali; and in accordance with the orders of Government, the Wali was told that he should render true allegiance to the authority of the Amir, and pay the accustomed tribute.

Injury done to graveyards in Kandahar, 1882-83.

333. During the year 1882 several reports were received as to damage having been done to the British graveyards at Kandahar; and the matter was represented to the Afghan authorities. When the Amir heard of it, he wrote to the Governor of Kandahar, severely reprimanding the local officials for the damage done, and directed the immediate repair of the graves, &c., which seems to have been carried out. A sum of R2,127-8-0 was sanctioned by Government for the building of high walls, and measures were taken for the protection of the cemeteries. The Governor of Kandahar apologetically explained that the damage had not been intentionally done; and that measures had been adopted so that in future no injury could be done to the monuments.

Grant of pension, &c., to Sirdar Muhammad Husein Khan, a refugee from Kandahar to Pishín, 1881-84.

334. Sirdar Muhammad Husein Khan, brother of the ex-Wali of Kandahar, took refuge in Pishín in 1881, and received R1,500 in cash, and at the suggestion of the Agent to the Governor General, R5,000 in cash, with leave to go where he pleased. He, however, did not leave Quetta, and the Government of India at first declined to grant him a permanent allowance, but acceded to a proposal to grant him some land which he might cultivate. In this view he was granted a temporary allowance of R400 per mensem, and R5,000 were sanctioned for the re-opening of Lundi Karez in Pishín to irrigate lands which the Sirdar might cultivate. The plan, however, of opening the karez proved to be impracticable: and the same may be said of an attempt of a similar nature made at Khúshdil. The Sirdar was put in possession of 40 acres of rent-free land, watered at Government expense of R25 per mensem; and from the 1st July 1884 he was granted an allowance of R300 per mensem.

Temporary grant of a pension to Muhammad Husein Khan, a Kandahar refugee, 1882.

335. Among the refugees from Kandahar, after the city was handed over to the Amir, was Sirdar Muhammad Husein Khan, who, together with his family, came to Quetta about the end of the year 1881. The party included three wives and seven sons. In Quetta they received a compassionate allowance of R6 per day, granted because they arrived in Quetta in a state of destitution. In November 1882 the Government of India decided that the allowance of R6 per day should be withdrawn, and that the family should be given a pension of R500 and allowed to depart whither they pleased. The Sirdar was accordingly informed that the allowance was to cease from November 1882, and he was paid the R500 sanctioned. The case of this Sirdar is, it should be understood, separate from that of Muhammad Husein Khan referred to in the previous paragraph.

Complaints as to thefts said to have been committed in Afghan territory by Atchakzais, 1885.

336. In 1885 information was received from the Foreign Office as to complaints made by the Afghan authorities regarding thefts and robberies said to have been committed in Afghan territory by Atchakzais within British jurisdiction. On reference to Mr. Barnes it appeared that the Atchakzais in question were nomadic, living in summer within his jurisdiction, and in the winter descending into Afghan territory. Most of the offences complained of were committed by men living all the year in Afghan territory. In cases in which the offenders took refuge in British territory, the usual course was for the Governor of Kandahar to address Mr. Barnes, and steps were then taken to bring the offenders to justice. A list of cases supplied showed that thirteen had occurred; six of which had been referred to Mr. Barnes by the Kandahar authorities. In

ten of these cases the stolen property was recovered and returned to the owners; one case was pending, while two were returned to the Governor of Kandahar, the offenders being in the Amir's jurisdiction. The Agent to the Governor General did not think that the Afghan authorities had much to complain of. It was at the same time observed that numerous thefts had been committed in Quetta by Kakozai Atchakzais of Afghan territory; and that none of the stolen property had been returned by the Afghan authorities. The Governor General in Council approved of the proceedings of Mr. Barnes.

Arrangements made in the Baluchistan Agency regarding the march of the Afghan Boundary Commission to the Helmand.

337. About the middle of the year 1884 the Government of India, under instructions from the Secretary of State, made preparations for sending the Afghan Boundary Commission for the delimitation of the boundaries of that country. Mr. Barnes, C.S., Political Agent, Quetta and Pishín, was sent to Nushki to make all necessary arrangements. The arrangements for camel transport were made by Mr. R. Bruce, C.I.E., and about 1,300 camels were collected for the march of the Mission. The Mission left Siriab on the 19th September 1884, Mr. Barnes saw the Mission to Galachah *en route* to the Helmand, and then returned to Quetta. Much assistance was given in respect to camel carriage by Azad Khan, Chief of Khárán. A note of the measures taken by him will be found in the information with regard to that Sirdar given in this report. From the accounts it appears that a sum of R70,953 in the purchase of carriage and supplies was spent by Mr. Barnes when making arrangements at Nushki for the Mission. The distance from Quetta to the Helmand is about 320 miles, which was covered by the Mission in 21 marches. At Nushki the Mission halted two days, and halts were also made at other places in the desert between Nushki and the Helmand. Mr. Barnes, in reporting on the subject, observed—

"From Nushki to the Helmand is 226 miles, every mile of which is a desert, destitute of supplies. All the provisions for the Mission had therefore to be carried by camels from Nushki, and laid out at the different stages along the road. Moreover, the resources of Nushki (which are very limited) were insufficient to provide supplies for the whole road. Large quantities of barley and atta had to be brought to Nushki from great distances—from Shorawak, Mastúng, and even from Quetta—before they could be sent on. This explains the large expenditure on camel hire."

It was at one time proposed to form a depôt at Nushki, but this plan was afterwards abandoned. Caravans of stores and supplies were sent to the Commission *viâ* Herat. The supplies collected consisted of barley, atta, ghí, dhal, firewood, and forage. Some money was spent in granting subsistence allowance to the chiefs and others who assisted in the work of preparing the desert road, and in digging wells in the desert. In the short space of six weeks no less than 700 wells were dug along the 220 miles between Nushki and Khwaja Ali. For the work of digging these wells and filling tanks, labourers had to be sent from great distances by Mr. Barnes. Large sums were also expended by that officer in camel hire, &c. As to the work done by the Baluchistan Agency in the interests of the Boundary Commission, the Government of India said—

"Colonel Ridgeway has acknowledged in the strongest terms his obligations to yourself and the officers of the Baluchistan Agency for the aid afforded to him in carrying out their difficult operation. The Governor General in Council wishes me to inform you that your exertions in the matter are fully appreciated, and that he has heard with much satisfaction of the hard work done by Mr. Barnes and Rai Bahadur Hitu Ram on behalf of the Commission."

The Secretary of State also observed in a despatch, dated 13th February 1885, that—

"the cordial acknowledgments of Her Majesty's Government are also due to Sir R. Sandeman and the officers associated with him in the Baluchistan Agency, for their arduous and successful exertions in connection with the preliminary arrangements."

The Government of India further remarked—

"The work done by Messrs. Bruce and Barnes is fully appreciated by the Government of India."

Postal arrangements for the Boundary Commission.

338. As to the postal arrangements to be made for the transmission of letters to and from the Boundary Commission, it was found that no reliance could be placed on postal arrangements across the desert to the Helmand, and it was therefore arranged that the post should be sent *viâ* Kandahar, with the consent of the Amir of Kabal. Arrangements made for the conveyance of the post at a cost of R164 per mensem were sanctioned by the Government of India with effect from the 12th October 1884. After the Amir had completed arrangements for the post from Chaman to Kandahar, this establishment was abolished from the 3rd November 1884. For the work connected with the post, a munshi was sanctioned by the Government of India for the Office of Mr. Barnes, from the 1st February 1885, on R40 per mensem. A large amount of correspondence has taken place in the Office of the Agent to the Governor General with respect to a considerable number of parcels, &c., forwarded to and from the members of the Boundary Commission. As a stream of such articles is passing to and fro, this correspondence continues (August 1885).

Officers who have held the post of Residency Surgeon.

339. The officers who have held the post of Residency Surgeon are—

Surgeon Major O. T. Duke, from 21st February 1877.

Officiating—Surgeons Major Thomson, Veale, and Kirtikar.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Ditto | Surgeon | J. C. Fullerton, from 12th March 1880. |
| Ditto | ditto | R. J. Baker, from 16th April 1884. |
| Ditto | ditto | J. C. Fullerton, from 15th July 1884. |

The post is now (August 1885) held by Surgeon Fullerton.

Public health in Baluchistan, 1884-1885.

340. The following report on public health in Baluchistan has been drawn up by Dr. Fullerton, the Residency Surgeon at Quetta, and may be quoted here in full:—

**Report on the health of the civil community under the care of the Medical Officer, Baluchistan Agency, for the period March 1880—November 1884.**

**1880.**

I joined the Baluchistan Agency on the 12th March 1880, and during the greater part of the rest of the year I was engaged on duties which necessitated my going about a great deal in camp in the Kakar country and in the Pishín valley, and I also visited Kandahar a second time, so that I had opportunities for observing generally the conditions of health of the country people.

The general health of the people, so far as I could ascertain, was good throughout the year.

There were no epidemics of any disease until the autumn, when small-pox appeared from the direction of Kandahar. A good many deaths occurred in Pishín from this disease, and later on in the Quetta and Sibi districts also. The outbreak was a very general one all over Baluchistan and the parts of Afghanistan known to us.

An attempt was made to obtain vaccinators from India to help to prevent the disease from spreading, but none could be spared from the Panjab or Sind, and it was found necessary to do what was possible in the way of carrying on vaccine operations with the assistance of the Hospital Establishment. The Hospital Assistant at Quetta accompanied me to the different villages in the Quetta valley, and we succeeded in vaccinating large numbers of unprotected persons, including many women. The people received the vaccination most eagerly, and I found no difficulty in completing the operations except in that the vaccination establishment was *nil*, and I had to do the work myself, assisted by the Hospital Assistant when he could leave the dispensary. I then had only

the Kalát and Quetta dispensaries to superintend, and I had more leisure for such work than I have now with more dispensaries to look after.

The total number of patients treated at the Quetta Civil Dispensary during the year was 3,473. Of these, 646 were cases of fever, and 416 diarrhœa and dysentery. In the cold weather, chest affections were prevalent, but the mortality resulting from them was not greater than usual.

The above affections were the chief causes of sickness throughout the country, but they were not severe or excessive.

The Quetta and Kalát dispensaries were the only civil dispensaries at work in the Agency this year.

## 1881.

1. In the course of this year I visited the Sibi, Harnáí, Pishín, and Kalát districts.

2. On the whole the year may be said to have been a very unhealthy one, owing to the general prevalence of small-pox in the earlier months, and in the summer and autumn to fevers.

3. In the beginning of the year I first became acquainted with the Sibi district, and I visited all the villages in that district, and with the assistance of a Native doctor, vaccinated as many children as it was found possible to bring together for the purpose.

4. In my absence at Sibi, the Hospital Assistant at Quetta continued to carry on vaccine operations in the villages in the Quetta valley, and later on I myself made further inspections. Altogether these operations were most successful (amounting to between four and five thousand), and small-pox itself disappeared before the summer set in.

5. I should also mention that the Assistant Surgeon, Kalát, vaccinated a considerable number of people at Kalát.

6. The Pishín and Harnáí districts were not quite ready in those days for the introduction of vaccination, but many of the Pishín people came to Quetta to be vaccinated. Many men and youths came even from Kandahar for the same purpose, where small-pox was raging at the time.

7. The summer months were very hot and oppressive, and high winds and dust-storms prevailed.

8. Fevers were more prevalent than usual owing, I believe, in great measure to the excessive heat, high winds, and great diurnal ranges of temperature. The type of the severe variety was remittent, and the mortality among all classes was high.

9. The Sudder Bazar at Quetta suffered less than the villages of the district.

10. The question of the sanitation of Sibi was taken up in the spring, and necessary improvements introduced, notably the construction of large tanks for the storage of drinking water, the construction of town latrines, and the introduction of the use of conservancy and night-soil carts. These improvements were much needed.

11. The sanitation of Quetta also received a good deal of attention, and an extensive drainage system was commenced to be put into effect by the Public Works Department. Latrines were also constructed and wells dug. Complete analysis of the water-supply from all sources in and in the neighbourhood of Quetta showed the water to be of good quality, except that of a well in the Fort.

12. The Railway dispensary at Sibi was constituted a civil dispensary in addition to the Kalát and Quetta dispensaries in the autumn.

13. The total number of cases treated at the Quetta dispensary was 5,225 as against 3,473 the previous year. Of these, 1,193 were fevers, and 645 were diarrhœa and dysentery, 423 were respiratory affections (bronchitis and pneumonia). Pneumonia among the Native troops was very severe in the winter.

The total number of cases treated at Kalát was 2,352; fevers, ophthalmia, and rheumatism being the chief causes of sickness.

1882.

This was a healthy year throughout, and there was no epidemic of any kind. The climate was remarkably cool and equable. The air, as a rule, was very still, and there were very few dust-storms, which the previous year were of almost daily occurrence. To these conditions is, I think, in great measure to be ascribed the favourable state of the health of the civil community generally as compared with that of the previous years. The general health was undoubtedly excellent, and the deaths remarkably few.

There was no general return of small-pox, only two cases of the disease were observed in the persons of coolies from Kandahar. In the spring about 300 children were vaccinated in the Quetta district by the Hospital Assistant.

Fevers as usual were responsible for most of the sickness. These were chiefly of the remittent and intermittent types, and of a mild nature. Acute respiratory affections of the severer kinds were rather more prevalent in the cold weather, and diarrhœa and dysentery were less prevalent.

In the course of the year I was a great deal in camp, and I visited the Pishín, Kalát, Harnái, Thal, and Sibi districts.

The sanitation of Sibi received further attention in the spring, and that of Quetta later on.

I had occasion to visit many of the villages in the Quetta district, and at a series of meetings held at Quetta I consulted with all the district maliks in the Quetta district regarding the health of the valley which at the time was in a very satisfactory condition.

The attendance at the Quetta Civil Dispensary still further increased, the total number of cases treated being 8,162. Of these, 2,349 were cases of fevers, 976 diarrhœa and dysentery, 651 respiratory affections, and 526 rheumatism.

The attendance at the Kalát dispensary showed a decrease on the previous year, being 1,228 total cases treated against 2,352 the previous year. The falling off was chiefly owing to the absence of His Highness the Khán and his army from Kalát for 10 months.

The total number of patients treated at the Sibi dispensary was 4,519, of which 1,080 were fever cases, and 899 diarrhœa and dysentery.

The question of extending the system of civil dispensaries was brought forward, and arrangements were made for establishing a number of such dispensaries, *viz.*, one at Thal-Chotiálí, two in the Pishín valley, one at Sháhrig, and one at Gandakin Daff.

1883.

This was a fairly healthy year, but not quite so good in this respect as the previous one. There was no great outbreak of sickness anywhere except at the village of Bodra, and in the Quat-Mandai district, where fevers were very prevalent and fatal. In April a civil dispensary was opened at Gandakin Daff for the relief of these localities.

The climate, on the whole, was normal and pleasant, there was no intense heat, and very few high winds.

Although not very prevalent, the type of fevers generally was severe, and many deaths were occasioned by a virulent form of remittent fever characterized by a rapid course, high temperature, delirium, and early loss of consciousness. This is what the natives here call the *burra tup* of the country, which is occasionally prevalent about the spring time.

There were a few cases of small-pox at Sibi in the spring, introduced from India; and also at Quetta in the end of the year there were three cases—two of

these came from Pishín and one developed in the town of Quetta. There were also three cases treated in the Durani village.

There was no general outbreak of this disease, however, in the country, but the opportunity was seized for conducting further vaccine operations. These were commenced late in the year, and were completed in May 1884.

The diseases of the respiratory system were mild, and not often fatal in the winter.

In the course of the year I visited several times the Kalát, Pishín, Harnái, and Sibi districts. I visited all the villages in the Sibi district, and reported on their sanitary condition. The question of the water-supply and conservancy of the town of Sibi itself were also again brought forward.

New civil dispensaries were opened in April at Thal-Chotiálí, Gulistán, Khúshdil Khán, and Kachh. The last two-mentioned dispensaries were respectively removed to Pishín and Sháhrig a few months later on.

A civil dispensary was opened in the Bolan Pass in September in connection with the road works.

All these dispensaries were started to meet the requirements of the country people, and the different civil establishments of the districts in which they are located. They are cheap institutions, and so far have been very successful. The only establishment allowed is one Native doctor for each dispensary on a salary of R50 per mensem. It was thought that the work would be better done by one active Native doctor well paid for his work and holding undivided responsibility, than by the usual establishment of a Native doctor, compounder, dresser, servants, &c., who, when there is not a great attendance of patients only get into each other's way and very often neglect the little work there is to be done.

In the cases of Gandakin Daff and Sháhrig, the Native doctors in charge, having separate military duties to perform, only received R10 per mensem for the civil duties.

The attendance at the Quetta Civil Dispensary still further increased from 8,162 patients last year (1882) to 9,392 in 1883. Of these, 2,547 were treated for fevers, 1,167 were cases of diarrhœa and dysentery; respiratory affections were responsible for 755 admissions, rheumatism for 676, and syphilis for 466.

The attendance at the Kalát dispensary increased from 1,609 in 1882 to 2,698 in 1883. The principal affections were fevers (392), ulcers (1,384), respiratory affections (133), ophthalmia (133).

The total number of patients treated at the Sibi dispensary was 4,031 against 4,252 the previous year. Of these, fevers were responsible for 853, diarrhœa and dysentery for 601, rheumatism for 234, and respiratory affections for 217.

The attendance for the nine months commencing 1st April (the date on which these dispensaries were opened) at the other out dispensaries, and the chief causes of sickness, will be seen from the following statement:—

| Name of dispensary. | Chief causes of sickness. | | | | | Total No. of cases treated. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Thal-Chotiálí | | | ...... | | | 1,274 |
| Pishín . | Fevers. 638 | Dyspepsia. 355 | Dysentery. 222 | Ulcers. 205 | Other causes. 1,560 | 2,980 |
| Gulistán . | Fevers. 1,020 | Ulcers. 534 | Resp. affections. 377 | Ophthalmia. 322 | Other causes. 704 | 3,957 |
| Sháhrig . | Fevers. 160 | ... | Other causes. 164 | ... | ... | 324 |
| Gandakin Daff | 39 | 16 | 70 | ... | ... | 125 |

1884.

During the first six months of this year there was no inordinate sickness of any kind. But the last four months have been characterized by the almost universal prevalence of severe types of intermittent and remittent fevers. Very few localities have escaped, and the mortality, especially infant mortality, has been great.

Reports from Kandahar and other parts of Afghanistan and also from many districts in India seem to indicate that there has, in the last four months, been severe sickness over large areas.

The unhealthy agencies responsible for the sickness in this country recently are seemingly yet far from being determined. There has been nothing peculiar in the weather so far as it was possible to observe it. There has not been any excessive heat, and there have not been any great extremes of temperature; the rainfall has been normal, and the water-supply of average amount, the crops have been good, and there has been no scarcity of food. In fact, in every observable respect there has been very little difference between this and many previous healthy seasons.

The remittent variety of the fever which has been prevalent was of a severe type, frequently accompanied by jaundice, and in many cases it caused abortion and premature labour in pregnant women. Diarrhœa and dysentery have also been prevalent during the last four months.

It is curious to notice that in some instances one village or group of villages in a district (as happened at Sar-i-áb) have almost entirely escaped the disease or suffered moderately, while the other villages of the same district (as happened in the case of Khasi), perhaps occupying a more healthy site, have suffered severely.

Now that the autumn has closed, and winter is setting in, the sickness is gradually decreasing, and there is at present a very decided improvement in this respect. Fevers are much less prevalent and severe, and the diseases usually prevalent in the cold months, chiefly acute respiratory affections, are taking their place. I notice that jaundice is still prevalent and more common than I have ever before observed it.

I spent the greater part of the first three months in camp, and I visited the Pishín, Sibi, Thal, and Harnái districts. I got dysentery in camp, and had to go home sick in April for three months, during which time Dr. Baker carried on the duties at Quetta and visited the Kalát, Gulistán, Pishín, and Mangi dispensaries.

The year not having yet closed, and the dispensary reports not being due yet, it is not possible to give a complete account of the work done at the dispensaries. But from the latest weekly returns received the attendance from the 1st January up to a recent date has been as follows:— Quetta 11,996, Thal-Chotiálí 1,274, Kalát 3,296, Sibi 5,610, Pishín 4,267, Gulistán 4,067, Shárig 2,961, Gandakin Daff 872, Civil and Railway Sibi 789, Mangi 5,071.

General Remarks.

The diseases which may be looked upon as ordinarily responsible for most of the sickness and mortality in the several districts of this Agency are the following:—

*Fevers.*—These are prevalent everywhere and at all seasons, but more so in the hot than in the cold months. They are chiefly of the ordinary intermittent and remittent kinds. How they come to be so prevalent as they are in a dry climate, and in a country where there are only very limited areas of marshy soil, and where there is very little natural vegetation and extremely little

organic matter in the soil, is difficult of explanation. It is not improbable that the malarial poison itself, whatever it may be, is not generated in so concentrated a form as in the malarious districts of India, but is only given out in most places in small amount from the soil, and that the climate itself is chiefly responsible for the development of the prevailing fevers. Strong direct rays of the sun travelling through a rare, clear and dry atmosphere, intense glare, and extreme diurnal ranges of temperature would act in this manner, and these are ordinary conditions of the climate of this country, and the people most exposed to them are those who suffer most as a rule. They are by themselves, unaided by other influences, able to excite the disease in some people I think. But that the malarious and climatic elements combine to excite fevers in this country is certain, and I believe the latter are far stronger here than they are in India. They are, moreover, from their nature to a great extent preventible causes of sickness. Here also outbreaks of fever are more spasmodic, being influenced more by changes of the weather than they are in India, where the climate is more equable, and malaria works more steadily.

*Bowel complaints.*—Diarrhœa and dysentery are the commonest of this class of affections, and, like fevers, are more common in the hot than in the cold weather. In the summer they are largely due to the infection of unripe fruits, &c., and to night chills. Dysentery is met with of a malarial, and occasionally of a scorbutic nature.

*Respiratory affections* are most common in the higher altitudes and in the cold weather, and are a most serious item among the causes of mortality, especially in infants. I have never known pneumonia to appear among the civil population in an epidemic form, but it has appeared as such among the Native troops, notably at Khúshdil Khán in the winter of 1880-81, in which instance it was ascribed to overcrowding.

*Rheumatism* is a very common complaint, chiefly where the cold is severest.

*Syphilis* is a very common affection in all these districts, and no doubt is a fertile source of disease. The number of grown-up people and children who suffer from this disease is very great.

*Ophthalmia* of the ordinary chronic kind, the result of neglect, uncleanly habits, glare of the sun, or constitutional weakness, is to be found everywhere.

*Small-pox.*—Epidemics of this disease were formerly frequent, and very general, and the loss of life thereby very great. These outbreaks used to occur every three to five years. The practice of inoculation used to be common and general; but, as already stated, in recent years vaccination has largely taken its place. The whole of the Quetta valley and Pishín are now well protected by vaccination, and a large number of persons have been vaccinated in the Sibi and Thal districts, but the work has been greatly hampered at Sibi owing to a prejudice existing against the arm-to-arm method. I hope, however, the example of the other districts will soon overcome this obstacle.

Comparing the condition of health in the different districts, as observed among the civil community, the following may be generally stated, so far as my experience goes.

*Kalát* is less under the influence of malaria than any of the other districts, and fevers are less prevalent there than elsewhere as a rule. Owing to the severe winters, pneumonia and bronchitis are very prevalent, and fatal at that season. Rheumatism is also very prevalent, and chronic ulcers and ophthalmia are very common. Bowel complaints are not excessive.

*Quetta and Pishín.*—In the last few years the prosperity of the people has advanced rapidly, and they are now able to procure better food and to clothe themselves more suitably than they ever did before. These new conditions have

I believe, already worked a noticeable improvement in the general health, and the people are now less susceptible of disease and better protected against the climate. In these districts fevers are the most prevalent affections. But owing to the changeable nature of the climate their prevalence is subject to great fluctuation, sometimes being almost absent, while at others they assume very formidable dimensions. The fevers most prevalent are the ordinary intermittent and remittent kinds. Spleen affections are less prevalent than they are, as a rule, in India, owing, I believe, to the limited amount of malarial poison, and its requiring the assistance of other climatic elements to make itself felt, which only act occasionally. Bowel complaints are most prevalent in the summer. Dysentery, although common among coolies, is not a source of much sickness among the regular inhabitants. Respiratory affections, as a rule, are common and fatal in the cold weather, and are remarkably destructive to children. Rheumatism is not so common as at Kalát. Chronic syphilis is a very common disease among the people.

With regard to the health of the town of Quetta itself, I can say that it has always been quite as good, and very often it has been decidedly better, than that of other communities in the country. It has been in existence only about five years, but in the course of that time it has not been visited by any epidemic of disease. The standard of health has undoubtedly varied considerably from time to time, but only when climatic agencies were in action affecting for good or evil the public health generally. The fact that the inhabitants of the town of Quetta, largely made up of natives of India, enjoy as good, if not better, health than the old inhabitants of the valley, speaks well for the place, and would tend to show that there is nothing unwholesome about the site of the town or its surroundings.

*Thal-Chotiálí*—Is, I believe, more feverish than the above-named districts, and respiratory affections are somewhat less severe. Its climate resembles that of the Pishín valley, and the prevailing diseases are very similar.

*Sháhrig and Harnái.*—From June to November these districts are extremely feverish owing to the extensive cultivation of rice, and to abundant irrigation. They are the most feverish localities in the whole of the Agency. Wherever there is rice cultivation in this country, there is pretty sure to be a great deal of fever. Enlargement of the spleen is very common. The people are small and of bad physique. The six months from December to May are healthy enough, and the climate very pleasant.

*Sibi.*—Notwithstanding the almost intolerable heat that prevails in this district during the summer, the health of the people is generally wonderfully good. The people seem to suffer more from the directly enervating effects of the heat than from any particular form of disease, and these are certainly very depressing and trying. Fever is common enough at all seasons, but I have never known it to be very severe. Sibi is much less fever-stricken, I believe, than Jacobabad and many other localties in Sind. Bowel complaints are not excessive. Acute respiratory affections are prevalent in the winter, but are not nearly so severe as in the higher altitudes. The climate of Sibi, I am told by people who have experienced it for some years past, is now gradually becoming somewhat cooler in the summer than it used to be a few years ago, owing, doubtless, to the large area of country now maintained under cultivation. The water-supply comes next to the excessive heat as a cause of sickness. The drinking water is either procured from wells which generally furnish brackish water, or more commonly it is drawn from the surface streams which furnish the irrigation water. This water is largely impregnated with earthy and some organic matter both in suspension and solution. It would be very difficult to

suggest any efficient and inexpensive means of purifying the water for the use of the country people. The water tanks at Sibi town are very useful in *this direction.*

The following statement gives the total attendance of patients at the Quetta Civil Dispensary since the year 1880, for each year respectively. The steady increase of patients from year to year shows how widely the institution is now known, and how much it is appreciated, and how much the work has increased :—

| Years. | No. of patients treated at Quetta Civil Dispensary. |
|---|---|
| 1880 | 4,551 |
| 1881 | 6,238 |
| 1882 | 9,149 |
| 1883 | 10,605 |
| 1884 | 11,996 |

The following shows the total attendance at all the civil dispensaries in the Agency for each year respectively. This year not being complete the number given has been taken from returns of the most recent dates :—

| Years. | No. of dispensaries at work. | Total number of patients treated. |
|---|---|---|
| 1880 | 2 | 7,993 |
| 1881 | 3 | 8,590 |
| 1882 | 3 | 15,010 |
| 1883 | 8 | 25,994 |
| 1884 | 9 | 36,762 |

The above statement does not include civil work done on the Sind-Pishín State Railway by the medical officers, who have been stationed on the line during this year, or at the regular civil dispensaries stationed on the line of works.

J. C. FULLERTON, *I.M.D.,*
*Residency Surgeon.*

Ceremonies observed when the Agent to the Governor General visits the Khán.

341. It will be convenient to note the ceremonies observed at visits and return visits between His Highness the Khán and the Agent to the Governor General—

" When the Agent to the Governor General visits the Khán, His Highness' son or a high official meets him at some distance from the Khán's residence and conducts him to His Highness' camp. On arrival there a salute of 13 guns is fired, and the Khán's guard of honor presents arms. The Khán receives the Agent to the Governor General at the door of the Darbar tent and conducts him to a seat on his right. The Agent, the Khán, his sons, and the European officers are conducted to chairs, the others present sit themselves on carpets. On the departure of the Agent to the Governor General the same ceremonies are observed as on arrival.

Ceremonies observed on the visit of the Khan to the Agent to the Governor General.

" 342. When the Khán visits the Agent to the Governor General, the Assistant Agent or a Political Agent receives His Highness as he dismounts, a salute is fired, and the guard of honor presents arms. The Governor General's Agent advances a few paces to receive the Khán, shake hands with him, his sons, and principal officials, and shows the Khán to a seat on his right. The same ceremonies are observed on His Highness' departure as on arrival."

Hereditary and personal titles in Baluchistan.

343. The following is a list of the titles held by natives in Baluchistan, both hereditary and personal :—

*Hereditary.*

His Highness Mir Khudadad Khan of Kalát, G. P. S. I. from June 1857.
His Highness Jam Mir Khán of Lus Beyla.

Nawab Hassan Ali Khán.
Sirdar Jam Ali Khán, C.I.E., son of the Jam of Lus Beyla.
Do. Ghulam Murtaza, the Bugtí Sirdar.
Do. Mehrulla Khán, the Marri Sirdar.
Do. Baluch Khán, the Khetrani Sirdar.
Do, Assad Khán, Raisani chief of the Sarawan tribes.
Do. Gauhar Khán, chief of the Jalawan tribes.

*Personal.*

C.I E., Hasan Ali Khán.
Do., Assad Khán.
Do., Jam Ali Khán.
Do., Mir Muhammad Khán.
Do., Gauhar Khán.

Sir R. Sandeman recommends the grant of a jagir to Assad Khán, the chief of the Sarawans, 1877.

344. In November 1877, Sirdar Assad Khán, of Sarawan, submitted a petition to Major (now Sir Robert) Sandeman, praying that the Khán of Kalát might be requested to grant him a tract of land on the desert canal rent-free, and that the Government of India might be asked to give him water from the Maksudwah Canal, without charge, to irrigate it. In forwarding this petition* to the Government of India, Major Sandeman supported the application very strongly, and brought to the notice of the Foreign Department the very excellent services the Sirdar had rendered on many occasions. He also pointed out that, considering the high position Sirdar Assad Khán held in the Khanate, he was, from a pecuniary point of view, very badly off, and recommended that the state of his affairs should be taken into consideration, and that some assistance should be afforded him to enable him to maintain, in a suitable manner, his position as chief of the Sarawans, and the chief holding the next position in the State to His Highness the Khán himself. To this letter, so far as can be ascertained from the records of the Agent to the Governor General's office, no reply appears to have been received

The proposal again mentioned in 1879.

345. Two years afterwards, that is, in November 1879, when the Governor of Bombay visited Baluchistan to project the railway to Quetta, the services of Sirdar Assad Khan, who did excellent service in connection with it, were brought to the notice of His Excellency by the Agent to the Governor General, and it was recommended that he should be presented with a suitable piece of land in the Upper Sind District, rent-free, and that it should be made over to him and his heirs for ever as an acknowledgment of his services. The Sirdar had, it should be noted, surrendered the jangal wood of Mitri to be placed under the Government control, the Government of India receiving one-half of the income, and the Sirdar the other half. The wood was at that time very urgently required for railway purposes, and it was feared that, were the jangals of Mitri not placed under proper control, the wood would be cut down and sold to the great loss of Government. With Sir Richard Temple's permission a memorandum† was drawn p by the Agent to the Governor General on the subject, and a copy of it appears to have been sent officially to Sir Richard Temple; but there is no trace of any reply having been received, and the question seems to have remained quiescent until the beginning of 1881. This was chiefly owing to the outbreak of the Afghan war and the state of affairs in the country itself, which caused such questions to be lost sight of for the time being.

The proposal of the grant of a jagir made in 1881.

346. In February of that year, when Sir Robert Sandeman was proceeding on furlough to England, he expressed a wish that Sirdar Assad Khan's case should be again

* No. 728, dated 5th November, 1877.
† Dated 8th November 1879.

brought forward, and in his letter No. 449-A.-G.-G., dated 25th March 1881, Colonel Reynolds, Officiating Agent to the Governor General, addressed the Foreign Department on the subject, pointing out the good services rendered by the Sirdar during the Afghan war, then just concluded.

Proposal that the grant should be made entirely by the British Government.

347. He said that since the letter* quoted in the first part of this note was written, the state of affairs in Baluchistan had so changed on account of the war in Afghanistan, that any reward to be made to the Sirdar would be most suitably given, not, as proposed by Sir Robert Sandeman, by a grant of land and water, partly given by the Khán of Kalát and partly by the British Government, but by a grant entirely provided by the British Government.

Proposal to grant a jagir for three lives to Assad Khan.

348. The letter went on to say that it was Sir Robert Sandeman's intention to have submitted a proposal that in recognition of the services rendered by Assad Khan to the British Government during the Afghan war, he should receive, rent-free, a grant of land in the Upper Sind Frontier District to the extent of 1,500 acres, and that the grant should be *perpetual*. Colonel Reynolds thought, however, that there might be some difficulty in the way of granting the land in perpetuity, and suggested that, if such was the case, it should be made for two or three lives.

Difficulties in the way of a grant of land in Sind.

349. A copy of Colonel Reynolds' letter appears to have been forwarded by the Foreign Department to the Bombay Government, who, in due course, communicated with the Commissioner in Sind on the subject. The Sind authorities objected strongly to giving the jagir. They said they had no suitable land; that the only land they could give was land to which water had to be raised by wheels; that the possession of this land had frequently proved to be a source of loss rather than gain to its occupiers; and finally, they objected to reduce their irrigative revenue by the free grant of water.

Suggestion of the Bombay Government that a grant of land in Sibi should be made.

350. In sending to the Foreign Department a copy of the correspondence with the Commissioner in Sind, the Chief Secretary to the Bombay Government said† that the course proposed by Colonel Reynolds was open to grave objection; and suggested that a grant of land in the Sibi district should be made to the Sirdar, which, in the opinion of the Bombay Government, would be in every way suitable.

Difficulty in finding a piece of land in Sibi.

351. At this time the Foreign Department were pressing for a reply in the matter, and a letter‡ was written to the effect that, as there appeared to be numerous difficulties in the way of obtaining a piece of land in Sind, the Sirdar had been asked if he would accept a jagir in the Sibi district, if a suitable one could be found. In reply to that letter the Foreign Department said that it was understood that no land was available in the Sibi district; and asked if a further reference to the Bombay Government was recommended for the grant of a piece of land in Sind. To this Major Biddulph, Officiating Agent to the Governor General, replied that as difficulties had been raised by the Sind authorities, the question might perhaps be held in abeyance till the canal, which it was thought would be constructed in the Sibi district, was cut, failing which Bombay Government should be addressed again

* No. 728 of 5th November 1877.
† No. 2957, dated 1st July 1881, received with Foreign Office No. 15-24-E.-P., dated 16th July 1881.
‡ No. 1742-A.-G.-G., dated 15th June 1882.

*Reference made to the Government of Bombay.*

352. Foreign Department then wrote to the Bombay Government, and sent the Agent to the Governor General a copy of the letter they had written,* suggesting at the same time that the Agent to the Governor General should simultaneously write to the Commissioner in Sind on the subject; adding that—

"so much delay has taken place in the settlement of this case that it is very desirable that a decision should be arrived at as early as possible."

*The question of water-supply to the land raised.*

353. On receipt of the Foreign Department letter just quoted, the Agent to the Governor General wrote† to the Commissioner in Sind, and enclosed a sketch of the lands, selected by Sirdar Assad Khan, remarking that—

"whether these particular lands were selected or not, I hope it will be possible to come to some arrangement speedily, so that the promises made to the Sirdar nearly five years ago may at last be fullfilled"

The Sind authorities then raised the question of water. The Superintending Engineer for Irrigation in Sind reported that there was not sufficient water to irrigate the whole of the land selected by Sirdar Assad Khan, but that if he liked to take water *under conditions*, and limit the area of cultivation in the first instance to some 150 or 200 acres, it might probably be arranged to let him have the water.

*The question discussed by the Sirdar and Political Agent, Jacobabad.*

354. If this was not agreed to, the Commissioner in Sind suggested that some other suitable land should be chosen. The Agent to the Governor General then addressed the Political Agent, Jacobabad, on the subject, and suggested that Sirdar Assad Khán and the Deputy Commissioner, Upper Sind Frontier, might be brought into direct communication, as it was thought that this would probably be the means of bringing the matter to an early settlement. Colonel Reynolds sent for Assad Khán and explained to him the terms proposed by the Sind authorities, and recommended him to visit the Deputy Commissioner and discuss the question personally with him.

*Selection of land by Assad Khan.*

355. This the Sirdar did in the month of March 1883, and he was advised by the Deputy Commissioner to select land irrigated by the Sahi Canal. He went to the place indicated by the Deputy Commissioner, inspected the land, and selected a piece for his jagir, sending a sketch of it to the Agent to the Governor General's Office This sketch was forwarded‡ by the Agent to the Governor General to the Political Agent, Jacobabad, who was asked to see the Deputy Commissioner personally and endeavour to get the matter settled as speedily as possible. The Commissioner in Sind was also addressed,§ and was requested to kindly instruct the Deputy Commissioner to do his best to settle the matter in accordance with the wishes of the Sirdar, if practicable.

*Objection made by the Deputy Commissioner to the grant of the land.*

356. On receipt of the letter from the Agent to the Governor General's Office, Colonel Reynolds communicated‖ with the Deputy Commissioner, who in reply reported that there were prior claims to those of Sirdar Assad Khan, and that the land in question could not be given to him. A copy of the Deputy Commissioner's letter was sent to the Commissioner in Sind, who forwarded it on to the Bombay Government, remarking that the delay in the case was attributable to Sirdar Assad Khán's own dilatoriness. This was reported to the Foreign Department by the Bombay Government, and the Foreign Department sent to the

* No. 382E., dated 16th August 1882.
† No. 2590, dated 29th August 1882.
‡ No. 129-F.C., dated 11th April 1883.
§ No. 130-F.C., dated 11th April 1883.
‖ No. 454 dated 17th May 1883, from Political Agent, Jacobabad.

Agent to the Governor General a copy of the correspondence.* Some demi-official letters then passed between the Agent to the Governor General and the Foreign Secretary, and eventually in his demi-official letter, dated 10th July 1883, Mr. (now Sir Charles) Grant acknowledged that the services of the Sirdar were fully appreciated by the Government of India, and that they would be glad to help him in any reasonable way to obtain land that suited him for his jagir.

Other land said to be as good as, that selected.

357. Meanwhile Major Mayhew was appointed Acting Deputy Commissioner, Upper Sind Frontier, and, at the special and earnest request† of Sir Robert Sandeman, he interested himself in the Sirdar's behalf, and telegraphed‡ that if Assad Khán would go to him, the question could be easily settled, as there was other land equally good, if not better, than that selected, which could be given to him immediately.

Meeting between Major Mayhew and Assad Khán for the selection of land.

358. Sirdar Assad Khán was then in Quetta, employed on the Committee which was ordered by Government to assemble and report upon the proposed reorganization of tribal and other services in Baluchistan. When the Committee was dissolved, the Sirdar started§ for Jacobabad to meet Major Mayhew. The result of the meeting was very satisfactory, and Major Mayhew reported‖ to the Commissioner in Sind that Sirdar Assad Khán could be provided with 1,500 acres of land in "Deh" Jahanpur in the Jacobabad taluka. He said that the Sirdar had inspected the land and approved of it, and added that all that was required was the Commissioner's orders to have it measured off, and the boundaries clearly defined. In concluding his letter, Major Mayhew strongly recommended that sanction should be given to the piece of land in question being made over to Assad Khán.

Fresh objections raised to the land selected in Deh Jahanpur.

359. Major Mayhew sent the Agent to the Governor General a copy of his letter above referred to; and on its receipt he telegraphed ¶ to the Commissioner in Sind asking him to kindly give the matter his very early consideration, so that no more delay might occur. The Agent to the Governor General also wrote to the Foreign Department, saying that there was now good reason to hope that the matter would be speedily settled. This was not, however, eventually the case, for on receipt of Major Mayhew's letter, the Commissioner in Sind wrote in reply that a portion of the land selected by Sirdar Assad Khán had been set aside to be utilized as a fuel reserve for railway purposes, and that it was urgently required for that purpose. He therefore suggested that the Sirdar should be asked to select some other piece. Possibly it had not been brought to the notice of the Commissioner in Sind that the lands for fuel reserves at Mitri had been the Sirdar's own property, and had been surrendered by him to Government for railway purposes owing to their being conveniently situated near the Sibi railway station.

Proposal to expend R15,000 in buying land for Assad Khán in Baluchistan.

360. The question was once more represented to the Foreign Department,** and as so many difficulties had already presented themselves in the way of providing the Sirdar with a suitable jagir in Sind, the Agent to the Governor General proposed that the idea should be abandoned, and that instead of a piece of land in Sind, Sirdar Assad Khán should be granted a lump sum of R15,000, and that a tract of land within the limits of the Baluchistan Agency should be given him, which the Agent to the Governor General undertook to find. While the above letter was

* No. 1254-E., dated 15th June 1883.
† Made demi-officially.
‡ Dated 23rd May 1883.
§ 20th June 1883.
‖ See his No. 2688, dated 14th July 1883.
¶ No. 430, dated 16th July 1883.
** No. 2221, dated 24th August 1883.

under the consideration of Government, some further correspondence, it seems, took place between Major Mayhew and the Commissioner in Sind, and Major Mayhew was requested* by the Commissioner to arrange for the tansfer to the Sirdar of the 1,500 acres he had selected.

* Commissioner's No. 255, dated 10th November 1883.

Measurement of the land on the Sind authorities acceding to the grant of land in Deh Jahanpur.

361. On Major Mayhew reporting this to the Agent to the Governor General, the Sirdar's brother was directed, through the Political Agent, Jacobabad, to attend and supervise the measuring and demarcation of the land on behalf of Assad Khán. The Sirdar could not be spared to go himself, as he was on duty with the Agent to the Governor General in Mekran. This was done, and in his letter No. 600, dated 8th March 1884, the Deputy Commissioner, Upper Sind Frontier, requested that Sirdar Assad Khán might be informed that the land was ready to be transferred to him. This was done, and Mehrulla Khán, the brother of the Sirdar, was deputed to take the land over, which he did.

Proposal that the land should be granted free of taxes and water rates.

362. In the *interim*, however, Sirdar Assad Khán represented that the Sind authorities proposed to levy a tax on the land, and Colonel Reynolds was asked to enquire into the matter. He did so, and suggested that, as the Sirdar had, in the first instance, been promised a piece of land rent-free, and free of water rate, the Government of India might be again addressed on the subject. This was done in telegram No. 190, dated 27th March 1884, when the Agent to the Governor General recommended earnestly that the land be granted entirely free of all rates; or, as an alternative, the proposal to give the Sirdar a jagir in Baluchistan, to be purchased by the Agent to the Governor General for him with the R15,000 asked for, should be adopted, and a copy of this telegram was sent by the Foreign Office to the Bombay Government for report.

Value of the services rendered by Assad Khán.

363. The Agent to the Governor General then pointed out that the Sirdar had done the Government of India good service, both during the settlement of Kalát affairs with the Khán, and in connection with the railway by surrendering the Mittri jangals to the management of the British Government, the wood of which could have been sold by the Sirdar at a considerable profit to contractors. The Sirdar's services in Mekran had, the Agent to the Governor General said, been valuable, and it was at the same time pointed out that he had great influence in the Khanate, and that British influence on the Persian frontier could only be extended with his aid.

Grant of land to the Sirdar with a sanad.

364. The Foreign Secretary then sent the Agent to the Governor General a letter from the Bombay Government, explaining that the land in question was 1,425 acres; that in other jagirs held in this part of Sind the jagirdar was liable to pay a water rate ranging from 10 annas on rice land to 8 annas on other cultivation; that the local cess was levied from jagirdars as well as others in Sind; and that in the event of a village officer being appointed to the village, a village cess would also be imposed. The jagirdar would, however, obtain a valuable property rent-free for three lives, watered by the Begari Canal, to the regulations with respect to which he would have to comply. If the grantee should attempt to alienate the estate, it would be liable to resumption by Government. Subject to these conditions, the Governor General in Council sanctioned the transfer of the property to Assad Khán; and the Bombay Government were requested to issue the usual sanad. The reward was, the Government of India said, a substantial one, and would not be impaired by the obligations coupled with the grant, and an exception would be made in the Sirdar's favor by providing him at the outset with a channel connecting the land with the Begari Canal, at the public expense. The conditions laid down by Government were accepted by the Sirdar; and the land was made over to him with a sanad.

365. In this report the Sarawan and the Jalawan Sirdars have been

The Sirdars of the Sarawan tribes.

frequently referred to, and it may be here noted that early in the history of Baluchistan the country was divided into two provinces, called Sarawan and Jalawan, which terms applied to the highlands and lowlands respectively. At the present day these names are applied to two great divisions of the Brahui and Baluch tribes: the Sarawan Sirdars are as follows :—

| No. | Tribe. | Sirdar. | Remarks—Extraction. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Raisani . . . | Sirdar Assad Khán, C.I.E. . . | Afghan Tarin. |
| 2 | Naushirwani . . . | " Azal Khán . . . . | In the time of Nasir Khan II, Sirdar Muhammad Khán Shahwani gave up his place to the Naushirwan Sirdar—Perso-Baluch |
| 3 | Shahwani . . . | " Muhammad Khán . . . | Rind Baluch. |
| 4 | Bangulzai . . | Waderah Ahmad Khán . . . | Rind Baluch. } This order was arranged by Nasir Khan II., but the Sirdars did not assent, and still dispute the right of precedence. |
| 5 | Rind . . . | " Sirdar Khán . . . | Ditto. |
| 6 | Zagr Mengal . . | Sirdar Rahman Khán . . . | Brahui, pure. |
| 7 | Muhammad Shahi . | " Said Khán . . . . | Rind Baluch. |
| 8 | Kurd . . . | " Yar Muhammad Khán . . | Kurd. |
| 9 | Lahri . . . | " Dost Muhammad Khán . . | Rind Baluch. |
| 10 | Dumki . . . | " Sohrab Khán . . . | Ditto. |
| 11 | Marri . . . | " Mehrullah Khán . . . | Ditto. |
| 12 | Bugti . . . | " Ghulam Murtaza Khán . . | Ditto. |
| 13 | Sarfarah . . . | " Imam Bakhsh Khán . . | Brahui. |
| 14 | Langon . . . | " Khán Muhammad Khán . | Rind Baluch. |
| 15 | Rodena . . . | " Ghaur Khán . . . | Brahui, a branch of the tribe of Sarfarah. |
| 16 | Samalani . . . | " Sirdar Nabi Baksh Khán . | Brahui, pure. |
| 17 | Sinjarni . . . | " Alam Khán . . . . | Rind Baluch. |

Sirdars of the Jalawan tribes.

366. The Jalawan tribes have been from time to time mentioned in this report. A list of the Jalawan Sirdars may be here usefully given :—

| No. | Tribe. | Sirdar. | Remarks—Extraction. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Itarzai . . . | Mir Karam Khán . . . . | Descended from the Ahmadzais of the Khán's family. |
| 2 | Alizai . . . | Jammir Khán . . . . | Jam of Lus Beyla. Last of Rajput descent. |
| 3 | Zarakzai . . . | Sirdar Ghaur Khán . . . | Chief of the Jalawans. Nos. 1 and 2 sit above him in darbar owing to their relationship to the Khán Sayyid. |
| 4 | Gitchki . . . | " Amir Khán . . . . | Formerly the Gitchki Sirdars held a higher position. Sikh. |
| 5 | Megal . . . | " Mir Shakar Khán Shahizai | Brahui, pure. |
| 6 | Magassi . . . | Wadera Kaisar Khán . . . | Lashari Baluch. |
| 7 | Muhammad Hassani . | Sirdar Yusaf Khán . . . | Brahui. |
| 8 | Musiani . . . | " Umed Ali Khán . . . | The late chief recently died. Baluch. |
| 9 | Nurwani . . . | " Wali Muhammad Khán | Brahui. |
| 10 | Bezanjan . . . | " Mir Khira Khán . . . | Baluch. |
| 11 | Sasoli . . . | " Papar Khán . . . | Zahri. Bulfal Baluch. |
| 12 | Khidrani . . . | " Kamal Khán . . . | Do. Afghan. |
| 13 | Jattak . . . | " Shahbaz Khán . . . | Do. Do. |
| 14 | Lotani . . . | Mir Fateh Muhammad Khán | Do. Baluch. |
| 15 | Gurgnari . . . | " Muhim Khán . . . | Do. Brahui. |
| 16 | Bajoi . . . | " Mazar Khán . . . | Do. Baluch. |
| 17 | Nachari . . . | " Abdul Rahman . . . | Do. Afghan. |
| 18 | Pandrani . . . | " Sabzal Khán . . . | The late chief was killed in a dispute, and the Sirdarship has been disputed. Brahui. |
| 19 | Samalani . . . | " Bhai Khán . . . | A branch of the Mengal tribe. Brahui. |
| 20 | Kalandrani . . . | " Hasan Khán . . . | A branch of the Zahri Brahui tribe. |
| 21 | Sajdi . . . | " Hayat Khán . . . | A branch of the Bezanjan tribe. Zakri. |
| 22 | Tamrani . . . | " Alam Khán . . . | Do. Bezanjan Baluch. |
| 23 | Siyah Pad . . . | " Mehrullah Khán . . . | Do. do. |
| 24 | Natwani . . . | " Khair Muhammad . . . | Chutto. Zahri tribe. |
| 25 | Mahumdani . . . | " Umed Khán . . . | Brahui Do. |
| 26 | Chuto . . . | " Sirdar Sahib Khán . . | Jagdal Jat. Called in Lus Beyla Jamot |

Grant of a jagir to Rai Bahadur Hittu Ram, C.I.E., 1881-85.

367. In 1881 the Agent to the Governor General brought to the notice of the Government of India the good services rendered by Rai Bahadur Hittu Ram, C.I.E., on a variety

of occasions, and recommended that he should be granted 1,000 acres of land rent-free, for life. He had, however, 305 acres of land on favourable terms, and the Punjab Government enquired whether it would meet the views of Government if the rent levied on this land were removed. It was decided, however, that he might have an additional allotment of land, and Hittu Ram placed himself in communication with the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khan, accordingly. Delay, however, took place, as the land which he desired to have had been taken up by the Forest Department, and other land he hesitated to accept on account of its being liable to erosion by the river Indus. The Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khan, however, allotted him temporarily 300 acres from the district forest reserve, and the Agent to the Governor General suggested that this might be increased by an additional grant of 200 acres; this, however, the Punjab Government declined to do. On this the Agent to the Governor General referred the matter to the Government of India, as certain objections to the land were raised. Eventually the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab sanctioned the grant of 500 acres of waste land, in proprietary right, to be held revenue-free for life, the grantee waiving all claim to compensation for loss by diluvion; and the necessary deed of conveyance was signed.

Proposed revision of the revenue administration in the districts under the Agency, 1882-85.

368. In April 1882, on a suggestion made by Colonel Waterfield, then officiating as Agent to the Governor General, the Government of India sanctioned the special deputation of Rai Bahadur Hittu Ram, C.I.E., for the purpose of assisting the officers of the Baluchistan Agency in revising and establishing on a systematic footing the revenue administration of the various districts under their charge. For the purposes of revenue administration the Government of India laid down two principles:—

(1) "That no attempt should be made to introduce artificial uniformity into the revenue management of the various districts of the Agency. These districts have had separate histories and antecedents, and their revenue systems, such as they are, have grown up under local and individual circumstances. In attempting to improve their revenue system, the existing methods should, in so far as they are acceptable to the people and not open to serious objection, be taken in each district as the basis of the improved system which it is proposed to introduce. (2) It must be borne in mind that it would be not only bad policy, but bad economy, to seek a comparatively large revenue at the cost of discontenting the people and perhaps making them regret that they were no longer subject to an oriental administration. In many parts of the Baluchistan Agency, the tribes have, it is believed, paid little or no land revenue until of late years; and great care should be taken to impose no burden upon them in such cases beyond what, with reference to their customs and means of living, is undoubtedly reasonable and fair."

To take Hittu Ram's place, Pandit Suraj Kaul was sent from the Punjab. The Rai Bahadur was placed on special duty from the 1st August, and submitted reports, both as regards Pishín and Thal-Chotiálí. The whole question is still under discussion, and further notice regarding it in this report would be premature.

The Quetta district revenues for 1881-82.

369. During the year 1881-82 the total revenue realised was R67,232-10-4. Of this sum the amount raised—

| | R | a. | p. |
|---|---|---|---|
| In cash was | 1,736 | 3 | 0 |
| In kind | 22,722 | 15 | 9 |
| From other produce | 7,402 | 14 | 1 |
| „ town revenue | 35,370 | 9 | 6 |
| Total | 67,232 | 10 | 4 |

Mr. Ingle, who sent in the report for the year, said that the assessment prevailing in the district was of two kinds, *viz.*, "zar-i-kalang," or fixed cash and kind assessment, and "batai," or share of the produce. Of the 21 villages

in the district, 11 payed a fixed assessment in cash and kind, settled by His Highness the Khán previous to the British occupation of Quetta; the remaining 10 paid batai, ranging from $\frac{1}{8}$th to $\frac{1}{4}$th. These shares were also fixed by His Highness the Khán. The Government share of four villages, Agaburgh, Nowhissar, Kink and Suragoond, were farmed to zemindars, as had been done prior to the British occupation of Quetta. Green karbi and lucerne in the neighbourhood of Quetta was sold in that state, as it realised a better price, being near the station. That at a distance was received dry and afterwards sold. The Government share of the dry lucerne was farmed out. The realizations from vegetable produce were also farmed out. Income was also realized by the sale of grass, fruit and from certain mills at Samungli. The revenue of the district was found to have steadily increased, notwithstanding that prices were low during the year, as will be seen from the following totals:—

| | R | a. | p. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1879-80 | 44,967 | 8 | 2 |
| 1880-81 | 50,446 | 0 | 7 |
| 1881-82 | 67,232 | 10 | 4 |

The produce in kind consisted of wheat, barley, and Indian-corn, which was sold as advantageously as possible. The whole of the year's produce of every kind was disposed of. Revenue was also derived from the sale of the abkari and maskarat contracts. The balance in favour of the Khán for the year was R38,922-10-1.

The Quetta district revenue for 1882-83.

370. From the 1st April 1883, the arrangement under which the districts of Quetta and Pishín were amalgamated came into force. Before that time Mr. Ingle, the Cantonment Magistrate, supervised the collection of the land-revenue, while the Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General for Quetta collected the revenue from the court-fees, which was realised in cash, stamps not having then been introduced. Each officer kept a separate account of his own receipts and disbursements, and neither balance was credited in the treasury. From the sum collected by Mr. Ingle were paid the revenue establishments, their contingent expenditure, and the cost of some of the public works. The Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General defrayed from his collections the cost of the Civil Courts establishment, the pay of the Kazi, the Munsiff, and public works, such as the Munsiff's Court, connected with the administration of justice. The surplus from both accounts were at the end of the financial year paid to the Khán. In some of the previous years no court-fees were collected. This dual system of management was not found to work satisfactorily, and the placing of both Quetta and Pishín under a Political Agent was arranged for, his pay being defrayed from the Quetta revenues. Up to the year 1882 there was no budget, no estimate, and no classification of receipts and expenditure under separate ledger heads, the accounts being simply kept in a day-book of receipts and payments. The total collections for the year 1882-83 and the two previous years were—

| Year. | Amount realised. R | a. | p. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1880-81 | 50,646 | 0 | 7 |
| 1881-82 | 67,232 | 10 | 4 |
| 1882-83 | 76,443 | 7 | 4 |

The increase over the year 1881-82 was mainly due to the introduction of court-fees. The expenditure for the year 1882-83, exclusive of the sum paid to the Khán, was R46,647-3-11, which was spent in buildings, establishments, &c. The public works erected were the Kazi's and Munsiff's quarters, the Extra Assistant Commissioner's katcheri, the tahsil, school-house, &c. Some account of the revenues of Quetta before the amalgamation of the district with the district of Pishín will be found in Chapter IV of this Report.

# CHAPTER VII.

Scope of the chapter.

371. In previous chapters an account of the Quetta district, and of its eventual amalgamation in the district of Pishín, has been given in detail. The necessity for holding the valley of Pishín; its strategical importance; the first occupation of the valley in 1878; its assignment to the British Government after the treaty of Gandamak; the outrages which took place in Pishín during the Afghan war; the visit of Mr. Duke to Shoráwak and Sharód, and some description of those valleys; the views which have been entertained as to the retention and relinquishment of Pishín; together with other matters, have been mentioned in Chapters IV, V, and VI of this Report. It may also here be noted that many of the affairs with which the Political Agent of Quetta and Pishín is directly and intimately concerned have been described in the Fifth Chapter which deals with the Quetta district and several miscellaneous matters which affect the Baluchistan Agency. In this chapter a general description of the boundaries and physical aspect of the Pishín district will be given, together with an account of the revenue and a variety of administrative matters, with which the Political Agent of Quetta and Pishín is immediately connected, in the Pishín district.

The boundaries of the district of Pishín.

372. On the 28th May 1879, Sir R. Sandeman was requested to ascertain the limits of the district of Pishín, which should under the treaty of Gandamak be retained by the British Government for administrative and strategic reasons, in concert with General Stewart. In view to this order being carried out, Captain H. Wylie sent in a report, and Captain Showers was afterwards sent to make investigations, and he also submitted a report. Subsequently Sir R. Sandeman reported to Government that—

"from the Takatu mountain north of Quetta, Pishín marches with His Highness the Khán of Kalát's territory. The boundary line is here clearly marked with pillars which run from the Takátú mountains, across the Quetta Lora, 'about 2½ miles beyond the village of Kuchlak,' to the Gazaband range, along which they run until Sharód near Barg is reached. Shahród and Shoráwak form the boundary to the south, and between them is Kábal territory.* The boundary line runs nearly west from Barg to Chili Katch Ziarat. The western boundary is determined by the Khwaja Amran range, and the western extremity of the great Toba plateau inhabited along its entire length by the Achakzais. 'The boundary separating Pishín from Kandahar territory' is and apparently always has been the Kadani Valley, commencing from the western slope of the Amran range at the Daman-i-koh, or skirts of the hills, which gives a very clearly defined border line commencing near Poti in Shoráwak and running to near the junction of the Kadani and Tokrak rivers. It includes Chaman and Sina, but not Chaman Murgah.' The northern boundary is determined by the northern slope of the Toba plateau and extends from the Kadani Valley along the Chagi watercourse to the Khaud mountain inhabited by Atchakzais and Kakars."

In conversation with the Afghan Governor of Pishín at Kandahar the Agent to the Governor General elicited that the northern boundary ran up to the Zhob border and that revenue should be realised from the villages of Hindu Bagh and Kahan as being in Pishín. The eastern boundary of Pishín is defined by the Kakar village of Larai which belongs to Pishín and pays revenue. The boundary from it runs by Kahan along the watershed of the Surgan mountain; thence down the Nara river to Kawas, and westward including Amadan to the

* Sir D. Stewart sent a memorandum to Government in which it was said that "the long and high range called Dinar Katur Mushallak is the western boundary of the Kalát State." It was added that the Sewi nallah was the boundary between Pishín and Sharód, and that from the junction of the Sewi with the Tirkha or Shor river the boundary ran along the Lora until the Tang or Sarap streams met it. "The line of demarcation is then thought to go to the Sargu or Kurma hills. The western boundary of Shorarud is, I understand, the Sarlat range."

Takátú mountain. Sher Ali, the Wali of Kandahár, told Sir R. Sandeman "that the Karezes up to Charri, Momimkawas, Amadun, and Ziarat are within the Pishín boundary." A survey of the country was made by Captain Showers and Lieutenant Gore. It should here be observed that Hindu Bagh and the Mehtarzai villages of Kand Urgatsch were in Pishín, and that they formerly paid revenue to Sirdar Khushdilkhan, who about 30 years ago was Governor of Pishín; the only reason they have not been occupied by troops is the want of sufficient military force in Pishín to enable the Agent to the Governor General to place a post at Hindu Bagh. The principle which has hitherto been acted on is to refrain from taking revenue from villages until thorough protection from raids can be ensured to the inhabitants. It has previously been mentioned that Shahród or Shorarud is on the southern boundary of Pishín; it should, however, be understood that the valley of Shahród is in British territory and that revenue is taken from it by the Political Agent, Pishín, who completely controls it. Shahród and Shorawak formed a separate tahsil from Pishín under the Kandahar Governor. Both were occupied during the Afghan war, and revenue was levied until 1881. In 1881-82 some correspondence took place with the Government of India regarding these valleys, which terminated in Shoráwak being returned to the Amir, while Shahrúd was retained and added to Pishín. The present boundary between Thal-Chotiálí and Pishín runs from the Takátú mountain along the watershed which separates the Pishín Lohrah from the streams which run into the Bheji. The watershed is crossed by the Brahiman pass and the Ushtarasira pass, and between these two passes it forms the boundary. From the latter pass the boundary runs along the watershed to the Sargwand mountain, where it meets the Zhob boundary. At this point is the trijunction of the boundaries of Pishí , Zhob, and the Thal-Chotiálí district.

Historical notice of Pishín.

373. Pishín is said to have been ceded by Nadir Shah of Persia to Nasír Khán of Kalát, as a reward for assistance rendered. In the time of Ahmed Shah Durani it formed a portion of his dominions. On the fall of the Sadozai dynasty Afghanistan was divided, and the Pishín district was included in the district of Kandahar, one of the first Governors of which was Kohandil Khán, who collected the revenue in cash or kind. The authority of the Governors was however weak, and the revenue they raised was generally dependent on the power they had to collect it. Khushdilkhan, Governor of Pishín, is said to have collected revenue as far as Rahie, situated in Thal-Chotiálí, to the amount of nearly 2 lakhs yearly, about the year 1855.

General description of the Pishín District.

374. The area of Pishín is about 3,600 square miles, of which Pishín includes about 700; about ¼th of Pishín is level ground; the average elevation of the plain is about 5,000 feet, while the peaks of the mountains rise in some cases to more than double that height. To the south lies the district of Quetta. To the south-west are Sharód and Shoráwak and Registan. To the west and north-west is the Kadanai plain. To the north is the district of Maruf beyond Toba. North-east are the country of Zhob, and the valley of Bori. East and south-east are hilly tracts inhabited by Dumar, Panizai, and Sarangzai Kakar tribes. From Toba the plain slopes to the south-west; it is nearly treeless. Almost all the numerous hills have slopes at the base composed of their own debris, spread over miles of country. A noticeable feature are the masses of red and white clayey deposits. The soil of the plain is alluvial and rich, and has an area of about 325 square miles. There are 94 villages and hamlets in Pishín proper exclusive of others in the Barshor and other glens. Every nallah on reaching the soft soil of the plain cuts a broad and deep bed, forming a serious hindrance

to passage across the valley. The sub-divisions of Pishín are Toba, Barshor, the Karez-zat-Kakari, and the Kakar Lora. A lengthy geological report on Pishín has been made by Mr. Griesbach, but it could not be entered here without laying this report open to the criticism of being *de omnibus rebus, et quibusdam aliis.*

General description of the Toba Sub-district.

375. Toba is an extensive upland region between the Kojhak pass and the Zhob valley, lying to the north of the Pishín plain. It is bounded to the west and south by the Kadanai hills, on the east by the Tokarak and Chingi nallahs, and by a line lying between the Chagi plain and the Spanglun pass; between the Kand mountain and the Tabi range the western boundary is a prolongation of the Khwájah Amrán range. It consists of narrow valleys or hollows, divided by low ridges or swelling undulations, and of rough hilly tracts; Tobin, that portion of Toba nearest to the Kojhak, is a plain of considerable size. The drainage is into the Kadanai stream. It is fairly well watered, and there is a considerable amount of cultivation. The plain of Tobin to the south-west is comparatively waterless. The region is nearly treeless. The whole country is nearly equally divided between the Atchakzai and Kakar tribes; the best route to Toba from Pishín is by the Karatu ravine. The upper portion is known as Mandan, while the lower is called Ferakhe. Obashtkhai is in this portion of Toba, and near it is Pinakai. Kakar Toba is more hilly than Mandan. There are hardly any villages in the district, the people living in scattered huts. The soil is capable of much cultivation owing to the good supply of water.

General description of the Barshor Sub-district.

376. The Barshor sub-district is a glen north-east of Khushdilkhan fort, containing numerous hamlets on the banks of streams—the Tor Margha and the Barshor—surrounded with fruit trees and cultivation, inhabited by Kakars, which tribe is divided into numerous sections. The valley opens out on to the plain of Pishín about 4 miles north-east of Khushdilkhan fort. The valley is full of small glens, in which the population is remarkably thick, and there is a good deal of cultivation.

General description of the Karez-zat-Kakari Sub-district.

377. The Karez-zat-Kakari sub-district is to the east of Pishín. On the north is a mass of hills which separate it from Zhob; and at the northern end of the plain is the Mehtarzai watershed. There are several villages and hamlets in the district, of which Balozai and Kanozai are the largest, and these contain a considerable amount of irrigated and cultivated land.

General description of the Kakar Lora Sub-district.

378. The Kakar Lora district is a sub-division of Pishín, extending from near Gwal to the boundary of the Khán of Kalát's territory; it contains 13 villages, inhabited by Sanatia Kakars. There is a considerable amount of karez irrigation, and numerous trees are to be seen.

Cultivation in Pishín.

379. The cultivable area of Pishín has been calculated at 1,200 square miles of irrigated and unirrigated land. Irrigation is supplied by the bunding up of watercourses, and by karezes. The Lora stream is too far below the level of the plain to be of much use for irrigation; the result of bunding up the Lora has been and would be to cause alarm to the people of Shoráwak through whose valley it runs. The divisions of irrigated lands are termed shabanahs or shares, and that of barani or non-irrigated land is called hals or ploughs. The occupiers of land are the mulkdar or holder direct from Government, and the bazgar who pays the original holder ⅓rd of the produce as rent, and is responsible for the Government share and expenses. The khistgar pays half the revenue in addition to his rent, the mulkdar paying the other half. The hamsaya settles on land with

the owner's permission, and has to work for the owner. The food-grains are wheat, barley, maize, and millet; lucerne grass and melons are much cultivated. Ploughing is carried out in a cheap and rough manner. Two-thirds of the land is allowed to lie fallow yearly. Lucerne grass requires a large amount of water. Rain is much looked for in Pishín, as on it depends the crop on unirrigated lands, while that on irrigated lands is increased by it. Water-mills are frequently met with for grinding corn. Camels, horses, ponies, donkeys, cows, sheep, goats, and fowls, are to be met with. The principal tribes are the Atchakzais, Tarins, Saiads, and Kakars; their numbers have been estimated at 81,000.

Compensation for land occupied by troops, and water supplied to fortified posts at Gulistan Karez, Killa Abdulla, and Khushdilkhan, 1879-83.

380. In 1879 fortified enclosures were constructed at Gulistan Karez and Killa Abdulla in Pishín, partly for the use of the officers of the civil administration and partly for the small garrisons necessary for their protection. In 1881, the Agent to the Governor General reported that they had been considerably enlarged and that the fortified enclosure at Killa Abdulla had been entirely made over to the Military Department. Water for the use of the garrisons was obtained by diverting a portion of the Karez belonging to the nearest villages to the forts. The value of the land on which Killa Abdulla stood had been assessed at R300, and the value of the water was taken to be the same amount. To the value set on the water the people would not agree. The Agent to the Governor General recommended the payment of R50 per mensem to each of the villages near Gulistan Karez and Killa Abdulla forts, together with R25 per mensem for water used for troops at Khushdilkhan. These payments the Government of India sanctioned in November 1881, for the period that the posts were occupied by British troops. In April 1883, the Agent to the Governor General reported that land to the extent of 48 jaribs, or about 36 acres, had been taken up for the use of troops at Khushdilkhan, and he recommended that rent should be paid for it at the rate of R13-9-4 per mensem from the time that the ground was occupied in April 1879. To this request the Government of India acceded in June 1883.

The Governor of Kandahár informed that the Government of India did not desire to interfere with his authority in Shoráwak, 1882.

381. An account of Doctor Duke's visit to Shoráwak and Sharód, together with some description of these valleys, has already been given in this report. About the commencement of the year 1882, the question of the disposal of these valleys was raised, and Colonel Waterfield, at that time officiating as Agent to the Governor General, reported that it would be unadvisable to allow them to be occupied by the Amír, since as long as Pishín remained in British hands, the inconvenience of an Afghán occupation of these two districts would be great, and political difficulties would occur, which would be avoided by having the desert for the boundary. It was also observed that the greater number of the inhabitants of Sharód were Brahuis; that the valley had been given to Nasir Khan I. by Ahmad Shah Durani; that it had been iregularly resumed; and that the holding of the two valleys would sever Kalát from Afghanistan. The estimated area of the valleys was put down at 200 square miles, and the population at about 22,500. The Governor of Kandahar addressed the Agent to the Governor General on the subject, and on the matter being referred to the Government of India an order was received to the effect that the Agent to the Governor General should inform the Governor that the Government of India did not wish to interfere with the exercise of his authority in Shoráwak; "that is, the tract of country formerly held by the Afghan Government to the west of the Sarlatti range." The Governor of Kandahár was informed accordingly. In June 1882, Major Biddulph, then officiating as Agent to the Governor General, proposed to take steps to let it be publicly known that Sharód was under the jurisdiction of the Indian Government. About this

time the Governor of Kandahar was taking steps to assert the Amir's authority in Shorawak, and the Sharód maliks asked permission to come into Quetta. The Governor General in Council approved of the proposal to take such steps as might "be necessary to make the continuance of the British connection with Sharód on the same footing as Pishín," and it was added that—

"I am to request that you will proceed in this matter with caution, avoiding any unusual formalities, or any proceedings calculated to create excitement or stir. Should it be found possible to levy revenue, the collections would be nominal, and particular care should be taken to make the relations of the people with Government as easy as possible."

The boundary between Shoráwak and Sharód is generally defined as the Sarlatt range of mountains.

382. In November 1881, the Government of India sanctioned arrangements for the security of the passes through the Khojak Amran range, and for the custody of the fortified posts in Pishín from which British troops had been withdrawn. The entertainment of a body of 100 Atchakzai Khasadars under a Subadar and two Jemadars, at a monthly cost of R1,220, was sanctioned, to be posted as follows :—

Establishments entertained in Pishín, 1881-82.

| | |
|---|---|
| Chaman . . . . . . . . . . . | 50 |
| Khojak . . . . . . . . . . . | 10 |
| Rogham pass . . . . . . . . . . | 10 |
| Gwajah " . . . . . . . . . . | 30 |

At each post vacated by the regular troops one caretaker on R12, and three chowkidars on R8 each, were sanctioned. Arrangements were also approved for the protection of the telegraph wire from Quetta to Gulistan at a monthly cost of R240. To Haji Sarbuland Khán, Atchakzai, a pension of R300 per mensem for life was sanctioned, conditional on good behaviour; together with R400 per mensem for the maintenance of 20 sowars; and an allowance of R300 per mensem as a personal allowance, in addition to the life pension granted to him. The retention of posts at the Gazaband pass, Samugli and Dinar Karez, at a cost of R780 per mensem, was also sanctioned; shortly afterwards a redistribution of the posts was sanctioned resulting in a saving to Government of R175. An account of the whole question of the local levies in Baluchistán will be found in another part of this report.

383. On the 29th April 1883, a caravan proceeding from India to Kandahar was attacked by Atchakzai robbers near the Khojak pass; one man with it was killed and two were wounded. The outrage was said to have been due to the Kasadar officers being absent from their posts, and to negligence on the part of Haji Sarbuland Khán who was responsible for the safety of the caravan. Subsequent investigation showed that there had been a quarrel between the Atchakzai and the kafilamen, arising from the latter grazing their camels on the ground of the former. Nawab Hassan Ali Khán, who made the first enquiry into the dispute, reported that this quarrel had been arranged and that the attack on the kafila was a distinct act of lawlessness committed with the object of plunder only. The Political Agent, Quetta and Pishín, however, believed that the fight arose directly out of the dispute about the grazing, in which the kafilamen were in the wrong, and threw considerable doubt on any robbery having taken place at all. The Agent to the Governor General concurred in the conclusion arrived at by the Political Agent. Haji Sarbuland Khán, Atchakzai, resigned his duties in regard to the prevention of robberies, &c., and of the acceptance of this resignation the Governor General in Council approved. The allowances which had been sanctioned to him for the maintenance of sowars and keeping open the

Attack by Atchakzais on a caravan near the Khojak pass, 1883.

passes was withdrawn, but the life pension payable to him was continued on the clear understanding that, though he was exempt from active service, in the event of an emergency occurring he was bound to assist in any duty when called upon. A redistribution of the pay of the khasadars and sowars formerly drawn by Haji Sarbuland Khán was made in the levy reorganisation scheme (of which an account has been given in this report), under which a more strict surveillance over the posts of levies was to be introduced. Pending the sanction of the scheme temporary arrangements were made.

Murder of two banniahs between Kachh and Gandak, September 1882.

384. On the 1st September 1882, two banniahs were found lying on the road between Kachh and Gandak by a party of sepoys on escort duty with a commissariat convoy; one of them was dead, the other died shortly after he was found. A medical examination showed that they had been stoned to death. Suspicion fell upon two Pathans who had been seen in their company, and who disappeared and were not subsequently found; the property in the possession of the banniahs valued at R650 was stolen.

Depredations by the Achakzais, 1882.

385. About the middle of the year 1882 the Governor of Kandahár complained of depredations made by the Atchakzais of Toba in Afghan territory; and Mr. Jennings, then Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General in charge of Pishín, was directed to make enquiries as to the facts. In accordance with directions Mr. Jennings held a durbar on the 2nd September 1882, at Gulistan, with the object of opening friendly relations with the Atchakzais, preventing thieving in British and Afghan territory, obtaining the recovery of stolen property, and arranging for supplies to a column which it was proposed to send into Toba under Colonel Mallaby. Several khillats were distributed, and the Atchakzai maliks agreed to restore stolen property and prevent robbery. This was the first occasion on which the maliks of Toba had come down from their hills to meet a Political Officer. In the latter portion of the year a small force under Colonel Mallaby marched through Toba. A durbar was held by Mr. Jennings at Haji-Khan-Ka-Killa, at which a few khillats were presented. No difficulties of any kind were encountered. Topographical reports as to country were sent in in detail.

The selection of sites for the cantonments in Pishín and elsewhere, 1883.

386. In 1882 the Agent to the Governor General proposed to abolish the corps of Baluch Guides, to amalgamate the grant given for the corps with other grants for local and tribal levies, and to distribute the whole in a series of fixed posts throughout the Agency. This question was discussed by the Levy Committee, an account of the proceedings of which has been given in another place. In connection with this scheme it was proposed that a central position should be selected in Pishín for a civil and military station, to be selected by the military authorities in communication with the Agent to the Governor General. The site was accordingly selected by a committee, and the Agent to the Governor General concurred in the selection, remarking that the civil and military lines should be kept quite separate. Arrangement had then to be made for the supply of water, and this was done. The site selected was on an unculturable moor, the property of Government, for which no compensation had to be paid. In Resolution No. 177 S. C. of 7th May 1883, the Government of India sanctioned the withdrawal of the semi-detached posts in Baluchistan and the concentration of the troops at a few stations in support of a chain of posts to be held by tribal levies. In connection with this scheme sites for the location of troops were selected at Thal-Chotiálí, and at Shahrig. Information as to the Thal-Chotiálí cantonment will be found in the next chapter. It was decided that the place where the troops were to be located in Pishín should be called the "new cantonment, Pishín;" an account of the buildings erected there will be found in the

notice given in this report of the works undertaken by the Public Works Department, *vide* Chapter XI.

Magisterial powers of officers in regard to Pishín in 1878 and 1879.

387. When in 1878 the district of Pishín was assigned to the British, the first officer placed in executive charge of it was Captain H. Wylie; an establishment for the collection of revenue and a body of police were entertained. The people were left as much as possible to themselves to settle their own disputes. Sir R. Sandeman was granted powers over all persons in the district of Pishín similar to those exercised by a Sessions Judge and a First Class Magistrate. Captain H. Wylie was also given the powers of a First Class Magistrate; the Nazim of Pishín was given the powers of a Subordinate Magistrate.

Magisterial powers of the Political Agent, Pishín, May, 1883.

388. On the 12th May 1883 the Government of India addressed letter No. 946E. of 12th May 1883, to the Agent to the Governor General, saying that in future the powers of a District Magistrate, as described in Act X of 1882, with the powers described in Section 30 of the Act, would be exercised by the Political Agents of Quetta and Pishín, and Sibi (as it was then called). Pandit Suraj Kaul, the Extra Judicial Assistant Commissioner at Quetta, exercises the powers of a First Class Magistrate, and the power to try summarily. The Tahsildar in Quetta, and the Munsiff, each exercise the powers of a Magistrate of the Second Class.

Civil jurisdiction in the Quetta district, 1885.

389. It has been ruled by the Government of India, in Notification No. 590E., dated 21st April, 1885, that—

"In the administration of civil justice in the district of Quetta, the Code of Civil Procedure shall be taken as a general guide. * *

"The Political Agent for the time being in charge of the district of Quetta shall have power to try all original suits within the said district, whatever be the amount or value of the subject-matter; and for the purposes of all enactments for the time being in force, the Court of the said Political Agent shall be the Court of the District Judge.

"The Extra Assistant Commissioner in Quetta for the time being shall have power to try all original civil suits within the said district, when the amount or value of the subject-matter does not exceed R10,000. The Munsiff of Quetta (if any) for the time being shall have power to try all original suits within the said district, when the amount or value of the matter does not exceed R300.

"The Tahsildar of Quetta for the time being shall have power to try all original suits within the said district, when the amount or value of the subject matter does not exceed R300. For the purpose of the Code of Civil Procedure—

I.—The Court of the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Quetta, for the time being shall be the Court authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of the said Munsiff and Tahsildar;

II.—The Court of the Political Agent for the time being shall be deemed to be the Court authorized to hear first appeals from the decisions in original suits decided by the said Extra Assistant Commissioner.

III.—The Court of the Agent to the Governor General for the time being shall be deemed to be the Court authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of the said Political Agent. For all the purposes of the said Code the Agent to the Governor General shall exercise the powers of a High Court."

Civil jurisdiction in Pishín, 1885.

390. As regards Pishín, it was notified in Notification No. 457E., dated 26th March 1885, that—

"In the administration of civil justice in the district of Pishín, the Code of Civil Procedure shall be taken as a general guide. * * The Political Agent for the time being in charge of the district of Pishín shall have power to try all original suits within any part of the said district whatever be the amount or the value of the subject-matter; and for the purposes of all enactments for the time being in force, the Court of the said Political Agent shall be deemed to be the Court of the District Judge. The Tahsildar of Pishín for the time being shall have power to try all original civil suits within the said district, when the amount or value of the

subject-matter does not exceed R500. The Munsiff of Pishín for the time being (if any) shall have power to try all original suits within the said district, when the amount or value of the subject-matter does not exceed R300. For the purposes of the Code of Civil Procedure—

I.—The Court of the Political Agent for the time being shall be the Court authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of the said Tahsildar and Munsiff.

II.—The Court of the Agent to the Governor General for the time being shall be deemed to be the Court authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of the said Political Agent."

For all the purposes of the said Code the Agent to the Governor General shall exercise the powers of a High Court.

It was decided by the Government of India in 1883 that—

"It is not the desire of the Governor General in Council that the Indian codes of law should be too strictly applied in Baluchistán among the natives of the various districts, but that disputes should be as far as possible settled in accordance with local laws and customs."

Officers who had charge of Pishín, May, 1881-85.

391. When Pishín was first occupied, the head-quarters of a British officer were fixed at Gulistan Karez. Captain H. Wylie was the first officer appointed, and he was succeeded by Captain Loch. Colonel St. John, writing in 1881 as Officiating Agent to the Governor General, observed that nearly the whole time and energy of both of them had been absorbed in the all-important business of feeding the troops on the line of communication, and they therefore had little time to spare for the supervision and improvement of the district. The officers who have subsequently had charge of Pishín are Lieutenant R. H. Jennings and Colonel E. S. Reynolds. Mr. H. S. Barnes has held the post of Political Agent, Pishín, since the 8th June 1883, up to the present time (August 1885).

Murder of Havildar Medoo Khan by a Ghazi in Pishín, 29th September 1882.

392. Mention will now be made of outrages which have taken place. On the 29th September 1882, Havildar Medoo Khan, of the 24th British Native Infantry, was in a field near his lines belonging to the Ishfalzai village in Pishín, when a man about 17 or 19 years old armed with a sword rushed at him and killed him. He afterwards ran in the direction of the lines waving his sword, and was shot by a sepoy. From a report made by Mr. Jennings it appears that the Ghazi was probably a Tarin.

Murder of Mr. Dupuis on Zarghun by Yassinzai Pathans, May 1884.

393. In this report occasional instances of murder for fanatical reasons have been mentioned; the last case which occurred took place on the 25th May 1884, when Lieutenant Dupuis was murdered on Mount Zarghun near Quetta. This officer was passionately fond of mountain climbing, and had made before the occasion on which he lost his life an attempt to climb the Zarghun mountain; on the occasion of the last endeavour he rode about 15 miles to the foot of the hill, left his pony in charge of his syce at the foot of the hill, with directions to bring it to an appointed spot at a fixed hour, and commenced the ascent. The syce sheltered the pony in the neighbouring hamlet during the day, went to the appointed spot in the evening, and at 10 P.M. at night returned to Quetta and reported that his master had not appeared. On hearing that the missing officer had not appeared, the Agent to the Governor General made arrangements for enquiries on the spot, whither he proceeded himself. The Political Agent, Quetta and Pishín, also went to the spot, with the 45th Sikhs and some police. The tract of country in which Mr. Dupuis might have met his death is very extensive, rugged, precipitous, and cut up with ravines full of large boulders. The troops marched up the gorge in which the body of Mr. Dupuis was eventually found, but discovered nothing, nor did an unremitting search for three days reveal anything. Mr. Barnes then went back to make enquiries in the Hanna village accompanied by some Bolan Pass Marris; after a diligent search in the gorge

near the village, the Marris discovered the place where the murder had taken place, and the place where the body had been temporarily buried under stones, and afterwards removed. It was now clear that the murder had been committed by Yasinzais; and when the maliks of the tribe found that they could no longer conceal the fact, they brought in the body and delivered up the murderers,—Paind, Mowladad, and Lal Khan: the property of the murdered officer was also discovered. The prisoners were tried by the Agent to the Governor General under the Act for the suppression of murderous outrages, and it then appeared that as Mr. Dupuis was returning from the ascent of the mountain, he had to pass over a narrow ledge with a drop of about 15 feet on one side into a river bed; that Mowladad had at this place pushed him over the edge; that Mr. Dupuis had twice fired at his assailants whom he missed; and that he had been killed by blows from stones hurled at him. No other cause for the outrage except that of fanaticism was found to exist. The instigator and chief actor in the outrage was Mowladad, who was hanged, and his body was afterwards burnt. Paind and Lal Khan were sentenced to transportation for life, and an appeal against the sentence was rejected. The chief malik of the village and some others were tried for being concerned in the removal of the body, and were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. A fine of ⅛th of the harvest was inflicted on the whole Hanna valley, as the inhabitants, although aware of what had happened, concealed the matter as long as possible. Officers are not permitted to wander about the country without first consulting the Political Agents, as although by far the greater part of the inhabitants are friendly, individuals imbued with fanatic zeal occasionally commit crimes. The Government of India in remarking on the case said—

"the energetic measures taken by Mr. Barnes to track out the murderers and recover the body reflect great credit on him, and the Governor General in Council trusts that the successful apprehension of the murderers will produce a salutary effect on the Yasinzai and other sections of the Kakar Pathans."

Attack made on a policeman in Gulistan fort, 1884.

394. In June 1884, the Political Agent, Pishín, reported that an attack had been made by a Ghazi about 18 years old,—a Spin Tarin of Harnáí,—who entered the Gulistan fort, on the plea of wishing to see the hospital assistant, and attacked a Hindu policeman whom he wounded. The Ghazi was captured, and was afterwards found to be a criminal lunatic, and was sent to the Asylum at Hyderabad, Sind.

Scheme of irrigation for the proposed forest nursery at Kharawa Nalla in Pishín, 1885.

395. In the interests of forestry the establishment of a forest nursery at Kharawa Nalla in Pishín was suggested; in view to discovering if water could be obtained for the nursery, Mr. R. S. Kennedy, Executive Engineer, Pishín, has submitted a report, from which it appears that the flood waters in the nallas might be utilised for irrigation purposes by a method of contour irrigation by which water could be secured, whenever the nallas had water in them, in the spring months. In the summer months water might be brought from the Gurkhal, a stream in the neighbourhood, or water might be obtained by strengthening some of the contour bunds to form reservoirs for storing water. Mr. Kennedy recommended an experiment on a small scale; and the Agent to the Governor General has suggested that R500 be expended for the purpose. An account of the forest administration in Baluchistán will be found in Chapter XI of this Report.

Revenue of Pishín.
Report by Sir. O. St. John.

396. In May 1881, Colonel St. John forwarded to Government a report on Pishín in which was included information as to the revenue. He said—

"That the revenue of Pishín, as in other parts of Afghanistán, is derived mainly from the land. Unlike the other districts of Kandahár, however, only a small part of the Pishín land

revenue appears as a fixed assessment in money or produce, the greater part being obtained from 'zabti,' *i.e.*, confiscated land, where a certain proportion of the crop varying from one-third to one-tenth is taken by the ruling power. What proportion this zabti land bore to the whole area cultivated I cannot estimate with any degree of accuracy; for the Kakars, though the most numerous tribe and occupying the most fertile parts of the country, paid very little.

"Other taxes are—cash in lieu of personal service; contribution for food of Governor; tax on mills; poll-tax on Hindus; tax on goldsmiths; tax on artizans; poll-tax on camels, sheep and other animals, duty on hemp used as a narcotic drug.

"From the Revenue Records of 1875-76, a year, I am informed, of not more than average prosperity, I find that the revenue collected for the Kandahar Government was as follows:—

"From miscellaneous taxes quoted above and levied, it would appear, on the Tarin and Kakar villages only—

| | |
|---|---|
| Cash | R9,159. |
| Kind | 7-91 Kharwars of wheat. |
| Butter | 21½ Mans. |

"The fixed assessment on land amounted to—

| | |
|---|---|
| Cash | R1,135. |
| Kind, mixed grain | 7 Kharwars. |
| Wheat | 182 " |
| Barley | 6 " |

"The Government share of the zabti lands amounted to—

| | |
|---|---|
| Wheat | 1,091-78 Kharwars. |
| Barley | 225-35 " |
| Maize | 80-19 " |
| Millet | 39-89 " |

"Lucerne grass and other garden crops produced R136; and fines R411.

"The total cash revenue thus amounted to R10,481; and the share of produce to 1,640 kharwars. This was generally sold on the spot at low rates, seldom, I am told, more than R8 a kharwar. At that price the Government share of crops would have produced R10,720, raising the total revenue of the district to R21,201. During the last two years drought and the presence of large numbers of troops have raised the value of grain to famine level; but the promised abundant harvest, and the withdrawal of the major part of the army, may be expected to reduce it considerably, though it is unlikely to fall to the old rate. About R25 a kharwar may, I think, be taken as the average future value of Pishín grain: and this would give with the crop of 1875-76, *viz.*, 1,640 kharwars, a money value of R41,000, raising the total revenue to R52,481.

"Revenue for the last two years. In Appendix A* will be found a detailed statement of revenue realised from Pishín during the two years of British occupation, *viz.*, 1879-80 and 1880-81, amounting in the first to R68,734, and in the second to R61,353. To institute a comparison of these figures with those given in paragraph† 10 of the revenue in the Amir's time, it is necessary in each instance to separate the revenue paid in cash from that paid in kind. In 1875-76 we have seen that the cash revenue was R10,481, and the Government share of the grain 1,640 kharwars. Excluding certain minor items of taxation that were not brought into account by the Kandahar Revenue officials (forming probably perquisites of their own), together with sums derived from Customs dues, I find that the cash revenue for 1879-80 was R18,489, and that for 1880-81, R14,696. The grain collected in the first year amounted to about 950 kharwars, and in the second to 535 only. Thus in the first year of British administration the cash revenue rose R8,009 above what it had realised in 1875-76, falling, however, R3,793 the next year. The fluctuation appears mainly due to the poll-tax on sheep and cattle which brought in R2,830 in 1875-76, R9,568 in 1879-80, and R7,031 in 1880-81. On the other hand, the revenue in kind shows a great falling off under British administration. Indeed in 1880-81 it was less than a third of the produce of 1875-76, and the produce of the two last seasons together did not equal that of that year. Much of the decrease is no doubt attributable to the partial drought of 1879-80, and the severe drought of 1880-81; but droughts are not unusual in Southern Afghanistan, and those of the years in question were by no means of unexampled severity. Moreover, I am informed that the minimum yield of Pishín under Afghan administration was 1,000 kharwars; and I am, therefore, inclined to suspect that the very high price of grain tempted the peasants to evade proper payment of the Government share of the crops, not perhaps a very difficult task, considering the

* Of Colonel St. John's report forwarded to the Foreign Department with letter No. 243, dated 26th May 1881.
† Of Colonel St. John's report above alluded to.

inexperience of the Indian officials employed in this method of collection, and the facilities it offers for evasion.

Revenue of Pishín for 1878-79, 1879-80, and 1880-81.

397. The Agent to the Governor General in October 1881 reported—

"That the total revenue of Pishín during the three years since our occupation of the country has been as follows :—

| Sources. | 1878-79. | | | 1879-80. | | | 1880-81. | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Land Revenue.* | *R* | *a.* | *p.* | *R* | *a.* | *p.* | *R* | *a.* | *p.* |
| In grain | 42,759 | 2 | 8 | 42,926 | 13 | 0 | 35,601 | 15 | 10 |
| " other produce | ...... | | | 4,333 | 14 | 0 | 8,759 | 12 | 0 |
| " cash | 3,782 | 14 | 6 | 21,473 | 13 | 0 | 16,992 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 46,542 | 1 | 2 | 68,734 | 8 | 0 | 61,353 | 11 | 10 |

"In 1880-81, in addition to the figures given above, Captain H. Wylie succeeded in levying a certain amount of revenues from the valleys of Kachh, Hamadun, and Khawas which, though they form a part of the Afghan district of Pishín or Fushung, had previously paid no revenue to our officers, and very little to the Afghan Government. The revenue obtained by Captain Wylie, before the outbreak in August put a stop to his operations, was 684 mans of grain and a small sum of R486 on account of the poll-tax on sheep and cattle, the total value of all the collections being R3,914-7-8. Adding this to the rest of the revenue collected in Pishín, the total revenue for 1880-81 amounts to R65,268-3-6.

"As might be expected, it will be seen that far the greater portion of the income of Pishín is derived from the land revenue, which again is for the most part collected from the zabti, or confiscated lands, which pay a varying share of the produce to Government. The following figures show the amount of the collections in kind during the three years under review :—

| | 1878-79. | | | | | | 1879-80. | | | | | | 1880-81. | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | M. | S. | C. | *R* | *a.* | *p.* | M. | S. | C. | *R* | *a.* | *p.* | M. | S. | C. | *R* | *a.* | *p.* |
| Grain | 10,420 | 2 | 0 | 42,759 | 2 | 8 | 9,985 | 27 | 6 | 42,926 | 13 | 0 | 5,622 | 4 | 4 | 35,601 | 15 | 10 |
| Other produce | ... | | | ... | | | 3,917 | 22 | 0 | 4,333 | 14 | 0 | 4,128 | 10 | 8 | 8,759 | 12 | 0 |
| Total | 10,420 | 2 | 0 | 42,759 | 2 | 8 | 13,903 | 9 | 6 | 47,260 | 11 | 0 | 9,750 | 14 | 12 | 44,361 | 11 | 10 |

"In paragraph 15 of my report* on Pishín, to which I have already alluded, I pointed out that, according to the best information I was able to obtain, the minimum grain revenue of Pishín under the Afghan Government was 1,000 kharwars, or (at 10½ mans per kharwar) 10,500 Indian mans. I also showed that in 1875-76, which I believe was only a fairly average year, the grain revenue realised by the Afghans amounted to 1,640 kharwars, or 17,220 Indian mans, more than the total grain revenue of both the years 1879-80 and 1880-81 put together. Indeed, the above figures show that during our occupation of the country we have only once succeeded in realising the minimum grain revenue yielded by the district under Afghan administration, while latterly the revenue has progressively decreased until in 1880 81 it amounted to less than one-third of the collections in 1875-76. Much of this decrease is owing, no doubt, to the prolonged drought which has afflicted Pishín during the last two years, but I do not think the drought alone is enough to account for the deficiency, and, as I pointed out on a previous occasion, I think it very probable that the people were enabled to evade the payment of a large portion of the revenue, partly owing to the inexperience in Afghan revenue matters of the officials employed in the duty of collection, and partly on account of the very heavy work thrown upon them in connection with the provision of supplies for the troops, which left them little leisure to attend to details of administration. In the spring of the present year copious rain fell in Pishín, and there is reason to believe that both the spring and the autumn crops

* Forwarded with letter to the Foreign Department No. 243, dated 26th May.

will be above the average. I have also placed the services of an experienced Kandahár official at the disposal of the Assistant Agent to the Governor General in charge of Pishín to assist him in the revenue work. I therefore anticipate that the grain revenue during 1881-82 should reach a minimum of 1,500 kharwars, or 15,750 mans, which, at the lowest estimate, and allowing for a large fall in the prices now prevailing, should produce at least ₨40,000. During the last two years the revenue derived from produce other than grain shows a slight increase. Nothing was realised on this account in 1878-79, since most of what was due had been collected by the Amir's officials previous to our occupation. But in 1879-80 and 1880-81, an average of 4,000 Indian mans was collected in each year. Still from this source also the revenue obtained was, I think, less than it might have been had the Pishín officials possessed more local experience. To take one item only, it is the custom in Afghanistan to collect from every crop of wheat or barley equal weights of grain and straw, and had this been done in Pishín it will be evident that the revenue from chopped straw would have been more by four or five thousand rupees during each of the two last years. The large increase in the money value of the produce other than grain during the year 1880-81 is attributable to the great demand which arose for all kinds of forage owing to the march through the district of the troops under General Phayre and Sir F. Roberts.

"As in Sibi so in Pishín we possess no records of village areas, nor has any statement been prepared showing the actual number of villages under cultivation during each of the last three years, or the approximate amount of land cultivated. According to the records of the Kandahár revenue office there are 97 villages in Pishín, excluding the Barshora valley, and at first sight the total revenue collected from them compares very unfavourably with the sum realised from the nine villages, which were all that paid revenue in Sibi during 1880-81. It should however be remembered that a large number of the Pishín villages, most of those for instance which are inhabited by Sayyids, are revenue-free, while a still larger number are almost entirely dependent on rainfall for their cultivation. It is therefore out of the question to attempt any comparison between the revenue of the two districts until we have more information than we at present possess regarding the extent of the cultivated area, the number of the revenue-free holdings, the share of the produce usually levied from the *zabti*, or Government lands, and the rate at which other lands are generally assessed. I shall take an early opportunity of calling the attention of the Assistant Agent to the Governor General in Pishín to these points, with a view to the collection as soon as possible of the required information.

Cash revenue.

"The cash revenue of Pishín is derived from a great variety of sources, some of which, such as the cash assessments on canals, springs, and on garden cultivation, should properly be classed under the head of Land Revenue. The other taxes levied are of a very miscellaneous character, and consist of such items as payments in lieu of personal service, payments in lieu of supplies to the Governor, taxes on artizans, taxes on sheep and cattle, and custom duties. The Afghans also levied a poll-tax on Hindus, but this has been discontinued since our occupation of the country. The following figures give the cash revenue of Pishín during the last three years:—

| DETAIL. | 1878-79. | 1879-80. | 1880-81. |
|---|---|---|---|
| | R a. p. | R a. p. | R a. p. |
| Items debitable to land revenue | } 3,782 14 6 | 2,924 4 0 | 1,940 8 0 |
| Miscellaneous | | 18,549 9 0 | 15,051 8 0 |
| TOTAL | 3,782 14 6 | 21,47 313 0 | 16,992 0 0 |

"The small amount realised in the first year is due to the fact that the Amir's officials had already collected ₨7,256-13-0 before we arrived in the country. In the following year as much as ₨9,568 were realised from the poll-tax on sheep and cattle, and the total collections rose to ₨21,473-13-0, or twice as much as the Afghans obtained in 1875-76, the figures of which year I have already made use of for the purpose of comparison, and in which the total cash revenue only amounted to ₨10,481. In 1880-81 there was a considerable decrease, every single branch of the revenue showing a slight falling off, though for what reason it is difficult to explain, unless the cause is to be found in the very heavy work thrown on the political officer and his establishments in consequence of the events at Kandahár in the autumn of 1880. It will be noticed that very little revenue has been realised in Pishín under the head of "Abkari." This is owing to the objections raised by the military authorities to the sale of liquor in the military posts in Pishín, where alone the trade would have been profitable. For similar reasons there will be no revenue from this source during 1881-82. In the current year

another item of revenue, *viz.*, the custom duties, will also disappear from the Pishín accounts. These duties are a relic of the import duties levied by the Afghan Government on all goods crossing the frontier. For reasons of convenience most of these duties were paid by the merchants when they arrived in Kandahár, but so much as was due for goods actually consumed in Pishín was usually collected on the Pishín border. During 1879-80 and 1880-81 the British officers continued to levy this tax in accordance with the Afghan practice, but, under the altered circumstances of Pishín, it is of course altogether indefensible, forming as it does a transit duty between two portions of British territory, and it has therefore been discontinued from the beginning of the present year.

"I also append a statement* similar to that given for Sibi, showing the expenditure incurred in Pishín in connection with the collection of the revenue, and the net sum credited to Government during each of the three years under review. In 1878-79 no expenditure was incurred, and the whole sum realised, R46,542-1-0, was credited to Government. In 1879-80, out of the gross revenue of R68,734-8-0, a sum of R127-8-0 was paid away in fees to the village maliks, and it also appears that at the time of collection some 368 mans of grain were deducted for a similar purpose from the revenue in kind. In 1880-81 a sum of R257-10-9 was expended on account of the same fees, and the net revenue credited to Government during the last two years amounts to R68,607 in 1879-80, and to R61,096-1-4, or including the revenue from Kachh, Hamadan, and Khawas, to R65,010-9-0 in 1880-81. It is satisfactory to note that, with the exception of the small sums paid on account of the malikana fees, no expenditure was incurred in Pishín in excess of the authorized establishments.

* Appendix B to letter No. 243, dated 26th May 1881.

"It may be mentioned here that, under the orders of Sir Robert Sandeman, the valleys of Kachh, Hamadan, and Khawas have since the beginning of 1881 been placed under the control of Mr. Duke, the officer in charge of the Harnái districts. The revenue derived from them will therefore no longer find a place in the accounts of Pishín. For the current year, as I have already stated, I estimate the revenue of Pishín at a minimum of R65,000, *viz.*, value of grain revenue R40,000, cash revenue R25,000. As, however, a large number of troops have been detained in Pishín and Quetta during the summer months, the prices of grain and forage have fallen less than I expected, and it is probable that the estimated money value of the grain revenue will be considerably exceeded. This completes the account of the Pishín revenue for the period under consideration."

The revenue system of Pishín.

398. In 1883, Mr. Jennings sent in a report in which he describes the revenue system.

In Pishín a large portion of the land revenue is collected in kind, only a few springs and karezes being permanently assessed. Garden produce is valued each year by the tahsildar and owners jointly, and a proportion of the value thus arrived at, depending on the system of irrigation, is taken in cash. Certain tribes pay no land revenue, but in lieu pay a tax, in place of personal service to which they would otherwise be liable. There is also a tax called "sursat," which was before the British occupation paid in lieu of supplies given to the Governor of Pishín. These two taxes are paid by land-owners only. There are also a maldaghi or tax on animals, the usual land revenue or batai taxes, taxes on water-mills, abkari, and taxes on artizans. Transit dues were levied by the Government of the Amir of Afghanistan, but are not taken by the British. The batai tax will now be described. Mr. Jennings says—

"In every village or mouzah, as the crop becomes ripe and the reaping and gathering commence, a watchman is appointed on behalf of Government to see that none of the grain or bhoosa is removed from the threshing floors until the Government share has been taken. The Pishín police are invariably employed on this duty. We will suppose, for example, that the ground of the mouzah in question is irrigated by karezat, and that the Government share in kind is $\frac{1}{6}$ of the produce. As soon as the threshing is over and the bhoosa is separated from the grain, the cultivator divides the grain into six equal lots and the bhoosa into a similar number of heaps. This division is made generally by measurement, sometimes by guess-work, but never by weight. While this division is going on, and in fact until the revenue official (tahsildar or naib tahsildar) has finished weighing the Government share, it is the watchman's duty to see that no thieving takes place; also the mouzah where this measurement is going on is visited by the tahsildar, naib tahsildar, or their assistant. When every khistkar in the

mouzah has finished the division as above explained, they inform the head malik of the mouzah, who is generally a zemindar, but not necessarily a cultivator. He informs the tasildar or naib tahsildar that the harvest in the mouzah is completed, and he invites the official to come to his village to complete the batai. On the above-named revenue official receiving this information, he goes to the village in question accompanied by a dhanwai or weighman, and proceeds with kishtkar No. 1, as follows. The latter takes the revenue official up to his heap, and says, 'Choose one,' which the latter does. The weighman then proceeds to weigh this heap, while the tahsildar enters the weight in his note book. Similarly for the bhoosa. This process is carried on with each khistkar in the mouzah until the batai of that mouzah is completed. The Government share of bhoosa and grain, as above, is handed over to the maliks of the mouzah, and they are held responsible for its safe custody until it is required. The above is the manner in which 'batai' is done in Pishín, but it differs in one or two points from the Afghan custom."

Mr. Jennings goes on to say—

"There are four systems of irrigation in Pishín (excluding rain-water) which I will briefly touch upon, as they have not hitherto been alluded to in any report: (1) 'Rudha,' or the stream system by which ground is irrigated by streams from hills; (2) 'Karezat,' which system is so well known that it is needless to describe it further than to state that the water is conveyed from a water-bearing stratum, abounding in springs at the foot of the hills, by an underground channel at a gentler slope than the slope of the ground through the impervious clay of which the valley is composed, until brought to the surface. The water-bearing stratum is tapped in the proper place, giving an inexhaustible supply of excellent water. It is commonly supposed that the water-supply of a karez proceeds from a spring. This theory, I venture to think, is not correct, as it is well known that the amount of water in most karezes increases as we recede from the place originally tapped. Hence it follows that until the karez gets clear from the water-bearing stratum, it is continually receiving increments of water."

The third kind of irrigation mentioned by Mr. Jennings is called "chashmsar," or irrigation from springs at, or practically speaking at the surface. The fourth system is called "churha." In the alluvial valley of Pishín many ravines will be found running from the base of the hills some distance into the plains. These have evidently been formed from the effects of heavy rains year after year. When the churs or hollows have reached a certain depth, in some of them a virtually perennial stream of water is found to flow, for the most part running from an accumulation of water in the hills. Irrigation is carried on from these streams. The bed of the Lora stream in Pishín is at some depth below the surface of the country, and consequently there is no canal irrigation. Khushkaba lands are those which are not irrigated; they are only cultivated after heavy rainfall, the water being secured by the construction of small bunds or banks. Two crops yearly cannot be obtained from these lands, whereas they are often obtained from irrigated lands. Barley and wheat are the only crops grown on khushkaba lands. The spring or rabi crops consist of wheat, barley, and hemp; the autumn or kharif crop, of Indian corn, millet, madder, and tobacco. Melons, cucumbers, pumpkins, potatoes, carrots, and turnips are grown. This cultivation is called paliz, and a share of the produce, generally summarily assessed and sold on the spot, is taken as revenue. Lucerne grass is also grown in large quantities, and revenue in kind is taken from it. In places where land is scarce and water abundant, it is customary to sow and reap crops, harvest after harvest, except after a wheat crop, when the land is always allowed to lie fallow. If barley or hemp be grown as the spring crop, the same ground will be sown with either Indian corn, millet, paliz, or madder for the autumn crop. Only after wheat does the ground get a rest. Wheat is grown in a much larger quantity than other crops. According to Mr. Jennings, the whole of the land revenue of Pishín is derived from what are called "zabti" lands. Formerly no land in Pishín paid revenue, each mouzah being the property of some one. As time went on, some land was confiscated for misconduct, and some lapsed to the State failing heirs. The lands

which have in a variety of ways become the property of the ruling power, have been given by that power to new owners, on condition that they should pay a certain share of the produce in kind as revenue, according to the system of irrigation with which the land was cultivated. All culturable land in Pishín is either "zabti" or "muafi." The rates payable on "zabti" lands are—(1) on Rudha, $\frac{1}{3}$ of the total produce in kind; (2) on Karezat, $\frac{1}{6}$ (with a few exceptions); (3) on Chashmsar and Churha, $\frac{1}{5}$; (4) on Khushkaba, $\frac{1}{6}$.

Pishín revenue report for 1881-82.

399. In 1880-81 the amount of grain collected was 5,978 maunds 35 seers 11 chattaks, while in 1881-82, 11,926 maunds 25 seers $10\frac{1}{2}$ chittaks were collected, showing a considerable increase. The amount of grasses and straw collected in 1881-82 was 13,536 maunds 36 seers $10\frac{1}{2}$ chittaks, as against 4,128 maunds 10 seers and 8 chittaks in 1880-81. The maldaghi tax on animals for the year 1881-82 showed a considerable decrease as compared with previous years, owing chiefly to remissions, to a decrease in the number of animals, and to changes in the mode of collecting the tax; persons who had been exempted from this tax under the Afghan Government being held to be not liable to taxation under the British Government. Owing to changes made in regard to the inclusion and exclusion of items under various heads, there was some difficulty in comparing the cash revenue for 1881-82 with that of the previous year; it seems, however, to have been nearly the same in both years. The land revenue was also nearly the same as that taken in the previous year. The following figures show the revenue of Pishín for 1881-82 as compared with 1880-81:—

| | R | a. | p. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total for 1880-81 . . . . . . . . | 61,096 | 1 | 4 |
| Total for 1881-82 . . . . . . . . | 52,803 | 7 | 2 |

Revenue of Pishín for 1882-83.

400. The Pishín revenue report for the year 1882-83 shows that the gross revenue amounted to R52,310-0-6, of which R39,365 were realised by the sale of revenue in kind; the remainder was realised in cash, the greater portion of which was obtained from the tax in lieu of personal service. Cash revenue was also obtained from the tax on artizans, the maldaghi, and abkari. The expenditure incurred came under the heads of malikana and payments to men employed to watch the crops. The net revenue realised was R51,605-0-2. The net wheat revenue was 7,768 maunds 3 seers and 13 chittaks; the net cash revenue obtained from it after sale was R25,480-5-9. Inclusive of Shorarud, the revenue credited in the treasury to Government amounted to R52,806-4-2. As compared with the year 1879-80, when the revenue was R68,607, there was a decrease, but the revenue of 1879-80 was due only to the prevalence of war prices. The revenue in 1880-81 reached R61,096-1-4 for the same reason. The realisations in kind in 1882-83 were less than in 1881-82, owing chiefly to Colonel Waterfield's orders, under which revenue was to be realised strictly in accordance with the Amir Sher Ali's revenue returns, the result of which was that several villages previously assessed became revenue-free. The total revenue for 1882-83, as compared with 1881-82, is as follows:—

| | R | a. | p |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1881-82 . . . . . . . . . | 52,803 | 7 | 2 |
| 1882-83 . . . . . . . . . | 52,806 | 4 | 2 |

Revenue of Pishín for 1883-84 and 1884-85.

401. From the revenue report for 1883-84, it appears that there was a falling off of about R8,000 as compared with the previous year, mainly due to less revenue in kind being realised, and to a fall in prices. There was also a falling off in the cash revenue of the year. The tahsildar in this year did

not show sufficient activity, and he was replaced by another younger man; owing to this, the dryness of the year, and the low average crop, the receipts were below those of the previous year. The totals as compared with the previous year are—

| | R | a. | p. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1882-83 | 52,806 | 4 | 2 |
| 1883-84 | 44,730 | 5 | 3 |

The falling-off therefore amounted to R8,075-15-5.

For convenience of comparison the revenues of Pishín for the year 1879-80 to 1884-85 are given below:—

| | R | a. | p. | | R | a. | p. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1878-79 | 46,542 | 1 | 2 | 1882-83 | 52,806 | 4 | 2 |
| 1879-80 | 68,607 | 0 | 0 | 1883-84 | 44,730 | 5 | 3 |
| 1880-81 | 61,096 | 1 | 4 | 1884-85 | 92,578 | 14 | 7 |
| 1881-82 | 52,803 | 7 | 2 | | | | |

In the report for the year 1884-85, sent in by the Political Agent, that officer remarks—

"The improvement in the returns of the land revenue is almost entirely owing to the careful supervision exercised by the tahsildar during the year. For the first time probably under either Afghan or Baluchistan rule the ⅓ and ⅙ shares due to Government from the land irrigated with river and karez water respectively have been collected in full, and the total collections in kind are far in excess of those made in any other year since the British occupation of the country, notwithstanding the fact that the crops of the year were, if anything, below the average."

The gross collections on account of land revenue amounted to R83,153-4-6, as against R44,979-0-6 in the previous year. Rupees 7,210 were realised on account of excise, R381-13-9 from fines, R836-14-9 from stamps and court fees. These items owe their origin to the construction of the new station in Pishín. The total revenue after all deductions amounted to R91,242-3-9. The total net revenue of Pishín and Shorarud was R92,578-14-7.

Revenue of Shoráwak and Shahrod or Shorarud for the year 1880-81.

402. Captain Loch, in charge of Pishín, writing in April 1881, said that the revenue of Shoráwak and Shahrod had been levied for the first time during that year, the assessment being based on records from the Kandahar office, showing the amount that had formerly been realised by the Amirs of Afghanistan. It seems that 162 camels were collected as revenue; these were valued in cash at R140 per camel; a few remained due. Out of 120 kharwars of wheat due, 75 were realised. A considerable amount of the revenue from various reasons could not be collected. The amount actually realised was R12,587-8.

The revenue of Shahrod for 1882-83 and 1883-84.

403. The year 1882-83 was the first year in which the Shorarud, or Shahrod, revenue was regularly collected and brought to account. The net revenue credited to Government was R1,201-4. The net revenue in the year 1883-84 amounted to R1,062, showing a slight falling off. These amounts are included in the Pishín revenues. In 1884-85 the total revenue after the sale of grain amounted to R1,336-10-10, which showed a considerable increase over the previous year.

Excise revenue in Pishín and Quetta.

404. The following statement shows the excise revenue of Pishín for the years 1882-83 and 1883-84:—

| Year. | Amount. R | a. | p. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1882-83 | 862 | 10 | 0 |
| 1883-84 | 230 | 0 | 0 |

Until the year 1883-84 there was no head-quarter station in Pishín, and many

commanding officers objected to the sale of liquor at their military posts; there was therefore no regular levy of excise revenue in the district, beyond the imposition of small fees in the diminutive civil bazar. In 1884-85 the contract for the sale of country liquor and drugs was sold by auction for R7,160, and R15 per mensem were realised on account of licenses for the sale of European liquor.

Appointment of Lieutenant Domvile to Pishín, April 1885.

405. On the 9th April, Lieutentant Domvile, who had done good service during the Zhob expedition, was appointed to work under the Political Agent, Pishín, in connection with the purchase of supplies for the troops which it was at that time expected would be sent to Quetta.

Communications in Pishín, May 1881.

406. With respect to communications in Pishín, Colonel St. John reported in May 1881 that a cart-road had been made from Quetta to Chaman, and also from Quetta to Kasim Killa, while a camel track from Quetta to Kachh was made over the Sarakulla pass. Telegraph lines were put up between Quetta and Kachh, Quetta and Chaman, and between Killa Abdulla and Khúshdil Khán. Further information on the subject will be found in Chapter XI, in which an account of the works undertaken from time to time by the Public Works Department will be found.

The Baluch Guides, from 1838 to their abolition in 1884.

407. An account will now be given of the corps of Baluch Guides, and of the levy reorganisation scheme. The questions dealt with affect all the districts of the Agency, and may be conveniently entered here. The corps of Baluch Guides had its origin in some levies raised in 1838, the men being enlisted with the object of doing service in Katchi, and beyond the frontier in keeping open communications. About the year 1852, they were withdrawn from service in Katchi, and being assigned duties within the British border, they ceased to be a political body. This step was, however, subsequently found to have been a mistake. On the establishment of the Baluchistan Agency in 1877, the corps was transferred from the Military Department, Bombay, to the Political Department of the Government of India. In June 1877 the Agent to the Governor General reported that it was necessary to employ them in service at the outposts, and in escorting officers, stores, &c., from the frontier, across Katchi to the Bolan, and through the Bolan to Quetta and elsewhere, as well as keeping open communications with Lus Beyla and other places in Southern Baluchistan. Experience, however, showed that the same men would not serve both above and below the passes. In order to provide for this contingency, the corps was divided into two wings, the one to be employed in the plains as far as Dhadar, and the other at Quetta and among the hills. When submitting recommendations for the reorganisation of the corps in June 1877, it was proposed by the Agent to the Governor General to raise the pay of the sowars from R15 per mensem to R20, and at the same time to provide for native officers and non-commissioned officers at a total additional cost of R4,865 per mensem. It was at the same time proposed to employ men from all parts of the Khanate in view of the excellent political effect to be expected from the provision of such employment, which was said to be not an expensive way of consolidating British influence in the country. The proposals made received the sanction of Government, and orders for carrying out the proposed reorganisation were sent by the Agent to the Governor General to Captain Reynolds and Mr. Bruce, by whom the details were carried out in 1877. Captain Mosley was appointed to the command of the corps in June 1880. In 1883 the Commander-in-Chief proposed a scheme under which the numerous minor military posts distributed over the country from the Khojak pass to Thal-Chotiálí and from the Sind and Kalát

frontiers to Sibi, should be handed over to the charge of local levies, chiefly on the ground of the deleterious effects of numerous detachments on regiments. To carry out this scheme it was necessary to abolish the corps of Baluch Guides, the requisite money for the carrying out of the proposal which included the reorganisation of the whole of the political services of the Agency being only obtainable by this step. The proposal was approved of by the Government of India, and the Baluch Guides, after a checkered career of 46 years, and after undergoing many vicissitudes and changes, were abolished.

Scheme for substituting levies for military posts, 1883-85.

408. In 1882 there were a number of isolated posts in Baluchistan garrisoned for the protection of the country by small detachments of regular troops—a system which interfered with the discipline and efficiency of the regiments from which the detachments were drawn. In order to avoid this, and with the concurrence of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, a Committee was assembled by the Agent to the Governor General at Quetta in August 1873, and during these deliberations it was proposed that nine of the military posts should be taken over from the Military Department and garrisoned by local levies. By this system it was represented that an increase of political power would be placed in the hands of the Agent to the Governor General, as by enabling him to grant extra service it would become worth the while of the majority of chiefs to array themselves alongside of the various Political Agents in securing the peace of the country. It was intended to insist upon tribal responsibility to the fullest degree; at the same time there was no intention of paying anything like black-mail for immunity from outrage. With few exceptions, every recipient of pay would have to perform specified duties, evasion of which would not be permitted. The various posts were, whenever possible, to be garrisoned by the tribes living in the immediate neighbourhood. The only exception was the Kachh post, which was to be occupied temporarily with picked men of the Baluch Guides, the temper of the Kakars in the vicinity being uncertain. The Agent to the Governor General, however, hoped that in the improved condition of affairs which was in progress, service might be given to the Dumar, Panizai, Sarangzai, and other Kakars. With the exception of this post, the money paid for service was to be regarded as securing in time of need the services of the whole tribe, and not merely of those whose names were entered in the service rolls. To carry out these proposals the Baluch Guide corps, to which reference has already been made, was abolished, as in this way only the requisite money could be obtained.

The services to be reorganised and the posts to be occupied.

409. The Committee sat in May 1883, and considered the reorganisation of the whole of the political services in Baluchistan. These services were:—

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | The Telegraph service | 254 horse and foot. |
| 2. | The Postal service | 351 ,, |
| 3. | The Police service | 330 ,, |
| 4. | The Bolan pass service | 291 ,, |
| 5. | The Frontier levies | Strength not fixed. |
| 6. | The Afghan and Baluch tribes | 133 horse and foot. |
| 7. | The Baluch Guides | As sanctioned in Foreign Department Resolution No. 379P. |

The reconstitution of the services was rendered absolutely necessary by the intention of the Military Department to concentrate the troops in cantonments at Thal, Sharig, Pishín, Sibi, and Quat. The posts which had to be held by the levies were: (1) Gulistan, (2) Khushdilkhan, (3) Barshor, (4) Kachh, (5) Dirgai, (6) Harnáí, (7) Spintangi, (8) Kuchali, (9) Gandakindaf, (10) Kalat-i-Killa, (11) Thali, (12) Mal, (13) Lehri, (14) Puleji, (15) Shahpur, and (16) Gandoi.

410. The whole of the services were to be placed under two heads: (1) posts and levies under the direct control of agents, (2) posts under the Superintendent of levies. The control of those under head No. 1 would be in the hands of the Agents, the Superintendent of levies inspecting them. The control of those under the Superintendent of levies being entirely under him, and in consideration of the extra work thrown on him, it was recommended that he should receive R200 per mensem extra. The Assistant Superintendent of levies was to be in direct charge of the levy posts at Thali, Mal, Lehri, Puleji, Shahpur and Gandoi, in addition to political duties which he might have to perform under the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí.

Duties of Political Agents, (2) the Superintendent of levies, and (3) the Assistant Superintendent of levies.

411. It was decided that the nomination of chiefs should rest with the Political Agents, while the nomination of men should rest with the chiefs; that the power of rejecting a nominee should rest with the Superintendent of levies, as well as the power of discharge, appeals lying to the Agent to the Governor General; that changes and substitutions amongst the men should be in the hands of chiefs, with the approval of the Superintendent; and that Political Agents should not employ men without the concurrence of the Superintendent.

Rules relating to the appointment, rejection, discharge, and changes of the men employed.

412. In Thal-Chotiálí troops were to be withdrawn from the following posts: Kachh, Thali, Mal, Lehri, Puleji, Shahpur, Goranari, but they were to be kept at Thal-Chotiálí, Shahrig, Quat Mandai, Sibi, and Sui. The committee recommended that a post should be placed at Gandoi manned by 1 rassaldar, 1 jemadar, 1 daffadar, and 15 sowars, and that the following new levies should be entertained:—

Proposals made affecting Thal-Chotiálí.

| Names of Tribes. | Jemadars. | Daffadars. | Sowars. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Shadozais | 1 | 1 | 20 |
| Umaizais | ... | 1 | 10 |
| Tarins | ... | 1 | 15 |
| Sunis | 1 | 2 | 15 |
| Barozais of Sangan | ... | 1 | 10 |

At Kachh it was proposed to increase the Kakar service by 20 sowars; the total of the new and the former levies being—

| | Ressaldars. | Jemadars. | Daffadars. | Sowars. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| New levies | ... | 2 | 6 | 95 |
| Former | 1 | 2 | 4 | 57 |
| TOTAL | 1 | 4 | 10 | 152 |

The Committee recommended that the following posts should be garrisoned as under:—

| Names of Posts. | Jemadars. | Daffadars. | Sowars. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mal | 1 | 1 | 25 |
| Lehri | 1 | 1 | 20 |
| Puleji | 1 | 1 | 15 |
| Shahpur | 1 | 1 | 15 |
| Ghoranari | 1 | 1 | 15 |

Kachh was to be exceptionally treated and garrisoned with Baluch Guides, 10 sowars and 50 footmen with native officers being so employed. The Baluch Guide posts at the following places were to be abolished:—

| Posts | Jemadars. | Daffadars. | Sowars. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Harnáí | 1 | 2 | 25 |
| Dirgai | | 1 | 7 |
| Thal | ... | 1 | 5 |
| Kalat-i-Killa | ... | 1 | 6 |
| Nari | ... | 1 | 6 |

The following posts then garrisoned by Baluch Guides were to be garrisoned by levies:—

| Posts. | Daffadars. | Sowars. |
|---|---|---|
| Spintangi | 1 | 10 |
| Kuchali | 1 | 10 |
| Gandakindaff | 1 | 10 |

It was not proposed to disturb the existing postal and telegraph services in Thal-Chotiálí, except so far as the Telegraph service might be affected by the dismantlement of the line from Quetta to Shahrig on the Harnáí route.

Arrangements proposed for the Bolan Pass.

413. The total monthly sum available for service in the Bolan pass was R4,591-10-8 per mensem. To political services under the control of the Political Agent it was proposed to allot R2,341-10-8 per mensem, to be distributed as follows:—

| | R | a. | p. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mulla Muhammad Raisani | 500 | 0 | 0 |
| Police at Mach | 112 | 5 | 4 |
| " Rindli | 110 | 0 | 0 |
| Yar Muhammad | 100 | 0 | 0 |
| Satakzais | 80 | 0 | 0 |
| Mingals | 205 | 0 | 0 |
| Mazarani and Aliani Marris | 185 | 0 | 0 |
| Kuchaks | 90 | 0 | 0 |
| One Munshi | 26 | 0 | 0 |
| The Kurds | 500 | 0 | 0 |
| The Satakzais from Siriab to Mach | 250 | 0 | 0 |
| Sirdar Assad Khan | 183 | 5 | 4 |
| TOTAL | 1,408 | 5 | 4 |

To fixed posts under the Superintendent of levies R2,100 was allotted, to be distributed as follows:—

| | R | a. | p. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kurds | 310 | 0 | 0 |
| Satakzais | 360 | 0 | 0 |
| Mingals | 290 | 0 | 0 |
| Pugh and Pug | 150 | 0 | 0 |
| Mazaranis | 410 | 0 | 0 |
| Kuchaks | 280 | 0 | 0 |
| Jattois, Jalambanis, Chotais | 250 | 0 | 0 |
| Sons of Alladina Kurd | 50 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 2,150 | 0 | 0 |

Although the Saryks of Panjdeh had, ever since their arrival there, been under the rule of Herat, they were but a portion of the Yolatan tribe, who were subjects of Russia; and the Russians continued through the Yolatans to endeavour to induce the Saryks to declare themselves vassals of Russia. They were unwilling to do so, but Afghân oppression was so grievous that on our appearance in the country the Saryk chiefs besought us to accept them as British subjects. They declared they would sooner go over to Russia than remain under Afghan rule.

They were said to possess arms which were hidden away, and, owing to the comparatively weak Afghan force in their country, their attitude caused the Afghan authorities much anxiety.

After some association with British officers, which was encouraged by the Kazi, the Saryks agreed to remain tranquil, if a British officer was left with them to ensure good treatment.

Such was the state of affairs on February 15, 1885. I had then to break up my winter quarters to relieve the Junishidi population around Bala Murghab of the constant requisitions of our large camp, which had entirely absorbed their limited resources. I had, moreover, to seek for a convenient position to locate my headquarters, so as to comply with the instructions from home, that my main escort should be halted far enough from the frontier to avoid exciting any alarm there.

I determined to return to Gulran, to be near the Meshed telegraph office and conveniently placed, should I have to meet General Zelenoi, who was then said to be on his way to Sarakhs. It brought me within three days' post of Meshed, and was about 100 miles from Panjdeh. I left Colonel Ridgeway with some other officers and an escort of 25 mounted men at Panjdeh, supported halfway to Gulran by 50 more of the 11th Bengal Cavalry under a British officer.

Colonel Ridgeway's task proved to be a very difficult one. He had to ensure the fidelity of the Saryks amidst the excitements of the Russian advances, and the inducements held out to them to cast in their lot with Russia, previous to the attack on Panjdeh of March 30.

Before that date Colonel Ridgeway had been relieved by Captain C. Yate.

The Ameer states:—

Up to this moment the officials of the mission and their soldiers had given every assurance to the officials of my army that Russia dare not attack them so long as they did not move from the station.

It is well that the possible source of this statement is in my possession, as it explains the position and shows the difficulties which I and my officers had then to contend with.

On February 20, more than five weeks before the collision took place at Panjdeh, the following communication was made to General Gous-ud-din by Colonel Ridgeway:—

I have received your letter to-day. In this letter you say that in resisting and turning out the enemy you will act according to any advice which I may give regarding the welfare of the God-granted Government.

Now it is necessary that my position should be clearly explained.

I am not here to give you orders.

I have not been authorized by my own Government to do so.

I am here to assist you in your dealings with the Saryks, among whom Russian intrigue will be busy, and mediating with the Russians.

You have already decided to resist at Ak-Tapa, and as if the Russians attack it in time of peace they will act treacherously, you have perfect right to do so. If the enemy should come in overwhelming numbers, you will equally be justified in retiring to Maruchak or Bala Murghab, where I believe troops are coming from Herat.

As war has not been declared between England and Russia, British officers cannot fight against the Russians without committing the same offence as Ali-Khanoff has committed, for which he will probably be punished by his Sovereign.

You may rely upon me to help you in all possible manner compatible with my duty.

Before any fighting takes place I hope to have another opportunity of mediating and persuading the Russians to retire.

Finally I have reported to Sir Peter Lumsden that you are in a very difficult position and no one could have done better than you have.

Up to the last I could not believe that Russia would attack Panjdeh, especially after the assurance conveyed to me in a Foreign Office telegram of March 16 :—

The Russian force will not advance from the positions they now occupy provided the Afghans do not advance, or attack, or unless there should be some extraordinary reason, such as a disturbance at Panjdeh. M. de Giers declared that these orders should be repeated to Colonel Ali-Khanoff in consequence of my telegram of the 9th instant.

British officers were then at Panjdeh using their influence to prevent the occurrence of "any extraordinary reason," such as the rising of the Saryks, to justify a Russian advance. The Ameer thus describes the Russian attack on March 30 :—

The following day, March 30, a full brigade of the Russian army attacked the small Afghan force lying there; the English officials on hearing this news, together with their army, fled towards Herat.

The Ameer's remarks on the conduct of the British officers are totally unjustifiable, as the facts are that no officers, in such a position, could possibly have behaved better than Captain C. Yate and those with him at Panjdeh.

After that good soldier General Gous-ud-din had done all a soldier could do with the force under his command, these officers restrained the Saryks from falling on the retreating Afghans on their withdrawal from Panjdeh, and not until some hours after the rear of the retiring column had passed on, *en route* to Maruchak, did they move with their own baggage, escorted by the Saryk chiefs to the confines of Saryk territory, in order to fall back on the support of the 50 sabres of the 11th Bengal Cavalry at Killa-Maur, on the Khusk river.

The Ameer takes great credit to himself for having foreseen the danger of this Russian advance towards Panjdeh and having sent a strong force to keep the Russians from entering it. The strength of this strong force, however, he further on allows, amounted to 140 gunners, four brass and four mountain train guns, with a small force of infantry. Such force was sufficient as an outpost, if it had been supported, as it should have been, by the force reported to be in Herat.

From the result, however, it became evident that General Gous-ud-din's force was the only field force available to cover Herat, and the soundness of the advice given to him by Colonel Ridgeway was fully established.

Under this arrangement posts were to be established at Rindli, Pir Chowki, Kohandilani, Drajbet, Kirta, Bibinani, Abigum, Mach, Dozan, Dasht, and New Karez, manned by the different tribes. It was decided that it was not necessary to keep up a separate service for the telegraph line, and that it should be abolished and amalgamated with the pass service; and that service should be granted to—

| | R |
|---|---|
| Rassul Bux . . . . . . . . . . . | 100 |
| Two sowars at R25 each . . . . . . . . . | 50 |
| TOTAL . | 150 |

A fixed post should be placed at Rindli :—

| | R |
|---|---|
| 1 Jemadar at R50 . . . . . . . . . | 50 |
| 7 Sowars, at R25 each . . . . . . . | 175 |
| It was also proposed to add two sowars to each of the following posts: Kirta, Bibinani, Mach, and Dasht. The sum to be paid to Alladina's son was to be increased by . . . . | 50 |
| and he was to furnish six Kurd sowars at R25 each . . . | 150 |

The total of these sums amounted to R625, *i.e.*, the sum which had been sanctioned for the Telegraph service.

Arrangements for the Khetran country.

414. The Committee had next to consider the measures to be taken for the preservation of communications with the Khetran country and the roads *viá* the Chachar Pass and Fort Munro. For the 78 miles of road it was recommended that the following posts should be established :—

| Tribes and Posts. | Daffadars. | Jemadars. | Sowars. | Footmen. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Karim Khán-ka-kote—Bijaranis . . . . | 1 | ... | 10 | ... |
| Hankoi—Luni Pathans . . . . . | ... | 1 | 10 | ... |
| Ditto . . . . | ... | 1 | ... | 10 |
| Hassanis . . . . . . | ... | 1 | 10 | ... |
| Baluchis . . . . . . . | ... | 1 | ... | 10 |
| Khetrans . . . . . . . | ... | 1 | 10 | ... |
| Ditto . . . . . . . | ... | 1 | ... | 10 |
| Haji-ka-kot—Khetrans . . . . . | 1 | ... | 10 | ... |
| Isani-ka kot—Khetrans . . . . . | 1 | ... | 5 | ... |
| Rukni . . . . . . . | 1 | ... | 10 | ... |

Arrangements for Quetta and Pishín.

415. The total sum available in Pishín from the following was—

| | R | a. | p. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Telegraph service . . . . . . . | 3,034 | 0 | 0 |
| Postal „ . . . . . . . . | 2,297 | 5 | 4 |
| Police „ . . . . . . . . | 5,361 | 13 | 4 |
| Afghan „ . . . . . . . . | 2,170 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL . | 12,863 | 2 | 8 |

At Gulistán and Khúshdil Khán it was arranged that police thanas should be placed, and tribal levies were entertained in the following passes as previously: Sarákulá and Rodh, Hana, Wriskai, Murgai, and Gazáband. Local posts were to be placed at Dinar Karez, Segi, and Gulistán. Six jemadars and 28 sowars were to be posted at Quetta, and 7 jemadars and 26 sowars were to be placed at Pishín; posts were also to be established at Shorarud, Barshor, Gwal, Haidarzai, Malizai, and Khúshdil Khán. Under the head of revenue levies, Mirza Haidar Kuli Khán was to be granted R50 per mensem, and service for 6 sowars. These sowars with 10 others were to be employed on revenue work, such as watching

the crops at the time of batai, and to perform the multifarious duties of tahsil chaprassis, of whom there were none in Pishín. The Atchakzai service was to remain *in statu quo*, and the continuance of a few personal allowances was to be provided for. The district postal service from Quetta to Kullazai was to be kept up. The Kalát postal and telegraph service was to remain unaltered. In the district police a saving of ₨290-8 was to be made, the proposed establishment being—

| | ₨ | a. | p. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Inspector | 200 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 Do. | 60 | 0 | 0 |
| 7 Duffadars, at ₨35 each | 245 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 Munshi | 35 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 Do. | 30 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 Court Inspector | 25 | 0 | 0 |
| 22 First class Constables, at ₨31 each | 682 | 0 | 0 |
| 35 Second " " at ₨25 " | 875 | 0 | 0 |
| 3 First class Sergeants | 75 | 0 | 0 |
| 6 Second " " | 90 | 0 | 0 |
| 7 Naiks | 84 | 0 | 0 |
| 50 First class Constables | 500 | 0 | 0 |
| 55 Second " " | 495 | 0 | 0 |
| 65 Third " " | 520 | 0 | 0 |
| 2 Bhistis | 20 | 0 | 0 |
| 2 Sweepers | 20 | 0 | 0 |
| Rations batta for 257 men, at ₨3-8 per man | 899 | 8 | 0 |
| Clothing allowance for 259 men, at ₨10 per annum | 225 | 13 | 4 |
| Hospital Assistant's allowance | 10 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 5,081 | 5 | 4 |

The telegraph service as a separate service, except between Quetta and Kalát, was to be abolished, and the pay of postal sowars was to be increased by ₨5, in lieu of rations and other privileges.

Levies for Head-quarters, Khúshdil Khán, Gulistán, and Kachh.

416. The levies recommended for the posts of Head-quarters, Kachh, Gulistán, and Khúshdil Khán, were as follows:—

| | ₨ | | ₨ |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Head-quarters—** | | **Gulistán—** | |
| 1 Ressaldar | 100 | 1 Jemadar | 50 |
| 1 Jemadar | 50 | 1 Daffadar | 30 |
| 1 Daffadar | 30 | 1 Havildar | 16 |
| 25 Sowars | 25 each. | 1 Naik | 14 |
| **Office Establishment—** | | 5 Sowars | 25 each. |
| 1 Writer | 70 | 25 Footmen | 12 do. |
| 1 Mohurrir | 30 | 1 Sweeper | 10 |
| 2 Chaprassis | 10 each. | **Khúshdil-Khán—** | |
| **Kachh—** | | 1 Jemadar | 50 |
| 1 Jemadar | 50 | 1 Daffadar | 30 |
| 1 Daffadar | 35 | 1 Havildar | 16 |
| 5 Sowars | 25 each. | 1 Naik | 14 |
| 2 Havildars | 16 do. | 5 Sowars | 25 each. |
| 2 Naiks | 14 do. | 20 Footmen | 12 do. |
| 40 Footmen | 12 do. | 1 Sweeper | 10 |

In fixing the pay of the sowars, the principle to be observed was that those in their own country should receive ₨20, and those in a strange district ₨25.

Arrangements for police in the Thal-Chotiáli District and in the Bolan.

417. With respect to police in Sibi, Harnái, and Thal-Chotiáli, it was proposed that the pay of the men should be raised to ₨28-8 instead of ₨20, which was inadequate, while a small body of police should be entertained for Gumbaz. It ...

spector in Sibi on R195, and to substitute an inspector on R104, the total increase in cost being R280. A small police guard of 2 head constables and 8 constables for Jacobabad was sanctioned. For the Bolan three alternative proposals were made by Major Biddulph when acting as Agent to the Governor General, and with these the committee did not wish to interfere; these proposals are quoted below *in extenso* :—

"(1) Strength and cost of police, if the whole of the 8 posts in the Bolan are taken over from the Military authorities, including 2 havildars and 20 constables for escorting convoys :—

| | R |
|---|---|
| 1 Havildar, 1st grade | 25 |
| 10 Havildars, 2nd grade, at R15 | 150 |
| 92 Constables, at R10 | 920 |
| | 1,095 |

"(2) Strength and cost if no provision is made for escorting convoys :—

NOTE.—Each post is composed of—
1 Second class Havildar.
9 Constables.
1 First class Havildar superintending the whole line.

| | R |
|---|---|
| 1 Havildar, 1st grade | 25 |
| 8 Havildars, 2nd grade, at R15 | 120 |
| 72 Constables, at R10 | 720 |
| | 865 |

"(3) Strength and cost if the posts of Mach and Pir Chowki are retained by the Military :—

| | R |
|---|---|
| 1 Havildar, 1st grade | 25 |
| 6 Havildars, 2nd grade, at R15 | 90 |
| 54 Constables at R10 | 540 |
| | 655" |

It may here be noted that the strength of the services as they were in 1883, together with the services as the committee proposed they should be, are at the end of this chapter.

Financial results.

418. The financial results were as follows: the monthly sum sanctioned for the pay and allowances of the local services was R51,376-7-8, while the cost of the new services was to be R51,102-13-4; the result being a saving of R273-10-4. The regular troops whose places would be supplied by this scheme were estimated to cost R15,000 to R20,000 per mensem. Owing to changes made afterwards the expected saving was not secured.

Arrangements pending the sanction of the levy scheme.

419. The levy scheme was necessarily complicated, and in sanctioning it considerable delay took place; in the meantime the military posts were withdrawn from their stations, which resulted in the Political Agent, Pishín, being obliged to garrison them with police; and as the men were much required for their ordinary duties, and as several raids occurred, he pressed for an early decision as to the levy scheme. Similar difficulties arose in Thal-Chotiálí, and the post at Gumbaz was occupied about April 1884 with military troops; 50 sowars and 40 infantry being sent, pending the receipt of orders from Governmant. At the same time the Agent to the Governor General sanctioned the establishment of a post of the Luni tribe at Shahbaz Chínah, where it was urgently required, at a monthly cost of R440, the R10 in excess of the amount agreed to by the Levy Committee being provided from savings in the money sanctioned for the Baluch Guides. In May 1884 the Agent to the Governor General sanctioned the giving of service to the Shadozais pending the decision of Government on the whole scheme, as the step had been shown to be requisite by the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí. It may here be noted that in December 1884 the Quarter Master General telegraphed to the Agent to the Governor General as to the evacuation of

posts occupied by Bombay troops. The Agent to the Governor General replied that the Sui post would have to be permanently retained, while that at Toj could be withdrawn. As levy garrisons occupied Sunri, Guranari, Shahpur, and Puleji, the Jacobabad garrison had been withdrawn.

General sanction, with modifications, to the scheme.

420. In giving a general sanction to the whole scheme, the Government of India made a reduction of R239 in the Thal-Chotiálí police on account of batta and the allowances of men serving below the passes. In Pishín a reduction of R200 per mensem was made as regards the postal service. A reduction of R370 was also made in respect of the pay of Haidar Kuli Khán, a Kandahar official, to whom it had been proposed to grant an allowance for himself and 12 sowars to be kept up by him. The grant of R50 per mensem to Allahdad Khán in the Thal-Chotiálí Agency was also to be struck out of the levy reorganisation scheme. With regard to the Commandant of Baluch Guides, it was decided that the appointment should be abolished. The Assistant Superintendent of Levies was converted into a Superintendent and *ex-officio* Political Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General, the control of the levies being placed under him and the Political Agents. The Government of India thought it unnecessary that the commissariat depôts in the Bolan should be guarded by military posts, but that the care of the stores should be entrusted to the levies as far as possible.

Representations of the Political Agent, Pishín, on the reductions made.

421. With regard to the postal service between Pishín and Chaman, in which the Government of India made a reduction of R370, the Political Agent pointed out that the service was not a new one, but part of the old Atchakzai service, and always had been granted. He urged that it would be unwise to reduce the Atchakzai service, the sowars used for the post being also utilised to patrol the roads. The post could not, he said, be carried by fewer men, and that when the number of 12 was fixed, it was reduced as low as possible, as had indeed been done in every recommendation he had made; and that it was only because these sowars were daily passing over the road, he had agreed to do without posts at Killa Abdulla and Chaman. He also urged that the emoluments of the Atchakzai chief, who had done good service, should not be reduced as regards these sowars, the tribe being both powerful and at times troublesome. The Political Agent also represented that the 15 revenue sowars which the Government of India had declined to sanction should not be abolished, as they were required for work at a distance from head-quarters, and to abolish them would seriously hamper the administration, as, if the escort sowars were used for these purposes, he would not be able to provide the escorts required, and would have to be relieved of that obligation—an alternative which was, in the Agent to the Governor General's opinion, hardly practicable. As Haidar Kuli Khan would shortly be pensioned, the Political Agent proposed that the R50 paid to him should be utilised for the payment of a native officer for the 15 sowars.

Service to the Dumars recommended.

422. Shortly after the issue of the orders of Government, the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí, represented that service to the Dumars had in the levy scheme been overlooked, and that it was indispensable; he therefore submitted a memorandum showing that it would cost R430 per mensem.

The re-session of the Levy Committee, and the orders of the Government of India.

423. The Committee then again met. In the meantime, as they were urgently required, one jemadar and six sowars were entertained at Quetta. The post of Commandant of the Baluch Guides was abolished from the 1st August 1884, together with the corps. A lengthy

report on the proceedings of the Committee was forwarded to the Government of India, in which the representations made by the Political Agent, Pishín, were embodied and supported. In letter No. 1995E. of 1st August 1884, the Government of India modified their previous orders on the levy scheme, and sanctioned the pay of the jemadar of the postal service being continued at the rate of R100 per mensem, the salary of his successor being subject to revision; and in the light of fresh facts submitted by the Agent to the Governor General, sanction was granted to 12 sowars being kept up for postal service With respect to 16 sowars,—6 of whom were attached to the Tahsildar of Pishín at a cost of R120 per mensem, 5 more of whom were employed in Gulistán at a cost of R100, and 5 of whom were employed in the Píshin cantonment,—the Agent to the Governor General had urged that they were absolutely necessary. The Government of India observed that it was understood that their retention would enable the Political Agent to meet all requisitions for providing escorts, and sanctioned their retention. On the conversion of the Assistant Superintendent of Levies into a Superintendent of Levies and an *ex-officio* Political Assistant, the Agent to the Governor General had proposed, in view of the heavy work the Political Agents had, and of the great distances the Superintendent would have to travel to inspect the posts, to place the levies entirely under the Political Agents, with Captain Gaisford as an Assistant in Thal-Chotiálí, while an Assistant to the Political Agent, Pishín, should be provided. This proposal was, the Government of India said, to be considered, Captain Gaisford retaining his post unchanged; and Major Mosley's services were to be retained until the scheme could be carried out, and the affairs of the Baluch Guide Corps be wound up. The Agent to the Governor General had recommended, with respect to the Baluch Guides discharged, that gratuities should be disbursed at the rate of one month's pay for every man discharged with less than four years' service, and above four years' service, at the rate of one month's pay for every additional year's service up to the maximum of 12 months' pay. On the condition that as many men as possible of the disbanded corps were re-employed in the new local levies, the Governor General in Council sanctioned the proposals. With regard to the Dumar service, the inclusion of which in the levy scheme would convert the saving effected into a deficit, the Government of India asked for further information; sanction was at the same time given to the entertainment of a Munshi on R20 per mensem, to be attached to the Khetran Chief, from the 1st February 1884, in order that weekly diaries and special reports might be submitted to the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí.

Orders as to the preparation of the bills.

424. In preparing the bills of the levies entertained, the Agent to the Governor General represented that it was impossible to conform strictly to the rules of the Account Department, under which the name of every person drawing pay upwards of R10 per mensem had to be entered in the bills, and in the case of police of those drawing upwards of R20 per mensem. The object which the Government of India had in view was to make sure that the payment of the money sanctioned for the entertainment of the levies was spent upon that object, and not diverted to any other; any re-appropriation of funds sanctioned for tribal services without the authority of the Government of India being forbidden. Provided this rule was strictly enforced, and provided that any savings which might accrue under the scheme of tribal organisation were duly credited to the State, the Government of India stated that they were willing to meet the difficulties described by the Agent to the Governor General by special rules. The Account Department, it was explained, took cognizance of the fact that the sanction accorded to the Agent to the Governor General's proposals authorised fixed salaries to a fixed number of men, and it accordingly required compliance

with the usual rules affecting establishment bills. But, it was added,—

"it would appear that the charges should more properly be described as 'stipulated payments to the chief of such-and-such a tribe for the month of 188 , on account of providing service as specified below, in accordance with the sanction contained in the Government of India letter No. , dated ."

The Government of India sanctioned the charges in this form, but at the same time asked for a full statement regarding them; and it was added—

"it will then be sufficient to specify the title of the officer who will be responsible for seeing that the payment set forth in the bill is actually made."

In the case of difficulty in obtaining the signature of a responsible officer, the bills might be drawn under the signature of an Agent or Assistant Agent. The stipulated payment bill should, it was said, be formally revised, whenever any addition or alteration was made in the payment.

Grant of service to the Dumars.

425. As to the grant of service to the Dumars, the Agent to the Governor General assured the Government of India that the force of 44 men could not possibly be dispensed with, and sanction was given to their entertainment. At the same time a hope was expressed that the possibility of reduction would be steadily borne in mind; and a complete statement of the whole of the establishment employed and of the cost of its maintenance was called for.

Further representations made by the Agent to the Governor General with regard to the manner in which payments should be made.

426. As to the method in which payments to the levies were to be made, the Agent to the Governor General said that the greater portion of the payments were not made to the chiefs, but direct to the jemadars, daffadars, and others; that a separate pay abstract drawn up monthly for each post would add seriously to the office work; that the distances between the posts and the difficulty of the country would render it impossible for the Political Agents to disburse pay within one or even two months, unless they devoted themselves to this work alone; that payments had frequently to be withheld pending the settlement of political charges against the maliks and others; that the signature to the bills of chief officers could not always be obtained even within two months; that the native officers did not know how to write; and that the Agents or Assistants could alone be responsible for the disbursement of pay. The Agent to the Governor General suggested that lists should be prepared by the Agents containing the establishments, the cost of maintenance, the sums allotted for the posts, the names of the chiefs, the officer at each post, and the number of the levies, but not their names; that the monthly bills should be drawn by the Political Agents; that the pay should be disbursed by the Agents or officers deputed by them, a schedule of disbursements being forwarded to the Agent to the Governor General; that pay suspended should be kept by Political Agents until disbursed; that acquittance rolls should be kept by Political Agents signed by chiefs and the officers in charge of posts; that savings from fines, deaths, &c., should be formed into a fund to be expended in increasing the efficiency of the levies, and in meeting petty expenditure, under the control of the Agent to the Governor General, as an excluded local fund; the necessity for such a fund having been severely felt in emergent circumstances. The Agent to the Governor General further requested that he might be empowered to effect petty modifications, not altering the total sums allotted for any one post, merely reporting the fact to Government. If monthly certificates as to the pay previously drawn having been disbursed were required, the Agent to the Governor General recommended that a certificate stating that the sum had been disbursed in the manner described in the pay bill might be submitted three months in arrears; and that this certificate should be accepted as sufficient to enable a Political Agent to draw the bill for the current month, in cases in which suspended pay could not be disbursed pending the settlement of cases.

This matter was then discussed by the Agent to the Governor General in Calcutta.

Reply of the Government of India.

427. To this letter the Government of India replied as follows :—

"I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 293-C., dated the 22nd January 1885, regarding the mode of preparing the pay abstracts of the tribal levies, and regarding the disposal of minor savings accruing from the levy allotments.

"2. With reference to the former subject, you explain the practical difficulties which are anticipated in the preparation, submission, and audit of monthly pay bills, drawn in accordance with the instructions conveyed in this office letter No. 2965-E., dated the 15th November 1884. Your representations on this matter have been carefully considered; and I am now to inform you that the Government of India has been pleased to modify the instructions issued in November last. The new rules, while adapted to secure adequate financial control, will, in the opinion of the Government, remove all reasonable objections which may be urged against the present system.

"3. The charges in question will be passed, if drawn on a bill, in the following form :—

'Stipulated payments to X. Y., Chief or— of the A. B. tribe, for the month of 188 in accordance with the sanction contained in Government of India lettter No. , dated

"To this bill must be obtained the signature of the *British* officer, who is directly responsible for seeing the payment made to 'X Y.' If that officer draws the bill himself, nothing further will be required. But if he does not draw the bill, and it is drawn by some officer at a central station, who cannot himself certify to the payment being made to 'X. Y.,' then the signature of the British officer, who can so certify, must be obtained. If money is drawn and not fully disbursed before the close of the month in which the bill is drawn, the certificate should be to the effect that the amounts previously drawn had been paid, less so much still in hand. A bill prepared in accordance with these instructions would run as follows :—

'*Marri Tribal Levies.*

| | R |
|---|---|
| Kahan . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 730 |
| Sibi . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 430 |
| &c. &c. | |
| TOTAL . . | |

"And the amount in hand may either be deducted from the total (and subsequently drawn if required) or a certificate in the following form appended :—

'Certified that all amounts previously drawn have been paid, except * * kept in hand for subsequent payment to * *.'

"4. With regard to the question raised in paragraph 5 of your letter under acknowledgment as to the necessity for a revised sanction when any addition or alteration is made in the payments, I am to say that the Government of India will offer no objection to your altering the internal constitution of any post, should you deem it necessary to do so, provided the cost of the post is not increased, and that reductions are credited to Government, and not applied elsewhere without sanction.

"5. As these arrangements will, it is believed, meet all your requirements, I am to say that no further relaxation of the special account rules already prescribed can be entertained.

"6. In regard to your proposals respecting the treatment of fines and other savings accruing from temporary or accidental causes affecting the levy establishments, I am to say that the Government of India are unable to accede to your wishes in this respect. Your recommendation in favour of the creation of a Fine Fund must therefore be considered as negatived. Any necessary expenditure required for the improvement of the levies can always be obtained in the regular manner."

Representations made by the Agent to the Governor General, May 1885.

428. On receipt of the orders of Government, the Agent to the Governor General replied :—

"In proposing the abolition of the corps of Baluch Guides, and the introduction of the levy scheme in its place, I had largely in view, with the object of securing success to the measure, the increased political power and influence this arrangement would give in the control and management of the numerous wild tribes in Baluchistan, including the Bolan Pass, and inhabiting the extended and exposed Punjab and Sind frontiers, for whose good conduct, involving the peace and security of the said country and frontiers, the Governor General's Agent is now held responsible."

Under the arrangements which it was proposed to make, the Agent to the

Governor General urged that any action requiring the command of funds on the spot could not be undertaken

"without probably a lengthened correspondence, and reference to the Government of India in the Foreign and Public Works, and probably also the Finance Department. I have only to-day received a letter from the General Officer Commanding in Sind, conveying to me the instructions of the Bombay Government regarding the repair and custody of the posts lately held by the Sind Frontier Force. Posts must also be built in the Pishín and Thal-Chotíálí districts. Last year, owing to the delay in constructing the Bolan posts, which even now have not been constructed, as many as 170 bullocks died from exposure; also, I understand, 26 human beings. I had removed the levies before the very severe weather set in, so they did not suffer. With a frontier administration above all does the saying '*bis dat qui cito dat*' hold good, and by the time a reference has been made to Government, and sanction obtained, very often the opportunity of effecting the desired object would have passed away for ever. * * *

"I would here beg to refer you to Government of India, Foreign Department, Resolution No. 2819P. of the 16th October 1875, paragraphs* 26 and 27, where it will be observed that even as a Deputy Commissioner I was granted complete discretion to make whatever arrangements I considered advisable, within the total sum sanctioned after the Mithankote Conference, namely, R66,960 per annum. I further desire to note that the R66,960 then sanctioned were given for the protection of the Sind and Punjab frontiers only, and this sanction was accorded long before I became Agent to the Viceroy in Baluchistan, and it did not include the Bolan Pass and Kalát generally. At that time I so utilised the money that it served for all purposes. It is true enough that extra sums have been sanctioned since, but these sums were for a wholly different purpose, and were sanctioned at the time when Quetta was permanently occupied and during the Afghan war, and included the Afghan service and services connected with the occupation of Pishín and Thal-Chotíálí, the Khojak Pass, and other important places. In making this explanation here, I do so with the object of its being clearly understood that, so far from my having been extravagant in my requests for money for tribal service, if the vast extent of hill country and the numbers and size of the tribes I have brought within British influence are considered, I claim to have acted most economically. Another most important result of the system hitherto in force (which gave rise to this question) can be learnt from the fact that I have found myself in a position to accept the very grave responsibility of taking over from the Sind Frontier Force and other Bombay troops, as requested by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the whole of the military posts along the Sind-Kachhi frontiers, without any appreciable additional cost to Government, whereby I have set free for imperial purposes a very large body of regular troops. In addition, I beg to point out that when I took charge of this Agency its income was '*nil.*' It now credits to Government a revenue of R3,60,000, not including the income derived from the Quetta District and the Khán's lands watered by Sind canals. I would largely increase this revenue quite legitimately, by taking revenue, according to agreement, from the Khetran country, in the same way as I took it from Sangan and the Harnáí valley. I hope to be in a position to do this directly orders are issued regarding Bori, and the construction of the military road between the Punjab and Pishín * * *."

* Extract annexed.

Sir R. Sandeman then proceeded to say—

"It was the power vested in me by the Resolution above quoted that enabled me to settle the Kalát State, which had been for more than twenty years convulsed and almost ruined by civil war and internal dissensions, and the whole of this frontier, in a successful and satisfactory manner."

Sir. R. Sandeman, in conclusion, earnestly requested that

"the Government of India would reconsider the question, and not withdraw from me these powers, which I consider to be necessary for maintaining my proper influence over the tribes."

In August 1885 the Government of India sanctioned the formation of a Fine Fund from the funds, and for the purposes which had been mentioned. The fund was to be constituted as an Excluded Local Fund on the following conditions:—

"That the balance is kept in the treasury.

"That the money is drawn on bills and properly vouched.

"That the money is spent in promoting the efficiency of the levies.

"Subject to the foregoing conditions, the fund will be at the full disposal of the Governor General's Agent. A copy of the accounts will be submitted yearly to this Department."

This sanction was conveyed tentatively.

429. With reference to the number and class of levies for whom posts had to be constructed in the Bolan Pass, the Agent to the Governor General reported in December 1884 that posts were required at each of the places named below, with accommodation sufficient for the number of men and horses entered opposite each post:—

Construction of posts for the levy sowars in the Bolan, 1884 and 1885.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| RINDLI | 1 Jemadar. 7 Sowars. 8 Horses. | ABIGUM | 2 Jemadars. 10 Footmen. |
| PIR CHOWKI | 1 Jemadar. 10 Footmen. | MACH | 3 Jemadars. 8 Sowars. 15 Footmen. 11 Horses. |
| KUNDILANI | 1 Jemadar. 10 Footmen. | DOZAN | 1 Jemadar. 10 Footmen. |
| DRAJBET | 1 Jemadar. 10 Footmen. | DASHT | 2 Jemadars. 8 Sowars. 10 Footmen. 10 Horses. |
| SOUTH KIRTA | 1 Jamadar. 8 Sowars. 10 Footmen. 9 Horses. | NEW KAREZ | 1 Jemadar. 10 Footmen. |
| BIBINANI | 1 Jemadar. 8 Sowars. 10 Footmen. 9 Horses. | | |

With respect to the arrangements which had formerly been made, it was explained that the nature of their duties demanded that the levies should be stationed close to the Bolan Pass road; that the posts formerly occupied at Pir Chowki, Kundilani, Drajbet, Bibinani, Abigum, and Mach were situated on the old road which at those points ran at a distance from the new road recently constructed; and that the former accommodation would fail to meet present requirements. Subsequently estimates were forwarded to the Public Works Department, showing that the total cost of the construction of the posts was expected to be R26,506. In the Budget Estimate for 1885-86 this sum was allotted under the head "Civil Buildings." It was at the same time stated that the Government of India was not in a position to increase the grant, which should be considered to represent the total provision for posts throughout Baluchistan in 1885-86; the distribution of the grant being left to the Agent to the Governor General, and also the decision of the question as to whether the construction of posts in the Bolan should take precedence of other works. With regard to the post at Dasht, it was observed that, as the Military Department had represented the inconvenience of restoring the serai buildings in existence at that place to the Political Department, by whom it had been handed to the Military Department in 1881, the cost of construction of the post required at that place would be transferred from the Military Works Budget to that of "Civil Buildings." The Secretary to the Agent to the Governor General in the Public Works Department was in April 1885 requested to put the work in hand as soon as possible, as the posts were urgently required.

430. In 1884 the Political Agent, Quetta and Pishín, brought to notice that he was unable to find a police guard to escort prisoners from Quetta to Sibi, on their way to the Shikarpur Jail. The practice had formerly been to obtain a guard from the Military authorities for the escort. Mr. Barnes had, however, latterly employed police on this duty. When the levy scheme was

Constables entertained for escort of prisoners from Quetta to Sibi, on their way to Shikarpur Jail, 1885.

sanctioned, the strength of the police in Quetta and Pishín was reduced by 34 men, under the impression that military guards could again be obtained. With the reduced numbers the Political Agent, however, was unable to undertake the the escort duty; and as the officer commanding at Quetta was precluded by the Army Regulations from furnishing a military guard, the Agent to the Governor General represented the matter to the Government of India. In April 1885 the Government of India sanctioned the entertainment of 10 third class constables, at an expenditure of R123-5-4, for escort duty. It may be noted that, from time to time, arms, ammunition, &c., have been furnished to the police. It will here be convenient to add the appendices furnished to the report of the Committee on the levy scheme.

Officers who have held the post of Commandant of Baluch Guides.

431. The officers who have held the post of Commandant of Baluch Guides are—

Captain Showers, to 25th March 1880.
Major J. E. P Mosley, from 6th July 1880.
Officiating—Lieutenant M. E. Archdale, from 7th June 1882.
Major J. E. P. Mosley again occupied the post as Superintendent of Levies. This post now (August 1885) no longer exists, Major Mosley having vacated it, and having left Quetta for India.

432. Appendices to letter No. 200 F. C., dated 3rd August 1883, regarding the levy scheme:—

## SCHEDULE I.

*Statement showing present Strength, Pay, and Distribution of existing Tribal and Other Services in Thal-Chotiálí, the Bolan Pass, Quetta, Pishín, and the other Districts under the Administration of the Baluchistan Agency.*

| No. | Particulars. | | Salary per mensem. | TOTAL. | REMARKS. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **I.—TELEGRAPH SERVICE.** | | | | |
| (A) | THAL-CHOTIÁLÍ DISTRICT. | | R a. p. | R a. p. | |
| | KUCHALI TO KACHH. | | | | Sanctioned in Foreign Department Nos. 1087E., dated 19th May, 1878E.P., 1102E.P., dated 25th May 1881; telegram dated 8th December 1881, No. 1101E.P., dated 30th June 1882. |
| | *Gandakindaff.* | R a. p | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R20 each | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, at R10 each | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 250 0 0 | ...... | Foreign Department No. 1102E.P., dated 25th May 1881. |
| | *Quat.* | | | | |
| | 2 Duffadars, at R30 each | 60 0 0 | | | |
| | 6 Sowars, at R20 each | 120 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 180 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | *Harnái.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | 6 Footmen, at R10 each | 60 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 75 0 0 | ...... | No. 2064E.P., dated 8th September 1881. |
| | *Sharigh.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | 6 Footmen, at R10 each | 60 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 75 0 0 | ...... | Telegram dated 8th September 1881. |
| | Carried over | | 580 0 0 | | |

| No. | Particulars. | | Salary per mensem. | Total. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | R a. p. | R a. p. | |
| | Brought forward | | 580 0 0 | | |
| | **TELEGRAPH SERVICE**—*contd.* | | | | |
| | THAL-CHOTIÁLÍ DISTRICT—*concld.* | | | | |
| | *Chhapar.* | R a. p. | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . . | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | 6 Footmen, at R10 each . . | 60 0 0 | 75 0 0 | ...... | No. 1101E.P., dated 30th June 1882. |
| | *Kachh.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . . | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | 6 Footmen, at R10 each . . | 60 0 0 | 75 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| (B) | BOLAN PASS. | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . . | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar . . . . . | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 23 Sowars, at R20 each . . . | 460 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . . | 10 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, at R8 each . . | 80 0 0 | 625 0 0 | ...... | No. 1087E., dated 29th May 1878. |
| (C) | KALÁT. | | | | |
| | 2 Duffadars, at R30 each . . | 60 0 0 | | | |
| | 7 Sowars, at R20 each . . . | 140 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Munshi . . . . . | 20 0 0 | 220 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | QUETTA DISTRICT. | | | | |
| | *Quetta to Mehterzai.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . . | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Sowars, at R20 each . . . | 40 0 0 | 65 0 0 | ...... | No. 866E.P., dated 19th May 1882. |
| | *Mehterzai to Gazáband.* | | | | |
| | 2 Sowars, at R20 each . . . | 40 0 0 | 40 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | *Gazáband to Dinar Karez.* | | | | |
| | Malik Bahawal Din Bazai . . | 170 0 0 | | | |
| | " Gaibi " . . | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | " Nabo " . . | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | " Majid " . . | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | " Hussain " . . | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | " Purdil " . . | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | " Zardad " . . | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | " Suleman " . . | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | " Barun " . . | 20 0 0 | | | |
| | Contingencies " . . | 20 0 0 | 490 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| (E) | PISHÍN DISTRICT. | | | | |
| | *Dinar Karez to Segi.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . . | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Sowars, at R20 each . . . | 40 0 0 | 65 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | *Segi to Gulistán.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . . | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Sowars, at R20 each . . . | 40 0 0 | 80 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | *Gulistán to Karballa.* | | | | |
| | 2 Sowars, at R20 each . . . | 40 0 0 | 40 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | *Karballa to Khúshdil Khán.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . . | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Sowars, at R20 . . . . | 40 0 0 | 65 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | Carried over . | | 2,420 0 0 | ...... | |

| No. | Particulars. | R a. p. | Salary per mensem. R a. p. | TOTAL. R a. p. | REMARKS. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Brought forward | | 2,420 0 0 | ...... | |
| | **I.—TELEGRAPH SERVICE**—*concld.* | | | | |
| | PISHÍN DISTRICT—*concld.* | | | | |
| | *Atchakzai Service.* | | | | |
| | Haji Sirbuland Khan . . . | 300 0 0 | 300 0 0 | ...... | No. 2611, dated 4th November 1881. The service bracketed is known as the Atchakzai service, and is paid for the safety both of the telegraph line and convoys. |
| | 20 Sowars with ditto, at R20 each | 400 0 0 | | | |
| | 90 Khassadars " " R10 " | 900 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Sadbashi " | 100 0 0 | | | No. 2722E.P., dated 9th December 1881. |
| | 2 Panjabashis " at R50 each | 100 0 0 | ...... | ...... | |
| | 10 Dehbashis " " R12 " | 120 0 0 | | | No. 1892E., dated 21st August 1883. |
| | 2 Jemadars " " R12 " | 24 0 0 | | | |
| | 6 Caretakers " " R8 " | 48 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 1,692 0 0 | | |
| | Savings | | 55 0 0 | | |
| | Rations, at R3-8 per man . . | | 889 0 0 | ...... | No. 45E., dated 5th July 1882. |
| | Forage allowance to Sowars, at R7-8 each | | 630 0 0 | | |
| | TOTAL TELEGRAPH SERVICE . . | | ...... | 5,986 0 0 | |
| | **II.—POSTAL SERVICE.** | | | | |
| (A) | THAL-CHOTIÁLÍ DISTRICT. | | | | Sanctioned in Foreign Department Nos. 239F., dated 9th May 1878, 968E.P., dated 11th May 1881, 1996E.P., dated 1st September 1881. |
| | Sibi to Pishín *viâ* Harnáí, with branch from Gandakindaff to Thal. | | | | |
| | MAIN LINE. | | | | |
| | *Nari Gorge.* | R a. | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar . . . . . | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 6 Sowars, at R25 each . . . | 150 0 0 | 180 0 0 | ...... | No. 976E.P., dated 11th May 1881. Sowars are necessary on this part of the line, as the road passes through the Marri country, and the Marris decline to serve as footmen. |
| | *Gandakin Daff.* | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar . . . . . | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 6 Sowars, at R25 each . . . | 150 0 0 | 180 0 0 | ...... | No. 976E.P., dated 11th May 1881. |
| | *Spintangi.* | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar . . . . . | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 6 Sowars, at R25 each . . . | 150 0 0 | 180 0 0 | ...... | No. 976E.P., dated 11th May 1882. |
| | *Harnáí.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . . | 12 0 0 | | | |
| | 8 Footmen, at R8 each . . . | 64 0 0 | 76 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | *Sharigh.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . . | 12 0 0 | | | |
| | 8 Footmen, at R8 each . . . | 64 0 0 | 76 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | *Dirgai.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . . | 12 0 0 | | | |
| | 8 Footmen, at R8 each . . . | 64 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Inspector (including batta) . | 53 8 0 | 129 8 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | (*For Kachh to Quetta—see under Quetta District.*) | | | | |
| | BRANCH FROM GANDAKINDAFF TO THAL. | | | | |
| | *Quat.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . . | 40 0 0 | ...... | ...... | |
| | 1 Daffadar . . . . . | 25 0 0 | ...... | ...... | Marri country. |
| | 5 Sowars, at R20 each . . . | 100 0 0 | ...... | ...... | |
| | | | 165 0 0 | ...... | No. 976E.P., dated 11th May 1881. |
| | Carried over | | 986 8 0 | 5,986 0 0 | |

| No. | Particulars. | | Salary per mensem. | Total. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | R a. p. | R a. p. | |
| | Brought forward | | 986 8 0 | 5,986 0 0 | |
| | **II.—POSTAL SERVICE**—*contd.* | | | | |
| | THAL-CHOTIÁLÍ DISTRICT—*concld.* | | | | |
| | *Tung.* | R a. p. | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | ...... | ...... | Marri country. |
| | 5 Sowars, at R25 each | 125 0 0 | 155 0 0 | ...... | No. 1107E.P., dated 4th June 1881. Telegram dated 19th April 1882. |
| | *Thal.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar and 11 Sowars | 270 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Inspector | 30 0 0 | 300 0 0 | ...... | No. 976E.P., dated 11th May 1881. |
| (B) | BOLAN PASS. | | | | |
| | SIBI TO CHAMAN *viâ* QUETTA. | | | | Throughout the Bolan Pass, sowars are necessary to expedite the post to Quetta. |
| | *Rindli.* | | | | |
| | 1 Inspector | 75 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 20 Sowars, at R20 each | 400 0 0 | 540 0 0 | ...... | No. 968E.P., dated 11th May 1881. |
| | *Kundilani.* | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 20 Sowars, at R20 each | 400 0 0 | 425 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | *Kirta.* | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 18 Sowars, at R20 each | 360 0 0 | 385 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | *Bibinani.* | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 18 Sowars, at R20 each | 360 0 0 | 385 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | *Abigum.* | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 20 Sowars, at R20 each | 400 0 0 | 425 0 0 | ...... | No. 968E.P., dated 11th May 1881. |
| | *Siri Bolan.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 20 Sowars, at R20 each | 400 0 0 | 465 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | *Dasht.* | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 20 Sowars, at R20 each | 400 0 0 | 425 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | *Siriab.* | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 18 Sowars, at R20 each | 360 0 0 | 385 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | (*From Quetta to Gulistán—see under Quetta and Pishín.*) | | | | |
| (C) | QUETTA DISTRICT. | | | | |
| | QUETTA TO KALÁT. | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 14 Sowars, at R20 each, and contingencies | 303 5 4 | 333 5 4 | ...... | No. 339F., dated 9th May 1878. |
| | *Quetta to Kachh.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 6 Footmen (at Quetta), at R10 each | 60 0 0 | | | |
| | 6 " (Sarákhulá), at R10 " | 60 0 0 | | | |
| | 6 " (Sarantangi), at R10 " | 60 0 0 | 210 0 0 | ...... | No. 976E.P., dated 11th May 1881. |
| | Carried over | | 5,419 13 4 | 5,986 0 0 | |

| No. | Particulars. | | Salary per mensem. | Total. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | R a. p. | R a. p. | |
| | Brought forward | | 5,419 13 4 | 5,936 0 0 | |
| | **II.—POSTAL SERVICE**—*concld.* | | | | |
| | QUETTA DISTRICT—*concld.* | | | | |
| | *Quetta to Khúshdil Khán.* | R a. p. | | | |
| | 2 Jemadars, at R40 each | 80 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 Sowars (Quetta), at R20 each | 80 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 Do. (Kuchlak), at R20 „ | 80 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 Do. (Syud Yaru), at R20 „ | 80 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 Do. (New Cantonment), at R20 each | 80 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 400 0 0 | ...... | No. 136E.P., dated 21st January 1882. |
| | *Quetta to Gulistán.* | | | | |
| | 2 Jemadars, at R100 and 40 each | 140 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 Sowars (Quetta), at R20 each | 80 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 Do. (Mehterzai), at R20 „ | 80 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 Do. (Diñar Karez), at R20 „ | 80 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 Do. (Segi), at R20 each | 80 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 Do. (Gulistán), at R20 each | 80 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 540 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | Rations, at R3-8 per man | | 1,095 8 0 | ...... | No. 45E., dated 5th July 1882. |
| | Forage allowance to Sowars, at R7-8 each | | 2,002 8 0 | | |
| | TOTAL POSTAL SERVICE | | ...... | 9,457 13 4 | |
| | **III.—POLICE FORCE.** | | | | |
| (A) | THAL-CHOTIÁLÍ DISTRICT. | | | | Sanctioned in Foreign Department Nos. 392A., dated 20th September 1879, 868A., dated 18th October 1879, 194E.P., dated 2nd February 1882, 611E.P., dated 9th April 1882. |
| | *Thal-Chotiálí.* | R a. p. | | | For an explanation of the difference between the total amount sanctioned in these letters—see remark at section IV of the Schedule. |
| | 1 Thanadar | 78 0 0 | | | |
| * | 1 Daffadar | 33 8 0 | | | |
| † | 9 Sowars, at R20 each | 180 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Shuter Sowars, at R28-8 each | 57 0 0 | | | |
| † | Contingencies | 10 0 0 | | | (Bolan Pass Establishment.) |
| | | | 358 8 0 | | No. 194E.P., dated 2nd February 1882. |
| | *Harnái.* | | | | |
| † | 1 Sergeant | 28 8 0 | | | |
| | 1 Naik | 16 8 0 | | | |
| | 2 Shuter Sowars, at R28-8 each | 57 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, at R13-8 each | 135 0 0 | | | |
| | Contingencies | 10 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 247 0 0 | ...... | No. 194E.P., dated 2nd February 1882. |
| | *Kachh.* | | | | |
| | 1 Thanadar | 75 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Sowars, at R25 each | 50 0 0 | ...... | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | Clothing Allowance | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 140 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| (B) | BOLAN PASS. | | | | |
| | *Mach.* | | | | |
| | 1 Deputy Inspector | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Sowars, at R25 each | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Munshi | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | Contingencies | 7 5 4 | | | |
| | | | 112 5 | ...... | No. 611E.P., dated 9th April 1882. |
| | *Pir Chowki.* | | | | |
| | 1 Deputy Inspector | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Sowars, at R25 each | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Munshi | 20 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 110 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| (C) | QUETTA DISTRICT. | | | | |
| | 1 Inspector | 150 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Deputy Inspector | 60 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 210 0 0 | ...... | No. 329A., dated 20th September 1879. |
| | Carried over | | 1,177 13 4 | 15,443 13 4 | |

* Includes 30 per cent. deputation allowance.
† Includes batta, at R3-8 per man. (F. D. No. 1469E.P., dated 12th July 1881.)

| No. | Particulars. | | Salary per mensem. | Total. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | R a. p. | R a. p. | |
| | Brought forward | | 1,177 13 4 | 15,443 13 4 | |
| | **III.—POLICE FORCE—*concld.*** | | | | |
| | QUETTA DISTRICT—*concld.* | | | | |
| | *Mounted Police.* | R a. p. | | | |
| | 25 1st Class Sergeants, at R31 each | 775 0 0 | | | |
| | 15 2nd „ „ at R25 „ | 375 0 0 | 1,150 0 0 | ...... | No. 329A., dated 20th September 1879. |
| | *Foot Police.* | | | | |
| | 2 1st Class Sergeants, at R25 each | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 2nd „ „ at R15 „ | 60 0 0 | | | |
| | 40 1st „ „ at R10 „ | 400 0 0 | ...... | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | 40 2nd „ „ at R9 „ | 360 0 0 | | | |
| | 40 3rd „ „ at R8 „ | 320 0 0 | | | |
| | Clothing allowance | 140 0 0 | ...... | ...... | No. 7E., dated 1st July 1882. |
| | Hospital Assistant allowance | 10 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 1,340 0 0 | | |
| (D) | PISHÍN DISTRICT. | | | | |
| | 1 Deputy Inspector | 40 0 0 | 40 0 0 | ...... | No. 868A., dated 18th October 1879. |
| | *Mounted Police.* | | | | |
| | 2 Sergeants, at R31 each | 62 0 0 | | | |
| | 25 Sowars, at R25 each | 625 0 0 | 687 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | *Foot Police.* | | | | |
| | 1 Sergeant | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 3 Sergeants, at R15 each | 45 0 0 | | | |
| | 12 Constables, at R10 „ | 120 0 0 | ...... | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | 80 „ at R8 „ | 640 0 0 | | | |
| | Clothing Allowance | 103 5 4 | ...... | ...... | No. 7E., dated 1st July 1882. |
| | | | 933 5 4 | | |
| | SIBI DISTRICT. | | | | Sanctioned in Foreign Department No. 1615E.P., dated 26th July 1881, and No. 2184E.P., dated 17th September 1881. |
| | 1 Inspector | 150 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Deputy Inspector | 60 0 0 | 210 0 0 | ...... | No. 1615E.P., dated 26th July 1881. |
| | *Mounted.* | | | | |
| | 4 Daffadars, at R31 each | 124 0 0 | | | |
| | 17 Sowars, at R25 each | 425 0 0 | 549 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | *Dismounted.* | | | | |
| | 2 Sergeants, at R25 each | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 „ at R15 „ | 75 0 0 | | | |
| | 13 „ at R12 „ | 156 0 0 | | | |
| | 90 Constables, at R10 „ | 900 0 0 | 1,181 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | *For Railway protection, Tribal Sowars.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Duffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 26 Sowars, at R20 each | 520 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 Chowkidars, at R10 each | 40 0 0 | 640 0 0 | ...... | No. 344E.P., dated 25th February 1882. |
| | *Establishments.* | | | | |
| | 1 Munshi | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Moharir | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Bhisti | 8 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Sweeper | 8 0 0 | | | |
| | Contingencies | 40 0 0 | 126 0 0 | | |
| | Batta and rations for Sibi Police | | 563 8 0 | ...... | No. 1615E.P., dated 26th July 1881. |
| | Clothing allowance for Sibi Police | | 109 2 4 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | Rations, at R3-8 per man | | 1,011 8 0 | ...... | No. 1469E.P., dated 12th July 1881. |
| | | | | 9,718 5 0 | No. 1339E., dated 23rd June 1883. |
| | Total Cost of Police | | ...... | | |
| | Carried over | | ...... | 25,162 2 4 | |

| No. | Particulars. | | Salary per mensem. | Total. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | R a. p. | R a. p. | |
| | Brought forward | | ...... | 25,162 2 4 | |
| | **IV.—BOLAN PASS ESTABLISHMENT.** | | | | R20,500 per annum, sanctioned in paragraph 3 of Foreign Department No. 379 P., dated 21st February 1877 . 1,708 5 0 per mensem.<br>Sanctioned in Foreign Department No. 2435 P., dated 31st October 1878 . 1,700 0 0 "<br>Sanctioned in Foreign Department No. 1478 P., dated 19th July 1878 . 100 0 0 "<br>3,508 5 0<br>Less accounted for on page 199 under "Police" at Mach and Pirchowki . 222 5 4<br>Amount shown here . 3,286 0 0 |
| | *Sons of Alla Dina Kurd.* | R a. p. | | | |
| | Yar Muhammad | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | Dost Muhammad | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | Afzal Khan | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 150 0 0 | | |
| | *Dasht.* | | | | |
| Kurd. | 1 Jemadar, Nehal Khan | 20 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 " Ali Murad | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 27 Footmen, at R8 each | 216 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 261 0 0 | | |
| | *Dozan.* | | | | |
| Shahukzais. | 1 Jemadar, Paysud Khan | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, at R8 each | 80 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar, Nabbi | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Footmen, at R8 each | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar, Sheran | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | 8 Footmen, at R8 each | 64 0 0 | | | |
| Mingals. | 1 Jemadar, Mugsi | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | 7 Footmen, at R8 each | 56 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 310 0 0 | | |
| | *Mach.* | | | | |
| Shahukzais. | 1 Jemadar, Kutub Khan | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 " Bahawal Khan | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 " Sabzal Kha | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | 20 Footmen, at R8 achn. | 160 0 0 | | | |
| Mingals. | 1 Jemadar, Rahim Khan | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 " Haibat Khan | 6 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 " Bahawal Khan | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 " Wazir Khan | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | 20 Footmen, at R8 each | 160 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar, Mehran | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, at R8 each | 80 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar, Rawat | 21 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 " Mehrgul | 21 0 0 | | | |
| | 18 Footmen, at R8 each | 144 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 727 0 0 | ... | |
| | *Abigum.* | | | | |
| Biluch. | 1 Jemadar, Doda | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 " Jaggam | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 " Din Muhammad | 12 0 0 | | | |
| | 19 Footmen, at R8 each | 152 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 214 0 0 | ... | |
| | *Bibinani.* | | | | |
| Mazarini. Maris. | 1 Jemadar, Kleli Khan | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 " Nabbi Bux | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 20 Footmen, at R8 each | 160 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 215 0 0 | ... | |
| | *North Kirta.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar, Til Khan | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 " Nabbi Bux | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 20 Footmen, at R8 each | 160 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 220 0 0 | ... | |
| | Carried over | | 2,097 0 0 | 25,162 2 4 | |

| No. | Particulars. | R | a. | p. | Salary per mensem. R a. p. | Total. R a. p. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Brought forward | | | | 2,097 0 0 | 25,162 2 4 | |
| | **IV.—BOLAN PASS ESTABT.**—*concld.* | | | | | | |
| | *Drajbet.* | | | | | | |
| Mazarani. | 1 Jemadar, Kawal Khan | 25 | 0 | 0 | | | R20,500 per annum, sanctioned in paragraph 3 of Foreign Department No. 379P., dated 21st February 1877: R 1,708 a. 5 p. 4 per mensem.<br>Sanctioned in Foreign Department No. 2435P., dated 31st October 1878: 1,700 0 0<br>Sanctioned in Foreign Department No. 1478P., dated 19th July 1878: 100 0 0<br>3,508 5 4<br>Less accounted for on page 198 under "Police" at Mach and Pir Chowki: 222 5 4<br>Amount shown here: 3,286 0 0 |
| Mazarani. | 1 „ Kutab Khan | 25 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Mazarani. | 1 „ Jangi Khan | 12 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Mazarani. | 19 Footmen, at R8 each | 152 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 214 0 0 | ... | |
| | *Kundilani.* | | | | | | |
| | Jalambani—1 Jemadar, Tawas | 25 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | Chotai—1 Jemadar, Muhammad Jan | 25 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | 15 Footmen, at R8 each | 120 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 170 0 0 | ... | |
| | *Dhana Bolan Pass.* | | | | | | |
| Mazarani. | 1 Jemadar, Doda | 25 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Mazarani. | 1 „ Shakal | 25 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Mazarani. | 20 Footmen, at R8 each | 160 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 210 0 0 | ... | |
| | *Pir Chowki.* | | | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar, Kirtak | 15 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, at R8 each | 80 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 95 0 0 | ... | |
| | Sirdar Mulla Muhammad | | | | 500 0 0 | ... | |
| | Total Bolan Pass Establishment | | | | ...... | 3,286 0 0 | See remarks on page 200. |
| | **V.—FRONTIER LEVIES.** | | | | | | |
| | THAL-CHOTIÁLÍ DISTRICT. | | | | | | Sanctioned in Foreign Department Resolution No. 379P., dated 21st February 1877. Letters No. 1478E.P., dated 19th July 1878, and No. 1034E.P., dated 17th June 1882. |
| | *Khahán.* | | | | | | |
| | Sirdar Meeroola Khan | 300 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | 15 Sowars with Meeroola Khan, at R20 each | 300 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | 1 Vakil | 40 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | 2 Sowars with Vakil, at R20 each | 40 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | 2 Munshis, at R30 and 20 | 50 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 730 0 0 | ... | |
| | *Sibi.* | | | | | | Sanctioned in Foreign Department No. 379P., dated 21st February 1877, R66,960 per annum or R5,580 per mensem. |
| | 1 Ressaldar | 100 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | 10 Sowars, at R20 each | 200 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | Allowance for 5 hostages, at R20 | 100 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 430 0 0 | ... | |
| | *Spintangi.* | | | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R20 each | 100 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, „ 10 „ | 100 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 280 0 0 | ... | |
| | *Quat.* | | | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R20 each | 100 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, at R10,, | 100 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 280 0 0 | ... | |
| | *Tung.* | | | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R20 each | 100 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, „ 10 „ | 100 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 250 0 0 | ... | |
| | *Gamboli.* | | | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R20 each | 100 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, „ 10 „ | 100 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 280 0 0 | | |
| | Carried over | | | | 2,250 0 0 | 28,448 2 4 | |

| No. | Particulars. | | Salary per mensem. | Total. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | R a. p. | R a. p. | |
| | Brought forward | | 2,250 0 0 | 28,448 2 4 | |
| | **V.—FRONTIER LEVIES—*concld.*** | | | | |
| | **THAL-CHOTIÁLÍ DISTRICT—*concld.*** | | | | |
| | ***Thal.*** | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R20 each | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 180 0 0 | ... | No. 379P., dated 21st February 1877,—see remarks on page 200. |
| | ***Shum.*** | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Sowars, at R20 each | 200 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 280 0 0 | ... | Ditto ditto. |
| | ***(Quat Orderlies)*** | | | | |
| | 1 Ressaldar | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R20 each | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 280 0 0 | ... | Ditto ditto. |
| | ***Chinna.*** | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar, Buktyar | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 Footmen, at R8 each | 32 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar, Khali | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 Footmen, at R8 each | 32 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 94 0 0 | ... | Ditto ditto. |
| | ***New Marri Service (Orderlies).*** | | | | |
| | 1 Khair Bux, Marri Chief's son | 120 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Sowars, at R20 each | 200 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 320 0 0 | | |
| | ***Pajjah.*** | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 0 0 | | ...... | No. 1034EP., dated 17th June 1882. |
| | 3 Sowars, at R20 each | 60 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Footmen „ 10 „ | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 160 0 0 | | |
| | ***Mandokund.*** | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R20 each | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 125 0 0 | ...... | No. 379P., dated 21st February 1877. (See remarks on page 200.) |
| | ***Bugtis.*** | | | | |
| | Ghulam Murtza for the Bugti Tuman | 965 0 0 | | | |
| | Shadi Khan for 1 Daffadar & 8 Sowars | 315 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 1,180 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | ***Shambani.*** | | | | |
| | Sobdar Khan Shambani Tumandar | | 100 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | ***Gandoi.*** | | | | |
| | Ghulam Murtza Khan for 1 Daffadar and 15 Sowars | | 330 0 0 | | |
| | Khetrans | | 600 0 0 | ...... | Ditto ditto. |
| | Haddianis | | 120 0 0 | | |
| | Durkanis | | 40 0 0 | | |
| | Savings | | 1 0 0 | | |
| | ***Barozai Levies.*** | | | | |
| | Sirdar Muhammad Khan | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | Sirdar Sirbuland Khan | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Daffadars, at R30 each | 60 0 0 | | | |
| | 12 Sowars at R20 each | 240 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 500 0 0 | ...... | Sanctioned in Foreign Department No. 963E., dated 6th November 1882. 1 Daffadar, 10 Sowars, stationed at Nari Gorge. 1 Daffadar, 2 Sowars, remain in attendance on Barozai Chief. |
| | TOTAL FRONTIER LEVIES | | ...... | 6,560 0 0 | |
| | Carried over | | | 35,008 2 4 | |

| No. | Particulars. | | Salary per mensem. | Total. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | R a. p. | R a. p. | |
| | Brought forward | | ...... | 35,008 2 4 | |
| | **VI.—AFGHAN TRIBES.** | | | | |
| (A) | **THAL-CHOTIÁLÍ DISTRICT.** | | | | |
| | *Tribes in Harnái neighbourhood.** | | | | |
| | Bahi Khan Sarangzai Kakar | 185 0 0 | ...... | ...... | |
| | Sahib ditto | 20 0 0 | | | |
| | Ismail Vanechi Kakar | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | Kala Khan ditto | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | Hussain Pechi | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | Ali Muhammad Syud | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | Taran, son of Murad Ali, Chilgarri | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | Shirdil Taran | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | Esajan Sheikh | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | Toti Mekhiani | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | Alladad Khan | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 500 0 0 | | |
| | Mirza Hyder Kuli Khan | ... | 50 0 0 | | |
| | Haji Mirza | ... | 23 0 0 | | |
| | PANIZAI KAKAR LEVIES. | | | | |
| | *Kachh.* | | | | |
| | 1 Subadar, Ibrahim Khan, H. Chief | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 15 Footmen, at R8 each | 120 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 170 0 0 | ... | |
| | Rahimdad Dumar | ... | 430 0 0 | ... | |
| | *Ispiligi.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar Hakim | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | 8 Footmen, at R8 each | 64 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 104 0 0 | ... | |
| | *Mangi.* | | | | Sanctioned in Foreign Department Telegram No. 2435, dated 31st October 1878. |
| | 1 Jemadar Paio | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 8 Footmen, at R8 each | 64 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 94 0 0 | ... | |
| (B) | **QUETTA AND PISHÍN DISTRICT.** | | | | |
| | *Sarákhula and Rodh Passes.* | | | | |
| | Maliks Mushkai, Saidad, Yusuf, Yusuf II, Nasir, Musa, Akram Taran, Lal Khan and Baidulla Bazais, at R40 each | | 400 0 0 | ... | |
| | *Hanna Pass.* | | | | |
| | Maliks Pirak, Rahimdad Zaman, Sharif, Bostan, and Nasir Yasinzais | 72 0 0 | | | |
| | Maliks Wattan and Mehr Dil for selves and 20 Footmen | 216 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 288 0 0 | ... | |
| | *Uriskai and Murgai Passes.* | | | | |
| | Taj Muhammad and 15 Footmen | | 263 0 0 | ... | |
| | Sultan Muhammad and 15 Footmen | | 263 0 0 | ... | |
| | Kirari Syuds | | 130 0 0 | ... | |
| | Sirdar Gowhar Khan Zehri | | 300 0 0 | ... | |
| | Kazi | | 10 0 0 | ... | |
| | Din Muhammad | | 146 0 0 | ... | |
| | Savings | | 69 0 0 | | |
| | TOTAL AFGHAN TRIBES | | ...... | 3,240 0 0 | |
| | **VII.—CORPS OF BALUCH GUIDES.** | | | | *Vide* Foreign Department telegram dated 17th October 1877. |
| | *Quetta.* | | | | |
| | 2 Jemadars. | | | | |
| | 6 Daffadars. | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar. | | | | |
| | 71 Sowars. | | | | |
| | Carried over | | ... | 38,248 2 4 | |

| No. | Particulars. | Salary per mensem. | Total. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Brought forward | R a. p. | R a. p. 38,248 2 4 | |
| | **VII.—CORPS OF BALUCH GUIDES**—*concld.* | | | |
| | *Dirgai.* | | | |
| 1 | Daffadar. | | | |
| 7 | Sowars. | | | |
| | *Harnái.* | | | |
| 1 | Jemadar. | | | |
| 2 | Daffadars. | | | |
| 25 | Sowars. | | | |
| | *Spintangi.* | | | |
| 1 | Daffadar. | | | |
| 9 | Sowars. | | | |
| | *Kuchali.* | | | |
| 1 | Daffadar. | | | |
| 6 | Sowars. | | | |
| | *Quat Mandai.* | | | |
| 1 | Jemadar. | | | |
| 3 | Daffadars. | | | |
| 15 | Sowars. | | | |
| | *Thal.* | | | |
| 1 | Daffadar. | | | |
| 4 | Sowars. | | | |
| | *Khilati Killa.* | | | |
| 1 | Daffadar. | | | |
| 6 | Sowars. | | | |
| | *Nari Gorge.* | | | |
| 1 | Daffadar. | | | |
| 6 | Sowars. | | | |
| | *Sibi.* | | | |
| 2 | Jemadars. | | | |
| 8 | Daffadars. | | | |
| 32 | Sowars. | | | |
| | *Sind Frontier Posts.* | | | |
| 16 | Sowars. | | | |
| | *Siriab.* | | | |
| 1 | Daffadar. | | | |
| 4 | Sowars. | | | |
| | *Miscellaneous.* | | | |
| 9 | Dismounted Sowars. | | | |
| 5 | Nalbunds. | | | |
| 3 | Assisting in shop. | | | |
| 5 | Sweepers and drivers. | | | |
| 1 | Ressaldar } Barozai Gurani. | | | |
| 2 | Jemadars } | | | |
| 4 | Daffadars } Bugti men. | | | |
| 57 | Sowars } | | | |
| 2 | Daffadars. | | | |
| 16 | Sowars. | | | |
| | *On Escort Duty.* | | | |
| 1 | Ressaldar. | | | |
| 6 | Daffadars. | | | |
| 69 | Sowars. | | | |
| | *On Leave.* | | | |
| 5 | Jemadars. | | | |
| 2 | Daffadars. | | | |
| 22 | Sowars. | | | |
| | Total Baluch Guides | ... | 12,045 0 0 | Telegram dated 17th October 1877. |
| | GRAND TOTAL | ... | 50,293 2 4 | |

## APPENDIX B.

### SCHEDULE II.

*Statement showing proposed Strength, Pay, and Distribution of Tribal and Other Services in Thal-Chotiálí, the Bolan Pass, Quetta, Pishín, and the other Districts under the Administration of the Baluchistan Agency.*

| No. | Particulars. | | Salary per mensem. | TOTAL. | REMARKS. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **I.—UNDER POLITICAL AGENT, THAL-CHOTIALI.** | | | | |
| (A) | TELEGRAPH SERVICE. | | | | |
| | THAL-CHOTIÁLÍ DISTRICT. | | R a. p. | R a. p. | |
| | *Gandakin Daff.* | R a. p. | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R25 each | 125 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, at R10 each | 100 0 0 | 275 0 0 | | |
| | *Quat.* | | | | |
| | 2 Daffadars, at R30 each | 60 0 0 | | | |
| | 6 Sowars, at R25 each | 150 0 0 | 210 0 0 | | |
| | *Harnái.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | 6 Footmen, at R10 each | 60 0 0 | 75 0 0 | | |
| | *Thal.* | | | | |
| | 1 Duffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 3 Sowars, at R25 each | 75 0 0 | 105 0 0 | | |
| | *Pajjah.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Footmen, at R10 each | 50 0 0 | 65 0 0 | | |
| | *Gamboli.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Footmen, at R10 each | 50 0 0 | 65 0 0 | | |
| | *Tung.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Footmen, at R50 each | 50 0 0 | 65 0 0 | | |
| | TOTAL TELEGRAPH SERVICE | | ... | 860 0 0 | |
| | POSTAL SERVICE. | | | | |
| | THAL-CHOTIÁLÍ. | | | | |
| | Sibi to Pishín *viâ* Harnái, with Branch from Gandakindaff to Thal. | | | | |
| | MAIN LINE. | | | | |
| | *Nari Gorge.* | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 6 Sowars, at R25 each | 150 0 0 | 180 0 0 | | |
| | *Gandakindaff.* | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 6 Sowars, at R25 each | 150 0 0 | 180 0 0 | | |
| | Carried over | | 360 0 0 | 860 0 0 | |

| No. | Particulars. | | Salary per mensem. | Total. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | R a. p. | R a. p. | |
| | Brought forward | | 360 0 0 | 860 0 0 | |
| | **POSTAL SERVICE—*concld.*** | | | | |
| | THAL-CHOTIÁLÍ—*concld.* | | | | |
| | *Spintangi.* | R a. p. | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 6 Sowars, at R25 each | 150 0 0 | 180 0 0 | | |
| | *Harnái.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 12 0 0 | | | |
| | 8 Footmen, at R10 each | 80 0 0 | 92 0 0 | | |
| | *Sharigh.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 12 0 0 | | | |
| | 8 Footmen, at R10 each | 80 0 0 | 92 0 0 | | |
| | *Dirgai.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 12 0 0 | | | |
| | 8 Footmen, at R10 each | 80 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Inspector (including batta) | 53 8 0 | 145 8 0 | | |
| | (*For Kach to Quetta—see under Quetta District*). | | | | |
| | BRANCH FROM GANDAKIN DAFF TO THAL. | | | | |
| | *Quat.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R25 each | 125 0 0 | 195 0 0 | | |
| | *Tung.* | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R25 each | 125 0 0 | 155 0 0 | | |
| | *Thal.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 11 Sowars, at R25 each | 275 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Inspector | 30 0 0 | 355 0 0 | | |
| | **BOLAN PASS.** | | | | |
| | SIBI TO CHAMAN *viâ* QUETTA. | | | | |
| | *Rindli.* | | | | |
| | 1 Inspector | 75 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 20 Sowars, at R20 each | 400 0 0 | 540 0 0 | | |
| | *Kundilani.* | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 20 Sowars, at R20 each | 400 0 0 | 425 0 0 | | |
| | *Kirta.* | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 18 Sowars, at R20 each | 360 0 0 | 385 0 0 | | |
| | *Bibinani.* | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 18 Sowars, at R20 each | 360 0 0 | 385 0 0 | | |
| | *Abigum.* | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 20 Sowars, at R20 each | 400 0 0 | 425 0 0 | | |
| | Carried over | | 3,734 8 0 | 860 0 0 | |

| No. | Particulars. | Batta. | R a. p. | Salary per mensem. R a. p. | Total. R a. p. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Brought forward . | | | 3,734 8 0 | 860 0 0 | |
| | POSTAL SERVICE—concld | | | | | |
| | Bolan Pass—concld. | | | | | |
| | *Siri Bolan.* | | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . . | | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar . . . . . | | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 20 Sowars, at R20 each . . . | | 400 0 0 | | | |
| | | | | 465 0 0 | | |
| | *Dasht.* | | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar . . . . . | | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 20 Sowars, at R20 each . . . | | 400 0 0 | | | |
| | | | | 425 0 0 | | |
| | *Seriab.* | | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar . . . . . | | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 18 Sowars, at R20 each . . . | | 360 0 0 | | | |
| | | | | 385 0 0 | | |
| | (*From Quetta to Gulistan—see under Quetta and Pishín.*) | | | | | |
| | Total Postal Service . | | | | 5,009 8 0 | |
| | POLICE FORCE. | | | | | |
| | Thal-Chotiálí District. | | | | | |
| | *Thal-Chotiálí.* | | | | | |
| | 1 Thanadar, at R60 . | R18-0 | 78 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar, at R30 . | „ 3-8 | 33 8 0 | | | |
| | 9 Sowars, at R25 . | „ 3-8 | 256 8 0 | | | |
| | 2 Shuter-Sowars, at R25 . | „ 3-8 | 57 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Head Constable, 1st grade, at R25 . . | „ 3-8 | 28 8 0 | | | |
| | 1 Head Constable, 2nd grade, at R15 . | „ 3-8 | 18 8 0 | | | |
| | 15 Constables, at R10 . | „ 3-8 | 202 8 0 | | | |
| | | | | 674 8 0 | | |
| | *Harnái.* | | | | | |
| | 1 Sergeant, at R25 . | R 3-8 | 28 8 0 | | | |
| | 1 Naik, at R13 . . | „ 3-8 | 16 8 0 | | | |
| | 2 Shuter-Sowars, at R25 . | „ 3-8 | 57 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, at R10 . | „ 3-8 | 135 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Foot Jemadar, at R12 . | „ 3-8 | 15 8 0 | | | |
| | 10 Barkandazes, at R10 . | „ 3-8 | 135 0 0 | | | |
| | | | | 387 8 0 | | |
| | *Sibi.* | | | | | |
| | 1 Deputy Inspector, at R80 . . . | R24 | 104 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Deputy Inspector, at R60 . . . | „ 18 | 78 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Mohurir, at R40 . | „ 12 | 52 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Ditto at R30 . | „ 9 | 39 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Head Constables, 1st grade, at R25 . | „ 3-8 | 57 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Head Constables, 2nd grade, at R15 . . | „ 3-8 | 92 8 0 | | | |
| | 13 Head Constables, 3rd grade, at R12 . . | „ 3-8 | 201 8 0 | | | |
| | 90 Constables, at R10 . . | „ 3-8 | 1,215 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Bhistee, at R8 . . | „ 3-8 | 11 8 0 | | | |
| | 1 Sweeper, at R8 . . | „ 3-8 | 11 8 0 | | | |
| | 4 Mounted Head Constables, at R31 . | „ 3-8 | 138 0 0 | | | |
| | 17 Sowars, at R25 . . | „ 3-8 | 484 8 0 | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . | | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar . . . | | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 26 Sowars, at R20 . . | | 520 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 Chowkidars, at R10 . | „ 3-8 | 54 0 0 | | | |
| | Contingencies . . | | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | | | | 3,178 8 0 | | |
| | Carried over . | | | 4,240 8 0 | 5,869 8 0 | |

| No. | Particulars. | Batta. | R a. p. | Salary per mensem. | Total. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | R a. p. | R a. p. | |
| | Brought forward | | | 4,240 8 0 | 5,869 8 0 | |
| | POLICE FORCE—*concld.* | | | | | |
| | THAL-CHOTIÁLÍ DISTRICT—*concld.* | | | | | |
| | *Rindli.* | | | | | |
| | 1 Deputy Inspector, at R40 | R3-8 | 43 8 0 | | | |
| | 2 Sowars, at R25 | „ 3-8 | 57 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Munshi, at R20 | „ 6-0 | 26 0 0 | | | |
| | | | | 126 8 0 | | |
| | *Mach.* | | | | | |
| | 1 Deputy Inspector, at R40 | R3-8 | 43 8 0 | | | |
| | 2 Sowars, at R25 | „ 3-8 | 57 8 0 | | | |
| | 1 Munshi, at R15 | „ 4-8 | 19 8 0 | | | |
| | Contingencies | | 7 5 4 | | | |
| | | | | 127 5 4 | | |
| | Clothing allowance for 198 men, at R10 each per annum=per mensem | | | 165 0 0 | | |
| | TOTAL POLICE FORCE | | | ...... | 4,659 5 4 | |
| (D) | BOLAN ESTABLISHMENT. | | | | | |
| | Sirdar Mulla Muhammad | | | 500 0 0 | | He will furnish 1 Jemadar at R50, and 2 Sowars at R25 each, to be at disposal of Political Agent. |
| | Sirdar Yar Muhammad Kurd | | | 100 0 0 | | |
| | *Satakzais.* | | | | | |
| | Kutab Khan | | 40 0 0 | | | They will furnish 1 Sowar each, to be at disposal of Political Agent. |
| | Paind Khan | | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | | | | 80 0 0 | | |
| | *Mingals.* | | | | | |
| | Rohim Khan | | 30 0 0 | | | Two men by turns to remain present at Mach or wherever required by Political Agent. |
| | Mehran | | 23 0 0 | | | |
| | Haibut | | 10 0 0 | | | |
| | Raho | | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | Taimur | | 23 0 0 | | | |
| | Satgath | | 23 0 0 | | | |
| | Mugal | | 23 0 0 | | | |
| | Dad Karim | | 23 0 0 | | | |
| | Rasul | | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | | | | 205 0 0 | | |
| | *Mazarani and Aliani Marris.* | | | | | |
| | Kenchi | | | | | One by turn to remain present at Rindli or wherever required by Political Agent. |
| | Nabi Baksh | | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | Kamal | | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | Kutab | | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | Dada | | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | Shukal | | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | | | | 185 0 0 | | |
| | *Kuchaks.* | | | | | |
| | Til Khan | | 50 0 0 | | | Will keep 1 Sowar each at disposal of Political Agent. |
| | Nabi Baksh | | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | | | | 90 0 0 | | |
| | One Munshi | | 26 0 0 | 26 0 0 | | |
| | *Kurds.* | | | | | |
| | Yar Muhammad | | | | | |
| | Satakzais | | | 500 0 0 | | |
| | Sirdar Assad Khan | | | 250 0 0 | | |
| | | | | 183 5 4 | | |
| | Sirdar Assad Khan's new service:— | | | | | |
| | Rasul Baksh Jemadar | | 100 0 0 | | | Under orders of Political Agent. |
| | 2 Sowars, at R25 each | | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | | | | 150 0 0 | | |
| | TOTAL BOLAN ESTABLISHMENT | | | ...... | 2,269 5 4 | |
| | Carried over | | | ...... | 12,798 2 8 | |

| No. | Particulars. | | Salary per mensem. | Total. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | R a. p. | R a. p. | |
| | Brought forward . | | ... | 12,798 2 8 | |
| (E) | POLITICAL SERVICES. | | | | |
| | Thal-Chotiálí District. | | | | |
| | *Khahan.* | R a. p. | | | |
| | Sirdar Mehrulla Khan, at R300 . | 300 0 0 | | | |
| | 15 Sowars with do., at R20 each . | 300 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Vakil, at R40 . . . . | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Sowars with Vakil, at R20 each . | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Munshis, at R30 & 20 . . | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 730 0 0 | | |
| | *Sibi.* | | | | |
| | 1 Ressaldar . . . . | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar . . . . . | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Sowars, at R20 each . . . | 200 0 0 | | | |
| | Allowance for 5 hostages, at R20 | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 430 0 0 | | |
| | *Spintangi.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . . | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar . . . . . | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R20 each . . . | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, at R10 „ . . . | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 280 0 0 | | |
| | *Quat.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . . | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar . . . . . | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R20 each . . . | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, at R10 „ . . | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 280 0 0 | | |
| | *Tung.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . . | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R20 each . . . | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, at R10 „ . . . | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 250 0 0 | | |
| | *Gumboli.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . . | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar . . . . . | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R20 each . . . | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, at R10 „ . . . | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 280 0 0 | | |
| | *Thal.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . . | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar . . . . . | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R20 each . . . | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 180 0 0 | | |
| | *Shum.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . . | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar . . . . . | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Sowars, at R20 each . . . | 200 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 280 0 0 | | |
| | *Quat (Orderlies).* | | | | |
| | 1 Rassaldar . . . . | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . . | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar . . . . . | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R20 each . . . | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 280 0 0 | | |
| | *New Marri Service (Orderlies).* | | | | |
| | Khair Baksh, Marri Chief's son | 120 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Sowars, at R20 each . . | 200 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 320 0 0 | | |
| | Carried over . | | 3,310 0 0 | 12,798 2 8 | |

| No. | Particulars. | | Salary per mensem. | Total. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | R a. p. | R a. p. | |
| | Brought forward | | 3,310 0 0 | 12,798 2 8 | |
| | POLITICAL SERVICES—*contd.* | | | | |
| | THAL-CHOTIÁLÍ DISTRICT—*contd.* | | | | |
| | *Pajjah.* | R a. p. | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 3 Sowars, at R20 each | 60 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Footmen, at R10 „ | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 160 0 0 | | |
| | *Bugtis.* | | | | |
| | Ghulam Murtza for the Bugti Tuman | 965 0 0 | | | |
| | Shadi Khan for 1 Daffadar and 8 Sowars. | 215 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 1,180 0 0 | | |
| | *Bugti Posts.* | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 15 Sowars, at R20 each | 300 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 330 0 0 | | |
| | *Shambani.* | | | | |
| | Kenchi Khan Shambani Tumandar | ... | 100 0 0 | | |
| | *Mandokund.* | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R20 each | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 125 0 0 | | |
| | *Guranis.* | | | | |
| | 1 Ressaldar | 150 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 20 Sowars, at R25 each | 500 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 680 0 0 | | |
| | *Rinds.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 75 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 12 Sowars, at R25 each | 300 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 405 0 0 | | |
| | *Barozais.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 9 Sowars at R20 each | 180 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 230 0 0 | | |
| | *Domkis.* | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 8 Sowars, at R20 each | 160 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 190 0 0 | | |
| | *Kajaks.* | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 8 Sowars, at R20 each | 160 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 190 0 0 | | |
| | *Shadozais.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 20 Sowars, at R25 each | 500 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 580 0 0 | | |
| | *Umarzais of Duki.* | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Sowars, at R20 each | 200 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 230 0 0 | | |
| | *Tarins of Thal and Chotiálí.* | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 15 Sowars, at R20 each | 300 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 330 0 0 | | |
| | Carried over | | 8,040 0 0 | 12,798 2 8 | |

| No. | Particulars. | | Salary per mensem. | TOTAL. | REMARKS. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | R a. p. | R a. p. | |
| | Brought forward | | 8,040 0 0 | 12,798 2 8 | |
| | POLITICAL SERVICES—*contd.* | | | | |
| | THAL-CHOTIÁLI DISTRICT—*concld.* | | | | |
| | ***Lunis.*** | R a. p. | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Daffadars, at R30 each | 60 0 0 | | | |
| | 15 Sowars, at R20 „ | 300 0 0 | 410 0 0 | | |
| | ***Kakars.*** | | | | |
| | 20 Sowars, at R25 each | 500 0 0 | 500 0 0 | | |
| | ***Barozais of Sangan.*** | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Sowars, at R25 each | 250 0 0 | 280 0 0 | | |
| | ***Spintangi.*** | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Sowars, at R20 each | 200 0 0 | 230 0 0 | | |
| | ***Kuchali.*** | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Sowars, at R20 each | 200 0 0 | 230 0 0 | | |
| | ***Gandakindaff.*** | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Sowars, at R20 each | 200 0 0 | 230 0 0 | | |
| | Munshis { 1 at R50 / 1 „ 25 } | 75 0 0 | 75 0 0 | | |
| | ***Karim Khan-ka-Kot.*** | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar Bijiranis | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Sowars, at R20 each | 200 0 0 | 230 0 0 | ... | Khetrans. |
| | ***Haji-ka-Kot.*** | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Sowars, at R20 each | 200 0 0 | 230 0 0 | ... | Do. |
| | ***Isani-ka-Kot.*** | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R20 each | 100 0 0 | 130 0 0 | ... | Do. |
| | ***Ruktr.*** | | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Sowars, at R20 each | 200 0 0 | | | |
| | ***Tribes in Harnái neighbourhood.*** | | | | |
| | Bahi Khan, Sarangzai Kakar | 185 0 0 | | | |
| | Shahib, do. | 20 0 0 | | | |
| | Ismail, Vanechi Kakar | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | Kala Khan, do. | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | Hussain, Pechi | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | Ali Muhammad Syud | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | Taran, son of Murad Ali, Chilgarre | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | Sherdil, Taran | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | Esajan Sheikh | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | Allahdad Khan | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | Toti, Mekhiani | 15 0 0 | 500 0 0 | | |
| | Carried over | | 11,315 0 0 | 12,798 2 8 | |

| No. | Particulars. | | Salary per mensem. | Total. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | R a. p. | R a. p. | R a. p. | |
| | Brought forward . | | 11,315 0 0 | 12,798 2 8 | |
| | **POLITICAL SERVICES—*concld.*** | | | | |
| | PANIZAI KAKAR LEVIES. | | | | |
| | *Kachh.* | R a. p. | | | |
| | 1 Subadar, Ibrahim Khan, Head Chief . . . . . . | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 15 Footmen, at R10 each . . | 150 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 200 0 0 | | |
| | *Ispiligi.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . . . | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | 8 Footmen, at R10 each . . | 80 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 120 0 0 | | |
| | *Mangi.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 8 Footmen, at R10 each . . | 80 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 110 0 0 | | |
| | *Chinna.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . . | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 Footmen, at R10 each . . | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . . | 15 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 Footmen, at R10 each . . | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 110 0 0 | | |
| | *Barozai Levies.* | | | | |
| | Sirdar Muhammad Khan . . . | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | ,, Sirbuland Khan . . | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Daffadars, at R30 each . . | 60 0 0 | | | |
| | 12 Sowars, ,, 20 ,, . . | 240 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 500 0 0 | | |
| | TOTAL POLITICAL SERVICES . | | ... | 12,355 0 0 | |
| | **II.—UNDER POLITICAL AGENT, QUETTA AND PISHIN.** | | | | |
| (1) | TRIBAL SERVICE IN PASSES. | | | | |
| | *1.—Sarakulla and Rodh Passes.* | | | | |
| | Malliks Mushkai, Saidad, Yusuf, Yusuf II, Nasir, Musa, Akram, Toran, Lal Khan, and Baidulla Bazais, at R40 each . . . . | | 400 0 0 | | |
| | *2.—Hanna Pass.* | R a. p. | | | |
| | Malliks Pirak, Rahimdad, Zaman Shorif, Bostan, and Nasir Yasinzais . . . . | 72 0 0 | | | |
| | Malliks Waton and Mehrdil for selves and 20 footmen . . . | 216 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 288 0 0 | | |
| | *3.—Uriskai Pass.* | | | | |
| | Taj Muhammad Kasi | | | | |
| | 5 Footmen in Pass . . . | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar at Rs. 30 and 4 Sowars . | 53 0 0 | | | |
| | | 110 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 263 0 0 | | |
| | *4.—Murghai Pass.* | R a p. | | | |
| | Sultan Muhammad | | | | |
| | 8 Footmen in Pass . . . | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar and 2 Sowars . . | 83 0 0 | | | |
| | | 80 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 263 0 0 | | |
| | Carried over . | | 1,214 0 0 | 25,153 2 8 | |

| No. | Particulars. | | Salary per mensem. | Total. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | R a. p. | R a. p. | |
| | Brought forward | | 1,214 0 0 | 25,153 2 8 | |
| | TRIBAL SERVICE IN PASSES—*concld.* | | | | |
| | *5.—Gazáband Pass.* | R a. p. | | | |
| | Malliks Gaibi, Nabu, Majid Hussain Purdil, Zardad, and Suleman, at R40 each | 280 0 0 | | | |
| | Contingencies | 20 0 0 | | | |
| | Mallik Baran | 20 0 0 | 320 0 0 | | |
| | TOTAL TRIBAL SERVICE IN PASSES | | ... | 1,534 0 0 | |
| (II) | LOCAL POSTS. | | | | |
| | *1.—Dinar Karez.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 Khassadars, at R10 each | 40 0 0 | 65 0 0 | | |
| | *2.—Segi.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 Khassadars, at R10 each | 40 0 0 | 65 0 0 | | |
| | *3.—Gulistan.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 Sowars, at R20 each | 80 0 0 | 120 0 0 | | |
| | *4.—Quetta.* | | | | |
| | 1 Durani Jemadar | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 8 Sowars, at R20 each | 160 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Kasi Jemadars, at R40 each | 80 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Sowars, at R20 each | 200 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Bazai Jemadar at R50 and 5 Sowars at R20 each | 150 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Yasinzai Jemadar at R40 and 3 Sowars at R20 each | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Kasi Jemadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Sowars, at R20 each | 40 0 0 | 810 0 0 | | |
| | *5.—Pishin.* | | | | |
| | 1 Bazai Jemadar | 70 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R20 each | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | Alyar Khan, Rustomzai, at R100 | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at 20 each | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Atchakzai Jemadars, at R30 each | 60 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 Sowars, at R20 each | 80 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Kakar Jemadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Sowars, at R20 each | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Horamzai Jemadars, at R70 each | 140 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Sowars, at R20 each | 200 0 0 | 920 0 0 | | |
| | *6—Shorarud.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 70 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Duffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 15 Sowars, at R20 each | 300 0 0 | 400 0 0 | ... | Sowars to be with Political Agent. |
| | *7.—Burshor.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 70 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Ditto | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 30 Khassadars, at R10 each | 300 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Jemadars, at R40 each | 80 0 0 | | | |
| | 8 Sowars, at R20 each | 160 0 0 | 640 0 0 | ... | 4 Sowars to remain with Political Agent. |
| | Carried over | | 3,020 0 0 | 26,687 2 8 | |

| No. | Particulars. | | Salary per mensem. | Total. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | R a. p. | R a. p. | |
| | Brought forward . | | 3,020 0 0 | 26,687 2 0 | |
| | LOCAL POSTS—*concld.* | | | | |
| | *8.—Gwal.* | R a. p. | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . . | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Ditto . . . . . | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 20 Khassadars, at R10 each . | 200 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Jemadars, at R40 each | 80 0 0 | | | |
| | 3 Sowars, at R20 each . . | 140 0 0 | 495 0 0 | | 4 Sowars to remain with Political Agent. |
| | *9.—Haidarzai Road.* | | | | |
| | 1 Syed Jemadar . . . | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Khassadars, at R10 each . | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Kakar Jemadar . . . | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Khassadars, at R10 each . | 100 0 0 | 260 0 0 | | |
| | *10.—Malizai.* | | | | |
| | 1 Tarin Jemadar . . . | 20 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Khassadars, at R10 each . | 50 0 0 | 70 0 0 | | |
| | *11.—Khúshdil Khán.* | | | | |
| | 1 Tarin Jemadar . . . | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R20 each . . | 100 0 0 | 140 0 0 | | |
| | TOTAL LOCAL POSTS . | | ... | 3,985 0 0 | |
| (III) | REVENUE LEVIES. | | | | |
| | Mirza Hyder Kuli Khan, Tehsildar . | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 6 Sowars, at R20 each . . | 120 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 " at Gulistan, R20 each | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 " at Pishín, R20 each | 100 0 0 | 370 0 0 | 370 0 0 | |
| (IV) | ATCHAKZAI SERVICE. | | | | |
| | Abdul Hamid . . . . | 250 0 0 | | | |
| | 15 Sowars, at R20 each . . | 300 0 0 | | | |
| | Ghulam Hyder . . . | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R20 each . | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 90 Khassadars, at R10 each | 900 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Sadbashi . . . . | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Panjabashis, at R50 each | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Dehbashis, at R12 each . | 120 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Jemadars, at R12 each . | 24 0 0 | | | |
| | 6 Caretakers, at R10 each . | 60 0 0 | 2,004 0 0 | 2,004 0 0 | |
| (V) | MISCELLANEOUS. | | | | |
| | Kirari Syuds . . . . | 130 0 0 | | | |
| | Kazi . . . . . | 10 0 0 | | | |
| | Mohim Khan, nephew of Sirdar Gowhar Khan, with 3 Sowars . | 30 0 0 | 440 0 0 | 440 0 0 | |
| (VI) | DISTRICT POSTAL SERVICE. | | | | |
| | *1.—Quetta to Kachh.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar . . . . | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 6 Footmen at Quetta, at R10 each . | 60 0 0 | | | |
| | 6 " at Sarakulla, at R10 each | 60 0 0 | | | |
| | 6 " at Sarantangi, at R10 each | 60 0 0 | 210 0 0 | | |
| | *2.—Quetta to Pishín.* | | | | |
| | 2 Jemadars, at R40 each . | 80 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 Sowars at Quetta, at R25 each . | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 " Kuchlak, at R25 each . | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 " Syad Yaru, at R25 each | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 " Pishín, at R25 each . | 100 0 0 | 480 0 0 | | |
| | Carried over . | | 690 0 0 | 33,486 2 8 | |

| No. | Particulars. | | Salary per mensem. | Total. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | R a. p. | R a. p. | |
| | Brought forward | | 690 0 0 | 33,486 2 8 | |
| | **DISTRICT POSTAL SERVICE**—*concld.* | | | | |
| | *3.—Pishín to Chaman.* | R a. p. | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 12 Sowars, at R25 each | 300 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 400 0 0 | | |
| | *4.—Pishín to Gulistan.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 40 0 0 | | | |
| | 4 Sowars, at R25 each | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 140 0 0 | | |
| | | | | 1,230 0 0 | |
| (VII) | **KALÁT POSTAL AND TELEGRAPH SERVICE.** | | | | |
| | *Postal.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar and 14 Sowars | | 333 5 4 | | |
| | *Telegraph.* | | | | |
| | 2 Daffadars, at R30 each | 60 0 0 | | | |
| | 7 Sowars, at R20 each | 140 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Munshi | 20 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 220 0 0 | | |
| | | | | 553 5 4 | |
| VIII | **DISTRICT POLICE.** | | | | |
| | 1 Inspector | 200 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Deputy Inspector | 60 0 0 | | | |
| | 7 Daffadars, at R35 each | 245 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Munshi | 35 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 " | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Court Inspector | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 22 First class Mounted Sergeants, at R31 each | 682 0 0 | | | |
| | 35 Second class ditto, at R25 each | 875 0 0 | | | |
| | 3 First class Sergeants, at R25 each | 75 0 0 | | | |
| | 6 Second class ditto, at R15 each | 90 0 0 | | | |
| | 7 Naiks, at R12 each | 84 0 0 | | | |
| | 50 First class Constables, at R10 each | 500 0 0 | | | |
| | 55 Second class ditto, at R9 each | 495 0 0 | | | |
| | 65 Third class ditto, at R8 each | 520 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Bhisties, at R10 each | 20 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Sweepers, at R10 each | 20 0 0 | | | |
| | Rations for 257 men at R3-8 per man | 899 8 0 | | | |
| | Clothing allowance for 259 men, at R10 per year = per month | 215 13 4 | | | |
| | Hospital Assistant allowance | 10 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 5,081 5 4 | | |
| | | | | 5,081 5 4 | |
| | **SUPERINTENDENT OF LEVIES.** | | | | |
| | *1.—Head-Quarters (Quetta).* | | | | |
| | 1 Ressaldar | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 25 Sowars, at R25 each | 625 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Writer | 70 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Mohurir | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Chaprassis, R10 each | 20 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 925 0 0 | | |
| | *2.—Kachh.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 35 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R25 each | 125 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Havildars, at R16 each | 32 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Naiks, at R14 each | 28 0 0 | | | |
| | 40 Footmen, at R12 each | 480 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 750 0 0 | | |
| | Carried over | | 1,675 0 0 | 40,350 13 4 | |

| No. | Particulars. | | Salary per mensem. | Total. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | R a. p. | R a. p. | |
| | Brought forward | | 1,675 0 0 | 40,350 13 4 | |
| | **SUPERINTENDENT OF LEVIES—*contd.*** | | | | |
| | ***3.—Gulistan.*** | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Havildar | 16 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Naik | 14 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R25 each | 125 0 0 | | | |
| | 25 Footmen, at R12 each | 300 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Sweeper | 10 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 545 0 0 | | |
| | ***4.—Khúsdil Khán.*** | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Havildar | 16 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Naik | 14 0 0 | | | |
| | 5 Sowars, at R25 each | 125 0 0 | | | |
| | 20 Footmen, at R12 each | 240 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Sweeper | 10 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 485 0 0 | | |
| | ***5.—Thali.*** | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 2 Daffadars, at R30 each | 60 0 0 | | | |
| | 30 Sowars, at R20 each | 600 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 710 0 0 | | |
| | ***6.—Mall.*** | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 25 Sowars, at R20 each | 500 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 580 0 0 | | |
| | ***7.—Lehri.*** | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 20 Sowars, at R20 each | 400 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 480 0 0 | | |
| | ***8.—Puleji.*** | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 15 Sowars, at R20 each | 300 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 380 0 0 | | |
| | ***9.—Gandoi.*** | | | | |
| | 1 Ressaldar | 100 0 0* | | | * Command the three Bugti posts of Gandoi, Shahpur, and Ghoranari. |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 0 0* | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 15 Sowars, at R20 each | 300 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 480 0 0 | | |
| | ***10.—Shahpur.*** | R a. p. | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 15 Sowars, at R25 each | 375 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 455 0 0 | | |
| | ***11.—Ghoranari.*** | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 1 Daffadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 15 Sowars, at R25 each | 375 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 455 0 0 | | |
| | ***12.—Hankoi.*** | | | | |
| | 3 Jemadars } Horse { at R50 each | 150 0 0 | | | |
| | 30 Sowars } { ,, 25 ,, | 750 0 0 | | | |
| | 3 Jemadars, at R25 each | 75 0 0 | | | |
| | 30 Footmen, at R10 each | 300 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 1,275 0 0 | | |
| | ***13.—Rindli.*** | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 7 Sowars, at R25 each | 175 0 0 | | | |
| | | | 225 0 0 | | |
| | Carried over | | 7,745 0 0 | 40,350 13 4 | |

| No. | Particulars. | | Salary per mensem. | Total. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | R a. p. | R a. p. | |
| | Brought forward | | 7,745 0 0 | 40,350 13 4 | |
| | **SUPERINTENDENT OF LEVIES—contd.** | | | | |
| | *14.—Pir Chowki.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, at R10 each | 100 0 0 | 125 0 0 | | |
| | *15.—Kuṇdilani.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 25 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, at R10 each | 100 0 0 | 125 0 0 | | |
| | *16.—Draj[illegible]* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, at R10 each | 100 0 0 | 130 0 0 | | |
| | *17.—South Kirta.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, at R10 each | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 8 Sowars, at R25 each | 200 0 0 | 330 0 0 | | |
| | *18.—Bibinani.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, at R10 each | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 8 Sowars, at R25 each | 200 0 0 | 330 0 0 | | |
| | *19.—Abigum.* | | | | |
| | 2 Jemadars, at R25 each | 50 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, at R10 each | 100 0 0 | 150 0 0 | | |
| | *20.—Mach.* | | | | |
| | 3 Jemadars, at R30 each | 90 0 0 | | | |
| | 15 Footmen, at R10 each | 150 0 0 | | | |
| | 8 Sowars, at R25 each | 200 0 0 | 440 0 0 | | |
| | *21.—Dozan.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, at R10 each | 100 0 0 | 130 0 0 | | |
| | *22.—Dasht (Kurds).* | | | | |
| | 2 Jemadars, at R 30 each | 60 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, at R10 each | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 8 Sowars, at R25 each | 200 0 0 | 360 0 0 | | |
| | *23.—New Karez.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 30 0 0 | | | |
| | 10 Footmen, at R10 each | 100 0 0 | 130 0 0 | | |
| | *24.—Quetta.* | | | | |
| | 1 Jemadar | 100 0 0 | | | |
| | 6 Sowars, at R25 each | 150 0 0 | 250 0 0 | 10,245 0 0 | |
| | **POLICE FOR POLITICAL AGENT, JACOBABAD.** | | | | |
| | 2 Head Constables, at R15 and 12 | 27 0 0 | | | |
| | 8 Constables, at R10 each | 80 0 0 | 107 0 0 | 107 0 0 | |
| | Captain Gaisford's pay debitable to Tribal service—see paragraph 83 | 200 0 0 | 200 0 0 | 200 0 0 | |
| | Increase to Major Mosley's pay—see paragraph 7 | 200 0 0 | 200 0 0 | 200 0 0 | |
| | GRAND TOTAL | | | 51,102 13 4 | |

| No. | Particulars. | | Salary per mensem. | Total. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | R a. p. | R a. p. | |
| | **BOLAN POSTS.** | | | | |
| 1 | Havildar, 1st grade . | 25 0 0 | 25 0 0 | | |
| | *Pir Chowki.* | | | | |
| 1 | Havildar, 2nd grade . . | 15 0 0 | | | |
| 9 | Constables, at R10 each . | 90 0 0 | 105 0 0 | | |
| | *Kundilani.* | | | | |
| 1 | Havildar . . . . | 15 0 0 | | | |
| 9 | Constables, at R10 each . | 90 0 0 | 105 0 0 | | |
| | *South Kirta.* | | | | |
| 1 | Havildar . . . . | 15 0 0 | | | |
| 9 | Constables, at R10 each . | 90 0 0 | 105 0 0 | | |
| | *Bibinani.* | | | | |
| 1 | Havildar . . . . | 15 0 0 | | | |
| 9 | Constables, at R10 each . | 90 0 0 | 105 0 0 | | |
| | *Mach.* | | | | |
| 1 | Havildar . . . . | 15 0 0 | | | |
| 9 | Constables, at R10 each . | 90 0 0 | 105 0 0 | | |
| | *Dozan.* | | | | |
| 1 | Havildar . . . . | 15 0 0 | | | |
| 9 | Constables, at R10 each . | 90 0 0 | 105 0 0 | | |
| | *Dasht.* | | | | |
| 1 | Havildar . . . . | 15 0 0 | | | |
| 9 | Constables, at R10 each . | 90 0 0 | 105 0 0 | | |
| | *Siriab.* | | | | |
| 1 | Havildar . . . . | 15 0 0 | | | |
| 9 | Constables, at R10 each . | 90 0 0 | 105 0 0 | | |
| | FOR ESCORT PURPOSES BETWEEN PIR CHOWKI AND MACH. | | | | |
| 2 | Havildars, at R15 each . | 30 0 0 | | | |
| 20 | Constables, at R10 each . | 200 0 0 | 230 0 0 | | |
| | TOTAL . | | 1,095 0 0 | | |

# CHAPTER VIII.

Introduction.

433. In the previous chapters of this report frequent mention has been made of the tribes within the Thal-Chotiálí district. Throughout the second, third, fourth and fifth chapters reference will repeatedly be found to the Marri tribe, and the steps which have, from time to time, been taken in view to their pacification. In the fourth chapter will be found an account of the efforts which were made to open the Thal-Chotiálí route from 1875 to 1878, a description of the Vitakri valley, and the march of General Biddulph's force through Thal-Chotiálí. In the fifth chapter an account of the murder of Captain Showers has been given, and the punishment of the tribes concerned. In that chapter will also be found information as to the abandonment of the Harnáí route after the reverse experienced by General Burrows at Maiwand; the attack of the Marris on a railway convoy—generally known as the Kuchali raid; the consequent march of General MacGregor's brigade into the Marri country; the subsequent pacification of the tribe by Sir R. Sandeman; the occupation of Sibi, and the value of that district. In this chapter a general description of the Thal-Chotiálí and Sibi districts, which are now amalgamated and placed under a Political Agent, will be given, together with some information as to the various disputes between the tribes which have of late years been settled, and the means which have been from time to time taken for the pacification of the tribesmen; the various administrative undertakings which have received attention; the circumstances which led to, the expedition into the Zhob country; the method of collecting the revenue, and the amounts collected in Thal-Chotiálí, together with a notice of Sibi affairs, and the revenue collections made there.

General description of the Thal-Chotiálí district.

434. According to Mr. Duke, on the north of Thal-Chotiálí lie the Dumar hills, the Bori valley, and the Musa Khel country. The control of our relations with Zhob, the Bori valley, and Musa Khel country has lately been placed under the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí. On the east lies the Marri country, and on the south and south-west lie the hills which flank the Bolan Pass. For convenience of administration, the country has been divided into five subdivisions: (1) Kachh, Amadún, Khawhás, and the Kakar tribes; (2) the Zawar valley; (3) the Sángán valley; (4) the Marri-Bugtí hills; and (5) Thal-Chotiálí. Sibi, at the time Mr. Duke administered the district, was not under his administration; it has since been added. The first three of these were, when Mr. Duke had charge of the district, worked by the Native Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General, Hak Nawaz Khán; the Marri hills were worked entirely by the Political Officer personally; and at Thal-Chotiálí there was a tehsildar. The levy of revenue from these districts by the Kandahar Government, the efforts of Sir Robert (then Captain) Sandeman to open the trade routes, the raids of the Marris, the efforts and success of the Agent to the Governor General to induce the Government of India to place troops at Vitakri, Thal, Harnáí and other places, and the eventual settlement of the Marri tribe, have all been previously explained.

General description of Kachh, Khawhás and Hamdún. First revenue collections.

435. In the valleys of Kachh, Amadún and Khawhás are the most westerly sources of the Nari river, the valleys are fertile and well cultivated, the huts of the inhabitants are surrounded with trees, and juniper forests extend over the mountain sides. At Kachh there is a fort. Khawhás is a flourishing

village of about 200 houses, and the same may be said of Amadún. Revenue was first taken from these villages by Captain H. Wylie in 1879, then in charge of Pishín; from Kachh nothing was taken; Khawhás paid a small sum. The principal tribes inhabiting these valleys are Panizais, Sarangzais, and Tarins. In 1880, when he was again collecting revenue, his proceedings were brought to a termination by the reverse at Maiwand. These valleys were subsequently placed under the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí. In 1881, Colonel St. John, on Mr. Duke's recommendation, fixed a lump assessment for the two valleys, *viz.*, 1,000 maunds of produce; and the following arrangements were made, the total 1,000 maunds were divided into 20 shares as given below:—

| Name of tribe. | Village. | Maunds. |
|---|---|---|
| Tarins, 10 shares | Khawhás | 454 |
| | Hamdún | 46 |
| Panizais | Dirgai | 100 |
| | Chínah | 100 |
| | Kachh, Amadún, Kajjha, Kában | 100 |
| Sarangzais, 3 shares | | 150 |
| Ísá Khels, 1 share | | 50 |
| | | 1,000 |

Mr. Duke reported "that this arrangement gave great satisfaction to the majority of the people concerned: two-thirds of this tax were to be paid from the spring crop, one-third from the autumn crop, and the people were to bring the grain at their own expense to Kachh. The whole of these conditions were punctually fulfilled."

436. It has been previously noted that after the establishment of the Agency in 1877, friendly relations were opened with the Kakar tribes; a Political Officer was appointed to the charge of the Harnái route in 1880. In June 1881 service was given to the Panizai Kakars, to the extent of ₨462 per mensem, and men were required to be kept at four posts. Information as to the service given to the tribesmen under the management of the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí, will be found in the report on the levy scheme, included in the previous chapter. The total number of families of the Panizais, Sarangzais, Tarins, Tarans and Isa Khel inhabitants of these valleys were calculated by Mr. Duke at 785.

*Service granted to the Kakars.*

437. The Zawar valley, extending from the Chhapar mountain to Spin Tangi, is 56 miles in length, and is, according to Mr. Duke, bounded on the north by the Khalífat and Pán mountains, on the south by a rocky range of hills, its eastern end is nearly closed by the Gulu Sháh hill, while its western extremity is terminated by the Chhapar mountain, which is closed by an extraordinary gorge known as the Chhapar rift, about 2½ miles long, through which the Mangi river flows into the Zawar valley, where, after receiving in its course several minor streams, it eventually joins the Nari river. The chief villages are Dirgai, Khost, Harnái and Babián. Running parallel with the Zawar valley to the north are the Khawhás and Smalan valleys. To the south are the Sángán and Bahdera valleys. It is flanked by Pur and Thal on the east, and by the Mangi valley and the Pur mountain on the west. Near Sháhrig are some coal beds. The Zawār valley is held by Kakars as far as the southern limits of Dirgai, and from Khost to Spin Tangi it is occupied by Spin Tarins divided

*General description of the Zawar valley.*

into two sections—the Vanechis and Mekhianis. Ismail, the Vanechi headman, surrendered to Sir R. Sandeman in January 1881, and with others undertook to keep the passes open. There are also to be found in the valley Pechis, Tarans, and Sheikhs. The cultivation of Zawar is good, and the irrigation system excellent; wheat constitutes the staple spring crop, and rice the autumn crop; the lands are not rich, and are more or less exhausted from over-cultivation. The Harnái cattle are said to be excellent. The Zawar people are all Sunni Musalmans. When the country was settled after the murder of Captain Showers, a sum of R450 per mensem was expended on tribal service, to the tribes inhabiting the valley. Information as to the murder of Captain Showers, and regarding the sums spent in tribal service both here and elsewhere, will be found in previous chapters.

General description of the Sángán district.

438. The Sángán district may be said to be bounded by the Dadar plain on the south, the Bolan Pass on the west, the Bahdera valley on the east, and the Zawar valley on the north; from all of which, except the Bahdera valley, it is separated by lofty and difficult mountain ranges. The valley contains about 9,115 acres of arable land, its length is about eight miles and its drainage is to the Nari. The village of Sángán is the only village in the valley; good grazing is to be found there.

General description of the Thal-Chotiálí plateau.

439. The Thal-Chotiálí plateau is, Mr. Duke says, bounded by hills extending from the Syálú range to the Chamalang valley, on the south-west is the Mazari hill, at the eastern extremity are the Sarlarra hills; the chief stream is the Bheji river, which joins the Nari. In the wet season on the Karai plain there is a lagoon. The districts surrounding the plateau are, to the north the Bori valley, to the west the district of Bábíán, to the south the Marri and Zarkhan country, and to the east districts depopulated by tribal disputes. The plateau is divided into four townships—Thal, Jalar, Duki, and Chotiálí; they are not superabundantly supplied with water. The soil is cut up by a number of torrents, the Narechí, the Hanambár and the Baladaka. There are but few trees; in years when the rainfall is heavy there is a considerable supply of grass and fodder. Before the advent of the British the perpetual state of strife in which the people lived had indirectly done much to weaken the population; each village was at feud with its neighbour, whilst the Marris and the Kakars harried them all; owing to this state of affairs the people could not go far from their villages without special arrangements. The inhabitants are mostly of the Afghan race, and are chiefly Spin Tarins, Hasanis, Shadozais, Lunis, and Kakars.

Revenue formerly levied.

440. Revenue was levied from the plateau many years ago by Ahmad Sháh, Durani, who at one time appointed a Governor, but Ahmad Sháh seems to have had a weak hold over the valley, to govern which from Kandahar some attempt was made. Occasionally revenue was raised with the help of sepoys from Kandahar, but before the arrival of the British no revenues had been raised from Thal for 14 years. At that time the Shadozais were the leading men, taking half of the produce of lands watered by Thal streams, about $\frac{1}{6}$th of the produce of lands held by the Hasanis and Lunis; they had, however, to pay blackmail to the Marris. Mr. Duke, writing in 1883, says—

"that lands irrigated by the Thal stream now pay one-sixth to Government, and the Tarins and the Shadozais divide equally the remainder of the produce between them. At Duki one-sixth is collected from all lands in the township. The Government share is collected in kind, and is

stored in the villages until required. One-sixth is taken from all lands whether irrigated by stream, storm or karez waters, and irrespective of the different kinds of tenure which were formerly in vogue."

Information as to the revenue of the district will be found further on.

Review of the administration of Thal-Chotiálí, 1883.

441. The Thal-Chotiálí plateau was first traversed by troops when Colonel Keen and Sir R. Sandeman passed through it in 1879; an account of this expedition has been given in a previous chapter. It was afterwards visited by Captain Showers; and subsequently Sir R. Temple, in company with Sir R. Sandeman, made a tour in the valley; the escort which accompanied them was left at Thal as a garrison. When Vitakri was abandoned as a military station in January 1880, Captain Showers, who at that time held political charge, was relieved by Lieutenant Jennings, who did much work, commencing the collection of revenue, the construction of lines, civil offices, &c., but his efforts were cut short by the abandonment of Thal and of the railway line consequent on the reverse at Maiwand in July 1880. In October of the same year, Thal was re-occupied by a regiment of infantry, another of cavalry, and two mountain guns. Lieutenant Jennings returned to Thal in December of that year, and was relieved by Mr. Duke in February 1881. The Marri tribe were humbled by the march of General MacGregor's troops through the valley, and a road through their country was constructed in 1881. The Political Officer at Thal was assisted by a tehsildar and a thanadar when Mr. Duke was there. All criminal cases in which British subjects were not concerned were settled by a council of elders, and Mr. Duke says, "We have enforced the decisions of the elders as if they had been our own judicial orders; the system of village responsibility has been carefully inculcated, and in every possible way interference has been minimised." A small garrison was kept up at this time at Thal, where some Baluch Guides were located. A small outpost of sowars was placed at the Jalar Pass to check Marri and Kakar raiding parties, who used to come across the Sembhar Pass. Mr. Duke effected some settlements between the Marris and the Dumars, and between the Lunis and the Marris. In the Zhob direction Baretch Khán, of Smalan, undertook for Sháh Jahan, of Zhob, the protection of the border; and it was arranged that the freedom of Bagao from the taxation which Lieutenant Jennings had taken from it depended on the safety of the border. The tribes to the north of Thal received no service from Government in Mr. Duke's time.

Officers who have held the post of Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General at Harnáí, and Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí.

442. At one time there was an Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General at Harnáí; the post was held by Surgeon Major O. T. Duke, Lieutenant R. H. Jennings, and Mr. R. I. Bruce, C.I.E. The post became merged in that of Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí, which is now held by Mr. R. I. Bruce, C.I.E. Captain Gaisford has been appointed Assistant to the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí, and Assistant Superintendent of Levies since 25th April 1883. Sibi is now included in the Thal-Chotiálí district. Mr. Dames and Mr. Biddulph have both been on special duty there in past years. The Native Assistants employed in the district are Rai Bahadur Hittu Ram, C.I.E., and Hak Nawaz Khán.

Duties of Mr. Duke, Political Agent in charge of Harnáí and the neighbouring valleys, March 1880.

443. In a memorandum, dated 1st March 1880, the duties of the Political Officer, Mr. Duke, in charge of the Harnáí portion of the assigned district of Sibi, were defined. He was placed in administrative charge of the Zawar, Harnáí and Sángán valleys; his jurisdiction extending from the Harnáí gorge

to Dirgai, including the railway operations in the Chhapar rift. He was charged with the realization of revenue in these valleys (any doubtful point being referred for orders to the Agent to the Governor General), and the improvement of the Sibi, Harnáí and Thal postal line. Hak Nawaz Khán was placed in subordination to him. The Marri sowars for the protection of the telegraph line and the carriage of the mails were placed under his orders, but the general management of the tribe remained in the hands of the Agent to the Governor General. Mr. Duke was, however, to use every endeavour to conciliate the Marri and Pathan tribes, in order to ensure the safety of the thousands of labourers working upon the railway line which was at that time under construction.

Tour of Colonel (now Sir O.) St. John. Service given to the Kakars in 1881, and revenue to be taken from Kachh, Khawhás, and Hamdún.

444. Colonel St. John in the middle of 1881 made a tour in the country inhabited by the Kakars of Kachh and the neighbouring villages. As to the fortified post at Kachh, he observed that it was at the junction of four roads from Sibi, Quetta, Pishín, and the Kakar country; that a military post was requisite there for the guarding of the Harnáí route, but that the post was in a weak position for defence. Arrangements were made with the Kakar headmen for the realization of revenue and the giving of service. Prior to the treaty of Gandamak no land revenue had been paid by the inhabitants of Kachh, Khawhás, and Amadún, to the Kandahar Sirdars, but their liability to personal service was commuted to a money payment. Some revenue was collected from them in 1879 by Captain H. Wylie. In 1880 occurred the murder of Captain Showers and other troubles which have been previously described; the Kakars were then given service by Sir R. Sandeman, and to this Colonel St. John recommended an addition. For the collection of the revenue Colonel St. John fixed a lump assessment of 1,000 maunds of produce. These arrangements received the sanction of the Government of India.

Settlements of disputes between the Bugtís, Mazaris, and other tribes in 1881.

445. In 1881 a number of disputes, in which the Bugtís, Mazaris, and several other tribes were concerned, arose, when Lieutenant Jennings, R.E., was in charge. They led to a course of mutual retaliation and murders, and threatened to generally disturb the peace of the Sind-Punjab frontier. Colonel Reynolds satisfactorily settled them in the following way. It was decided that the matters in dispute should be referred to a jirga to be assembled at Jacobabad; and this arrangement was carried out. At the same time the terms on which service and pay were given to the Bugtís was revised. To prevent the further prosecution of blood feuds, all the parties concerned agreed to pay Government a fine of R1,000 in addition to the ordinary blood money, R600. The principle on which the revision of service was based was, that payments to the tribes should be only made in return for service actually performed, and while retaining the sum of R1,610 per mensem, which had been previously granted, the amount was redistributed. The scheme also provided for the general submission of the tribe to the British Government; the giving of hostages by the principal sections of the tribes; the naming and definition of the duties of the chiefs of tribal sections; and the residence with the chief of the tribe, Ghulam Murtaza, of a Resaldar of the Baluch Guides with 12 sowars. The Government of India expressed satisfaction at the settlement of the disputes and the arrangements made as to the tribal service. As to the submission of the tribe to the British Government, it was understood that no new responsibilities had been incurred. In November 1881 payments recommended by the Agent to the Governor General for the Kahiri and Dumki tribes of R1,810 and R800,

respectively, were sanctioned; these payments had been awarded by the jirga to the Dumkis and Kahiris against the Marris. As to the hostages, the Government of India sanctioned the charge for the subsistence of these men being entered in the contingent bill of the Agent to the Governor General's Assistant at Jacobabad. It was at the same time suggested that the presence of the hostages should be dispensed with, it being understood that in the event of hostages being again required, their subsistence must be provided for either by the tribe, or by a corresponding reduction in the service grant.

Settlement of disputes between the Bozdárs and Bugtís, 1882.

146. In June 1882 hostilities broke out between the Bozdars and the Bugtís, in which the Ghulamani section of the former and the Massori section of the latter were more immediately involved. In view to healing the breach between the two tribes, Mr. Fryer, the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan, and Mr. Bruce met together with the headmen concerned at Fort Munro, and a jirga was formed for the settlement of the matters in dispute according to Baluch custom. A settlement was effected upon the basis of renunciation of mutual demands by the tribes at enmity. The headmen agreed to pay a fine of R1,000, and compensation at the rate of R600 for every man killed if the agreement were broken. Hostages for the fulfilment of the engagement were sent to Jacobabad and Dera Ghazi Khan by the tribe. For the subsistence allowance of the hostages at Jacobabad the Agent to the Governor General asked for sanction to a monthly expenditure of R40. The Government of India expressed satisfaction at the settlement effected, but with respect to the R40, an enquiry was made as to whether the sum could not be met from the service grant payable to the Bugtí tribe. The Agent to the Governor General, however, urged that it would not be judicious to reduce the allowances paid to the tribe. The Government of India then sanctioned the sum as a special case, adding that in future "when engagements are made with, and allowances are granted to, tribes on the Baluch frontier, they should understand that these allowances are liable to deductions on account of subsistence charges to hostages." Retrospective effect was not, however, given to this principle.

The Marri tribe, 1881 and 1882.

447. The measures taken for the pacification of the Marri tribe, and the sending of a force into their country under General MacGregor, have already been explained in this report, in the previous chapters of which constant reference to this tribe, which has played for a long series of years so important a part in Baluchistan politics, and in all matters connected with the management and control of the frontier tribes, has necessarily been made. When reviewing the proceedings taken by Sir R. Sandeman for the enforcement of the terms which the Government of India had determined to require from the Marris, it was observed by the Government of India that "His Excellency in Council considers that the task of aiding the chief of the Marris in reducing to obedience the refractory members of this tribe, though one of no small difficulty, was under your direction brought to a settlement which is likely to be durable;" and it was also remarked that the measures taken by Sir R. Sandeman "were characterized by promptitude and energy." On account of the destruction of the crops of Quat Mandai, the sum of R25,000 from the balance of the fine due was remitted. In May 1881 the Agent to the Governor General reported to the Government of India regarding the working of the arrangements made for the management of the tribe, and the performance of their engagements. With regard to the Loharani Marris, some difficulty was experienced in getting from them a hostage, who was, however, eventually obtained. As to the payment of the sum of R50,000, being the balance of the fine due by the Marris, it was anticipated that the levy of the

fine would be a very difficult task, and it was proposed that the payment of this sum should be held *in terrorem* over the tribe, to be insisted on in case of any infringement of the terms granted to them. The Government of India decided that the Marri Sirdar should be distinctly given to understand that the demand with respect to the fine was being held in reserve, and that any remission which might ultimately be made could only be made as a reward for proved good behaviour on the part of the tribe. During the year 1881 a large number of disputes and cases were settled with the Marri tribe, most of the property from time to time plundered by the tribe was recovered, and the behaviour of the tribe was found to be improving. These results were considered by the Government of India to be very satisfactory, and in June 1882 the addition of R480 to the Marri service was sanctioned for the purpose of maintaining a small post of levies in the Pajjah plain, and of providing some suitable employment for Sirdar Mehrulla Khán's eldest son, Khair Baksh. The whole sum of R1,25,000, which was recovered from the Marris, was credited to the accounts of the Kandahar State Railway. The loss occasioned by the abandonment of railway, tools, plant, and stores during the evacuation of the Harnái route, in 1880, was reported to be R3,50,772-3-5, and was charged off in the accounts. Colonel St. John, while officiating as Agent to the Governor General, recommended the grant of sums not exceeding one month's pay in each case to Messrs. Duke and Jennings, to their office establishments, and to certain employés of the Postal Department. The Government of India, however, adhered to the rule "which debars the grant of compensation to Political Officers and others for private losses sustained on active service," and declined to grant the compensation recommended. It may be here noted that a detailed account of the Marri tribe drawn up by Mr. Bruce, the Political Officer in charge of them, will be found among the appendices of this report.

Disputes on the Dera Ghazi Khan frontier settled in 1882.

448. About the commencement of the year 1882 a large number of cases between the Marris on the one hand, and the Khetrans and other Baluch tribes on the other hand, on the Dera Ghazi Khan border, were settled by the united efforts of Mr. Duke, then Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General in Thal-Chotiálí; and Mr. Fryer, Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan. Many of these cases had been pending for some time, and prior to their settlement Mr. Duke discussed the question with Mr. Fryer. Subsequently the cases were taken up by Mr. Fryer, and many of them were settled by him; it was intended that Mr. Duke should go to Dera Ghazi Khan to settle the cases, but he was unable to do so. Mr. Duke and the Agent to the Governor General concurred in the arrangements made by Mr. Fryer; and the Agent to the Governor General expressed his obligations to that officer for his cordial co-operation in the matter. The Governor General in Council considered it satisfactory that "these officers have been able to meet and effect a settlement of so many disputes." All remaining disputes were settled by Mr. Bruce during the year, and at a meeting between Mr. Bruce and Mr. Fryer certain rules for the reporting of border cases were drawn up and approved by both the Panjab Government and the Government of India, which have worked well.

Serious quarrels between the Marris and Bugtís, 1883.

449. In 1883 serious quarrels which had arisen between the Marris and Bugtís were settled. It appears that two Loharani Marris, who had business transactions with the Bugtís, visited Bibruk Dera, the head-quarters of the Bugtí tribe. When there, intimation was given to the post of Sind Horse at Sui that the two Marris were in the country with the intention of thieving in the Sind districts of Jacobabad. These two Marris, on leaving the head-quarters of the Bugtís,

were followed by a party of Sind Horse accompanied by a few Baluch Guides. On the Sind Horse sowars coming up with the two Marris, the Marris were directed to surrender. Certain Baluch Guides, by order of a non-commissioned officer commanding the party, fired on the two Marris, one of whom was killed, while the other was taken prisoner. Prior to this the Bugtí Chief had asked the Marris to expel some Bugtí refugees from the Marri country. The Marris did not comply, and this was the probable reason why the British post at Sui was led to try to apprehend the Marris, which on such information should not have been done. Directly the Marris heard of the death of their clansmen, they at once held the Bugtís responsible, and killed a man of that clan in retaliation; the Bugtís then assembled from 1,000 to 1,200 horse and foot and attacked the Marris, killing five men, and carrying off nearly 700 head of cattle, sheep and goats. The Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí, then took measures to prevent the quarrel from spreading; but finding that the matter was becoming serious, and apprehending a disturbance of the whole frontier from Jacobabad to Dera Ghazi Khan, Mr. Bruce referred the dispute to the Agent to the Governor General, saying that he could not be responsible that the Marris might not any day attack the Bugtís in force.

Settlement of the disputes by Sir R. Sandeman, 1883.

450. The Agent to the Governor General then determined to visit the Marri hills in view to arbitrating with regard to the quarrel; and on doing so was joined by the chiefs and headmen of both tribes, and a jirga was appointed to hear the case. The jirga decided that Data Mandrana, Bugtí, the original cause of the quarrel, should be made over to Mr. Bruce for trial according to tribal custom, which was done; that restorations of, and compensations for, property should be made by both sides; that the Marris should make over to the Political Agent certain refugees, who would settle the quarrel between the refugees and their clansmen in accordance with Baluch custom. Certain hostages were given, and the whole settlement was ratified in public darbar. The Viceroy and Governor General in Council considered the settlement arrived at to be "very satisfactory," and the Secretary of State, in a despatch to the Viceroy, said—

"I concur in the opinion, which you have expressed, that the settlement of this case, effected by the Agent to the Governor General in Baluchistan, is very satisfactory, and reflects much credit on Sir R. Sandeman and the officers (Mr. Barnes and Mr. Bruce) associated with him."

Dispute between the Umarzais of Duki and the Dumars of Bagao.

451. In December 1882, Mr. Bruce submitted a report on a quarrel which had arisen between the Umarzais of Duki and the Dumars of Bagao. It seems that a stream of water, on which the northern lands of Duki are completely dependent for their cultivation, passes through the Dumar hills at Bagao. A dispute as to this water had arisen 14 years previously, in which the Dumars killed a man and commenced a blood feud which lasted for many years. Temporary truces were rudely broken, and the quarrel reached a stage at which the interference of British officers became absolutely necessary. Temporary settlements were made by Mr. Duke and Colonel Waterfield, but they were not of a lasting nature. In the year 1882 the Dumars made a raid on the Umarzais and killed 16 of them. The case was enquired into by Mr. Bruce on the spot, with the aid of a jirga. The jirga were of opinion that the lives taken on both sides balanced one another, and that for the future R1,000 fine should be inflicted for each life taken without provocation. Since the commencement of the feud 83 lives had been taken. The jirga also made some money awards; and it was arranged that up to a certain point the Duki water was to be protected by the Dumars. Minor points were at the same time settled; and an agreement ratified in darbar,

the terms of which were carried out. Mr. Bruce considered that he had never seen a more difficult case brought up before a jirga.

Dispute between the Dumar Kakars and the Mekhiani Tarins.

452. During 1882 Mr. Bruce also reported that a dispute had arisen between the Kanozai section of the Dumar Kakars of Pui, together with a few Zakhphels, and the Mekhiani Tarins of Harnáí, in which the Dumars killed six men and carried off a large amount of cattle and property. Into this case also Mr. Bruce enquired. This and the case referred to in the last paragraph implicated more or less the whole of the Dumar tribe. This dispute was referred to the arbitration of a jirga, the award of which was agreed to in darbar. Mr. Bruce anticipated that the arrangements made with the tribe would enable him to improve our relations with them, and make them more easy of management in future. Sir R. Sandeman approved of both the settlements made, which he considered "to be satisfactory and highly creditable;" and the Foreign Secretary observed—

"I am to say that the proceedings of Mr. Bruce in this matter appear to the Government of India to have been very judicious."

Tour of the Agent to the Governor General in Thal-Chotiálí, 1883.

453. During 1883 the Agent to the Governor General made a tour in the Thal-Chotiálí district and settled several cases. A case had been long pending between the Kanozai Dumars of Pui and the Mekhianis and Marris of Harnáí. The matter in dispute had been decided by jirga, as has been mentioned in the last paragraph, but the Pui maliks refused to pay the compensation which the jirga had decided was due from them, and the sum was paid to Mekhianis and Marris by persons who had stood security for the Kanozais. Ultimately the Pui maliks paid the money. The next dispute discussed was that between the Dumars of Bagao and the Umarzais of Duki, with respect to water for irrigation, which had resulted in a blood feud costing over 80 lives. The matter had been settled by a jirga in 1882, and since then there had been no dispute for some time. Eventually it broke out again, however, and was settled by the Agent to the Governor General and Mr. Bruce. The Hamzazai Kakars had been charged with the murder of two syces; one of the maliks was fined under the award of a jirga, and some chief offenders were proclaimed. Some minor cases were also settled. A camp follower near Bagao was murdered by a Ghazi, and the murderer was hanged.

The tribes inhabiting the Thal-Chotiálí district, and between it and the Dera Ghazi Khan frontier, July 1883. Report by Mr. Bruce, C.I.E.

454. Some information will now be given as to the districts inhabited by various tribes in Thal-Chotiálí, and between it and the Dera Ghazi Khan frontier. From the Brahaman Pass near Amadún, and following the watershed of the Súr Gúnd mountain, according to Mr. Bruce, the country is inhabited by the Kakar tribes of Panizai and Sarangzai, who with the Tarins of Khawhás are the proprietors of Kachh, Khawhás, Amadún, Spira Raga, Spizandai, Zargai, Manna, and Gwashki, as far as Chari Moman and Chari Ziarat. The Panizais and Sarangzais are, Mr. Bruce says,—

"proprietors of Dirgai, Uzoba, Raga, and other villages as far as Khost on the Harnáí route, while the Sarangzais also have villages in the low lands between the Khalifat range of mountains and Sháhrig. The watershed of Ziarat Chari is the boundary between the Sarangzais and the Vanechis (Tarins) and Pechis (Syads). The watershed of the Moman Chari is the boundary between the Sarangzais and the Zakhphel Dumars. The former hold the lands of Choter and Wani up to the village of Poi; while the latter are the proprietors of Chinjan, Dargi, and Chanali. The Vanechis and Pechis are also the proprietors of the villages and lands of the Bábián ilaqua on the Harnáí route, between Harnáí and Spin Tangi. Next in order come the several sections of the Dumars of Poi, Regora, Smalan, Biani, Bagao, and Shinlez, whose boundary is conterminous with that of the Uthman Khels. The Uthman Khels with the Alizais, Shabozais, and one section of the Hamzazais, occupy the country as far as the village of Awahar, at the head of the Ánambár valley, and a line taken from

Ánambár along the eastern boundary of the Luni country (so far as to include that tribe) to the village of Chotiálí may be said to mark the limit to which our influence at present (July 1883) makes itself felt."

Friendly relations with the tribes west of the Luni eastern boundary.

455. Mr. Bruce reported that all these tribes were disposed to be friendly to the British Government; that the Panizais, Sarangzais, Tarins, Vanechis, and Pechis were in receipt of Government pay, and that revenue was taken from their lands and those of the Lunis. The Dumars, he added, held their land revenue-free on condition of loyalty to Government and good conduct. More control could, however, be exercised if they were in Government pay and placed on the same footing as the others. With the exception of a few cases, these tribes had given but little trouble; they were, moreover, willing to take service, and Mr. Bruce said "No doubt in time a more uniform and less anomalous system can be introduced."

Difficulties with the tribes to the east of the Luni country.

456. The tribes to the east and north of the Luni country are the Hamzazais, Khidarzais, Kibzais, and Musa Khels. "There is no doubt that since Thal was occupied, the attitude of these tribes towards us, as compared with the others, has been apparently unfriendly, if not actually hostile." Mr. Bruce gave as a reason for this, that while the other Pathan tribes were friendly, the fact that the force at Thal-Chotiálí was too small, and that the Political Officer there could not, while stationed at that place, maintain peace between them and their neighbours and enemies, *viz.*, the Marris, Bugtís, Khetrans, Bozdars, Hadianis, and Durkanis. The Pathan tribes regarded it as a grievance that the Baluch tribes should be under the immediate control of the British Government, and by way of emphasizing their grievance committed crimes aimed at Government. Mr. Bruce said that raids and counter-raids were of daily occurrence "between the Marris, Bugtís, Khetrans, Bozdars, Hadianis, and Durkanis on the one side and Musa Khels, Hamzazais, Kibzais, and Khidarzais on the other," in which the Baluchis were usually the more successful. After observing that peace had been established between the Baluch tribes and certain of the Pathans, *viz.*, the Dumars, Sarangzais, Vanechis, Tarins, Lunis, and Uthman Khels, Mr. Bruce said that two measures would conduce to the remedy of the evils produced by quarrels: (1) the increase of the Thal-Chotiálí garrison; and (2) the transfer of the Khetran country to the control of the Agent to the Governor General. Both these measures were carried out.

Settlements of quarrels effected by Mr. Bruce.

457. Several cases between the Khetrans and the tribes within the jurisdiction of the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí, were settled by Mr. Bruce. Baluch Khán, the Khetran Chief, with the tribal jirga came to Thal, and from thence went to Quetta, where he was told that the Agent to the Governor General had been granted jurisdiction over his country, as he had wished. He also succeeded in establishing peace between the Uthum Khels, one of the most powerful sections of the Kakars possessing several villages, and the Marris. The jirga of the Uthman Khel tribe came to Thal for the purpose. Mr. Bruce reported that (in July 1883) there were no claims of any importance pending against the Marris and Bugtís, either from Sind or the Punjab. A consideration of the relations which existed after these arrangements had been made, both with respect to one another and to the British Government, showed that much progress had been made, and that the British position on the frontier had been strengthened.

Proposal to settle the Massori and Nothani Bugtís on lands watered by Sind canals, 1883 and 1884.

458. In April 1883 the Agent to the Governor General made proposals to the Government of India regarding the settlement on lands watered by Sind canals of the Massori and Nothani sections of the Bugtí tribe. In reply, the

Foreign Secretary said that His Excellency in Council was averse to sanctioning grants of land revenue-free except on a moderate scale, and in cases in which it was desirable to confer a specific mark of honour or favour on the grantees. "He, however, fully admits the advantage of any measure which may tend to reclaim the wild tribes on the frontier from their predatory tendencies, and so to ensure the peace of the country by holding out to them inducements to settle down to industrious habits. He would therefore view favourably any scheme for making grants of land on advantageous terms to these frontier tribes."

The Political Agent, Jacobabad, the Deputy Commissioner, Upper Sind Frontier, and the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí, were then desired to work out in consultation a scheme whereby these objects might be effected.

Impracticability of the scheme.

459. A scheme was then proposed which practically amounted to the withdrawal of the Nothanis and Massoris from the hills, but the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí, showed that this scheme was not practicable, as the remainder of the Bugtís could not hold their own in the hills if the two most powerful sections of the tribe were withdrawn. He further showed that the plan of settling them in Sind had been tried before and had failed, the whole of the Bugtís decamping to their native hills, and that the true method of dealing with these tribes was to be found in their peaceful settlement in their own countries, and not in transplanting them from it. The Agent to the Governor General reported to the Government of India, in July 1884, that any scheme for the granting of land to the sections referred to of the Bugtí tribe was practically impossible; that the Sind authorities objected to assign lands to the Bugtís unless some guarantee were given that they would settle; that Mr. Bruce, the Political Officer in charge of the Bugtís, had pointed out that it would be an impossibility to remove permanently any number of Bugtí families from the hills; and the Agent to the Governor General recommended that the proposal might be allowed to drop. To this the Government of India agreed.

The Panjab-Kalát frontier in 1872.

460. The question of the definition of the Punjab-Kalát frontier has been under discussion for many years. As long ago as 1872 the Bombay Government recorded that Captain Sandeman had proposed a rectification of the frontier line, with the object of bringing into British territory the whole of the Gurchani tribe, some of whom were in Kalát, and some in British territory. According to Sir W. Merewether, the tract occupied by the Gurchanis was excluded from British possession when the boundary was laid down in 1856. The Bombay Government decided that tribes situated within British territory should be prohibited from occupying lands beyond the frontier, but that the *status quo* as regards tribes partly within and partly without the British boundary need not be disturbed. Captain Sandeman had at the same time recommended that a post in advance of the then line of posts should be established on the Sham plain beyond the British border; the Government of India, however, negatived the proposal in Resolution No. 62-C. P of 21st November 1872.

Identification and demarcation of the boundary, sanctioned in 1874 and again in 1877.

461. The question was again raised in 1873, but the Government of India declined to re-open the question and interfere with the boundary agreed to in 1856, and which, taking a general view of the matter, was fixed to follow the summit and watershed of the mountains as forming a clear and sound territorial limit between the territories of India and Kalát. At the instance of the Panjab Government the Government of India again considered the question in 1874. It was then observed that the boundary, although not demarcated on the ground in 1856, was defined, and the general question could not be re-opened without the consent of the Khán. Government decided that Captain Sandeman and Colonel

Loch might meet to identify and demarcate the boundary line already settled. Circumstances, however, prevented this arrangement from being carried into effect. In 1877 friendly relations with the Khán having been established, Major Sandeman recommended that his co-operation might be asked for in settling the boundary. The Viceroy accordingly consented to the fixation and demarcation of the boundary between Lehri and the Gehindari Peak, and northwards to the latitude of Harrand; and Major Sandeman was authorised to demarcate the line, should the Khán not object, with the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan. The boundary was not, however, finally demarcated. From correspondence regarding the tribes on the frontier, it appears that it was thought that when the question as to their control was settled, there would be no further necessity for demarcating the boundary.

Question of the control of the tribes on the Dera Ghazi Khan frontier, 1879.

462. The question of the control of the tribes on the Dera Ghazi Khan frontier was raised by the Panjab Government in 1879, and a telegram was sent to Mr. Fryer, then on special duty, in which he was told that he should have control of the tribes beyond the border. Sir R. Sandeman, in conjunction with Mr. Fryer, represented that the Baluch tribes within and beyond the Dera Ghazi Khan border were intimately connected with each other. The tribes in question were—

| | |
|---|---|
| 1. Kasranis | Living within and without the border. |
| 2. Bozdars | Living entirely outside the border. |
| 3. Lunds | Partly within and partly without the border. |
| 4. Khetrans | Living entirely outside the border. |
| 5. Khosas, 6. Lagharis, 7. Gurchanis | Partly within and partly without the border. |
| 8. Drishaks | Living entirely within the border. |
| 9. Marris, 10. Bugtis, 11. Shambanis | Living entirely outside the border. |

It was recommended that those tribes living partly within and partly without the border, as well as those entirely without the border, should be under the control of the Agent to the Governor General, in order to avoid a dual system of management with regard to them; in some minor respects the Agent to the Governor General being subordinate to the Panjab Government, and the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khan, being subordinate to the Agent to the Governor General. It was at the same time observed that the necessity for a demarcation of the frontier, which had frequently previously been proposed, would, under these proposals, be avoided. The Panjab Government, however, did not concur as to the advisability of the changes proposed, the introduction of which was opposed. At that time the question of the reorganisation of the whole of the frontier was under consideration, and the Government of India decided that it was therefore impossible to place any part of the Dera Ghazi Khan district under Baluchistan; but to prevent the evils of divided management, Mr. Fryer was placed in charge of the district in view to carrying out Sir R. Sandeman's views and political arrangements.

Quarrel between the Khetrans and Hadianis settled by the Agent to the Governor General, 1879.

463. Towards the close of 1879 the Khetrans were guilty of an outrage on the Hadianis, and on the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khan, reporting that he could not settle the case, the Agent to the Governor General proceeded to the disturbed districts to settle the case himself. The Durkanis joined the Hadianis, and the dispute threatened to embroil other tribes. The visit of the Agent to the Governor General was successful, and peace was restored. The settlement of this case tended to show how inseparably the border clans were

connected with one another, and that the service granted to them should be controlled by the Agent to the Governor General.

Quarrel between the Gurchanis and Khetrans, 1881.

464. In 1881 the Gurchanis made a serious attack on the Khetrans, and fearing that the quarrel might extend to the Hadianis, the Deputy Commissioner proclaimed a blockade. The imposition of this blockade received the sanction of Government. Later on the Durkanis entirely submitted, and all claims against them were settled.

Question of the control of the Khetran tribe raised in 1883.

465. Early in 1883, in consequence, *inter alia*, of disturbances arising between the Khetrans and their neighbours, and endeavours made by the Panjab officials to settle them, the question of the control of the Khetran tribe on this frontier of the Agency was raised. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab said that the arguments for leaving the control of this tribe with the Panjab were, that their trade relations were with Dera Ghazi Khan, that they had expressed a wish to be made British subjects, that they were related by marriage to the Lagharis, that the Laghari chief owned Laghari-Barkhan in Khetran territory, and that they had usually been managed by the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan, through the Laghari chief.

Limit of the political jurisdiction between the Panjab and Baluchistan. Supervision of the Khetran tribe entrusted to the Agent to the Governor General, 1884.

466. In April 1883 the Agent to the Governor General addressed to the Foreign Secretary a letter regarding the limits of the political jurisdiction between the Baluchistan Agency and the Panjab. Sir Charles Aitchison was of opinion that the Khetran tribe should be under the control of the Panjab Government. Sir R. Sandeman, on the other hand, pointed out that they had been controlled under his direct orders for several years, the Khetran country being geographically a part of the assigned district of Sibi. The question of the management of the tribe was first raised in connection with the question as to whether the garrison at Dera Ghazi Khan should provide a portion of the troops for Thal-Chotiálí, and the Agent to the Governor General then showed that the management of the tribe which borders on the Sind, Panjab, and Kalát frontiers, should be entrusted to the Baluchistan Agency. The Khetrans, it was shown, are intimately connected with the Luni Pathans, Marris, and Bugtís; whereas between the Khetrans and the Panjab lie the Suliman range of mountains, inhabited by the Hadianis, Durkanis, and Lesharis, acting as buffers between the Khetrans and the Panjab. Sir R. Sandeman, when Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan, managed all the Baluch tribes conterminous with the Panjab and Sind, and on the formation of the Agency they were all made over to the charge of the Agent to the Governor General, and prior to this he had subsidised the Marris, Bugtís, Khetrans, Hadianis, and Durkanis; and the service was subsequently controlled by him. As there was a Political Agent in charge of Thal-Chotiálí, and of the Bugtís, Marris, Luni and Kakar Pathans, it was urged that he should also have charge of the Khetrans—much of the success of a scheme then proposed of protecting the frontier by means of local levies instead of regular troops depending upon the management of these tribes. It was also pointed out that during the Afghan war, the peace of the border had been disturbed by the Khetrans, and on the tribe being blockaded by the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan, the Agent to the Governor General had himself settled the case; moreover, the Khetrans themselves desired to be managed by the Agent to the Governor General through the Political Agent at Thal-Chotiálí. It was eventually decided that the political management of the Khetran tribe should be vested entirely in the Baluchistan Agency, it being understood that all necessary communications with the Khetrans would be conducted under

the authority of the Agent to the Governor General by the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí. The other tribes on the Dera Ghazi Khan frontier, *viz.*, the Bozdars, Khosas, and the tribes inhabiting territory partly within and partly without the Panjab border, were to continue under the management of the Panjab officials, subject entirely to the orders of the Panjab Government. In all matters in which the interests of tribes under the two Administrations were concerned, there was to be full and free communication between the officers on both sides of the frontier. Up to this time the Durkanis and Hadianis had received service, the allowance being included in the sum of R66,960, which was placed at the disposal of Sir R. Sandeman, when he was first sent up to Baluchistan by the Government of India. The money paid to these clans had been sent from Quetta to the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khan, for disbursement; as the management of these tribes had been placed under the Panjab Government, it was decided that the money should be transferred to the Panjab budget allotment.

Question as to whether the control of the Durkanis, Hadianis, and Bozdars should vest in the Panjab Government.

467. Early in 1885, in connection with a raid made by the Hadiani section of the Leghari tribe on the Kakars of Bori, the Agent to the Governor General represented that under recent orders the control of the Baluch tribes inhabiting territory partly within and partly without the Panjab border was vested entirely in Panjab officials, and that he thought that if these orders were maintained, difficulty would be experienced in obtaining satisfactory settlements along the Panjab-Kalát frontier. The Agent to the Governor General solicited a reconsideration of the whole question of the management of the three semi-independent Baluch tribes on this frontier, *viz.*, the Durkanis, Hadianis, and Bozdars, on the ground that under existing orders a dual system of management was in force. It was urged that on the Sind frontier, where the whole of the political arrangements were in the hands of the Agent to the Governor Generals no tribal disputes existed, whereas several existed on the Panjab frontier; that, levies were being substituted for regular troops in consequence, and that Panjab officials, when invited to meet those of the Agency for the settlement of disputes, were at times unable to attend. The Agent to the Governor General explained that the country of the Bozdars was inaccessible from the Panjab, but easily accessible from Thal-Chotiálí; and that the people had had more intercourse with the inhabitants of the latter country than they had with those of the Panjab. The country of the Hadianis was, it was added, equally easy of access from Thal-Chotiálí, and that the Durkanis were, until the Treaty of 1838, which gave Harrand to the Panjab, subjects of the Khán of Kalát. The Marri tribe was only prevented from retaliating in disputes with these three tribes by pressure from the Agent at Thal-Chotiálí. The Agent to the Governor General quoted the orders of Government, stating that the political jurisdiction of the Commissioner, Derajat Division, from whom he had received charge of Baluchistan affairs, extended from Harrand to the sea, and showed that the Durkanis inhabited Harrand, and were not very long ago Kalát subjects; while Government had only recently directed them to elect permanently to be either Panjab or Kalát subjects. In the meantime the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khan, met the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí, and a large number of cases were settled during the commencement of 1885. Fresh raids, however, took place in January 1885, and the Agent to the Governor General urged the consideration of the whole question on the Panjab Government. The Lieutenant-Governor did not, however, think it desirable to re-open the question, chiefly on the ground that it would be impossible to avoid raising wider and more important issues than those raised by the Agent to the Governor General; it was at the same time observed that the most cordial aid would be afforded to the officers of the Balu-

chistan Agency by Panjab officials. The Governor General in Council also declined to re-open the question, and the control of Hadianis, Durkanis, and Bozdars consequently remains with the Panjab officers.

Question of the control of the Musa Khel tribe, 1885.

468. In connection with these questions, the question of the control of the Musa Khel tribe was raised early in 1885. The Panjab Government said that there was no objection whatever to the general control of this tribe resting with the Agent to the Governor General, provided that discretion be left to the Lieutenant-Governor to take such measures as circumstances might require in any case affecting the Panjab. The question is now (June 1885) under the consideration of the Government of India, to whom it has been referred.

Postal arrangements sanctioned for the Thal-Chotiálí and Harnái postal line, 1880 and 1881.

469. In April 1880 the Government of India sanctioned the entertainment of an establishment for the postal service from Sibi to Thal and Harnái, at a cost of R1,170 per mensem. Some correspondence then took place on the subject; and in May 1881 the Government of India sanctioned, for the line of postal communications from Quetta to Sibi, *viá* Kachh and Harnái, including a branch postal line from Spin-Tangi to Thal-Chotiálí, a sum amounting to R1,335 per mensem, with permission to increase the monthly expenditure up to a maximum of R1,500, when regular postal communication was established through the Marri hills to Thal-Chotiálí. Shortly afterwards sanction was conveyed to the expenditure of R155 per mensem for the conveyance of the mails between Sibi and Nari Gorge. This sum was afterwards transferred to the conveyance of mails between Gandakin Daff and Gambooli. An account of the proceedings of the Levy Committee and the various recommendations made by them, with respect to the services maintained in Baluchistan, will be found in another place in this report.

Claims for compensation for camels lost during the Afghan war, 1881-84.

470. After the Afghan war a variety of claims were made for compensation by the owners of lost transport animals, and for the purpose of settling these, Mr. Stogdon and Colonel Hayter were appointed to make awards. "Baluchistan being a State under the Foreign Department," it was decided that, with respect to claims from Sind and Baluchistan—

"the claims therefrom should be settled after due investigation by the Political Officers attached to that State. * * * As it is probable that the camel owners in Sind and Baluchistan have mixed interests, it will be necessary that free communication in all matters relating to these claims take place between the Sind Committee and the Political Officers settling claims in Baluchistan."

For the purpose of making investigations as to the claims made, the Political Officer, Jacobabad, under a sense of the extreme difficulty of ascertaining the truth in these matters, appointed a committee of Native gentlemen, and they came to the conclusion that a total sum amounting to R10,700 was due to camel owners from the Government of India for 214 camels. Compensation for 400 had been claimed. The awards made were as follows:—

| | R |
|---|---|
| 1. To Gulzar Sahram, for 31 camels | 1,550 |
| 2. " Khyra and Dalu, Lusharis, for 13 camels | 650 |
| 3. " Jaru, Lushari, for 5 camels | 250 |
| 4. " Bira Khán and certain Magzis for 40 camels | 2,000 |
| 5. " Misri Shah and others for 100 camels | 5,000 |
| 6. " Shahdad, Brahui for 25 camels | 1,250 |
| TOTAL | 10,700 |

The Political Agent first ascertained that none of the claims had been entertained by the Sind Committee, and then recommended that the decisions should be confirmed, in which opinion the Agent to the Governor General concurred. The payment of this sum, as recommended, was sanctioned by the Government of India and paid.

Claim of Muhammad Bashir on account of camels lost.

471. A complicated claim was made by Muhammad Bashir for R13,680 for camels lost, and after a lengthy investigation, the Agent to the Governor General recommended that this amount should also be paid; Colonel Reynolds being responsible for satisfying the owners of the animals, with the reservation that Muhammad Bashir should be allowed to deduct the jemadari of R5 per camel for the benefit of the estate of one Muhammad Rahim Khán, together with a fair share of the expenses incurred by him in prosecuting the claim against Government. These recommendations were sanctioned by Government, and the money was paid.

Temporary resumption of a jaghir in Upper Sind granted to Sirdar Islam Khán and Mai Mehudi, 1881-84.

472. In 1881 certain lands in Sind which had been granted rent-free to Sirdar Islam Khán and to his wife Mai Mehndi, as a reward for political services, were, it was said, in part alienated by the grantees, and as this was contrary to the conditions on which the jaghir had been granted, the Sind authorities proceeded to resume the rent-free grant on the portion of the frontier lands said to have been sold. The Agent to the Governor General pointed out to the Government of India the inexpediency of the resumption of a portion of a jaghir given for political purposes to a man living beyond the border over whom it was thought desirable to retain a hold; and who had probably broken the rule in ignorance. Further enquiries made by Colonel Reynolds and the Deputy Commissioner, Upper Sind Frontier, showed that there was no evidence to show that the lands in question had been transferred or sold; and on the recommendation of the Commissioner in Sind, the Bombay Government issued a Resolution that the full original grants should be continued to the grantees. The jaghir was accordingly restored, and a sum of R386-8-0 collected on account of land revenue and local cess on the resumed lands, from the date of the resumption up to the time of the restoration, was paid to the grantees.

Powers of the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí, the Native Assistant Hak Nawaz Khán, May 1883, and Rai Bahadur Hittu Ram, August 1883.

473. The powers of a District Magistrate were given to the Political Agent for the time being in charge of the districts of Harnáí and Thal-Chotiálí, in May 1883, and Hak Nawaz Khán, then Native Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General, was given the powers of a Magistrate of the 2nd class in the districts of Thal-Chotiálí and Harnáí. The Agent to the Governor General for the time being exercising the powers of a Sessions Court, in respect of all offences regarding which jurisdiction is exercised by the Political Agent and Native Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General trying at his discretion any case without a jury or the aid of assessors. The Government of India have stated that—

"it is not considered desirable to require in the districts of Sibi, Pishín, Thal-Chotiálí, and Harnáí, too rigid an adherence to the technicalities of the Indian codes of law, either civil or criminal, in cases in which only natives of those districts are concerned. In such cases the administration of justice should be ordered as much as possible in accordance with the customs of the country. Where Indian subjects of the British Government are concerned, they should of course be dealt with in accordance with the laws of India * *. Political Agents are empowered in any case in which the complainants (if any) and all accused persons are not British subjects, who are natives of India, to decline jurisdiction."

In August 1883 the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí, was told that Rai Bahadur Hittu Ram was authorised to hear appeals from the decisions of the Tahsildar and Naib Tahsildar of Sibi.

474. About the commencement of 1883, the British troops in Thal-Chotiálí were stationed at Dabar Kot, 11½ miles west of Thal-Chotiálí. For the selection of a site for a cantonment a committee was appointed. The troops had originally been stationed at Thal, and thence moved to Dabar Kot. The Agent to the Governor General was in favor of the occupation of the Gumbaz site, about 3 miles to the east of Thal-Chotiálí. The garrison sanctioned for Thal-Chotiálí was :—

The temporary occupation of Gumbaz by troops, 1883.

1 Native mountain battery.
1 Squadron, Native cavalry.
6 Companies Native infantry.

In June 1883 the Government of India approved of a proposal made that a detachment should be moved to Gumbaz to ascertain experimentally the climate of that place. Gumbaz was then visited by Sir R. Sandeman and Sir O Tanner, and they agreed that it was not a good place for the location of a cantonment; they however considered that the Duki plain, at the north-west corner of the Thal-Chotiálí plain, was well situated for such purposes, and the Agent to the Governor General recommended that it should be occupied, he at the same time thought that Gumbaz would be a suitable place for a small post.

475. The objects from a political point of view for which troops were then kept in Thal-Chotiálí were (*a*) to preserve order in the Thal-Chotiálí district; (*b*) to prevent the Marris and Bugtis from raiding on the Pathan tribes to the north of the plain, and *vice versa*; (*c*) to protect the Sibi Harnáí route; (*d*) to increase our influence among the Pathan tribes. From Duki, the Agent to the Governor General represented that the Pathan tribes could be effectually controlled, that the Harnáí route could be protected, and that Marri raiding could be stopped, besides the local advantages of the site which possessed good water. For Gumbaz a strong post was recommended. By this means both ends of the plain would be held and all raiding between the Marri and Pathan tribes would be prevented. It was then proposed that the Gandakin Daff post should be transferred to Duki, instead of to Quat Mandai as had been contemplated. In September 1883 the Government of India said that—

Objects in consideration of which troops were placed in Thal-Chotiálí; and the establishment of the Thal-Chotiálí cantonment.

"in deference to the opinion expressed by the local political and military authorities, the Commander-in-Chief has consented to the removal of the force at Gumbaz and Dabar Kot to the Duki plain, and has arranged for the assembly of a committee to consider the best situation in that locality for a cantonment for the troops."

About the commencement of 1884, a committee assembled and selected a site, the selection of this site was confirmed, and the commencement of civil buildings was authorised and undertaken. It was decided that the name of the cantonment should be the Thal-Chotiálí Cantonment. An account of the buildings, &c., erected will be found in the chapter in which an account of the proceedings of the Public Works Department is included.

476. On the 15th December 1882, a Ghazi made an effort to attack Dr. Joynt near Gambooli in the Thal-Chotiálí District, and succeeded in wounding a sowar of the 2nd Sind Horse, and a sepoy of the 7th Native Infantry. The Ghazi, who was a Marri, was killed on the spot.

Outrage: attack made by a Ghazi at Gambooli, December 1882.

477. In April 1883, the Government of India sanctioned a proposal made by the Agent to the Governor General that medical aid should be afforded to the civil population in the neighbourhood of Gandakin Daff at a cost of ₨20 per mensem, as an experimental measure for a period of six months. This period was subsequently extend-

Dispensary at Gandakin Daff, 1883 and 1885.

ed on two occasions, and in May 1885, it was ruled that "so long as the railway line is under construction, the railway shall bear the cost of the dispensary at Gandakin Daff, administering as heretofore medical aid gratuitously to the civil community generally." Since the above was written a full report on the working of the dispensaries has been submitted by Dr. Fullerton. It will be found among the appendices at the end of this report.

Appointment of a medical officer in charge of the Sind-Pishin railway line, 1885.

478. During the cold weather of 1884-85, Dr. Fullerton, the Residency Surgeon, made a tour in Baluchistan. In some of the districts cholera had made its appearance, and on receipt of Dr. Fullerton's report the Agent to the Governor-General recommended that a civil surgeon should be permanently placed in charge of the railway line, on which a large number of coolies were at work. Dr. G. E. Fooks, of the Bombay Medical Service, was appointed to the medical charge of the Sind-Pishin Railway. The Government of India have ruled that all medical arrangements in Baluchistan "should be under the general supervision and direction of the Agency Surgeon, who can when necessary refer matters for the orders of the Agent to the Governor General." It was also observed that the services of the medical officer thus appointed might be utilised for inspecting some of the outlying dispensaries in Baluchistan.

Outrage: two syces murdered near Thal, March 1883.

479. On the 30th March 1883, a party of syces were, contrary to regimental orders, cutting grass at a place some 7 miles from Thal. A party of Pathans came down from the hills, killed two of the syces, and carried off their camels. The Agent to the Governor General thought that the aggressors, Hamzazais, were probably acting at the instigation of Shah Jahan of Zhob.

Attack on the 2nd Sind Horse at Jhallar, May 1883.

480. On the 20th May 1883 a party of Kibzai Kakars attacked the outpost of the 2nd Sind Horse stationed at Jhallar. At about 2 A.M. about nine Kakars crept silently in two small bodies on to the outpost of 15 sowars of the Sind Horse at Jhallar, about 8 miles from Thal-Chotiálí, and surprised it; two sowars were killed, and two sowars and three camp-followers were wounded. The Kakars escaped uninjured. It was believed that the Kakars were acting under the instigation of Shah Jahan of Zhob, a man whose determined hostility to the British has been notorious, and who was said to have instigated shortly before the murder of a camp-follower near Kuchlak, and an attack on some syces of the Sind Horse who were killed. Notice of the latter incident has previously been taken. The Agent to the Governor General on this occasion represented the weakness of the Thal-Chotiálí force, which was strengthened. The mountain guns which had been withdrawn from that post were replaced. During the summer of 1883 the Agent to the Governor General intended to exact reparation for the outrage, when marching through the Thal-Chotiálí district, but it was decided that this should not be done. In September 1883 a party of Kibzais came to a village near Duki to purchase grain. The Assistant Political Agent on hearing of it sent out some sowars and captured the party; a capture of a similar nature was made shortly after. Mian Khán, the chief Malik, subsequently came in and professed his desire to treat for the release of the cattle taken with the men. He was informed that a fine of R2,000 would be inflicted on the tribe. The sum was paid up in January 1884, on which the prisoners, cattle, and property captured were restored.

Hostility of Shah Jahan of Zhob, March 1884.

481. The hostility of Shah Jahan of Zhob was manifested in March 1884, when he prevented Dost Muhammad and Saifulla, two influential men in Zhob, from making their submission to the Political authorities.

482. It will here be convenient to note that lying to north and north-west of the Thal-Chotiálí plain are four tribes who have been since the British occupation of the country conspicuous for their lawlessness. These are the Uthmankhels, Hamzazais, Kibzais, and Musakhels, and they have always shown hostility to the British rule. "This feeling," the Agent to the Governor General reported—

Hostility of the tribes to the north-west of the Thal-Chotiálí plain to the British.

"has its origin chiefly in a spirit of fanaticism, peculiar to all the Pathan tribes, which is kept alive by the Mullas, and perhaps in some degree also in the dislike all wild tribes have at seeing a strong government inimical to evil-doers established in their midst. At their back they have the Saran Kakars of Zhob. Powerful among the latter is Malik Shah Jahan, who, although not the titular chief of the Sarans, has acquired the greatest influence among them. Shah Jahan has a great reputation as a fakir, and is credited with the power of working miracles. His favorite boast is that he has never met the English infidels except in fight, and that he is the only man of note in the country who has not submitted to our influence. His whole prestige exists in his violent hatred and active opposition to us."

483. A series of outrages against the British Government, its subjects, and its servants were committed by the Kakar and Musakhel tribes residing to the north of the Thal-Chotiálí plain, which culminated in an attack made on the night of the 21st April on a camp of coolies employed on works then going on in the Thal-Chotiálí cantonment at Duki. Seven coolies were killed, and several were wounded, while some of the raiders were left dead, the rest were gallantly beaten off by the guard of the 3rd Bombay Native Infantry. There was no doubt that the attack had been instigated by Shah Jahan of Zhob. It was felt to be intolerable that raids of this nature should be allowed to continue without an effort to follow up and punish the guilty parties. A little consideration showed that the railway works then in progress on the Harnái route were threatened, there being nothing to prevent a well-organized raid on the workmen being made, with the result of desertions in large numbers. In April 1884, orders were issued by the Government of India for the movement of troops into the Zhob valley. At that time the difficulties of food and carriage in the country through which the troops would have to pass were such that it was decided to postpone the expedition until the autumn. On the 25th April a workman was murdered near the Chaphar rift, and some robberies were committed by Zhobis. In consequence of threatening rumours a regiment of Native infantry was sent to Khawas, and another was sent to Quetta to replace it. In the meantime a small force of Native Infantry and lancers was entrenched at Zandra, and no further important outrage took place.

Attack made on coolies at Duki, April 1884. Expedition decided on.

484. At that time the Government of India had but little information as to how far the different sections of the Kakars were implicated in the offences which had been committed. From enquiry made it seemed that sympathising with Shah Jahan of Zhob, the Hamzazais, Kibzais, and Musakhels had taken part against the British, and the Agent to the Governor General advocated marching against them first, and then against Shah Jahan. A full report regarding what took place on the expedition was made to the Government of India in December 1884, and as it summarises all that took place, may be quoted here *in extenso* :—

Advisability of first marching against the Hamzazais, Kibzais, and Musakhels, and the Zhob expedition.

"This plan, subject to modification, required by events, was, after some correspondence, approved by the Government of India.* I was further instructed to issue proclamations to the tribes warning them that if they failed to make their submission by a fixed date, punitive measures would be adopted. The proclamations were accordingly issued. The tribes

* From the Foreign Secretary, to the Agent to the Governor General, No. 2118-E., dated 9th August 1884.

were fully warned against the consequence of remaining in opposition to the British Government, and at the same time they were promised an impartial searching enquiry into any grievances of theirs against our subjects. The 10th October was fixed as the latest date on which their submission would be accepted.

"The Government of India, in the correspondence mentioned above, laid considerable stress on their desire to limit the scope of the expedition as much as possible. They declared that the chief object was to punish the Saran Kakars of Zhob for their continued and unneighbourly opposition. At the same time an implied sanction was conveyed to a settlement with the other outlying tribes.

"Such, speaking briefly, was the state of affairs when the head-quarters of the expeditionary force marched from Quetta on the 19th September. Accompanied by the officers named in the margin,* I joined the camp at Kachh on the 21st idem. Marching through the country of the Panizais, Sarangzais, and Dumars we reached Thal-Chotiálí on the 3rd October. Throughout the Kakar country subject to our control, we were received in a most friendly manner, and supplies and forage were provided in abundance.

* R. I. Bruce, Esq., C.I.E., Political Agent.
Lieutenant R. J. C. Domvile, 1st Sind Horse, on special duty.
Surgeon. Baker, M.B., I.M.D., in Civil Medical charge.

"At Thal-Chotiálí the Utmankhel Chiefs from Bori joined my camp. They acknowledged that one of the men who attacked the cooly camp was a Zhob Mulla settled among them, and agreed to make any reparation in their power. It was at the final settlement come to at the close of the expedition arranged that the Utmankhel must pay a certain share of the R20,000 fine imposed on all the Kakar tribes.

"A few days after Malik Khanan Khan, Khuderzai, who is perhaps the most influential Chief in the Bori valley, came in and asked that the terms named in the proclamation should be extended to all the Chiefs of Bori including the Hamzazais. He explained that all the remaining Maliks had gone to meet the advanced force at Anambar, the entrance to their valley.

"On the 9th and 10th October the Chiefs of the Hamzazais, Alizais, Khudezais, Shabbozais, and Khiderzais,† joined Captain Gaisford, who accompanied by them arrived at my camp. I had joined the advanced force on the morning of the 9th of October at Anambar—and made full submission. The whole of the Bori Chiefs were now in my camp, and I addressed them in public Darbar on the 10th October. I reminded them briefly of the various outrages which had been committed from time to time against the British Government, and then informed them that as they had submitted by the date mentioned in the proclamation issued by me under the sanction of the Government of India, they would be entitled to the benefit of the concessions there laid down. They were, however, to understand that they would be required to make reparation for whatever was proved against them, and also to give hostages for their good conduct in the future. I again assured them that all counter-claims against our subjects would be fairly enquired into, and reparation made if they were proved to be the offenders. I further assured them that foraging would be prohibited, and that all supplies levied from them would be paid for at fair rates. I also agreed to their requests that soldiers and camp-followers should be prohibited from entering their villages. In conclusion I required certain of their maliks to remain with me until I could assemble the Chiefs of the remaining tribes and settle the whole of the pending cases at one and the same time.

† Sections of the Bori Kakars.

"The darbar took place at the entrance into the Bori valley. The date fixed in the proclamation for the submission of the refractory tribes was now past, and yet the Sarans, Kibzais, and Musakhels had not joined me. I however was still under the impression that they would not hold out if they saw that we were determined to bring them to reason, and in consultation with General Tanner an advance to the Bori valley itself was decided on. Leaving a force at Anambar to protect the rear, the main body advanced to a suitable spot between the villages of Dulai and Lahor in the Bori valley, and a standing camp was formed and arrangements made for establishing a supply depôt there.

"Shortly after my settlement with the Bori Chiefs messengers arrived in my camp from Sardar Shah Jehan himself. They assured me that Shah Jehan was anxious for a settlement with the British Government. On his behalf they asked, firstly, that he should be granted a safe conduct to my camp; secondly, that he should not be sent to "London;" and thirdly, that Malik Bahi Khan, the Chief of the Sarangzai Kakars, should be allowed to proceed to his head-quarters and re-assure him. If these conditions were granted he undertook to pay compensation as required by the Government proclamation for injury done to British subjects. I

gave the messengers the assurances required by Shah Jehan, and sent them back with Bahi Khan. When setting out they declared that Shah Jehan, with the other headmen of Zhob, would join my camp on the evening of the 17th.

"These promises were not fulfilled. At the time appointed, Bahi Khan returned alone to my camp. He had visited Shah Jehan, and told me that he had been at first well received, but that afterwards he had been abused for being a friend of an infidel Government, and dismissed with dishonour. He expressed his opinion that the whole matter was a ruse on the part of Shah Jehan to gain time in order to remove his family and property from his residence at Vela into the hills. It is impossible to say whether Bahi Khan represented the true state of the case. I never ascertained what actually occurred between Shah Jehan and Bahi Khan, nor is the point of much importance. One thing was clear, Shah Jehan, whether through fear or bravado, or through intrigue, had made up his mind not to submit.

"It was now necessary to decide on our future action. Speaking as a political officer, I should have prefered to have carried out the original programme and settled matters with the Kibzais and Musakhels, either amicably or by force, before marching against Zhob. General Tanner, however, urged the advisability of dealing with the most formidable foe whilst the troops and transport were fresh. To this proposal I agreed.

"Under these circumstances a strong column under the immediate command of General Tanner marched on the 18th October from Dulai by the Marai Pass for Vela. During the advance supplies were fully paid for by order of the General, and up to the village of Alikhel (two marches from Dulai) the attitude of the people was decidedly friendly. On nearing Vela, the part of the Zhob valley inhabited by Shah Jehan's immediate adherents, a gradual change took place. The inhabitants left the villages for the hills, and supplies were procured with some difficulty.

As we proceeded, the demeanour of the maliks we met became more and more insolent. On the 21st October I had an interview with one Malik Haider, said to be the representative and personal friend of Shah Jehan. His manner was most unsatisfactory, and the information he gave me turned out to be wilfully false. Under all the circumstances of the case, I considered that coercive measures were necessary to bring the Chiefs and people to a proper sense on their responsibilities. In concert with General Tanner it was decided to seize all the camels, cattle and sheep that could be found, and to blow up the towers or small forts of the absent headmen.

"These measures were put in force, and had the effect of bringing in messengers in the evening of the 22nd October from Dost Muhammad and Shahbaz Khan,* asking for a safe conduct to enable them to come in. Their request was granted. On the same day several leading men of the Mirzai section of the Zhobwals arrived in camp and asked whether the terms of the proclamation would be extended to them also. I assured them that as soon as the whole of the Chiefs came in, I was quite prepared to discuss terms, to stop foraging and pay for supplies. Even up to this time there seemed every chance of obtaining our object without firing a shot.

* Members of the ruling family in Zhob. Their position is discussed later on in this report.

"On the next day, however, the 23rd October, a small body of fanatics, numbering some four or five hundred men, collected under Maliks Hamsa and Ghaus Muhammad, and occupied a strong position in some low hills, 11 miles to the north-west of camp. A Panazai Kakar was sent to warn them that they would be attacked and driven from their position if they persisted in their hostile attitude, but their only reply was to fire two shots at the messenger. They also fired on the cavalry sent by General Tanner to reconnoitre their position. He therefore attacked them on the morning of the 24th and completely defeated them. Both their leaders and some other men of note were killed. Our loss was trifling.

"Shahbaz Khan with his brother Shahmar Khan had joined my camp on the day previous to the skirmish mentioned in the preceding paragraph. During the progress of the fight the latter, with General Tanner's approval, rode up to his misguided tribesmen, and, at imminent risk to his own life, tried to persuade them of the futility of resistance. His intervention was, I regret to say, unsuccessful, but he nevertheless deserved credit for his attempt to prevent further bloodshed. His gallant conduct was witnessed with marked approval by General Tanner and his staff and other officers present.

"The effect on the Zhobwals of the lesson which they had learnt on the 24th was soon apparent. A number of the more influential Maliks, including Malik Haider, who had up to this held aloof, joined my camp. The next few days were spent in sending detached parties to seize those who did not come in of their own free will. This was done at the request of Shah-

baz Khan, who from the time that he made his submission worked thoroughly with us. In some instances the captures were effected only with difficulty. It reflects the greatest credit on the political officers chiefly concerned, Mr. Bruce and Captain Gaisford, that by the 31st October every chief of note in Zhob, with the exception of Shah Jehan, Saifulla, and one or two who had fled, or who resided at a distance, was in my camp. Their task was an arduous one and was most efficiently carried out. My thanks are also due to the military officers who commanded the detached parties of troops on these occasions. A list* accompanies this report, which gives the names of the chiefs and maliks, those who came in voluntarily being distinguished from those who were arrested by the political authorities. Shah Jehan and Saifulla Khan, accompanied only by their families and a few dependents, fled to the hills north of Vela, in the hope, it is believed, of finding an asylum with the Suleiman Khel Ghilzais. Their present whereabouts is not accurately known.

* Appendix A.

"Under the circumstances described above it was clearly my duty to receive and treat with Shahbaz Khan, who not only joined me before open hostilities broke out, but who, as will appear hereafter, is the *de jure* Sardar of Zhob. I accordingly held a darbar on the 2nd November, and with the concurrence of General Tanner agreed to a truce. I assured the chiefs that foraging would be stopped, they on their part agreeing to furnish supplies to the best of their ability. The question of the general settlement was introduced and discussed, but the arrangement of the final terms was necessarily postponed until we could deal with the Kibzais and Musakhels as well.

"This darbar was held at the village of Saifulla, and from thence we marched on Mena Bazar and Murgha Kibzai, the two chief villages respectively of the Kibzais and Pakkazais. At the former place we were joined by Meah Khan, the principal chief of the Kibzai tribe. The other most influential maliks, after some few days as we approached the head-quarters of the tribe, were induced to join him, and on the occupation of Murgha Kibzai itself, all the chief maliks made full submission.

"From the Kibzais the expedition proceeded against the Musakhels. In October I had learnt that some of the chief men of the tribe had gone across the border to the Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazi Khan. I telegraphed* to the Government of India to request that instructions might be issued by the Government of the Panjab blockading the Musakhels from the Derajat districts. The orders were given, but for reasons into which I need not enter in this place they were so far ineffectual that Baik Khan, one of the maliks of the Musakhel, who had been chiefly instrumental in arranging the raid on the cooly camp, failed to present himself at my camp on the pretence of some long-standing business with the authorities of Dehra Ghazi Khan. With this exception the chief men of the tribe submitted in person, and Baik has since been surrendered by the tribe.

* From the Agent to Governor General, to the Foreign Secretary, No. 0131, dated 18th October 1884.

"I had now, with the few exceptions mentioned, all the chief men of the tribes who had shown such persistent hostility to the British Government on this frontier during the last few years. From Sara the head-quarters of the Musakhels I returned to Dulai in the Bori valley, where a committee was constituted to draw up terms of a settlement between the British Government and the Kakar tribes. The names of the members of the committee are recorded in Appendix B to this report. The settlement thus arrived at was approved of by me, subject to the sanction of the Supreme Government. A translation is appended to this report. †

† Appendix C.

"The main points of the settlement may be conveniently summarised as follows:—

"The Chiefs and Maliks of Zhob, Bori and the Musakhels acknowledged the supremacy of the British Government and engage—

(*a*) to prevent their tribesmen from raiding on British territory. Should any so offend, he will be made over to the British authorities.

(*b*) to prevent Shah Jehan and Saifulla Khan from returning to Zhob excepting with the consent of the British Government.

(*c*) to pay a fine of R 22,000 in compensation of all offences against the British Government.

(*d*, to leave hostages approved by the Agent to the Governor General with the British Government for the fulfilment of the above terms. Further the right of the British Government to station troops in Zhob and Bori was recognized. The chiefs indeed asked for this, in order to protect the country from intestine strife.

"The above settlement was proclaimed in full darbar in November, and its gist communicated to the Government of India.* The object of the expedition was now clearly accomplished, and in accordance with my wishes General Tanner withdrew the troops to British territory. I returned to Quetta on the 27th November.

* From the Governor-General's Agent, to the Foreign Secretary, telegram No. 0155, dated 16th November 1884.

"As the Government of India has decided to defer passing any orders on the settlement described above until the receipt of this report,† I will take the opportunity of making a few observations on the subject, which I trust may meet with favourable consideration from His Excellency the Governor General in Council. I feel confident that no exception can be taken to the first part of the agreement, as it leaves the Government of India so entirely unfettered to pursue whatever course it may deem fair and right in its own interests. The whole country, it may be said, has submitted to the power of the British Government, and has engaged to recognise it in future. Ample compensation has been exacted for the offences of the past. I do not propose therefore to dwell on the stipulations relating to these points. But I would wish to record briefly what policy in my opinion should guide our future relations with Bori and Zhob. The policy should, I think, be different in the two cases, and I will therefore deal with them separately.

† Telegram dated Agra, the 23rd November 1884, from the Foreign Department, to the Governor-General's Agent.

"It will, I think, be found convenient to examine the case of Zhob first. I would beg to divide my observations on this subject under two heads—

(a) the question of the Sardarship of Zhob;
(b) our future relations with the Sardar.

"The Government of India will find appended to this report‡ a genealogical table of the ruling family among the Sanyakhel or Saran Kakars of Zhob. This shows that Sardar Shahbaz Khan is, by right of birth, the representative of the elder branch. He was, he informed me, only about twenty years of age when his father Rashid Khan died. His cousin Shah Jehan took advantage of his youth to usurp his place, and although Shahbaz Khan has made several efforts to regain his rights, he has never been successful. Shah Jehan has passed throughout his life as a holy man, and claims to possess the power of working miracles. He thus acquired such influence over the minds of the majority of his superstitious and ignorant countrymen, that he has been able to hold his own for some thirty years. Shah Jehan has now fled the country, and this fact alone has destroyed in a great measure the authority which he enjoyed. Belief in his supernatural powers must wane, when his followers see that he was powerless to arrest the progress of our arms in his country, and that his charms were of no avail against the bullets of our troops.

‡ Appendix D.

"Shahbaz Khan is now a man of about fifty years of age; he appears to possess fair intelligence, and his authority in the Zhob valley has been only second to that of Shah Jehan himself. After he once joined us he worked honestly with us, and showed a strong desire to win our friendship. In the absence of Shah Jehan, the other maliks turn to Shahbaz Khan as the natural successor to the Chieftainship. I would therefore recommend that he be recognised as such by the Government of India. I may observe that Shah Jehan must be nearly eighty years, and I did not gather that any of his sons have inherited his ability or claim to the miraculous powers ascribed to their father.

"The position to which Shahbaz Khan aspires is a peculiar one. He holds a sanad from Ahmed Shah Durani creating one of his ancestors "Badshah of Zhob," and has in his possession a jewelled ornament presented to the same ancestor by the Durani King when he gave him the sanad. The title was enjoyed by the Chief of Zhob till the last few years, but it appears now to have fallen into disuse. The Badshah was regarded as the Chief among the whole of the Kakars, and I believe I am correct in saying that even the Sanatias, such as the Panizais and Sarangzais, were bound by tribal custom to join his standard at his bidding. Of course, his authority has to some extent disappeared, as regards the Kakars within British territory, but nevertheless even with regard to them at the present day the Sardar of Zhob is influential enough to make it of much importance to us to secure his friendship.

"I will now pass to the second point mentioned in paragraph 25. It is not, I conceive, desirable to attempt to define with exact precision what should be the future position of the Sardar towards the British Government. At the same time it appears necessary that the broad lines of policy to be pursued should be laid down by Government for the guidance of the Agent to the Governor-General. I will therefore endeavour to state as clearly as possible my own views in the matter.

"It will be, I think, admitted without controversy that in the future the Chief of Zhob must be encouraged to keep up free communication with the political officers of this Agency. A hostile attitude on his part has proved intolerable, and a merely passive attitude would be impracticable. I do not mean to counsel that we should in any way attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the valley. Nor do I recommend that we should concern ourselves with quarrels between the Sardar and semi-independent tribes, such as the Ghilzais and the Waziris on his northern frontier, except when the Government interests render necessary our endeavouring to compose them. The Zhobwals are perfectly capable of protecting themselves in these quarters. But it is unreasonable to suppose that isolated cases of raiding will at once cease, and hence there will always be a certain number of cases pending between our own subjects and the people of Zhob. In such cases the Sardar should be required to effect a settlement in concert with the Political Agent in charge of Zhob affairs, as is the custom in arriving at a fair settlement of disputes between our subjects and the other semi-independent tribes on this frontier. The country would in this way come gradually more and more under our influence, and there are many reasons which would make this desirable. In the first place there are roads reported to be quite open, which passing to the north of the Khojak Amran range lead from Kandahar and Kelat-i-Ghilzai. Also other open roads to Ghazni and Kabul direct to India by the Gomal, Vihowa, and Draband passes.* It requires no argument to prove the value of these roads from a strategic point of view, and it appears therefore of the highest importance that our influence should be supreme in the country through which they pass.

* Dost Muhammad, the cousin of Shahbaz Khan, told me that when he accompanied Shah Jehan to Kabul on the invitation of the late Amir Sher Ali, he performed the journey from Zhob to Kabul on horseback in nine days, and that the route was quite open and easy.

"In the second place unless we encourage the Chief of Zhob to look towards us, it is certain that sooner or later the country will again fall under the influence of the Amir of Kabul. We may find ourselves to-morrow at hostility with the ruler of that country. During the late war the Amir Sher Ali Khan exerted all his influence to stir up the Kakars of Zhob against us, and as the Government is aware, he was so far successful that they caused us a great deal of trouble and much anxiety. Had the attack on Kachh by Shah Jehan succeeded, our line of communication with India would have been interrupted, and as it occurred just after Maiwand the result must have been most serious. On the next occasion the consequences would be even far more serious, as we should have a long railway line open to their attack. The Amir of Kabul has no claim to the allegiance of the Zhobwals. If he had, he would have undoubtedly protested against the march of our troops through their country. Nor could he restrain them in any way or enforce responsibility on them for raids committed on British districts.

"If the Government of India is pleased to accept my views we shall have in Shahbaz Khan a competent and friendly ruler on one of the most valuable points of the frontier. The tribes under him will act as a buffer against the incursions of people like the Ghilzais, and we shall not therefore be brought into direct contact with any who can claim that they owe allegiance to the Amir of Kabul. Such an ally would, I venture to think, make us strong where we have hitherto been weak.

"With regard to the Bori valley, the case is in my judgment entirely different. The valley is a well-defined division of the country, well watered, fertile, and inhabited by tribes who wish to become British subjects. It was undoubtedly at one time a part of the Thal-Chotiálí district. It is separated from Zhob by a well-defined range of mountains. On the other hand it is, like Thal-Chotiálí itself, situated in the basin of the Nari river and watered by it. It is connected with it by the open valleys of Anambar and Smalan. It will command the trunk road which will sooner or later be constructed from the Panjab to Pishin, if indeed the road is not taken through the valley itself as has already been proposed to the Government of India.† I have shown above to the best of my ability the advantage of securing the friendship of an influential chief like Sardar Shahbaz Khan on our frontier. The same policy is impracticable with Bori, for there is no one chief holding undoubted authority in the valley. There are a number of tribes, but they have no common head. If then the valley is left in its present state of independence, not only shall we find a great difficulty in settling border disputes and preserving the peace, but our hold on Zhob will be greatly weakened by the interposition of a wedge of territory for which there is no one responsible ruler.

† Telegram No. 0126, dated 16th October 1884, from the Governor-General's Agent, to the Foreign Secretary.

"Again, I believe that the best site for a cantonment in that part of the frontier will be found in the Bori valley. Besides protecting the trunk road, it would command the road

through the Zhob valley to the Gomal as well as the roads from Kandahar and Kelat-i-Ghilzai, Ghazni, and Kabul to India by the Draband and Vihowa passes. The climate would be perfect, water is abundant and supplies are practically unlimited. Our position would be immensely strengthened as regards the Zhobwals (including the Kibzais) and the Musakhels should they show any signs of returning to their attitude of hostility. I am prepared to show that a cantonment could be established in Bori with very little addition to the present force on the frontier. In fact, I believe a re-distribution of the present frontier garrisons would supply the force required. The valley is rich, the people are quite prepared to pay revenue, and its occupation would be no loss financially.

"But the main argument for taking the step which I am now advocating is the increased protection which would be afforded to the railway. The importance of this, I venture to say, cannot be overrated. I need waste no words in proving so evident a proposition, but I would beg to inform the Government of India that the highest authority on the subject, General Browne, Royal Engineers, telegraphed to me a few days ago that in his opinion no settlement would be satisfactory from a railway point of view which did not include the occupation of the Bori valley.

"To sum up briefly the views expressed in the preceding paragraphs, I have the honour to recommend as strongly as possible to the Government of India—

(1) that Shahbaz Khan be recognized as the Sardar of Zhob and be encouraged in every possible way to cultivate cordial relations with the British officers on this frontier;

(2) that Afghan influence be excluded from Zhob;

(3) that the Bori valley be occupied, and revenue taken from the people in return for protection from aggression from without;

(4) that a cantonment be established in the Bori valley either in addition to or in place of the existing camp at Thal-Chotiálí.

"Before concluding this report I would beg to bring to the notice of the Government of India the excellent service in scouting and keeping open the lines of communications performed by the tribal levies under Sardar Assad Khan of Sarawan, and Sardar Gauhar Khan of Jalawan. The accounts in connection with this body of men will be submitted as directed in paragraph 3 of your letter No. 2118-E., dated the 9th August 1884.

"I trust I am not going beyond my province in recording my obligations to Brigadier-General Sir O. Tanner for the ready way in which he met the political requirements of the situation from time to time.

"My special thanks are due to Mr. R. I. Bruce, C.I.E., Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí. During the whole of the expedition he made arrangements for supplying the Commissariat Department with the material necessary for feeding the native troops, camp-followers, and baggage animals. He rendered me the greatest possible assistance in all measures of a political character connected with summoning the headmen of the tribes, bringing in refractory maliks, and arranging the terms of the settlement arrived at. His duties were of an arduous nature, but he worked always without any thoughts of sparing himself. I have had on several occasions the pleasure of bringing to the favourable notice of the Government of India the valuable services rendered by Mr. Bruce since he has been on this frontier. It was mainly due to his exertions that the camels necessary for the transport of the expeditionary force were collected, as well as those for the Afghan Boundary Mission. I trust therefore that I may be excused if I venture to express a hope that the Government of India may be pleased to bestow on Mr. Bruce some suitable mark in token of their approval of the admirable work performed by him in Baluchistan.

"Further I desire to bring to notice the excellent work performed by Captain Gaisford, Assistant Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí. In addition to other good work, it was owing entirely to his energetic action that the important capture of Malik Bisharat, the Chief of the Khwadadzais, was effected.

"Lieutenant Domvile of the Sind Horse, who was placed at my disposal by the Government of India, proved himself to be a most energetic officer and one well-suited for service on the frontier. He is anxious, I understand, to obtain employment in the political department. I should be very glad if he could obtain some suitable post in this Agency. I intend to address you separately on this subject.

"The services of Dr. Baker were of value and much appreciated by the many sick people who came to him for treatment.

"Mr. FitzGerald was in charge of the current duties of my office during my absence and performed them to my entire satisfaction.

"Among the subordinate establishment the services rendered by the Native Assistant to the Agent to the Governor-General, Hak Nawaz Khan, were conspicuous. He worked loyally and well during the whole expedition, and was of the greatest possible assistance to me. The work of controlling the jirgas or assemblies of chiefs was in his hand, and he displayed admirable tact in managing them.

"My best thanks are due to Mr. Turner, the confidential clerk of the Agency, and to Mr. Uttam Chand, the Head Clerk of Mr. Bruce's office, for hard work willingly performed."

Subjoined to the report on the Zhob expedition, appendices were forwarded, which will be found at the end of the Administration Report, among the appendices attached thereto.

Fines levied. The orders of Government.

485. During the first half of the year 1885, fines, amounting to R22,000, were levied on the Zhob and Musakhel chiefs, and credited on the Quetta Treasury. The settlement effected with the chiefs and maliks of Bori, Zhob, and the Musakhels received the general acceptance of the Government of India. After remarking on the question as to whether Sardar Shahbaz Khan should be considered to be the chief of Zhob, it was said that "there is no objection to dealing with him directly in all matters connected with Zhob, and he should be encouraged to maintain friendly relations with us in accordance with the established policy of the Government of India towards the border tribes in general." Sir R. Sandeman was informed "that your exertions and those of the officers subordinate to you in connection with the Zhob expedition are appreciated by the Government of India."

Grant of the title of Khán Bahadur to Hak Nawaz Khán, Native Assistant in Thal-Chotiálí, 1885.

486. In 1885, the Agent to the Governor General reported that his Native Assistant, Hak Nawaz Khán, had been posted to Harnáí during the Afghan war, that he had been in charge of railway works for several years, that during the Zhob expedition he had done first-rate service, and the Agent to the Governor General requested that he might be given the title of Khán Bahadur. To this proposal the Viceroy acceded, and the title was accordingly granted to him.

Entertainment of the services of Mr. A. Ingle, April 1885.

487. In April 1885, the services of Mr. A. Ingle were entertained in connection with the provision of supplies, &c., for the army corps which it was at that time anticipated would march to Quetta and Pishin. This officer was placed under the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí.

Proposed new road between Pishin and Dera Ghazi Khán, 1885.

488. In February 1885, the sanction of the Government of India was accorded to a proposal made to move the military post at Gandakin Daff to Sinjawi, as a support to Colonel Sandford who was making explorations in the Bori valley with respect to a proposed route through that valley from Dera Ghazi Khán to Pishin; the Secretary of State having sanctioned a road from Kachh on the Sind-Pishin Railway line, by Khawas, Ziarat, Smalan, through the Thal-Chotiálí district, the Han Pass, Haji Khán-ki-kot, and Fort Munro to Dera Ghazi Khán. Colonel Sandford was also sent to report as to whether the cantonment at Duki should be moved to another more advanced spot. The tribes inhabiting the country through which the railway now in progress will pass are—

| | Estimated number of fighting men. |
|---|---|
| 1. Barazais and Kajjaks | 1,000 |
| 2. Marris | 4,344 |
| 3. Wanechis | 800 |
| 4. Chilgeris, Mukianis, and other sections of Tarin Pathans | 1,000 |
| 5. Sarangzai and Panizai Kakars | 2,500 |

The tribes through whose country the new road will pass are—

| | Estimated number of fighting men. |
|---|---|
| 1. Panizai and Sarangzi Kakars | 2,500 |
| 2. Wanechi Pathans | 300 |
| 3. Pechi Pathans | 100 |
| 4. Dumar and Kakar Utmankhel Pathans | 2,100 |
| 5. Arabkhel tribe of Boris | 850 |
| 6. Hamzazai Kakars | 770 |
| 7. Musakhels | 2,932 |
| 8. Luni Pathans | 1,200 |
| 9. Kibzai Kakars | 1,250 |
| 10. Khetrans | 4,500 |
| 11. Marris | 4,344 |
| 12. Bugtis | 2,500 |
| 13. Bozdars | 3,500 |

The total number of fighting men is estimated to be about 29,146. For the protection of the country there were in June 1885, at Sibi, one squadron of cavalry; at Pishin, one regiment of native infantry and one troop of native cavalry; at Thal-Chotiálí, six companies of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry less 25 sabres, and 4 mountain guns; at Gandakin Daff, two companies of infantry and 25 sabres; these last were, as before observed, temporarily removed to Sinjawi. The civil establishments at that time were, one Political Agent, one Assistant to the Political Agent, two Native Assistants, two tehsildars, and some police. Bearing in mind the expected additional revenue derivable from the Bori valley, the Assistant Agent to the Governor General recommended that an additional establishment be entertained for the political, civil, and police work, and that additional troops should be supplied, the proposals are at present (July 1885) under the consideration of the Government of India.

Line of military road approved of by the Government of India.

489. In June 1885, the Government of India approved of the line of military road selected by Colonel Sandford from Dera Ghazi Khán, *viâ* Fort Munro, the Rakhni plain, the Rankan Sham, the Nath-ki-chup, the Chamalang valley, the Trikh Kuram, to Sangurdi, the Anambar Gap, the Bori valley to Kot, and the line of N'gand (Ningan) Chinali, Chinjah, Spira Ragha, Yusaf Kachh, and Pishin. The Government of India were of opinion that a good pack road, to be subsequently improved, should be made. Two sites for cantonments were also approved of, Sinjawi for infantry and artillery, instead of Duki, and Sangurdi for cavalry.

The Thal-Chotiálí revenues for 1878-79, 1879-80, and 1880-81.

490. The Agent to the Governor General, in October 1881, submitted to the Government of India a report on the revenues of the Thal-Chotiálí district for the years 1878-79, 1879-80, and 1880-81, which is quoted below:—

"The tract of country at present under the charge of Mr. Duke, the Political Officer at Harnai, comprises the following districts:—

"I.—Thal Chotiali, including Bagao and the sub-district of Smalan.

"II.—Harnai and the Zawar valley, including the sub-districts of Khost, Shahrig, Harnai, and Babian, and the large villages of Sinerai and Mian Kach.

"III.—Khawas and the adjacent valleys of Kachh and Amadun, including Dirgai.

"IV.—Sangan.

"It is only, however, since the beginning of the present year that all these different districts have been placed under the control of one and the same officer.

"In 1880-81, Mr. Duke had charge of Harnái and Sangan only; Thal Chotiali was administered, though only for the portion of the year, by Mr. Jennings, while, as I have already explained,* the valleys of Kachh, Amadun, and Khawas had not at that time been separated from Pishín, and so much of the revenue due from them as it was found possible to realize was collected by Captain Henry Wylie.

* In another portion of the report submitted by the Agent to the Governor-General, with his letter No. 1634 A. G. G., dated 15th October 1881.

"In Thal Chotiali, Harnái and Sangan, no attempt seems to have been made either to collect the revenue or to introduce any regular system of administration until the spring of 1880. The revenue returns given in the statement† appended relate therefore to 1880-81 only, and even if that year had been altogether uneventful, it is probable that the information available for a revenue report would have been rather meagre and incomplete. But unfortunately, besides the war in Afghanistan, which necessarily threw a considerable amount of extra work on all the officers in Baluchistan, the internal history of these districts during 1880-81 consists of a series of disorders and disturbances, which began with the murder of Captain Showers by Panizai Kakars in March, and only terminated with General MacGregor's (an account of these will be found elsewhere) successful expedition against the Marris in the autumn of the year. It is not therefore to be expected that the account of the year's operations can be very satisfactory.

† Appendix F, forwarded with Agent to the Governor-General's letter No. 1634 of 15th October 1881.

"In the spring of 1880, Sir Robert Sandeman directed that the revenue of the Harnái and Thal Chotiali districts should be levied in kind, and the Government share of the produce was fixed at one-sixth of the gross outturn. Owing, however, to the very unsettled state of the country, the only places at which any regular division of the crops appears to have been made were the villages of Harnái and Sinerai, and this too in the spring harvest. In the beginning of May, the Babian people suddenly left their homes, taking the larger portion of their grain with them, and no proper division of the produce was possible. At a later date a rough estimate was made of the value of their crops, and the maliks paid up one-sixth of the total as the Government share, but the quantity of grain thus realized was probably very much less than would have been obtained in quieter times. In Shahrig and Khost the collection of the spring revenue was unavoidably delayed by the measures taken to punish the Kakars for the murder of Captain Showers, and the work of collection had not been commenced when the withdrawal of our troops and the temporary abandonment of the country in the early days of August prevented any attempt being made to realize even a portion of what was due. For similar reasons revenue was allowed to remain unpaid, and in Thal Chotiali, although a fair share of the spring the Sangan revenue was collected previous to our retirement, yet a considerable portion remained in arrears until our return in October, when it was of course impossible to obtain any accurate results. All the materials too, which Mr. Jennings had collected for the preparation of a revenue report on the district, were lost in the confusion which attended the evacuation of the country. The record of the collection of the autumn revenue is even more unsatisfactory, although in this part of the country, owing to the large cultivation of rice, the autumn harvest is usually the more profitable of the two. When Harnái was re-occupied in September 1880, nearly the whole of the Zawar valley was found to be abandoned by its inhabitants, and it took some time to restore confidence to the people, and to induce them to resettle in their homes. Moreover, the rice crops had been much damaged during the absence of the owners, many of them having been cut down for fodder by the troops proceeding to India. It was therefore found impossible to carry out any division of the produce, and in Harnai alone was any revenue collected. The Harnái maliks were assessed at a lump sum arbitrarily fixed from a consideration of the amount of revenue paid in the spring, and the sum demanded was collected without difficulty. But in Thal Chotiali very little of the autumn revenue was collected, and in Sangan none at all, most of the crops having been reaped before our return to the country. Briefly, therefore, Shahrig, Khost, Babian, and Sangan paid no revenue whatever in 1880-81; Harnai and Sinerai paid their spring revenue, but autumn revenue was collected from the latter place only, and then not to the full amount. In Thal Chotiali both the spring and the autumn collections, especially the latter, were much below the sums which might have been realized in more propitious times. In addition to the difficulties occasioned by the unsettled state of the country, both Mr. Duke and Mr. Jennings were scantily supplied with establishments, and with the exception of the Native Assistant Hak Nawaz Khan, they had no experienced native official to assist them in their work. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the revenue realised during the year was insignificant in amount, the total sum collected being only

R26,715-9-7, of which Harnai contributed R9,681-15-3, and Thal Chotiali R17,033-10-4. The details of the collections are as follows :—

| Detail. | Harnái. | Thal Chotiali. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|
| | R a. p. | R a. p. | R. a. p. |
| Land revenue in kind . . . . . . . | 7,501 15 3 | 14,658 10 4 | 22,160 9 7 |
| Cash revenue . . . . . . . . | 2,180 0 0 | 2,375 0 0 | 4,555 0 0 |
| Total . . | 9,681 15 3 | 17,033 10 4 | 26,715 9 7 |

"The cash revenue in Harnai consists entirely of judicial fines; that in Thal Chotiali, partly of fines and partly of sums realised in cash from the villages in lieu of the revenue in kind they should have paid.

"The last statement* appended to this letter shows the expenditure incurred in the collection of the revenue in Harnai and Thal Chotiali, and the net revenue credited to Government during the year. The total expenditure in both districts amounted to R6,098-1-5, of which R1,071-2-3 was spent in Thal Chotiali, and R5,026-15-2 in Harnai. The expenditure in Thal Chotiali consists of charges incurred for the measurement of crops on account of fees to maliks, and for the carriage and escort of grain to head-quarters. In Harnai nearly half the gross expenditure† is nominal, and represents the sum lost by Mr. Duke in the Marri raid at Kuchali, which, under the orders of the Government of India, has been written off as irrecoverable. The true expenditure amounts, therefore, to Rs. 2,527-1-5 only, and this was spent on charges similar to those incurred in Thal Chotiali. In addition to this expenditure a sum averaging R 1,050 a month has also been spent on the office and other establishments provided for Mr. Duke and Mr. Jennings under the orders of the Agent to the Governor-General. I believe it was originally Sir Robert Sandeman's intention that the cost of these establishments should be met out of the revenue collected in the Harnai districts, the net revenue only being credited to Government. This, however, has not been done : on the contrary, the establishments have been regularly paid from the Quetta Treasury. I may, however, mention here that this expenditure has been more than covered by the net revenue collected from the district, scanty though the latter has been. The total expenditure up to 31st March last was R 12,601-10-10, while the net revenue, as already shown, amounts to R 20,617-8-2, the balance to the credit of Government being R8,015-13-4.

* Expenditure and net revenue. Appendix G. Forwarded with Agent to the Governor-General's letter No. 1634, dated 15th October 1881.

† R 2,499-13-9.

"The prospects of the Harnai districts for the coming year appear to me to be very promising. Abundant rain has fallen during the last few months, and the perfect quiet which has reigned in the country since the autumn of 1881 has been very favourable to revenue operations. The administrative staff too is stronger and better organized than it was last year. All the four divisions of Thal Chotiali, Harnai, Sangan, and Khawas, have now been united under the control of Mr. Duke, an able and energetic officer, who is well acquainted with the people, and commands their confidence. He is assisted in his work by four native officials of experience, *viz.*, Hak Nawaz Khan, Native Assistant Agent, Tehsildar Maluadad Khan a Baluch, Tehsildar Sayyad Nur Ahmed Shah, a Punjab official experienced in settlement work, and Muhammad Nawaz Khan. These officers hold charge respectively of Harnai, Khawas, Thal Chotiali and Sangan, and with their aid Mr. Duke should have no difficulty in accurately assessing and collecting the revenue and in gathering together a variety of valuable information regarding the land tenures and the system and extent of cultivation in the district of which we at present know next to nothing. The transfer of the valleys of Kachh, Amadun and Khawas from Pishin to Mr. Duke was ordered by Sir Robert Sandeman in the beginning of the present year, and the change seems to me to be in every way an excellent one. For, as I pointed out in my letter No. 1340 A. G. G., of 26th August, the Panizais of Kachh and Khawas hold the Pil and Chhapar mountains, and the neighbouring portion of the Harnai valley, and are much more closely connected with the Sarangzais in the vicinity of Harnai than with the Panizais of Kakar, Lora, and the Barshora valleys. It is therefore most convenient that they should be under the charge of the officer stationed at Harnai. In the letter just alluded to I also described at length the results of my visit last June to the Panizai country, and it will be recollected that for reasons therein given I fixed

the revenue of Kachh, Hamadan and Khawas for the year at a lump assessment of 1,000 maunds of grain. In the other three districts under Mr. Duke's charge the revenue is also collected in kind, but at the rate for the most part of one-sixth of the gross produce as the Government share, no other dues of any kind being levied. From enquiries recently made by Mr. Duke it seems doubtful whether this rate can be uniformly applied to all parts of the country, and for reasons similar to those which influenced me in fixing the revenue of the Panizai Kakars at a lump sum for the year, it seems probable that it will be more convenient in many places to substitute a fixed assessment for the system of dividing the crops. On this point it will not be possible to offer any decided opinion until the information is completed which Mr. Duke is now busily engaged in collecting, but the matter is one which deserves careful consideration. Mr. Duke's estimate of the revenue for the current year is as follows:— In the spring harvest, from Thal Chotiali 6,500 maunds, of which 3,900 have already been collected; from Harnai and Zawar valley 4,000 maunds, the whole of which has been realized; from Sangan at least 500 maunds, total 11,000 maunds. In the autumn harvest of maize, millet and rice which in this part of the country is the principal harvest of the year, even better results should be obtained. The autumn crops are less dependent on rain and less liable to fluctuations than the spring crops of wheat and barley; and assuming that they are of average quality Mr. Duke estimates the Government share of the produce at 13,000 maunds. Adding to these figures the 1,000 mans which, as already explained, is the revenue due from Kachh, Hamadan and Khawas, we have a total of 25,000 Indian maunds as the gross revenue of the year. At present rates this would produce fully R 80,000, but the price of grain will probably fall considerably before the year is over, and R 60,000 will probably be a fairer estimate of the money value of Government share of the produce. Under the terms made with the Marris by General MacGregor in November last, the Government will also be entitled to one-twelfth of the produce of the Quatmundai valley, and taking this into consideration together with the sums we may expect to realise on account of fines and the excise on the sale of liquor and drugs, I estimate the revenue of the Harnai districts from all sources at a minimum of R 65,000. It is quite possible that these figures may be considerably exceeded, for the resources of the districts may prove to be greater, and prices may fall less than I have anticipated; but with the scanty information we possess about the country and the uncertainty which prevails as to the movement of the troops, it would not be wise to venture on a high estimate. For the future matters will, I hope, improve in this respect. Mr. Duke is already engaged in carrying out through patwaris a careful measurement of the culturable lands in Harnai and Thal Chotiali, and next year we shall probably possess the materials for a much more accurate computation of the capabilities of the districts under his charge.

The present monthly expenditure on the administration of the Harnai districts, excluding fractions of a rupee, may be stated as follows:—

| | R |
|---|---|
| Salary of Political Officer | 1,026 |
| Cost of office | 120 |
| Minor officials and police | 1,010 |
| Total | 2,156 |

or R 25,872 per annum. In addition to this, the following monthly payments made on account of the service given to the Marris and other tribes in the neighbourhood of Harnai may also be charged as part of the cost of administration, *viz.* :—

Payment to

| | R |
|---|---|
| Panizai Kakars | 462 |
| " Telegraph service | 505 |
| " Marris | 2,990 |
| " Afghan tribes in Zawar valley | 450 |
| Total | 4,407 |

or R 52,884 a year. The total expenditure is therefore R 78,756, or R 13,756 only in excess of the estimated revenue, a result which may, I think, be regarded as satisfactory considering that the estimate of revenue is a moderate one, and that this is the first year in which any attempt will have been made to realise all the revenue due.

Revenue of Thal-Chotiálí in 1881-82, 1882-83, 1883-84.

491. The revenue report for the Thal-Chotiálí district, comprising the valleys of Harnai, Sangan, Kachh, Khawas, Quat and Thal, shows that the revenue was for the year 1881-82 R52,689-0-2, while the expenditure was R5,313-4-7. The Harnai valley is a long narrow stony tract shut in by high mountains and traversed by

one or more hill streams. Along the banks of these streams and around the springs and rivulets which issue from the neighbouring hills are patches of cultivation often situated at considerable distances from each other. The Agent to the Governor General in 1882 reported that it was impossible to supervise properly the harvesting of these crops without a very much larger staff of officials than it would be worth while to maintain. On this account, "during the past year Mr. Duke was obliged to abandon the system of dividing the crops, and to collect the revenue on a rough estimate of the gross produce arrived at by the process technically called 'Kankoot'. Even this process, however, was found to be difficult to work."

The accounts for the year 1882-83 show that in the Thal district, the revenue collected amounted to R20,489-8-10, while in the Harnai district, including the valleys of Sangan and Quat, R15,279-7-5 were collected. The receipts in the Thal district in 1883-84 were R24,761-12-3, and in the Harnai district the figures show that R20,084-0-1 were collected. In the year 1884-85 the figures show that in the Thal district R48,967-12-9, and that in the Harnai district R31,391-11-11 were collected.

As before mentioned, Sibi was included in the district of Thal-Chotiálí in 1881-82, and was placed in charge of Mr. Bruce, and it will be here useful to show in one table the total revenues which have been collected in both districts from the years 1879-80 to 1884-85 inclusive; also the cost of their collection.

These figures show that cultivation is rapidly and steadily increasing, which is particularly remarkable in the regions near Thal-Chotiálí itself during the last three years, as will be seen by a reference to Appendix V.

Mr. Bruce in his report, No. 4041, dated 9th September 1885, on the revenue administration, writes as follows:—

"15. There is still a large field open for improvement in this district, and I anticipate that the progress which has been made during the past years will, under ordinarily favourable circumstances, continue for several years to come."

"17. I may mention that the results of the rabbi* harvest of the current year for that portion of the district under his immediate charge are equally satisfactory.

R. I. BRUCE,
*Political Agent.*

* Captain Gaisford reports 17,000 maunds collected.

The figures, *viz.*, R1,70,564-13-3 for 1881-82 are abnormally high in consequence of the large sum of R60,000 having been realized for the Sibi Abkari contract consequent on large railway works and movements of troops.

The receipts for the following years were :—

| | R | a. | p. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1879-80 | 35,382 | 4 | 2 |
| 1880-81 | 1,14,543 | 9 | 0 |
| 1881-82 | 1,70,564 | 13 | 3 |
| 1882-83 | 1,84,435 | 14 | 4 |
| 1883-84 | 1,37,258 | 14 | 0 |
| 1884-85 | 1,92,413 | 4 | 8 |

The expenditure during the year 1882-83 was :—

| | R | a. | p. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Establishment | 3,336 | 0 | 0 |
| Carriage of grain for 1881-82 | 2,388 | 11 | 11 |
| Ditto ditto 1882-83 | 1,631 | 9 | 4 |
| The expenditure during 1883-84 was | 3,336 | 0 | 0 |

The expenditure during 1883-84 was—

| | R | a. | p. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cost of Establishment | 5,878 | 6 | 9 |
| Carriage of grain for 1883-84 | 4,842 | 13 | 3 |
| Ditto for 1884-85 | 5,899 | 14 | 2 |
| TOTAL | 27,313 | 7 | 5 |

The receipts after the deduction of the expenditure have been paid into the Sibi Treasury.

Excise revenue in the Thal-Chotiálí district.

492. The following statement shows the receipts on account of excise in the Thal-Chotiálí district for 1882-83 and 1883-84:—

| | 1882-83. | 1883-84. |
|---|---|---|
| | R | R |
| Receipts from duty on spirit, English . . | 1,295 | 915 |
| Country liquor and drugs . . | 40,150 | 22,175 |
| TOTAL . | 41,445 | 23,090 |

A description of the Sibi district.

493. Some description of the district of Sibi will not here be out of place. It is the most northerly portion of the Kachhi plain, from which it is separated by a low stony ridge, broken in two places by wide gaps; through one of these the Nari flows, and through the other the Thal. Beyond this ridge is the Mal district. With Sibi proper are politically connected and included in it the districts of Thal-Chotiálí and Harnai, and Mal. Besides the Nari and the Thali there are some minor torrents. The soil of the greater part of the plain is clay.

History of Sibi.

494. After the conquest of Sind by the Mughals, Sibi continued to be a part of that empire, until the time of Ahmad Shah Durani, when it was included in the Durani empire. When this empire was broken up, Sibi, *inter alia*, passed to the Barakzai Sirdars of Afghanistan. From 1839 to 1842 Sibi was occupied by the British in the name of Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, and the revenue was collected in kind at the rate of one-third of the gross produce. The Khajaks refused to pay it, and a force was sent against their town. In 1843 Sibi again came under Afghan rule, and the Sirdars of Kandahar collected the revenue. The country has been distracted for several years, not only by the raids of the Marris, but also by internal feuds and quarrels.

Discussion as to the boundaries of Sibi, 1879.

495. During the year 1879 the question of the boundaries of Sibi were under discussion. The Agent to the Governor General, in a memorandum dated 12th July 1879, described the north boundary of Sibi as the hills enclosing the Marri towns, Badra Kwat, and Mandai, which tract had been taken by the Marris from Sibi about the year 1836. The east, south, and west boundaries were described as being Kalat territory.

"The boundary line follows the range of hills, enclosing Sibi on the north and east, and to the south as far as the Chakar Tak water course. Here a promontory of the Sibi district juts forward to the south, taking in the village of Mal and the country to the Nari, which is inhabited partly by Barozais and partly by Brahuis. The line then ascends the right bank to its junction with the Mashkaf water-course, and up the latter to the range of hills running nearly north and south. This range is followed till it joins the Marri country. The towns and villages of Harnai and Sangan are really a part of the Sibi district."

The Agent to the Governor-General went on to show that in 1841 the Political Agent had proposed that the district of Thal-Chotiálí, the revenues of which were also included in the Kandahar liabilities, might be assigned to Quetta, and he said that no portion of this territory could—

"be managed from Kandahar, and if we desire to manage it successfully, all the country that formerly paid revenue to its naibs should, with the sanction of the Kabul Government, be included in it."

496. The boundaries of Sibi were discussed by Sir R. Sandeman with Sir D. Stewart during 1879 at Kandahar. On the 6th September 1879 Sir R. Sandeman entered on the question with the Wali, Sher Ali Khan, at Kandahar. The Sirdar said that Sibi on the west included the country known as "Zamin Zawar," within which lie the villages of Harnai and Shahrig, as well as the valley of Zawar "which is bounded by the watershed of the Chhapar mountain, which separates in this direction Sibi from Pishín; all the country is a portion of Sibi, and pays revenue. The Thal-Chotiálí valley is also a portion of the Sibi district, and pays revenue. The fact is apparent from the Kandahar records, although of late years the revenue has not been levied; the Sirdar of his own knowledge verified this statement. The valley of Thal-Chotiálí bounds Sibi to the north where it joins the Bori valley, and thus its actual boundary in this direction is the valley of the Bori, including the Luni Pathans and the Dumar country. Neither the Bori people nor the Dumars have ever paid revenue. Sibi to the east is bounded by the Marri Baluch hills. Formerly the villages of Badra Khat and Mandai were a portion of the Sibi district, but the Marri clan some years ago included them within the limits of the Marri country. Revenue should be realised from the Sibi district proper, including the Zawar and Thal-Chotiálí valleys which form part of it. The Sirdar declared these boundaries to be correct, and General Stewart said that the records of the Kandahar revenue office pratically confirmed the views as to the boundaries given above.

The opinion of the Wali of Kandahar as to the boundaries of Sibi.

497. It may here be noted that up to the month of December 1882 the district of Sibi, and the management of the Bugtí tribe, formed part of the duties of the Political Officer at Jacobabad. These duties were, however, then taken over by the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí, Mr. R. I. Bruce, C.I.E. This arrangement is found to be more convenient on account of the intimate relations existing between the Bugtí and Marri tribes, as well as the close connexion of the latter with the Sibi district. This is fully explained in Appendix I.

Control of the Sibi district before and after December 1882.

498. In 1880, it was reported that the new town of Sandemanabad had been erected near the Sibi Railway Station, where previously there had only been a few tents containing about 800 shops and 1,000 houses, with a population of about 5,000 souls; that the town was well situated for trade purposes, as to Kachhi and the surrounding hills; that it was the point at which the trade routes down the Bolan and the Harnai routes met, and that in the cold weather the Brahuis and others came down the passes to settle there. With the increase in trade came an increase in work in the Courts, and the Agent to the Governor General recommended that additional magisterial powers should be granted to Rai Bahadur Hittu Ram, and on the 17th June 1881, a notification was issued empowering him to exercise the powers of a 1st class magistrate; he was also authorised to exercise powers in civil suits similar to those exercised in the Punjab by an Assistant Commissioner.

Growth of Sandemanabad in Sibi. Magisterial powers given to Rai Bahadur Hittu Ram, 1881.

499. The Agent to the Governor General reported in July 1882 that in the district of Sibi the only Sirdars of mark were two brothers, Muhammad Khan and Sirbuland Khan, Barozai; that in the days of the Afghan rule the chiefs of the Barozai family had exercised the functions of naibs, and had taken revenue; and that the importance of their position could be judged from the fact that they had very considerable rights with respect to irrigated land in the district. The Agent to

Grant of Rs. 500 per mensem to the Barozai Sirdars of Sibi, 1882.

the Governor General recommended that, in consideration of the position held by the family, and of their uniform good conduct, a grant of R500 per mensem should be given them, distributed as follows :—

| | R |
|---|---|
| To Sirdar Muhammad Khan . . . . . . . . | 100 |
| To Sirdar Sirbuland Khan . . . . . . . . | 100 |
| Two daffadars at Rs. 30 each . . . . . . . | 60 |
| Twelve sowars at Rs. 20 each . . . . . . . | 240 |
| | 500 |

It was recommended also that 1 daffadar and 10 sowars should be placed at Nari Gorge, and that 1 daffadar and 2 sowars should remain in attendance on the Barozai Chief. To these proposals the Government of India acceded.

Medical arrangements at Sibi, 1880—85.

500. In February 1880 the Agent to the Governor General applied for the establishment of a 1st class dispensary at Sibi, as there were a large number of sick there belonging to the Railway, Commissariat and Transport Departments. Under the orders of the Bombay Government, Apothecary Ahmed Khan was stationed at Sibi to look after their wants. Shortly afterwards the Agent to the Governor General recommended the establishment of a civil dispensary at Sibi, and that it should be placed under the medical officer for the time being with the troops then stationed at that place, and the Government of India sanctioned the payment of an allowance of R100 per mensem to the medical officer in charge of the troops for the supervision of the dispensary; no establishment was, however, sanctioned. Early in 1881, an arrangement was approved by Government under which the railway dispensary at Sibi was to be utilised by the civil as well as the railway population. The total cost of R222 per mensem was to be equally divided between the railway and civil departments. Later on in the year, however, in supersession of previous orders, an establishment was sanctioned for the hospital at Sibi, at a cost of R300 per mensem, to be contributed in three shares, by Government, the railway, and the town of Sibi. The Surgeon in charge of the hospital at Sibi was to include in his charge all medical arrangements necessary on the line of railway from Jatpat to Sibi, Pirchowki, and Nari Gorge; general superintendency being vested in the Residency Surgeon of the Baluchistan Agency. The hospital buildings were handed over by the railway to the Public Works Department. In 1882, owing to the reduction of the garrison of Sibi, the European Medical Officer would, it was expected, be withdrawn, and the Government of India decided that an Assistant Apothecary should be posted to Sibi. This order, however, was not to come into force as long as the Bombay Medical establishment would admit of a medical officer being retained in charge of the detachment at Sibi. Towards the close of 1883 an Assistant Apothecary was placed in charge, in place of the medical officer who had been transferred.

Claim made for compensation on account of the Abkari contract in Sibi, 1882—85.

501. In 1882 at the annual sale of the Abkari contract for the district of Sibi the contract was sold by Mr. Bruce to Messrs. Thakandass Gooranmall & Co. for R38,900. The contractor was allowed to open 14 shops, of which six were at the railway stations of Mihtri, Lindsay, Belpat, Nuttall, Templedera and Jhatpat, under agreement. This part of the agreement, however, met with objections from the Railway authorities, who closed the shops in question. On this, correspondence ensued resulting in Messrs. Thakandass being permitted to re-open their shops from the 16th October outside the stations, which they refused to do, and they then claimed R31,450, taking advantage of having a minor claim against Government to try to recoup themselves for losses they had

undergone on the whole contract. The Agent to the Governor General recommended to the Government of India that ₨2,900 should be paid to the contractors as compensation for their claims. In reply the Government of India directed that the terms of compensation should be arrived at with the contractors on the spot. The sum mentioned was offered to the contractors, but they refused to take it. The Government of India then directed that negotiations with the contractors should be entered upon, in view to a private settlement, by arbitration. After some delay a committee of arbitrators met but were unable to agree as to the amount which should be paid. Eventually in February 1885, Mr. Bruce succeeded in compromising the claim made by the contractors for a sum of ₨6,000, in full satisfaction of all claims. The payment of this sum to the contractors was sanctioned by the Government of India.

Construction of a fortified post and well at Mal, in Sibi, 1882—85.

502. In 1882, the Agent to the Governor General recommended the construction of a fortified post at Mal for the accommodation of troops, and the sinking of a masonry well; at an expenditure of ₨5,500 debitable to the Sibi revenues. This proposal was sanctioned by the Government of India. Part of the work was completed, but much difficulty was experienced with regard to the well, on account of the breaking of the boring machines; and it has not yet been completed. The balance of the money which was unexpended was credited to Government in the Quetta Treasury, to be redrawn when required.

Occupation of Sibi by the British in 1878.

503. Immediately after the outbreak of the Afghan war in 1878, the question of the occupation of Sibi was considered, the Government of India were of opinion that the country would be useful as regards supplies, and would form part of the plan for maintaining communication with Quetta during the war, and in October 1878, the Sibi Sirdars and Chiefs sent the Agent to the Governor General a petition giving particulars as to the condition of the country, and requesting that it might be taken under British protection, and might not again be placed under the rule of the Amir of Kabul. Sibi was occupied in November 1878, and as the affairs of the district were much mixed up with the Marri tribe, it was added to Mr. Bruce's charge, Mr. C. E. Biddulph being placed under him to aid him generally with this work and with the work of the Quetta treasury. For the Sibi district an establishment for the collection of revenue was sanctioned, together with a body of police. The revenue collection was to be made in kind, the cost of the establishments not including the European officer being paid out of the revenues. The people were left as much as possible to themselves, unnecessary interference being avoided. The powers of the Agent to the Governor General as a Sessions Judge have been extended to Sibi. Mr. Biddulph was invested with the powers of a first class Magistrate for that district.

Mr. Dames' report on Sibi, 1879.

504. Soon after its occupation Mr. Dames, C.S., who was deputed for the purpose, sent in an exhaustive report on Sibi. He said that the cultivation depended on irrigation, mainly from the Nari stream, from which canals led, the water of which was roughly distributed in shares of which each tribe held a certain number. The supply from the Nari, however, depended on a bund which was always swept away by floods, and the kharif crop was consequently scanty and uncertain. Mr. Dames advocated the construction of an efficient bund. The amount of land cultivated was very small. The population numbered about 14,000, and consisted of Pathans, Rind Baluchis, Brahuis, Jats, and Hindus. The Pathan tribes included Barozais, Pannis, Khajaks, Nodi Hassanis, and Silanchis. There were only seven inhabited villages, although the remains of several, once popu-

lated, existed. The Barozai family held the foremost rank, the chief of which was Muhammad Khan. There was some trade with Sind and Khorasan. Mr. Dames reported that the internal quarrels previously existing in the district had been settled; that the Marris could no longer raid the country, and that there was every prospect of prosperity being attained. The revenue collected for the year 1879 amounted to R9,417. Some small inams were given according to the previous custom, and Mr. Dames recommended their continuance. Mr. Dames also proposed that the rate at which revenue should be collected on both kharif and rabi should be one-sixth of the produce; but the Agent to the Governor General was of opinion that the rate on the rabi should be one-fifth in the first instance, as he did not think that the people would consider it any hardship to pay these amounts. The pay of the village servants should, it was recommended, be deducted from the collections. Service was granted to the inhabitants of Sibi on the following scale :—

| | Per mensem. |
|---|---|
| | R |
| 1 Jemadar on . . . . . | 50 |
| 2 Daffadars on Rs. 30 . . . . | 60 |
| 30 Sowars " 20 . . . . | 600 |
| | 710 |

Mr. Dames recommended that the number of sowars should be increased to 40, and with this proposal the Agent to the Governor General agreed. When Mr. Dames wrote his report there were no roads, and communication was very difficult during floods. Lines for the troops were at that time under construction.

505. The Government of India decided that the revenue should be collected in kind at the rate of one-fifth of the gross produce of the rabi, and one-sixth of the gross produce of the kharif; the continuance of the inams was sanctioned at the same time. The question of the increase of the tribal sowars was to be considered with the question of the revision of the Baluchistan levies. The district was, however, being managed at a loss roughly estimated at R2,620 per annum, a reduction in the charges was called for, and it was said that as little interference as possible with the usages of the people as might be compatible with the maintenance of political management and control was to be employed. From a report sent in by Mr. Biddulph it appears that the cash payments for the year 1878-79 amounted to R9,837-5-6; deductions, however, reduced this sum to R9,683-3-0. This officer sent in a report of the district from the 11th April to the 3rd November 1879, during the time he held charge of it. He experienced no open opposition to the collection of the revenue except from the Khajaks, who, however, were induced to pay a cash revenue instead of revenue in kind. There were losses of revenue owing to robbery of the crops before the levy of the revenue, and to severe storms, the value of the revenue levied in kind on the rabi crop was estimated at R32,869, to which was added R287 levied in cash. The entire revenue establishment sanctioned was not employed; the actual strength employed being—

Revenue of Sibi for 1878-79. Mr. Biddulph's report.

| | Per mensem. |
|---|---|
| | R |
| 1 Tahsildar . . . . . . | 125 |
| 1 Naib . . . . . . | 50 |
| 1 Muhasib . . . . . . | 40 |
| 2 Patwaris . . . . . . | 30 |
| 1 Jotedar . . . . . . | 20 |
| | 265 |

The whole of the police establishment sanctioned was also not employed, those actually employed were as follows:—

| | Per mensem. |
|---|---|
| | R |
| 1 Deputy Inspector . . . . . | 40 |
| 1 Foot Sergeant | 31 |
| 11 Sowars, Rs. 25 each . . . . . | 275 |
| 1 Sergeant, 2nd class | 25 |
| 1 do., 3rd do. . . . . . | 15 |
| 7 Constables, Rs. 8 each . . . . . | 56 |
| | 242 |

It may be here noted that the police have from time to time undergone changes, and that they, with others, were included in the report on the levy scheme, an account regarding which has been given in another place. Mr. Biddulph reported on the unsatisfactory conduct of the police, and recommended that they should be interchangeable with the Quetta Police. There were good grazing lands in Sibi, where 2,000 bullocks were sent from Quetta, it being impossible to feed them in the latter place. Many complaints were made as to the depredations of the Marris, several cases of taking life in revenge for adultery were reported. The cost of the revenue administration for the year 1880-81 was as follows:—Revenue establishment R315 per mensem, and police establishment R706 per mensem,—total R1,021 per mensem.

Revenues of Sibi in 1879-80 and 1880-81.

506. Since the time that the first report was made, owing to the growing prosperity of the district, the revenue figures have risen higher and higher until a considerable sum has been reached. The revenue for the years 1878-79, 1879-80, 1880-81, is noted in detail in the appendices attached to this report. Putting aside the figures for the year 1878-79, it will be seen that the revenue of Sibi from all sources amounted to R35,382-4-2 in 1879-80, and to R84,726-14-8 in 1880-81. Dividing the sources of revenue into heads under land revenue proper, and other sources, that is in the Sibi district, sources which have come into existence since the advent of British rule, the actual figures for the years 1879-80 and 1880-81 are as follows:—

| Sources. | 1879-80. | | | 1880-81. | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | R | a. | p. | R | a. | p. |
| Land revenue . . . . . . | 33,929 | 13 | 11 | 58,674 | 2 | 11 |
| Other sources . . . . . . | 1,452 | 6 | 3 | 26,052 | 11 | 9 |
| TOTAL | 35,382 | 4 | 2 | 84,726 | 14 | 8 |

In October 1881, with his letter No. 1634-A.G., dated 15th October 1881, the Agent to the Governor General sent in a detailed report of the revenues of Sibi up to the year 1880-81; in this report it was observed that the figures mentioned above show—

"an astonishingly rapid rate of development in all the sources of revenue—a development, which is due, no doubt, to the increase of population and the extension of cultivation which have followed the introduction of British rule. It is true the very large increase of revenue under the head of "Other sources" is owing chiefly to the excise on liquor and drugs, which,

from the evidence it affords of the large consumption of spirits in the Sibi district, will not perhaps be considered as altogether a subject for congratulation. But the increase in the land revenue may at any rate be regarded with unmixed satisfaction for, as I shall presently show, it may be ascribed, without affectation, entirely to the increased security and better administration, which have attended our occupation of the country. The money value of the grain revenue has of course been abnormally high during the last few years, and now that the war is over it is probable there will be some falling off in the amount of the land revenue as expressed in rupees. But during the years under review the rates have been fairly constant, and the following figures show that the increase in the money value represents quite a corresponding increase in the revenue in kind.

| Revenue in kind. | 1879-80. | | | | | | 1880-81. | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Weight. | | | Value in rupees. | | | Weight. | | | Value in rupees. | | |
| | *M.* | *s.* | *ck.* | *R* | *a.* | *p.* | *M.* | *s.* | *ck.* | *R* | *a.* | *p.* |
| Grain . . . . | 8,787 | 28 | 8 | 32,913 | 6 | 8 | 17,180 | 29 | 0 | 56,080 | 11 | 1 |
| Other produce . . | 380 | 2 | 0 | 941 | 7 | 6 | 216 | 1 | 0 | 548 | 6 | 4 |
| Total . . . | 9,167 | 30 | 8 | 33,854 | 14 | 2 | 17,396 | 30 | 0 | 56,629 | 1 | 5 |

"The revenue in kind for the present year is estimated at 24,445 maunds which should yield the estimated money value of R73,000, at rates considerably less than those at present prevailing.

Causes of increase in land revenue.

"In paragraph 4 of Sir Alfred Lyall's letter No. 856 E.P., dated 27th April last, the Government of India observed with reference to a brief statement of the Sibi revenue forwarded by Sir Robert Sandeman that 'it was difficult to judge of the actual increase in the land revenue without knowing whether the area, from which it was collected in both years, was the same,' and I was directed to submit a further report with such figures and returns of the number of villages brought each year under cultivation, as it might be in my power to supply. In the second statement* will be found some figures, which will, it is hoped, give the information desired. I would remark that the records of the Sibi district contain no statements of village areas, Under the system of revenue administration, which prevailed in Sibi under the Afghan Government, of either levying a fixed assessment in cash in the whole district, or of taking in kind a share of the produce of each crop, no such statements were required, and no attempt has yet been made to obtain accurate measurements of the land under cultivation, no suitable establishment being available for the purpose. It must therefore be understood that the figures given are merely approximate. Still, such as they are, they explain clearly enough the causes of the large ncrease in the revenue collections, those causes being, briefly, the large extension of cultivation in villages already inhabited, and the re-occupation and cultivation of others, which had been for many years deserted owing to the general insecurity of the country. In his report on the Sibi district, to which I have already alluded, Mr. Dames pointed out that, in the numerous sites of deserted villages scattered over the face of the country, there is abundant evidence to show that at one time the district of Sibi was far more populous than at present; and he gives a list of no less than 40 villages, which at the time he wrote were no longer inhabited or cultivated. He also mentions that in May 1879 there were only seven inhabited villages in the whole district. The figures I am now enabled to give confirm this statement. It will be seen that in 1878-79 the cash revenue was collected from seven villages only, the names of which are given in the margin. In 1879-80 eight villages were brought under taxation, cultivation having in the meanwhile been re-commenced in the village of Mal, which had previously been deserted in consequence of the raids made by the Marri tribe. It will be observed that in one village, Gulu Shahr, which had also been subject to Marri raids, only eight acres were brought under cultivation during the year, while in all the eight villages the total cultivated area amounted only to 4,556 acres. In 1880-81 nine villages paid revenue, the deserted village of Thalli having been re-occupied during the interval, and the extent of the cultivated area rose to 9,031 acres, of which 594 acres belonged to the village of Gulu Shahr. During the current year two new

* Appendix B.

| | |
|---|---|
| Dehpal. | Khajak. |
| Ghulam Bolak. | Safi. |
| Gulu Shahr. | Murghizani. |
| Mizri. | |

villages, Kaisar-ka-Got and Lor-ka-Got, have been re-occupied. At present therefore the total number of villages, from which revenue is realized, is eleven, and it is expected that the cultivated area during the year will exceed 12,000 acres, or nearly three times the area cultivated two years ago.

"These figures afford very satisfactory evidence of the growing prosperity of Sibi, and as there is still a vast quantity of culturable land in the district, there is every reason to hope that cultivation will continue to extend, and the land revenue to increase for a considerable time to come. It should, however, be borne in mind that cultivation in Sibi is almost entirely dependent on irrigation, and it is important, therefore, that every encouragement should be given to schemes for increasing the supply of water, and distributing more economically the supply which already exists. The Government of India has already sanctioned one proposal made by Sir R. Sandeman for improving the water-supply in the neighbourhood of the town of Sibi, and it is probable that any expenditure incurred with a similar object will prove to be amply reproductive. The matter is one which will engage my careful attention when I visit Sibi in the course of my cold-weather tour. For the present it will be sufficient to say that the country is one of mountain torrents and sudden floods, and that if it appears advisable to undertake the construction of irrigation works on a large scale, it will be necessary to obtain the services of a qualified canal engineer.

Cash revenue.

"The cash revenue of Sibi, besides some small payments made on account of grass and other crops cut while green, which properly belong to the land revenue, consists of sums realised by sales of unclaimed property, by fines, and on account of the excise on the sale of liquor and drugs. The only item which requires notice is the excise revenue, which has risen to a very considerable sum during the last two years, owing partly, no doubt, to the continual passage of troops and followers through the district, but more especially to the astonishing growth of the town of Sibi to which attention was drawn in Sir R. Sandeman's letter No. 269 A.G.G. of 23rd February. The system of levying this revenue is simple in the extreme, and merely consists in putting up to public auction once a year the monopoly of the right to sell within the limits of the district. It is however questionable whether it is altogether good policy to place so large and lucrative a monopoly entirely in the hands of one firm without any restrictions as to the quality of the liquor made, or as to the places and mode in which it is sold. This is one of the points which will require consideration when I visit Sibi. The high price at which the monopoly has been sold during the current year, R70,000, shows how very profitable the trade is. It is however doubtful whether the profits last year could have been sufficient to warrant so large and sudden an increase, and I am inclined to think that the price paid is probably speculative, and that it is open to question whether an equal sum will be realised in the future. During the current year an additional item will be added to the cash revenues of Sibi by the introduction of court fees. The Indian Stamp and Court Fees Acts are not in force in the district, nor are any stamps used in Baluchistan, but the increase of civil suits in Sibi has been so large, more than 100 suits a month having been instituted and tried during the first quarter of the current year, that it is now the practice to levy the usual Indian fees in cash, and the revenue from this source has already reached the sum of R250 a month.

Expenditure and net revenue.

"The third statement* annexed to this report shows the gross revenue of the Sibi district, the expenditure incurred in the course of collection, and the net revenue credited to Government during the same period. In 1878-79, when the cash assessment of the Afghan Government was collected, no expenditure was incurred in excess of the existing establishments, and the whole sum realised, R9,683-3-0, was credited to Government without deduction. In 1879-80, the first year of the collection of the revenue in kind, there was an expenditure of R4,163-0-5, so that out of a gross revenue of R35,382-4-2 only R31,219-3-9 was credited to Government. It was found necessary in the first instance to provide places for the storage of the grain collected, and under the orders of the Agent to the Governor General a sum of R2,533-13-11 was spent in putting into a serviceable condition the old domed granaries originally built by the Afghans, which through disuse had fallen out of repair. An allusion to these granaries will be found in paragraph 35 of Mr. Dames' report already quoted. The remainder of the expenditure, R1,629-2-7, was incurred in maintaining, in accordance with the custom of the country, an establishment of watchmen and weighmen for the duty of protecting and dividing the crop while lying on the threshing floors, and in arranging for the carriage and escort of the produce to head-quarters. In 1880-81, out of a gross revenue of R84,726-14-8, an expenditure was incurred of

* Appendix C.

R5,616-9-10. The greater portion of this sum was spent in the watching, weighing, carriage, and escort of grain as in the previous year, and R1,602 were paid as fees to maliks, and in refunds to the holders of revenue-free grants. This latter item appears for the first time in the accounts of 1880-81, and owes its appearance to our growing knowledge of the rights and tenures existing in the district. The remaining items of R27-5-0 and R71 explain themselves. I anticipate that the expenditure on account of the weighing and carriage, &c., of the produce will be much reduced during the present year. There is now a fairly strong revenue staff in Sibi, which may be expected to perform most of the work for which other arrangements have hitherto been made, and every effort will be made to prevent expenditure in excess of the authorised establishments. It will still be necessary to maintain, for the protection and division of the crops, a certain number of watchmen and weighmen, for whose employment no regular sanction exists; but I hope when I go to Sibi to be able to submit proposals for limiting this establishment so far as is possible, and for placing so much of it as it is found necessary to retain, on a proper and permanent footing.

In 1880-81, out of a net revenue of R79,110-4-10, only R74,367-9-5 have as yet been credited to Government, the reason being that the Political Officer has still on hand a small quantity of revenue grain valued at R3,879, which has not yet been disposed of, and there are a few items of cash revenue amounting to R863-8-11 in arrears.* These latter will, it is expected, be shortly collected in full.

* These amounts have been credited since this paragraph was written.

General remarks. Municipality.

It will be observed that there is a good deal of difference between the figures given in this report and those forwarded to Government with Sir R. Sandeman's letter No. 269 A. G. G. of 23rd February 1880. This is owing to the realization meanwhile of some outstanding arrears and to the more careful scrutiny the accounts have undergone. Another point which also deserves some notice is the absence in Sibi of many of the items of cash revenue, which find a place in the statement of the revenues of Pishin. The reason for this is, I imagine, to be found in the system adopted by the Afghans of commuting all the taxes for a fixed annual sum. Thus many of the forms of taxation usual in an Afghan district fell into disuse, and not being found in existence by our officers at the time of the British occupation, have no longer a place in the accounts. It may be mentioned here that, besides the ordinary revenues of the district, the Sibi town has an income of its own, which amounted to R20,000 in 1880-81, and is expected to reach the sum of R37,000 in the current year. This income consists for the most part of the proceeds of an octroi tax levied at the rate of three pies in the rupee, or rather more than 1½ per cent., on the value of all goods consumed within the limits of the town. I believe that adequate rules and restrictions are adopted to prevent this tax from operating as a transit duty on the trade passing through the town; but no account has yet been received in my office of the way in which this large income is expended. I have therefore directed the Assistant Agent to the Governor General at Jacobabad to prepare a full report on the revenue and expenditure of the municipality, since it began to have an income of its own, and arrangements will be made for the submission of a similar report once a year for the future, a copy of which will be forwarded, with the Agent to the Governor General's remarks, for the information of the Government of India.

In Sibi, as might be expected, the revenue was considerably in excess of the cost of administration, the present monthly expenditure being as follows:—

| | R |
|---|---|
| Pay of Political Officer at Jacobabad | 800 |
| Office establishment | 257 |
| Pay of Native Assistant at Sibi | 490 |
| Office of ditto | 235 |
| Tehsil and Minor establishments | 525 |
| Cost of Police debitable to Sibi District | 1,711 |
| Total | 4,018 |

or R48,216 per annum. Adding to this the sum of R19,320, which was the annual cost of the service granted to the Bugti tribe, the total expenditure

for the year amounted to R67,536, or less than half the estimated revenue, and taking the figures of all three districts together, thus :

| Districts. | Expenditure. | | | Revenue. | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | R | a. | p. | R | a. | p. |
| Sibi | 67,536 | 0 | 0 | 1,50,000 | 0 | 0 |
| Pishín | 78,084 | 0 | 0 | 65,000 | 0 | 0 |
| Harnai | 78,756 | 0 | 0 | 65,000 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 2,24,376 | 0 | 0 | 2,80,000 | 0 | 0 |

it will be seen that there should have been a net surplus of income over expenditure of more than half a lakh of rupees.

Revenue report of Sibi for 1881-82.

507. The revenue report of the Sibi district for the year 1881-82 shows that the revenue amounted to R1,20,512-13-10, the whole of which was realised and credited to Government. The revenue of this district had increased yearly by leaps and bounds, as will be seen from the following table :—

| Year. | 1879-80. | | | 1880-81. | | | 1881-82. | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | R | a. | p. | R | a. | p. | R | a. | p. |
| Total revenue collected | 35,382 | 4 | 2 | 84,726 | 14 | 8 | 1,20,512 | 13 | 10 |

In 1879-80, the acreage brought under cultivation was 4,556 acres, while the Government share collected in maunds was 9,167 maunds 30 seers and 8 chattacks, while in 1881-82, 12,899 acres were cultivated, and the Government share collected was 25,939 maunds 31 seers 8 chattacks. In 1878-79, there were only 7 villages cultivated, while in 1881-82, there were 12 villages under cultivation. Mr. Bruce, in charge of Sibi, considered that collections in kind had several advantages over collections in cash. Besides the Imperial revenues an octroi tax was levied in the town of Sibi, the income of the municipality for the years 1880-81-82 was R57,865. A project was during the year investigated for the excavation of an irrigation canal from the Nari river, in regard to which the director of irrigation in Sind submitted a report. The large sum of R60,000 was realised from the contract sale of country spirits and drugs. The Indian Stamp and Court fees Acts were introduced into the district during the year, the net revenue from this source amounted to R6,008-12-7. Every encouragement was given to the people to submit their disputes to arbitration by jirga. R5,620-11 were realised by fines in criminal cases. The trade of the town of Sibi was much increased by the opening of the railway.

Sibi revenues during 1882-83, 1883-84 and 1884-85.

508. During the year 1882-83 the revenue derived from the Sibi district was R98,666-14-1. As compared with the previous year, there was a considerable falling off. The revenue for the following year again showed a slight fall in receipts, the total being R92,413-1-8. The revenue for the year 1884-85 amounted to R1,12,153-12-11. It will here be convenient to show in one table the

amounts that have been realised during the years the district has been under British administration :—

| Year. | R | a. | p. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1879-80 . . . . . . | 35,382 | 4 | 2 |
| 1880-81 . . . . . . | 84,726 | 14 | 8 |
| 1881-82 . . . . . . | 1,20,512 | 13 | 10 |
| 1882-83 . . . . . . | 98,666 | 14 | 1 |
| 1883-84 . . . . . . | 92,413 | 1 | 8 |
| 1884-85 . . . . . . | 1,12,153 | 12 | 11 |

Extra police for Rindli and the Bolan, 1885.

509. Early in April 1885 the Agent to the Governor General applied to the Government of India for sanction to a temporary increase to the police establishment to guard stores at Rindli and in the Bolan Pass, which were at that time being collected for the army. In letter No. 922-E. of 13th June 1885, the Government of India said that the following total establishment had been sanctioned :—

1 Assistant Superintendent of Police.
1 Deputy Inspector.
204 Rank and file.

The police were supplied by the Panjab Government. Mr. R. C. Plowden was sent as Assistant District Superintendent of Police.

# CHAPTER IX.

Introduction.

510. Some of the previous chapters of this report have been devoted to an explanation of the administration of the districts of Quetta, first separately, and then after its amalgamation with the district of Pishín, under a Political Agent, who was placed in control of both. In another chapter the administration of the district of Thal-Chotiálí, including Sibi, both before and after the amalgamation of that district in the Thal-Chotiálí district, has been explained. Sibi was at one time included in the administrative control of the Political officer at Jacobabad, but as its administration has been reported on in a previous chapter, in this chapter it will only be necessary to occasionally refer to it. It is now proposed to give a brief description of the districts of Kachhi and Lus Beyla, an explanation of the affairs administered by the Political Agent at Jacobabad and Karachi, together with some mention of political matters which are and have been under the immediate superintendence, control, or management of that officer. An account will be given of Lus Beyla affairs; the quarrel of the Jám with his son; of the Chutta tribe, and the difficulties experienced regarding them; of the police administration on the Karachi frontier, and the introduction of tribal responsibility; of the system of assessment to be employed on the Kalát lands irrigated by Indus canals; of questions which have arisen as to the Sirwah canal; of the Sind-Kalát boundary dispute; of the settlement of disputes in and around Gwadar; and of the Makrán coast telegraph line, &c., &c.

Boundaries of the Province of Kachhi.

511. The following information extracted from an interesting report regarding Kachhi, and describing this division of Baluchistan, has been submitted by Lieutenant-Colonel Reynolds :—

The province Kachhi, according to MacGregor, is bounded on the north and north-east by the Marri and Bugtí country, on the south by the desert strip separating it from Sind, on the east by Sind, and on the west by the Hala mountains. Its utmost length from north to south is about 120 miles, and in breadth the habitable and fertile part of it is little more than 60. It is watered by the Bolan, Mula and Narí rivers. It has no marked natural features, and its surface is nearly uniformly flat, and, except within the influence of irrigation, or after successive seasons of favourable rains, may be termed a desert.

Towns in Gandáváh.

512. The principal towns of the province are Gandáváh, a winter residence of His Highness the Khán, near the Mula Pass, Bhág rather more than half-way between Jacobabad and Sibi, Háji Shahar, and Lehrí. Besides these there are the large villages of Shahpur, Chutter, and Pulaji in Eastern Kachhi; and Jhal, Shoran, &c., under the hills that form the western boundary of the plain.

Description of Bhág.

513. Bhág, the residence of a naib, is the largest and most important town in Kachhi. It is the centre of the Narí cultivation, and is now generally preferred to Gandáváh by His Highness the Khán when he comes down from Kalát for the winter. The town is situated on the Narí river about 60 miles north of Jacobabad, and 40 south of Sibi. The station of Bellpat on the Sibi-Pishín State Railway is 16 miles to the eastward. The valley of the Narí is noted for its breed of oxen, large numbers of which are yearly exported to the Panjab. The crops are principally wheat, jowari, and sarson, or mustard. These are grown as "barani" crops on lands watered only by rain, and also on lands irrigated from the Narí river. In either case they are greatly dependent on the rainfall, as in years when this is scanty there is but little water in the river, and as Sibi and Northern Kachhi get the first supply, there is not always a sufficiency for Bhág

and the country lower down. The river flows as far as Barshori, 30 miles south of Bhág, and then loses itself in the desert.

Háji Shahar, Mihtrí and Dhádar.

514. Sixteen miles north of Bhág on the right bank of the Narí lies the town of Háji Shahar, the inhabitants of which are mostly Jats and Hindus. The town received its name from Háji Muhammad Khán, Sirdar of the Brahui tribe of Shahwánís, who make this their residence in the winter months, returning to the Khurásán Highlands in summer. Twelve miles further north is the town of Mihtrí, the winter head-quarters of Sirdar Assad Khán Raisani, C.I.E., the Chief of the Sarawán Brahuis. He is the hereditary councillor of His Highness the Khán and ranks next to him amongst the Chiefs of Baluchistan. Mihtrí is the northern limit of the jurisdiction of the Jacobabad Agency, but I may mention that the important town of Dhádar lies about 12 miles to the north-west of it near the mouth of the Bolan.

Lehrí.

515. In Eastern Kachhi there is the town of Lehrí, and the villages of Pulaji, Chutter, and Shahpur. The first named is situated on the right bank of the river Lehrí about 70 miles from Jacobabad, and is the head-quarters of Sirdar Sohráb Khán, the Dumki Chief. The river is of considerable breadth and, though generally dry, comes down with great force when swollen by hill torrents after rain. There is abundant cultivation in the neighbourhood, the jowari crops especially being exceedingly fine. Cotton, wheat, and bajri are also grown. Lehrí is noted for the manufacture of leather from which sword-belts, pouches, shoes, &c., are made, and are beautifully embroidered with silk by the Baluch women. Matchlocks and knives are also made here. The town is walled and has a good bazar. Some ten years ago it suffered greatly from an earthquake, which is said to have destroyed over 200 houses. The southern wall of the town also has been undermined by the encroachment of the river, and a good deal injured. In former years Lehrí was subject to incursions from the Marris and Bugtís, but since the arrangements made in 1877 and the establishment of a cavalry post there, no disturbance of the kind has taken place. During the early part of the Afghan war Lehrí was the scene of great activity, it being the point where the Bugtí-Dera route and that *viá* Sukkur, Jacobabad, and and Shahpur converged. Sirdar Sohráb Khán and his son Mehrab Khán were of great assistance to the troops in procuring supplies, furnishing guides, &c.

Pulaji.

516. Pulaji is 16 miles south of Lehrí, and, together with Chutter, 8 miles further on, is inhabited by the Kaihiris, a priestly sect, the land being owned by the Mingals, a Brahui tribe whose head-quarters are at Wad in the Jalawan country.

Shahpur.

517. Shahpur is about 12 miles from Chutter and 30 miles north of Jacobabad. The principal inhabitants are Jats, and the headman of the village is Syad Achan Shah, a man of some note and considerable influence.

Jhal and Shorin.

518. Jhal is about 70 miles west of Jacobabad and is the residence of Sirdar Kaisar Khán, the Magasi Chief. Shoran is about 50 miles north of Jhal and 25 from Gandáváh. It is the head-quarters of Sirdar Khán and the Rinds in Kachhi.

Trade routes through Kachhi.

519. As MacGregor says, Kachhi is considered the most valuable portion of the Kalát dominions; its commercial importance arising from the circumstance that through it pass the two great thoroughfares between Sind and the North, *viz.*, the routes by the Bolan and Mula, both of which defiles debouch on its plains. When water is available the soil is fertile to a very "high degree." Since this, however,

was written, great changes have taken place. An important trade route has been opened from the north through Harnái, and the railway from Sibi and the mouth of the Bolan connects Baluchistan with the more civilised parts of India. Kachhi now freed from the predatory incursions of the Marris and Bugtís, and with its people at peace amongst themselves, is an entirely altered country from the Kachhi of 1875 and previous years.

Want of water.

520. The great obstacle to cultivation and consequently to increased population is the want of water. The country is still almost entirely dependent on the rainfall, and this supply is most precarious. In the adjoining district of Jacobabad the yearly average is, I believe, three inches only, and in Kachhi it is probably the same. After a heavy fall the rivers come down and the hill torrents render the country for a time impassable, but the people make no attempt to store the water, and, though it is as far as possible utilised at the time, much passes away and is lost. Along the railway, however, large tanks have been excavated at the different stations for the reception and storage of the hill floods, and a supply is collected which lasts, I believe, during the cold weather. Similar arrangements would of course enable the people to cultivate much more than they do at present; and I believe the experiment would at all events be worth making on a small scale. It is unfortunate that all attempts to obtain well water in the centre of Kachhi have failed. Even when obtained it has only been at the expenditure of great labour, and in very small quantities. It is, moreover, so impregnated with salts and various impurities as to be quite useless for any purpose. In Eastern Kachhi the wells are of considerable depth, about 90 or 100 feet, but the water is good and wholesome. This I imagine is due to the proximity of the hills from which the water percolates. It is not, however, very palatable, for the interior of the well is rivetted with tamarisk, and this gives the water a very unpleasant flavor.

Population of Kachhi.

521. The population of Kachhi was estimated by Masson at 100,000, but it is very difficult to say how far this may have been correct even at that date. I should think it an excessive estimate now, even including the winter residents; for it should be noted that the Brahuis, who bring down their flocks to graze in the cold season, migrate to the highlands for the summer. The people who permanently reside in Kachhi are Jats, Hindus, and some Baluch, such as the Dumkis at Lehrí and the Magasis at Jhal, and Jamalis of Rojan. The Kaihiris at Pulaji and Chutter also remain there throughout the year. Taking the population of Bhág to be 5,000, Gandáváh 5,000, Dhádar 4,000, Lehrí 3,000, Háji Shahar (in summer) 1,000, Pulaji, Chutter, and Shahpur 3,000, Jhal and Shoran 3,000, there still remain nearly 76,000 to be accounted for by the minor towns and villages and the winter visitors if we accept 100,000 as a fair estimate. I am inclined to think that the permanent inhabitants of Kachhi do not number over 50,000 or 60,000.

The Khán's revenue.

522. The revenue from Kachhi as realised from His Highness the Khán is said to be about R2,00,000. This of course being derived principally from the land is subject to considerable variations dependent on the rainfall. The revenue is taken in kind by the process known as batai. The share falling to the State being different in different cases. The proportion of the various shares is generally laid down in the sanad under which the zemindar holds the land, and the process by which this proportion is arrived at is extremely complicated and almost impossible to describe. A portion of the revenue of Kachhi is derived from transit duties on merchandise, &c., but this is not so great as it was before the construction of the railway.

523. An important item of revenue is now furnished by lands lying along the Sind border, which are watered by British canals, and this which I have not included in the revenue of Kachhi amounts to about R50,000 per annum. These lands lie to the north and north-west of the Upper Sind Frontier district. The extent of cultivation is about 50,000 acres, producing a gross revenue of nearly R1,00,000 per annum; a detailed account regarding them will be found in another place.

The lands watered by Indus canals.

524. The following account of the province of Lus Beyla has been given by Colonel Reynolds, political relations with His Highness the Jám being managed immediately by the Political Agent at Jacobabad.

Description of Lus Beyla.

I will now proceed to make a few remarks regarding Lus Beyla and the tribes on the Karachi frontier. MacGregor describes Lus as a "province of Baluchistan with well-defined boundaries. To the east the termination of the Hala mountains; to the west a range separating the province from Fao and Makrán. Whilst these two ranges approach to the north of Beyla as to an apex, to the south the line of sea-coast forms the boundary, constituting thus a rough triangle." . . . . . "The province is about 90 miles in length from north to south, by about 70 from east to west at the broadest point. The rivers are the Purali and the Hab. The towns are Beyla, the capital, Utal, Sonmiáni, and Lyari. The Government is vested in a hereditary Chief with the title of Jám."

525. The revenue in 1840 was computed by Masson at R25,000, but is now estimated at about R1,50,000, excluding Ormara, which is farmed for R15,000 annually. The revenue is derived from customs duties on merchandise entering or leaving the port of Sonmiáni, on goods brought by Kafilas, also from land assessment, and by the sale of fishing contracts. There is also a tax on pilgrims who visit the temple of Hinglaj. This tax varies from four annas to three rupees according to the position and circumstances of the individual, and as the number of pilgrims is very great, this is a somewhat important item; indeed, it is computed at R10,000 or R12,000 per annum. The province of Lus Beyla is divided for purposes of administration into five Naibis—Ormara, Sonmiáni, Lyari, Utal, and Beyla. Ormara produces from R15,000 to R16,000 per annum, Sonmiáni about the same, Lyari from R50,000 to R60,000, Utal about R13,000 or R14,000, and Beyla from R40,000 to R45,000.

Revenue of Lus Beyla.

526. The principal inhabitants of the province are Lassis which have numerous sub-divisions, the chief of them being the Jamot sub-division, to which the Jám belongs. The inhabitants of the Hab valley near the Karachi frontier are Chuttas, Sheiks, and Bandijos. The Chuttas are, generally speaking, cattle-owners, and are notorious for their quarrelsome disposition and habits of thieving, which make them a constant element of disturbance on the border. Their present* Chief is Sahib Khán. Sahib Khan's brother, Jan Muhammad, is also a man of note amongst the Chuttas, and has frequently disputed the Chiefship with Sahib Khán. He is a man of an intriguing disposition and indeed possesses to an intensified degree all the bad qualities for which his tribe are so noted. An account of these men will be found further on.

Inhabitants of Lus Beyla

* June 1885.

The Bandijos inhabit the country near the mouth of the Hab river; their Chief is Hambari.

527. Beyla, the capital of the province, "is seated on the banks of a confluent of the Purali river, this latter stream being about a mile distant." (Hughes.) The population appears to be variously estimated from 4,000 to 10,000 souls. There is said to

Description of Beyla.

be a good deal of cultivation in the neighbourhood, the water being obtained from wells.

The town and harbour of Sonmiáni is a small and insignificant place, distant about 70 miles south from Beyla and 52 north-west from Karachi. The exports from Sonmiáni to Sind comprise chiefly wool, oil seeds, and a little grain; to Bombay wool and provisions. The average value of these during the five years ending with 1874-75 was not less than R70,000. The imports into Sonmiáni comprise piece-goods and grain; from Bombay, piece-goods, metals, grain and pulse. (Hughes.)

Hughes gives the following table showing the value of exports and imports of Sonmiáni (and Makrán ports):—

*Value of the Exports from Sonmiáni (and Makrán Ports).*

| Year. | To Sind. | To Bombay. |
|---|---|---|
| | R | R |
| 1870-71 | 1,64,543 | 1,93,900 |
| 1871-72 | 2,14,132 | 1,83,663 |
| 1872-73 | 76,895 | 1,84,184 |
| 1873-74 | 84,110 | 1,64,813 |
| 1874-75 | 1,78,273 | 1,31,443 |

*Value of Imports of Sonmiáni (and Makrán Ports).*

| Year. | From Sind. | From Bombay. |
|---|---|---|
| | R | R |
| 1870-71 | 1,47,907 | 1,12,330 |
| 1871-72 | 1,16,188 | 61,163 |
| 1872-73 | 1,52,622 | 69,368 |
| 1873-74 | 1,46,143 | 49,335 |
| 1874-75 | 1,33,606 | 37,662 |

The towns of Utal and Lyari are small and unimportant.

Description of Ormara.

528. The port of Ormara on the Hingal river, in the province of Makrán, belongs to the Jám of Lus Beyla, having been given to a former Jám by the Khán of Kalát as a reward for services rendered. Masson estimates the revenue derived from Ormara at R1,000 annually, but it is computed by Hughes at R6,000. It is now farmed for R15,000. There is a station here of the Indo-European Telegraph Line.

Personal notice of the Jám.

529. The present Ruler of Lus Beyla is Jám Mír Khán, who succeeded in 1840 at about 12 years of age. He is married to the eldest sister of His Highness the Khán. By his first wife he has no issue and she no longer lives with His Highness. He has also espoused a sister of Nurdin Mingal. By the latter he has a son, Jám Alí Khán, heir-apparent to the Rulership of the province. He is also married to a Delhi lady and has issue by her—two sons. His fourth wife has one son. The antecedents of the Jám have been mentioned in various places in this report; it may here, however, be noted that in 1865 Jám Mír Khán, assisted by Sirdar Nurdin, the Mingal Chief, engaged in a conspiracy against the Khán by whom they were defeated and made prisoners, but were subsequently pardoned. A similar attempt was made in 1868 in which Azad Khán of Khárán was also concerned. This, however, was put an end to by negotiation. In 1869, however, the Jám and Nurdin Mingal again collected a force, but were opposed and defeated by

Shahgassi Wali Muhammad. Some account of the Jám, his sojourn at Hyderabad and elsewhere, under surveillance, and his eventual return to Lus Beyla, will be subsequently given.

The Jám and his son.

530. On His Highness's return from the Deccan he had an interview in Karachi with his son Jám Alí Khán, who had accompanied Sir R. Sandeman to the Delhi Assemblage, and both father and son went together to Beyla. There they remained on friendly terms for about five years, Jám Mír Khán allowing his son R1,800 a month besides paying his expenses on hunting excursions, &c. An account of the quarrels which afterwards took place between the Jám and his son will be found further on.

Sibi handed over to the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí.

531. Up to December 1882, Colonel Reynolds observes, Sibi and the management of the Bugtí tribe formed part of the charge of this Agency. These however were then taken over by the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí, and it was subsequently arranged that the Political Agent, Jacobabad, should take charge of Lus Beyla and reside for a portion of the year at Karachi. This arrangement appears to be in every way good. Karachi is only eighteen hours' run from the Upper Sind frontier, and an officer residing on the sea coast can now reach the centre of Kachhi in less time than he formerly could from Jacobabad. He is also able to superintend our relations with Lus Beyla and direct the management of the Karachi frontier, which, under the dual system that has been in force for the last seven years, was beyond doubt in a most unsatisfactory state. It is, moreover, no inconsiderable advantage to the Political Agent and his establishment that the performance of their duties is compatible with the enjoyment of a temperate climate for the greater part of the year, and that the intense heat which prevails in Upper Sind from April to September can now be avoided, not only without prejudice, but with actual benefit to the public interests.

Officers who have held the post of Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General, Sibi and Jacobabad, and Political Agent, Jacobabad.

532. The officers who have held the post of the Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General, Sibi and Jacobabad, are detailed below; this post was afterwards made into Political Agent, Jacobabad:—

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Second Assistant, | Colonel E. S. Reynolds | from 21st February 1877. |
| " | Lieutenant R. H. Jennings | " 20th January 1880. |
| " | Captain Martelli | " 17th August 1880. |
| " | H. L. Ramsay | " 12th June 1882. |
| Political Agent, | Colonel J. C. Berkeley | " 11th November 1882. |
| " | Colonel Reynolds | " 17th March 1883 up to the present time (August 1885). |

Ceremonies observed on visits to, and receptions of, the Jám of Lus Beyla.

533. The following ceremonies are observed when the Jám of Lus Beyla visits and receives the Agent, Governor General:—When His Highness visits the Agent to the Governor General, he is received by the Assistant Agent or a Political Agent, as he dismounts. The Agent to the Governor General advances a few paces to meet His Highness, shakes hands, and shows him to a seat on his right. The same ceremonies are observed on the departure of the Jám as on his arrival, a salute of 9 guns being fired on each occasion. When the Agent to the Governor General visits the Jám, His Highness sends a high official to the camp of the Agent to the Governor General to conduct him to the Jám's residence. The Jám receives the Agent to the Governor General outside the door of the darbar tent, a guard of honor presents arms, the Agent and the Jám shake hands, and His Highness conducts the Agent to a seat on his right hand. The same ceremonies are observed on departure as on arrival, a salute of 13 guns being fired on each occasion.

534. It will here be convenient to give an account of the quarrel between Jám Mír Khán, the Jám of Lus Beyla, and his son, Mír Jám Alí Khán.

*Review of Lus Beyla affairs from 1868 to 1882.*

The Jám of Lus Beyla is one of the confederacy of Chiefs who recognise the Khán of Kalát as their suzerain. About the year 1868, in consequence of disturbances in Sind and disorder on the Sind frontier, Sir W. Merewether, then Commissioner in Sind, having charge of political relations with Baluchistan, permitted His Highness the Khán of Kalát to assert his authority in Lus Beyla, which he did. The Jám and his son, Mír Jám Alí Khán, escaped into Sind, where, under the orders of Government, they were detained, first at Karachi and afterwards at Hyderabad. In consequence of intrigues which were carried on by Jám Mír Khán against His Highness the Khán of Kalát, the Jám was, in 1871, removed to Ahmednagar and afterwards to Poona. About the time of the Jám's removal from Sind, his son, Jám Alí Khán, effected his escape and returned to Lus Beyla, where, it seems, he undertook the conduct of affairs and came to terms with the Khán of Kalát. Subsequently the political relations of the British Government were placed in the hands of Sir R. Sandeman, and during the second mission of that officer to Kalát, and at the time when, in 1876, the quarrels then raging between the Khán and his Sirdars were finally settled by Sir R. Sandeman at Mastúng, Mír Jám Alí Khán was present as one of the Sirdars of Kalát representing his father. In consequence of the intercession of the Sirdars and at the request of the Khán the Jám was released from confinement in British India; and previously to his release from confinement, Jám Mír Khán distinctly recognised the suzerainty of the Khán of Kalát; he has, however, always enjoyed practical independence within the limits of the State of Lus Beyla. Jám Mír Khán remained at Poona till the spring of 1877, when, at the request of the Kalát Sirdars, headed by the Jám's son, and with the concurrence of the Khán of Kalát, the Jám was released and permitted to return to Lus Beyla. On his return he found that during his absence his son, Jám Alí Khán, had been carrying on, on his own account, the government of the country. At first* it seems the Jám was desirous that his son should continue to carry on the government, but this state of affairs did not last very long; the Jám took up the reins of government himself and disputes ensued. During 1878, Mír Jám Alí Khán was summoned by Sir R. Sandeman to Quetta in consequence of disturbances in Lus Beyla, and a temporary reconciliation was effected. During 1879 Mír Jám Alí Khán was induced to proceed on a pilgrimage to Mecca. After he returned he was for a time on good terms with his father, whom he accompanied to Karachi in 1880, when the Jám was summoned to meet there the Viceroy. In 1881, however, disputes broke out between father and son again, and in March 1882, Jám Mír Khán made bitter complaints against his son to Colonel Waterfield, then officiating as Agent to the Governor General, when he was in Karachi. Colonel Waterfield appears to have assured the Jám of moral support. The Jám shortly after wrote to the Agent, Governor General, complaining further of the insubordination of his son, and asking for help; in reply, he was told† that he should endeavour to keep order in his own territories, and that the Agent, Governor General, would judge between the disputants after he had heard what Jám Alí had to say at Quetta, to which place he had been summoned. The Jám said ‡ that he did not think Jám Alí would go to Quetta, and asked that an Assistant Agent might be sent to Beyla, as he was ready to pay his salary; should Government not do

* Enclosure B to Mr. Duke's report.

† 4th April 1882.

‡ Dated 4th April 1882.

this, and should Jám Alí not be kept at Quetta, the Jám offered to give up his country to the British on receipt of an allowance. About the same time Jám Alí wrote* to excuse himself from visiting Quetta on the ground of danger to his family, as he said he was expecting an attack on the part of his father; between the date of this letter and the 11th April more complaints were received regarding Jám Alí, which culminated in a telegram from the Jám, saying that Jám Alí had plundered some villages, and that the Jám was sending his forces against his son. The Jám asked† for troops for assistance. In reporting‡ the correspondence to the Foreign Office, the Agent, Governor General, said he did not anticipate any serious disturbance. Shortly after, a letter§ came from the Jám to say that an appeal to arms had resulted from the dispute between father and son, which resulted in the Jám taking his son prisoner.

* Dated 7th April 1882.

† Telegram dated April 15th.

‡ No. 249 F. C. of 18th April 1882.

§ Dated 20th April 1882.

Mr. Duke's enquiry into the open rupture between the Jám and his son.

535. This open rupture was the climax of disputes which had been going on for many years, and Mr. Duke was sent‖ to Karachi in order to report on the matter, which he did in detail (*vide* his report, dated 23rd May 1882). The statements made by the parties to the dispute were reduced to writing. The chief points raised by the Jám were (1) that his son had persistently refused to obey him and recognise his authority; (2) that Dost Muhammad of the Jokhya tribe had encouraged him and stirred up discord between father and son. This man was the Jám's Wazir. (3) That at last Jám Alí had broken out into open rebellion. The Jám requested that his son might be removed to a distant place, and placed under restraint, and offered to provide for the maintenance of his son and his son's family, ₹600 a month. Jám Alí Khán urged in his own defence (1) that he had managed affairs during his father's detention; (2) that he had asked for his release from confinement in India; (3) that he had apprehended difficulties with his father, and had consequently declined to carry on affairs after his father's return to Lus Beyla; (4) that his father misled by his Wazir, Nur Muhammad, a Pathan from Kalát, had oppressed his subjects, who had complained to Jám Alí; (5) that insulted by his father's adherents he had left Beyla, and had been attacked and taken prisoner by his father.

‖ No. 62S. of 12th May 1882.

Mr. Duke sends Jám Alí to Quetta.

536. Finding that feeling ran too high between father and son to afford any hope of a reconciliation being effected, Mr. Duke sent Jám Alí to Quetta, where he was kept under surveillance to prevent his intriguing in Lus Beyla.

Captain Hope enquires into Lus Beyla affairs.

537. In June 1882, in order to ascertain the causes which led to the disturbances in Lus Beyla, Captain Hope was sent to make an enquiry. His proceedings are detailed in his report No. A. of 8th July 1882. He did not summon the Jám to Karachi, but obtained a written statement from him. With regard to the sending of Jám Alí to Quetta, Captain Hope observed that since his departure there was quiet in Lus Beyla, and that it was better that the disputants should remain apart, it being likely that the Jám would after a time ask for the return and release of his son. The Jám offered to allow his son ₹600 from the subsidy he received for the telegraph line on the Makrán coast. Jám Alí, however, claimed an allowance of ₹ 2,400 per mensem. The Jám proposed to deduct a certain portion for the family of Jám Alí at Lus Beyla. Captain Hope proposed that the family, or such members as Jám Alí wished, should be sent to him at Quetta, the allowance of ₹600 per mensem being sufficient.

538. Mr. Duke when making his enquiry reported that he believed that a regular conspiracy, having strong support in British territory, had been worked against the Jám. The Jám had alleged that the Jokhyas, living in British territory, had joined in the rebellion against him. Enquiry, however showed that this statement could not be supported.

Captain Hope finds that there was no conspiracy in British territory against the Jám.

539. Jám Alí had stated that he had been urged into rebellion by the knowledge that his father wished to deprive him of the succession. It has previously been observed that the Jám had proposed this to the Agent to the Governor General and had offered to bequeath his territory to the British Government,—a bequest which he has not probably the power to make, as the succession should be decided in consultation with the Khán of Kalát, and the Sirdars of the confederation.

Jám Alí's offer as to the disposal of his territory.

540. Captain Hope was of opinion that Dost Muhammad Jokhya and Nur Muhammad were at the bottom of the disputes between the Jám and his son. Dost Muhammad had long been an adherent of Jám Alí's, and it was by his aid that Jám Alí had escaped from Hyderabad. Nur Muhammad was the Jám's Wazir. After Jám Alí's defeat Dost Muhammad escaped into British territory, with Suleiman, Jám Alí's Munshi. The Jám demanded their surrender. The Sind authorities did not surrender them, but proposed to deal with them under the Penal Code, on a charge of waging war against a friendly State. Proceedings were commenced, and the case was handed over to the Town Magistrate, Karachi, but after the first day the Jám's Agent would not proceed, probably because the Jám did not understand the matter, which had not been explained to him. Captain Hope came to the conclusion that it would be useless to proceed with the magisterial enquiry, and that the men could not be handed over to the Jám. As to Dost Muhammad, Captain Hope agreed with the Sind authorities that he should be detained under a warrant, unless he could be bound over on security to live away from Lus Beyla, and refrain from intrigue.

Failure of the magisterial enquiry made by the Sind authorities as to Dost Muhammad and Suleiman.

541. On this Major Biddulph, then officiating as Agent to the Governor General, told* the Jám that Jám Alí would be detained under surveillance, in the expectation that after a time the Jám would ask that Jám Alí should be sent back, and he proposed† to the Government of India that Jám Alí should be detained at Dera Ghazi Khán; an allowance of R600 for himself and family being paid from the Makrán telegraph subsidy. With regard to Jám Alí's Wazir, Dost Muhammad, the Agent to the Governor General recommended that he should be released from Hyderabad Jail on security.

The Agent to the Governor General reports to Government.

* Letter of 20th July 1882.

† No. 2237, Agent to the Governor General, of 27th July 1882.

542. The orders‡ of Government on the case were that Dost Muhammad, Jám Alí's Wazir, should be released under heavy security, not to leave British territory, or to visit the place of Jám Alí's residence. The Agent to the Governor General addressed the Commissioner in Sind accordingly.§ With respect to the wish of the Jám to set aside from the succession Jám Alí in favour of his younger brother, the orders of Government were that the question might be deferred until His Highness's anger had subsided, and a report after six months' delay as to this point was asked for.

The orders of Government.

‡ No. 751 E. of 3rd October 1882.

§ No. 32 F.C. of 11th October, 1882.

543. As to the proposed detention of Jám Alí in the Panjab, and the allowance to be given him, the orders of Government were that Jám Alí was to be detained at Sibi, pending

Detention of Jám Alí at Jhelum.

arrangements for his detention in the Panjab, the allowance of R600 per mensem was to be deducted from the telegraph subsidy. Jám Alí was sent to Sibi from Quetta, having previously made an attempt * to escape. As to the allowance, the Jám said that R600 was intended for the support of Jám Alí and his family; R400 being paid to the family while in Lus Beyla, leaving only R200 for Jám Alí. Jám Alí then refused to have his family with him, and demanded a larger allowance. It was subsequently † arranged that Jám Alí was to have R350 while at Jhelum, to which place he was sent for detention; this sum was to cover the whole of his expenses, and was to be deducted from the telegraph subsidy. The Jám was to be told that Jám Alí's family should be maintained in comfort at Lus Beyla, and that the Jám should provide riding horses at Jhelum for his son.

* No. 2593 of 29th August 1882.

† No. 1026 E. of 15th November 1882.

Jam Ali returns from the Panjab. Increase to his allowance.

544. For some time Jám Alí remained at Jhelum. Towards the close of the year 1883, the Agent to the Governor General proposed to open negotiations with Jám Alí's father, in view to bringing about a reconciliation, and relieving Jám Alí from his position as a State prisoner. In a letter dated 3rd November 1883, the Jám said that he would forgive his son, on several conditions, among which were, that he should remain for some time at Sibi and Quetta under the eye of the Agent to the Governor General, that his family should reside with him, and that R1,000 per mensem should be granted for his maintenance. The Jám said that after his death he wished the question of the succession to be left to the decision of the Government of India. On this point the Agent to the Governor General proposed that Jám Alí should be recognised as the heir-apparent pending future good conduct, and that should he become worthy of his father's confidence he would be removed to Karachi for employment under Colonel Reynolds on frontier work. Jám Alí accepted the conditions proposed, and was sent under surveillance to Mr. Bruce at Sibi. This officer was told to keep him under surveillance, but otherwise to treat him as the Jám's son. It was proposed to employ Jám Ali in the frontier police, but it was found that the feeling between him and his father rendered the scheme impossible. For the maintenance ‡ of Jám Alí and his family it was arranged by the Agent, Governor General, with the Jam that R1,800 per mensem should be paid, R700 per mensem of this sum being paid from the telegraph subsidy, and R1,100 per mensem being paid direct by the Jám to Jám Alí's family. Jám Alí subsequently came to Quetta, and sent for his sons; § he however returned to Sibi.

‡ No. 2184 of 25th May 1884.

§ No. 3000 of 26th August 1884.

Release of Dost Muhammad from his bond.

545. It has been previously noted that Dost Muhammad was to be released on security, and this was done. In 1884, he petitioned Government, requesting, *inter alia*, that his security bond might be revoked, and that he might be allowed to return to Lus Beyla. When reporting upon his petition the Agent to the Governor General reviewed the circumstances under which Dost Muhammad had aided Jám Alí in his disputes with his father, and remarked that during the culmination of the quarrel the Jám had called to his aid Sirdar Ibrahim Khán Mingal and other Sirdars of the Brahui confederacy, whereas the Jám, according to the agreement entered into by him with the British Government on his restoration, was bound not to intrigue with the Brahui Sirdars, and without the sanction of the Khán of Kalát he should not have called on the Brahui Sirdars to help him against his son. As regards the cancellation of the bond, the Agent to the Governor General said that he had no objection as the Jám was firmly established at Lus Beyla, and Jám Alí was with the Agent to the Governor General. Dost Muham-

mad, it was added, should be warned against further misconduct, and against entering Lus Beyla without the Jám's consent. The sanction of the Government of India* was granted with regard to release from the bond, and compliance with his other requests and claims was refused. On this Dost Muhammad executed a written document agreeing to the terms stipulated and the bond was cancelled.

*No. 3106 E. of 22nd December 1884.

546. To return to Jám Alí Khán. It appears that about the latter end of 1884, Jám Alí accompanied Sir R. Sandeman on the expedition which was undertaken to Zhob, after which he seems to have returned to Sibi. About the commencement of 1885, it seems that it was settled that Jám Alí should accompany Colonel Reynolds when that officer went to settle the Rind disputes. The latest correspondence† shows that Colonel Reynolds commended his services while at Gwadar, and that the Agent to the Governor General took the opportunity to observe to the Jám that it was owing to Mír Ibrahim Khán and other Mingals that the Jám could not agree with his son, who should be restored to confidence. The Jám replied that the disagreement with Jám Alí was due to his own misconduct; and he had no confidence in him, and that he thought it would be dangerous if his son were to come near him. Jám Alí is now, usually, in Sibi, but he occasionally visits Quetta. The disputes between the Jám and his son have been going on for many years, and it seems that the Jám still (August 1885) wishes that his son should remain at some distance from Lus Beyla.

The state of affairs at present.

†Letter from Jám Mir Khán, to the Agent to the Governor General, dated 30th April 1885.

547. It will now be convenient to give an account of the Chutta tribe, and its chief men—Sahib Khán, Jan Muhammad, and Naushirwan. The Chutta tribe is a turbulent tribe on the frontier of the Karachi district. The tribe is located on the western bank of the river Hab, between the country under the immediate influence of the Khán of Kalát, and that of the Jam of Lus Beyla. The tribe is, and always has been, considered as subordinate to the Jám. The tribe is a small one, the principal persons being (1) Sahib Khán, (2) his brother Jan Muhammad (sons of Umed Khán), and (3) Naushirwan, their cousin and the chief robber. Sahib Khán has been acknowledged as the head of the tribe by the Khán of Kalát, the Jám, and the Jhalawan and Saráwán Sirdars, in opposition to his brother who claims equality with him, and declines to admit that Sahib Khán has any authority over himself.

The Chutta tribe and their Chiefs.

548. In 1875 all direct relations between the Khán of Kalát and the British Government were broken off, as has been related in the previous chapters of this report. Robberies on the Karachi frontier became frequent, while satisfaction, and the surrender of offenders by the Khán's officials, became impossible. In consequence a new frontier police force was established. The number of men was increased from 40 to 140 at an increased monthly cost. It was thought that by the enlistment of the members of the various tribes in the force, the more turbulent disturbers of the peace would be enlisted in the interests of law and order. Sahib Khán, the Chutta Sirdar, was appointed inspector of the force, and he brought a number of his tribesmen with him. For about two years the plan was a success. Subsequently, however, numerous complaints were received from the Karachi authorities as to the impossibility of obtaining satisfaction for robberies, or the surrender of offenders from the tribe across the frontier. The difficulties experienced were increased by the quarrel existing between Sahib Khán, the chief of the Chutta tribe, and his younger brother Jan Muhammad. In order to settle this quarrel Sir R.

Increase of the frontier police in 1875, and appointment of Sahib Khán Chutta.

Sandeman* summoned Sahib Khán to Kalát, and made arrangements to send him with Mír Jám Alí Khán, "his immediate feudal superior," to Gandáváh, but Sahib Khán absented himself and evaded a settlement.

* No. 193, dated 9th May 1877.

549. The position of the Jám of Lus Beyla with regard to the Khán of Kalát will here be noted. "The Jám† of Lus Beyla is the Sovereign Prince of that province; he is the feudatory of the Khán of Kalát, to whom he owes allegiance, military service, and some trifling specific dues; .... the Jám of Lus Beyla has an undoubted right to levy any taxes he may think proper within his own territory, except transit dues on general merchandise passing through Baluchistan.

The Jám of Lus Beyla, a feudatory of the Khán.

† No. 193, dated 9th May 1877.

550. In 1877‡ Sir R. Sandeman visited Lus Beyla, and referred the disputes between the leaders of the Chutta tribe, and between them and the Jam of Lus Beyla, to a Committee of Sirdars and Rai Bahadur Hittu Ram. The Committee recorded that the village of Uthal had been raided by the Chutta tribe, headed by Sahib Khán, and plundered; that enmity did at that time exist between the Khán and the Jám, and that the cause of the bad feeling existing between the Jám and Sahib Khán was due to the Jám's not having forgiven Sahib Khán for the raid, and Sahib Khán had consequently made false reports regarding the Jám's conduct to the Karachi authorities. It was decided that Sahib Khán should ask the Jám's forgiveness for his offences, which he did.

‡ No. 57C., dated 26th December 1877.

Disputes between the Jám and the Chutta tribe settled.

551. At the same time an agreement was made in writing between Sahib Khán and his brother Jan Muhammad Khán, to the effect that Sahib Khán was to be considered the chief of the Chutta tribe, and that he should receive the annual allowances payable to the Sirdar by the clan, Jan Muhammad having no claim to them. As to transit fees, it was arranged that these should be divided in equal shares between Jan Muhammad, Sahib Khán, and Salib Muhammad; this deed of settlement was signed by the Jám, the disputing parties and others.

Sahib Khán acknowledged head of the Chutta tribe.

552. The District Superintendent of Police, in his letter No. 852 of 7th November 1878, summarised a number of complaints which had been received regarding Sahib Khán, Jan Muhammad, and the Chuttas generally, and reported that he was of opinion that Sahib Khán had used his position as a Government officer for his own profit, and that he was unfit for his position as a Government officer; this opinion was repeated in a letter from the same officer of 23rd February 1879, when Sahib Khán accused Naushirwan of trying to murder him. About the same time the Jám of Lus Beyla§ complained to the Agent to the Governor General regarding the depredations of the Chutta tribe, stating that Sahib Khán and Jan Muhammad were plundering beyond the British frontier, and carrying the booty into British territory, and requesting that Sahib Khán might be dismissed from the police. Sir R. Sandeman, in reporting‖ the state of affairs to the Government of India, observed that if he should be proved to be guilty of the charges brought against him, simple dismissal seemed hardly sufficient to meet the requirements of the case, and requested that steps might be taken against Sahib Khán and his people. Shortly afterwards¶ the Commissioner in Sind replied to the Agent to the Governor General that he had dismissed Sahib Khán as being unfit for Government employ. This was followed by a

Dismissal of Sahib Khán from the police.

§ Letter dated 3rd April 1879.

‖ No. 238 P., dated 24th April 1879.

¶ No. 243, dated 6th May 1879.

serious collision between the followers of the Jám of Lus Beyla and the Chuttas, and the Agent to the Governor General said that* he proposed visiting Karachi when he would take up the case. This was done, and the Jám and Chuttas filed papers stating that they had no further quarrels. Under arrangements† made by the Agent to the Governor General with the Commissioner in Sind, Sahib Khán and Jan Muhammad were sent to Quetta in view to the disposal of their case in consultation with the Khán of Kalát and the Brahui Sirdars, as the offences with which they were charged were committed chiefly in Kalát territory. "Both brothers seem‡ to have been kept for some time in confinement or at least under surveillance." At length the Agent to the Governor General brought about an agreement§ between the Chutta Sirdars and the Jám of Lus Beyla, by which the Sirdars agreed that they would abstain from interference with the land revenue, taxes, or sources of revenue within the limits of boundaries not included in their lands. This agreement was made in consequence of complaints received from the Sind authorities in 1880 as to the levy of taxes by the Chutta tribe. Sahib Khán and Jan Muhammad after having been for some time under surveillance seem to have been released.

* Dated 30th September 1879.

† No. 12 C., dated 7th February 1880. No. 56 C., dated 9th February 1880.

‡ No. B., dated 10th July 1882.

§ 24th November 1880.

Ali Muhammad causes trouble by ignoring the positions of the Jám and Sahib Khán.

553. After the dismissal of Sahib Khán from the police, the post of inspector which he held was not filled up, but two sub-inspectors were appointed, to one of whom, Akhund Alí Muhammad, a Brahui, the portion of the frontier formerly under Sahib Khán was entrusted. During 1881 several complaints were received by the Agent to the Governor General against the Chuttas, which were referred to the Commissioner in Sind, who in reply‖ observed that the Jám had been up to that time complaining to the Agent to the Governor General of the lawless behaviour of the followers of Sahib Khán. Sahib Khán, however, got round the Jám, and made an attempt to turn the tables on the frontier police who had reported his misconduct, by inducing the Jám to complain that Akhund Alí Muhammad was stirring up trouble on the frontier, and to say that unless he were removed, he, the Jám, would not be responsible for the behaviour of the frontier tribes. This, he said, the Jám would not have done, but for the supposition that the Agent to the Governor General was engaged in important Afghan affairs. The Commissioner hoped that the Jám would be told that he must put a stop to the lawless actions of the Chuttas, the whole blame for disturbances being thrown on Sahib Khán. The Commissioner further¶ said that he did not think that a plan, suggested by the Agent to the Governor General,—*viz.*, the retention of the Chutta hostages at Karachi to ensure the good conduct of the Chutta tribe,—would be successful in checking lawlessness. Matters did not mend, and in 1882 further complaints were made by the Commissioner, Karachi, against the Chutta tribe; and it seems that while the Jám and Sahib Khán were at the head of one party, Jan Muhammad and Akhund Alí Muhammad gave assistance to Jám Alí Khán, the son of the Jám, in disturbances and disagreements which took place in 1882 between the Jám and his son. Captain Hope, who investigated the whole affair in 1882, reported that

‖ No. 576, dated 12th September 1881.

¶ No. 604, dated 8th October 1881.

"Alí Muhammad complains that though thieves and stolen property were repeatedly traced into the territory of the Jám, and to the special habitations of Sahib Khán and Naushirwan, yet he was unable to obtain any satisfaction from either of these, and therefore turned for help to Jám Alí Khán and Jan Muhammad, through whose assistance he was able to recover a good deal of the stolen property. I need hardly remark tha this procedure was

entirely wrong; in anything connected with the Lus Beyla State of the Chutta tribe, the only persons who could properly be applied to were the Jám and Sirdar Sahib Khán. Failing these, it was most improper for the frontier police to endeavour to work through the rival parties,* and application ought to have been made to the Agent to the Governor General for assistance, if such were required."

* *Vide* No. 10216, Agent, Governor General, dated 1st April 1882; and No. 117, dated 22nd April 1882; and memorandum by Mr. Bruce on letter No. 174, dated 29th May 1882.

Akhund Alí Muhammad had the support of the Karachi authorities.

Captain Hope finds amicable settlement between Sahib Khán and Jan Muhammad impossible.

554. Captain Hope, in his report No. B, dated Quetta, 10th July 1882, said that he found that Sahib Khán and Jám Muhammad, when separate, most reasonable;—Sahib Khán merely wished his brother to acknowledge him as Sirdar, while Jan Muhammad only wanted his share of the tribal revenue which was his due. When, however, the brothers were confronted with one another, it became plain that no amicable settlement was possible, and Captain Hope told Jan Muhammad that his claims would be submitted for the orders of the Agent to the Governor General.

Captain Hope finds the Chuttas at least as much sinned against as sinning.

555. As to the specific complaints made by the police of the frequency of thefts on the Karachi-Lus Beyla frontier line, Captain Hope showed that many and loud complaints were made against the Jám or the Chutta Sirdars when cattle were carried off into Lus Beyla or Chutta villages. On the other hand, the Jám had made frequent applications to the frontier police for the surrender of criminals who had escaped from Lus Beyla into British territory, and that the District Superintendent of Police had invariably told him that he must apply to the Agent to the Governor General for aid. To this Captain Hope attributed his want of zeal in arresting robbers and restoring stolen property. As to the actual cases of robbery complained of by the police, Captain Hope showed that, in the case of missing cattle, the fact of the animals not being forthcoming was a good deal due to the carelessness of the owners, and that in other cases it did not appear that any charge could be brought home to any one, or that any good end would be produced by interference. The conclusion towards which the investigation pointed was that the cases had been got up by the sub-inspector, in order that blame might be thrown upon persons against whom he had a grudge, and that the real cause of the complaints was the disagreement which existed between Akhund Alí Muhammad, the sub-inspector of police, and Sahib Khán, the ex-inspector of police and head of the Chutta tribe,—the personal feeling between the parties having been increased by Alí Muhammad's persistence in endeavouring to ignore the authority of Sahib Khán, and to work through his younger brother, Jan Muhammad. Both Captain Hope and the Karachi authorities thought that Akhund Alí Muhammad should be removed. Captain Hope further recommended that the District Superintendent of Police, or the District Magistrate and Collector, Karachi, should correspond on all matters regarding the frontier with the Agent to the Governor General. This course had been previously adopted, but was put a stop to by the then Commissioner, the delay resulting from which neutralised any action that might be possible. The ultimate opinion arrived at by Captain Hope was that the Chutta tribe was found to have been at least as much sinned against as sinning.

The Agent to the Governor General forwards the whole case to the Government of India.

556. In forwarding the correspondence to the Government of India, Major Biddulph, Agent to the Governor General, observed that the Sind authorities had allowed Akhund Alí Muhammad to take "advantage of paternal and local quarrels, and to recover stolen property by appealing to Jan Muhammad against his elder brother, and to Jám Alí against his father—a course of proceed-

ing which he thought open to objection. Major Biddulph agreed in the opinions enunciated by Captain Hope, and said that the sub-inspector, Akhund Alí Muhammad, should be dismissed. He was also of opinion that the police should be placed under the Baluchistan Political Agency, the same system of tribal responsibility being instituted as existed on the Upper Sind frontier; and that an allowance should be made to Sahib Khán, in return for which he should be held responsible for all robberies, &c., and should make good all losses within certain limits. He added that the recognition of the Jám to this arrangement should be secured, and that a portion of the subsidy should be paid to Jan Muhammad and Naushirwan Chutta. The Agent to the Governor General further recommended that the Karachi police authorities should correspond direct with the Agent to the Governor General, and added that Jan Muhammad was at Quetta pending the settlement of his disputes with Sahib Khán.

The Agent to the Governor General suggests that restraint should be placed on Alí Muhammad.

557. Shortly after the submission of this report to Government, the Agent to the Governor General received accounts of further depredations on the part of the Chutta tribe; on this he warned* Sahib Khán that he would be held responsible for any misdoings of his people, and he suggested to the Commissioner in Sind that some restraint should be placed on the sub-inspector Alí Muhammad, as trouble would continue as long as he held office. The Commissioner replied† that Alí Muhammad had not interfered across the frontier, and that the Karachi authorities did not think that he was at the bottom of a great deal of the disturbance on the frontier. He made further complaints as to Sahib Khán's obstructiveness when cattle had to be traced, and as to his general character. Both the Commissioner and the District Magistrate supported Alí Muhammad, and, considering his conduct satisfactory, declined to remove him from his post. To this letter Sir R. Sandeman replied‡ that the allegations made against Alí Muhammad by the officers who conducted the enquiry had been found to be justifiable, and that he hoped that the recommendation made as to his removal, concurred in by the Collector of Karachi, would be approved by the Commissioner. It was further requested that the police reports might be sent to the Agency, as the practice had been discontinued.

*No. 2659, dated 1st September 1882.

†No. 309, dated 24th November 1882.

‡No. 217, dated 18th January 1883.

Jan Muhammad sent to Lus Beyla from Quetta.

558. It has been previously noted that a settlement between Jan Muhammad and Sahib Khán had been found to be impossible. Jan Muhammad was sent to Quetta, where he remained some months, after which the Agent to the Governor General sent§ him to Lus Beyla, in order that his dispute might be settled by the Jám in tribal fashion, and this apparently was‖ done.

§No. 183, dated 17th January 1883.

‖No. 891, dated 27th march 1885.

Reorganisation of frontier police.

559. Towards the close of 1883 the Government of India decided that the police arrangements on the Karachi¶ frontier should be modified, by which considerable reductions in their numbers should be made; the money thus obtained being devoted to the introduction of a system of tribal responsibility. Under arrangements made by Colonel Reynolds for carrying this out, men belonging to the Chutta as well as several other tribes were entertained. Sahib Khán, Chutta, obtained the post of rasaldar on R50 per mensem. Naushirwan became a jemadar on R30 per mensem, and 16 other men of the tribe received pay. The Agent to the Governor General observed that it was doubtful whether Sahib Khán would work well on the pay, which was insufficient; but as there was no money

¶No. 2269 E., dated 29th September of 1883.

available, nothing could be done. The system of tribal responsibility has been introduced on the Karachi frontier, and is now under trial. Sufficient time has not, however, yet * elapsed to enable an opinion to be formed as to whether the scheme will be successful, and as to whether the men employed have worked well.

* June 1885.

560. An account will now be given of the police administration of the Karachi frontier, and the introduction of tribal responsibility.

Karachi frontier police arrangements made in 1875.

Before the year 1875 the guardianship of the Karachi frontier, extending for about 80 miles, was provided for by the Karachi police, 40 of whom were stationed on the border. In 1875 all relations with the Khán of Kalát were temporarily broken off. As has been previously explained in this report, the Political Agent was withdrawn. The Khán was unable to leave Kalát for fear of damage at the hands of his Sirdars, with the result that it was impossible to obtain through him any satisfaction for robberies, &c., committed on the frontier. Consequently 100 men were added to the frontier police; these men were taken from the frontier tribes, in the hope that they would thus be interested in maintaining rather than interfering with law and order. Sahib Khán, the Sirdar of the Chutta tribe who inhabit the lands lying across the border, was made inspector of this police force. This arrangement was at first sanctioned tentatively for one year, and in 1876 it was continued until further orders on the recommendation of Colonel Munro, to whom the management of political relations on the frontier had been entrusted. The force was under the superintendence of the District Superintendent of Police, Karachi, and the control of the Commissioner in Sind.

Sahib Khán as Inspector, and troubles in the police.

561. At first the plan worked well, but after the reopening of political relations with the Khán of Kalát, frequent complaints were made by the Sind authorities to the Baluchistan political authorities regarding cattle thefts on the Karachi-Lus Beyla frontier. It was found that Sahib Khán, the Chutta Sirdar, made use of the frontier police to pursue his own private quarrels beyond the border. After much correspondence, Sahib Khán, the Sirdar and inspector, was dismissed from the police force. He was succeeded by Akhund Alí Muhammad, a Brahui, not as inspector, but as sub-inspector, and after this man's appointment complaints became frequent against Sahib Khán. Akhund Alí Muhammad finding that he could not co-operate with Sahib Khán, sought to make dissensions between Sahib Khán and his brother Jan Muhammad, and to enlist the latter on his own side.

Captain Hope's enquiry, and its result.

562. In 1882 Captain Hope, Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General, was deputed to enquire into the state of affairs at Karachi; and he heard what the sub-inspector Akhund Alí Muhammad and the ex-inspector Sahib Khán had to say. The result of his enquiry was that several cases had been got up by the sub-inspector Akhund Alí Muhammad in order to throw blame on persons against whom he had a grudge; that no satisfactory frontier arrangement would be possible as long as the sub-inspector remained at his post, both on account of the personal enmity existing between Alí Muhammad and Sahib Khán, and the endeavours of Alí Muhammad to ignore the position of Sahib Khán as Chief of the Chutta tribe. Captain Hope, in consultation with the Karachi authorities, came to the conclusion that Alí Muhammad should be removed from his post; and in this opinion the Foreign Office agreed when reporting the matter to the Government of Bombay.*

* No. 695 E., dated 26th September 1882.

563. Captain Hope further pointed out that the frontier police had been appointed when political relations were broken off with the Khán, and that the circumstances under which the force was increased had changed when the Baluchistan Agency was re-established in 1877. As to the work done by the force, he said it seemed to exist for the purpose of making complaints against the Chutta tribe. In addressing the Government of Bombay on the subject, the Government of India observed that the existing system might give rise to fresh difficulties. The frontier police are, it was observed, under the Sind authorities, while the management of the tribes across the frontier rests with the Agent to the Governor General. At the same time "it seems absolutely necessary to provide some means for ensuring prompt communication, and preventing misunderstandings between the authorities on either side of the frontier. On other portions of the frontier, it was said that the most effectual means of preventing plunder was found to lie, not in the establishment of British police, but in the enforcement of the principle of tribal responsibility in return for payments made to the principal men of the tribes. The adoption of this system was recommended for the Karachi-Lus Beyla frontier, the additional police sanctioned in 1875 being dispensed with, and the details of the system being worked out by the Commissioner in consultation with the Agent to the Governor General.

The Government of India propose to introduce the tribal system, and dispense with the frontier police.

564. With regard to this proposal, the Commissioner enquired* from the Agent to the Governor General what the tribal system would be along the Karachi frontier, how many chiefs or tribes would be responsible for order, what powers they would possess, and with what officers, and in what way, they would communicate, and with whom the Karachi police would communicate in the event of robberies taking place. The Commissioner said he thought that the tribal system would be of no use on the border. The Agent to the Governor General replied† that the Jám of Lus Beyla would be responsible for the conduct of the petty tribes, and that the tribal system, which was successful in other portions of the frontier, should be successful on this border. The Commissioner, however, in reply‡ asked—

Discussion between the Agent, Governor General, and Commissioner in Sind.

* No. 38, dated 31st January 1883.

† No. 513, dated 14th February 1883.

‡ No. 61, dated 21st February 1883.

(a) How many tribes or chiefs would be responsible for order.
(b) Whether each is independent or subordinate to another chief.
(c) What powers each chief would possess.
(d) What procedure should be followed in cases of theft.
(e) Why should not the tribal system be carried out across the border only.

On this the Agent to the Governor General explained§ that the Chutta tribes were subjects of the Khán of Kalát, from the standpoint that the Jám was a feudatory of the Khán; that the chiefs responsible for quiet on the border would be the Jám and the Khán, and that they had feudal powers over the Chuttas and other tribes. The Agent to the Governor General would direct and control arrangements for the settlement of robbery cases. In reply to a remark made by the Commissioner, to the effect that the tribal system might be used across the border while the police continued to protect the Karachi frontier, the Agent to the Governor General reviewed the correspondence regarding the frontier police and the conduct of the inspectors, and pointed out that it was due to the dual system of management of the Chutta tribe that the disagreements between the Jám and his son had taken place; that the Jám had ground of complaint, and that in justice to him a system which had not worked well politically should be changed, as the British Government had employed the Jám's vassals, Sahib Khán and Muhammad Ali,

§ No. 709, dated 16th March 1883.

in the police, and they had used the position thus obtained to make disturbances in his territory. In conclusion, the Agent to the Governor General said, "The present system is what the Jám complains of, and I merely ask that for it one should be introduced that, while affording protection to British interests within the Karachi frontier, will not disregard interests equally important beyond it."

The Government of India sanction the system of tribal responsibility.

565. In forwarding* the correspondence to the Government of India, the Agent to the Governor General said that the scheme involved the grant of service to the chiefs, and that probably the amount spent on the police would suffice. It was subsequently† decided by the Governor General in Council that there was no necessity for maintaining a special body of police on the Sind frontier; it was decided, however, not to withdraw the whole grant, those men retained for duty in Karachi being in future entirely restricted to duty within the British frontier. The sum of R10,250 per annum was made available for the introduction of a system of tribal responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order on the frontier.

* No. 710 of 16th March 1883.
† No. 2269E., dated 29th September 1883.

Agent to the Governor General submits the proposals to the Government of India.

566. On this the case was placed in Colonel Reynolds' hands to work out the details, which he did, and he submitted‡ to the Agent to the Governor General a statement showing the distribution and cost of tribal service. Under this scheme service was to be given to the Khidrani, Jamali, Chutta, Bundijo, and Rind tribes, a certain number of men being taken from each tribe and placed under the immediate orders of ressaldars, jemadars, and daffadars of their own tribes respectively, the cost being the total cost sanctioned for the scheme. In forwarding§ the scheme to Government, it was explained that the details had been arranged in consultation with the Jám and had his approval, and that he had promised to assume responsibility for the protection of life and property on the border, the whole being controlled by the Political Agent, Jacobabad and Karachi. It had been proposed to employ Jám Alí in this police, but the high feeling between him and his father, the Jám of Lus Beyla, frustrated this plan. As to the cost of the arrangement, it was pointed out that only half the sum sanctioned for police in 1875 had been sanctioned; that it would possibly prove to be insufficient, and that the scheme should therefore be considered to be tentative; at the same time an application for arms and clothing for the men was made. The Foreign Secretary replied|| that it was understood that the Agent to the Governor General was to subsidise the frontier tribes, and not to establish a fresh body of police, and that no sanction for arms and clothes could be given, and it was apprehended¶ that collisions would occur between them and the Karachi police. The Agent to the Governor General was asked to work out another scheme of tribal responsibility. The Agent to the Governor General replied that the new plan was so contrived as to proportion the pay received to the responsibility incurred by the various tribes, and at the same time he disclaimed any intention of organising a separate body of police. The Jám of Lus Beyla, it was added, was responsible for the good conduct of the men. On this the Foreign** Office asked for further information as to

‡ No. 287, dated 8th March 1884.
No. 345, dated 28th March 1884.
§ No. 1370, dated 14th April 1884.
|| No. 1034 E., dated 17th June 1884.
¶ No. 1710 E., dated 4th July 1884.
** No. 2490 E., dated 20th August 1884.

(1) The tribes on the frontier, their chiefs, and to whom they rendered allegiance.

(2) Who would be responsible for offences traced home to the members of each tribe.

(3) What powers would the authorities of each tribe possess,

567. The Agent to the Governor General replied in a letter comparing the proposals for the Karachi* frontier with the arrangements made with the Bugtís and Marris. The Sirdar of each tribe was granted a yearly allowance, and out of this the Bugtí and Marri Sirdars had to maintain a certain number of horsemen in British territory at the head-quarters of the Political Agent, besides being responsible for the restoration of plundered property. The British Government, on the other hand, maintained outposts of cavalry to assist the Sirdars. The Sirdars had not the power of transferring service from one minor chief to another. In the same manner under the proposed plan service was to be given on the Karachi frontier, the headmen being responsible for thefts by the tribesmen, stolen property being restored by them. As, however, the headmen had no posts of regular troops to apply to when requiring assistance, it became necessary to establish posts of each tribe to enable chiefs to coerce their men, titles of ressaldar, &c., being given to the heads of posts. The frontier tribes and the chiefs to whom they own allegiance are—

The Agent to the Governor General further explains his proposals.

* No. 1150, dated 29th September 1884, and No. 5864, dated 22nd December 1884.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Bundijo | Hambari Khán | Jám. |
| Chutta | Sahib Khán | Jám. |
| Jamalis | Darya Khán | Jám. |
| Khedranis | Jabal Khán | Gohur Khán Zahri. |

The above chiefs would be the responsible authorities, and would have to enforce restitution of property or pay the value. On an offence being committed the British police would have to complain to the Political Agent. This plan it was urged preserved the principle of tribal responsibility, while it was not apprehended that collisions would occur with the Sind police. To subsidise the tribes without keeping any posts garrisoned by them would not check plunder, and might cause dissensions among the tribesmen.

568. As the proposed plan was being worked, and as it had not received the formal sanction of Government, some correspondence took place as to the pay of the men which was placed under objection by the Comptroller of India Treasuries. In February† 1885, however, the Foreign Department issued a memorandum to the Finance Department, requesting that a grant might be allotted to the extent of R10,250 per annum from 1st April 1884, for the prosecution of the proposed plan, and that the Comptroller might be authorised to pass the bills. This memorandum, together with a telegram from the Foreign‡ Secretary, may be taken as sufficient provisional sanction for the continuance of the present arrangement. In that telegram the Foreign Secretary said that within the sum of R10,250 per annum the Agent to the Governor General might make any arrangements necessary, reporting the result, carefully guarding them as experimental or subject to revision. On the 2nd April 1885, the Comptroller of India Treasuries said that he had no orders to pass the bills, and the Foreign Secretary§ was informed accordingly in view to the bills being passed.

Sanction of the Government of India.

† No. 217 E., dated 14th February 1885.

‡ No. 37 E., dated 13th January 1885.

§ No. 1567, dated 18th April 1885.

569. In June 1879 the Viceroy was pleased, subject to the approval of Her Majesty's Government, to sanction the grant to Jám Mír Khán, of Lus Beyla, of a personal salute of 9 guns, so long as his conduct remained satisfactory. The Jám, it was observed, was not "recognised by the British Government as an independent prince.

Grant of a personal salute of 9 guns to the Jám of Lus Beyla, 1879.

Her Majesty the Queen-Empress of India approved of the grant of this personal salute.

Question as to the system to be employed for the assessment of lands in Kalát irrigated by Indus canals, 1879.

570. The question of the system of assessment to be employed on lands in Kalát irrigated by Indus canals will now be explained. The correspondence on the subject of the system to be employed began in 1879, and was consequent on the introduction by the Government of Bombay of a new settlement in Sind. The Bombay Government desired that the leases for Kalát lands should be altered in accordance with the new settlement. Originally there were two questions raised—(*a*) as to the rate to be charged in future for Kalát lands, and (*b*) the establishment required to measure the lands and look after the arrangements. The Government of Bombay considered that the assessment levied by the Khán from his ryots should be ascertained, and a rough settlement in lump should be made with him, treating him as a zemindar, the British Government obtaining half of the assessment. If the Khán objected to this arrangement, the ryots would have to be dealt with in the manner then in force, *viz.*, they would be required to pay one half of the rental that would be paid by similar lands in British territory, fallows being treated exactly as under the British Government. Captain Reynolds, then at Jacobabad, reported that the system in force under which a zemindar had to take up land was inordinately complicated, and he recommended that the applications for land should be made through His Highness's vakil to the political officer, who would pass them on to the Executive Engineer direct; on his sanction the land would be given to the zemindar and measured by a tapedar under the Political Officer. The Political Officer would then collect the share of revenue due to Government. His Highness the Khán approved of these proposals, and the Agent to the Governor General recommended them for the approval of the Government of India, at the same time remarking that there was no intention on the part of Government to make a profit out of His Highness. On the contrary, it was intended to sell the water at a fair value to his cultivators, the Maksudwa canal having been extended to Kalát with a purely political object, from Kashmor through the desert, thereby giving means for the employment of a large number of wild people. The Agent to the Governor General recommended that the canal should still be considered to be a political work, as the lands irrigated were in Kalát and beyond the British frontier.

Political officers entrusted with the supervision of the collection of the revenues.

571. The correspondence was sent to the Foreign Office, and a letter was addressed by the Government of India to the Government of Bombay, observing that the guiding principle in the recommendations made was that the arrangements with the Khán should be conducted by the Political Officers, and not by the Sind revenue officers, and that this arrangement would obviate the difficulties which must arise if the Sind revenue authorities were permitted to interfere. The Government of India proposed to entrust to Political Officers the entire supervision of the collection of the revenue, as proposed by Captain Reynolds, by whom the existing rate should not be enhanced, extra staff being entertained if necessary, a portion of the charges for surveyors and tapedars being borne by His Highness the Khán. The Government of Bombay agreed to the adoption of the proposals, but observed that it would be preferable to receive a lump payment from the Khán, in view to which the Commissioner in Sind should correspond with the Agent to the Governor General. In this opinion the Government of India expressed concurrence, and the Agent to the Governor General was told to correspond with the Commissioner in view to the payment of a lump sum annually.

572. The Khán, however, objected to the payment of a lump sum on several grounds, the chief, perhaps, being the expense of an establishment for the distribution of water, and of providing masonary heads to the channels to give each zemindar his share of water. Captain Reynolds reported that the assessment for lands watered had been fixed at ₹2 per acre on one third of a holding, it being understood that the holder would only cultivate one third, the remainder being in fallow; as a matter of fact, they cultivated, however, more than one third, and thus consumed more water than they were entitled to in Kalát lands. On British lands if they cultivated land in excess of one third of the holding, they had to pay at the rate of ₹1 per acre for the excess cultivated. The Bombay Government wanted to take half the assessment on the one third cultivated, and the entire revenue at ₹1 per acre on the excess cultivated. And this, it was said, would be unfair to the Khán, with whom the British Government had always shared in equal shares. Captain Reynolds advised that the zemindars should pay at the rate of ₹2 per acre for all cultivation, one half being paid to each Government, whereby the zemindar could cultivate as much as he chose to pay for, and Government would obtain a return for all water supplied. The engineer would first state whether water on a holding was available, then the Political Officer would hand over the land to the naib, the tapedar would then measure the land cultivated, the Political Officer would send the naib a statement of revenue due, and the naib would collect it and pay it to the Political Officer. For this a small establishment of

Objection of the Khán to pay Government a lump sum and recoup himself from the zemindars.

| | |
|---|---|
| 2 Tapedars | ₹ 30 |
| 2 Kotars | „ 15 |
| 1 Supervisor | „ 25 |
| | 70 |

would be required. Half the cost, it was proposed, His Highness should pay. The receipts would be credited to the Baluchistan Agency. The Commissioner in Sind, however, continued to press for the payment of a lump sum, but the Khán said he wished to abide by the arrangement made with General Jacob when the canal was made, as he was afraid he would be a loser by the new arrangement. From a subsequent letter from the Commissioner in Sind, No. 2832 of 5th August 1880, it seems that an error was made in saying that the British Government required ₹1 per acre on land cultivated in excess of one third of holdings, as the demand of the British Government was only 8 annas per acre in such cases. In reporting the matter to Government, the Agent to the Governor General said that the Khán could not be induced to accept the responsibility of undertaking to pay Government a lump sum annually for water supplied, recouping himself from his zemindars, nor would he wish to forego the assistance he had hitherto obtained from the officer in charge of relations with the Kalát State. The Agent to the Governor General thought that the former arrangement made by General Jacob should be adhered to, and that the collection of the water rate should be in the hands of the Agent to the Governor General.

573. Notwithstanding much search, no regular agreement could be found between the Khán and General Jacob as to the revenue, but a letter was found stating that the revenue obtained from Kalát lands would be equally divided between the Kalát State and the British Government. From a report made in reply to certain enquiries made by Captain Hope, it appears that during

No regular agreement between the Khán and General Jacob discoverable.

the year 1879-80 the amount of land irrigated was 55,564 acres, which gave Government a revenue of ₨45,705. The regulation of the supply of water from the canal to the nalas which carried the water into the Khán's lands was effected by temporary heads, the dimensions of the canal being calculated to supply one third of the land commanded. Within this limit the irrigated area within the Khán's territory was said to be on the increase. The canals being in British territory, the Sind authorities could stop all water entering into the Khán's territory.

Agreement between the Commissioner in Sind and the Agent to the Governor General as to the rates leviable, and as to the cases of leases.

574. The whole question was discussed by the Agent to the Governor General and the Foreign Secretary during 1880, and the Government of India then called for another report on the plan of assessment, observing that the management of the details of collection should be left as much as possible to the Khán's officers. In the meantime Major Reynolds was to levy rates according to the rules of assessment communicated to him, unless it could be shown that these rates were in opposition to an agreement with His Highness. On this the Agent to the Governor General informed the Commissioner that he approved of the proposal to take ₨2 per acre on all land under cultivation, half being paid to each Government, and the expense of the small establishment required being divided between the Governments. Early in 1881, the Commissioner in Sind and the Agent to the Governor General came to an agreement as to certain points raised in carrying out the above proposals, to the effect that—

(*a*) In dealing with lands leased to zemindars in Kalát, the Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General should adhere to the terms of each lease, and that should a cultivator cultivate irrigated lands in excess of the amount granted in his lease, he should pay for such excess.

(*b*) Existing leases for seven years should not be interfered with, but on their expiry the new system should be brought into force in all cases, as proposed in Agent to the Governor General's letter No. 8 of 2nd January 1881.

(*c*) A summary settlement of lands should be undertaken.

(*d*) The revenue realised should be credited to the Government of Bombay in the Shikarpur Treasury.

Certain remissions of revenue made.

575. Towards the close of 1882 the question of the grant of remissions of revenue was raised by the Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General, who suggested that recommendations for remissions should be sent to the Agent to the Governor General, the Collector of the district in Sind having power to make remissions on recommendations from subordinates in Sind. It was at the same time reported that there were arrears of revenue claimed by the British Government. Included in the arrears was a sum of ₨6,506-1 on account of cultivation in excess of one third of the area leased. The Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General did not consider this a fair claim, as the zemindars when they took the leases were unaware that the charge would be made, and recommended that it should be written off, together with a sum of ₨3,945-12-7 which was irrecoverable. Both these recommendations were accepted by the Agent to the Governor General. The total revenue demand for the year 1880-81 was ₨42,625-9, of which a sum of ₨9,480-12 was not realised. Of this, ₨6,425-11-0 represented ordinary remissions due on account of failure to supply water, &c., and ₨3,055-1 were recommended for remission for special reasons. Both these proposals met with the Agent to the Governor General's approval. The Commissioner in Sind directed the Deputy Commissioner to write off the sums in question. The charges on account of the

establishment for collecting the rates in Kalát territory, amounting to R840 per annum, were sanctioned in Bombay Government resolutions No. 95 A.I.-379 of 19th July 1881 and No. 36 A.I.-141 of 16th March 1883. In September 1883 the Agent to the Governor General sanctioned the remission of R2,084-1 due from Sirdar Dur Muhammad on account of water rate for 1881-82.

Proposals for an assessment of the lands on Hittu Ram's report.

576. In 1883, with the approval of the Khán and of the Commissioner in Sind, Rai Bahadur Hittu Ram was deputed by the Agent to the Governor General to visit the Khán's lands irrigated by canals and to report on the revenue system in force for the assessment and collection of the water-rate. That officer reported that it had been the custom to lease a given quantity of land for a term of seven years or thereabouts, on condition that the lessee should pay revenue on one third of the whole, at a uniform rate of R2 per acre, irrespective of the quantity of land leased, and irrespective of the method of irrigation, whether by lift or flow, or of the natural productive quality of the land. On this point the Agent to the Governor General observed to the Commissioner in Sind that if a settlement were made it would be the duty of the Settlement Officer to enquire into the question of the rate of assessment to be fixed for lands irrigated, the custom in vogue being undesirable on account of the amount of land uncultivated yearly, and of the difficulty of checking fraudulent cultivation. After the expiry of the leases, the system of leasing the lands for a term of years was abandoned, the lessees obtaining a lease for one year only, and having to pay at the rate of R2 per acre on the amount of land cultivated. The terms of most of the 7-year leases then in force would, it was reported, expire in July 1885. As to this system, the Agent to the Governor General remarked that the door was opened to fraud and mismanagement. Under the 7-year leases, no measurements were necessary for a jamabandi, whereas the introduction of yearly leases involved the measurement and assessment annually of the lands cultivated. For this work a revenue staff of officials would be required, instead of which this business had hitherto been left in the hands of two tapedars on R15 per mensem, whose work was checked by an overseer proportionately underpaid. An examination of the work done by these men showed that it was inaccurate. The Khán's naib who collected the revenue being ignorant of land measurements, the whole revenue depended on the measurements of the tapedars. The Agent to the Governor General recommended a settlement of the lands for a term of years, but bearing in mind that the land had never been settled and that the cost of an English Settlement Officer could not be afforded, a settlement for a lengthened period was not recommended, and one for seven years was advised, confidence being thereby given to zemindars to extend cultivation, and a large establishment not being required. The Agent to the Governor General proposed to place Rai Bahadur Hittu Ram in immediate charge of the settlement under the control of the Political Agent, Jacobabad, the services of Harichand, tahsildar, being utilised as Superintendent. An adequate subordinate establishment could, it was calculated, be obtained for R500 per mensem, the whole settlement costing R700 per mensem, half the cost being borne by the British Government. It was expected that the increased revenue would justify the outlay. The measurements, it was said, would be made under the immediate supervision of munserims. The Superintendent would enquire into rights, and would forward his files for villages or branch canals to the Settlement Officer, who would propose the jamabandi for the sanction of the Agent to the Governor General. The total cultivable area of the lands was estimated at 100,000 acres. His Highness the Khán approved of the proposal to settle the lands, and agreed to pay his share of the cost. The total cost of the work at R700 per mensem for one year was estimated at R8,400.

Views of the Commissioner in Sind on the question of settlement.

577. In reply to these proposals the Commissioner in Sind said that water from the Sind canals to irrigate 65,000 acres could be supplied with a fair degree of certainty, although in some years the supply might fail; and if this area paid R1 per acre, and there were no remissions, the increased revenue to the British Government would be R20,250 more than the average of the four preceding years. Allowing for two thirds of the land being yearly allowed to lie fallow, the area of the land to be measured and given out on lease should be 65,000 acres × 3, or, say, 200,000 acres. It was pointed out that the real difficulty in administering the settlement would be to control, through the revenue establishments, the cultivation, and to prevent an excessive area being brought under the plough in any one year, as without an efficient check the water-supply would be insufficient, and endless claims to remissions would be made, while those who had not cultivated more than their proper share would be deprived of water. The Commissioner said that if the Agent to the Governor General could impose an effective check on cultivation, he would recommend to the Bombay Government that half the cost of settlement should be borne by Government. As to the Begari canal, which after passing Kalát lands would re-enter British territory, he said it was necessary that rules should be framed for distributing water under the control of the canal officers, otherwise lands towards the tail of the canal would not receive a supply. As regards the terms of settlement, the Commissioner said that no attempt to fix rates for a long period should be made, the Superintending Engineer having recommended that a settlement for one or two years should first be made, and then, if found to answer, extended.

Report of the Political Agent, Jacobabad.

578. On this the Political Agent, Jacobabad, was asked for a report on the subject. That officer observed that at the rate of R8,400 for 100,000 acres, the rate calculated in the Agent to the Governor General's letter, about R17,000 would be required for the summary survey of 200,000 acres, the extent recommended by the Commissioner in Sind. Colonel Reynolds consulted Colonel Anderson, the chief revenue survey officer in Sind, and he calculated that the cost of survey, inclusive of village maps and registers, would be for 200,000 acres about R38,000, or more than double the cost of the proposed summary survey. If the system proposed by Hittu Ram were adopted, Colonel Reynolds thought that there would be a danger of collusion between the zemindar and the land measurer, in addition to the maintenance of an expensive establishment, which would practically result in a return to the 7-year lease system. Colonel Reynolds did not think that Hittu Ram's scheme would provide for the efficient check of excess cultivation, a most important point. Colonel Reynolds explained that, in the settlement in progress in Sind, the land was divided into plots, or survey numbers, of from 5 to 7 acres for land cultivated by flow, and about 8 acres for that cultivated by lift, the rates of assessment being fixed by the Settlement Officer according to the merits of each case, the occupier cultivating the land wholly, in part or not at all, at will, the extent of land cultivated was not restricted owing to an abundant supply of water in excess of that available for Kalát lands. The marking off of the land into small plots was, Colonel Reynolds said, expensive, but would in the end be economical, the extent of land cultivated by each zemindar being easily ascertained by the tapedar, whose work would be reduced to a minimum. The zemindars might be directed to apply each year for water to cultivate the numbers desired, and would not be allowed to take more than the canal officer might allot them; the Irrigation Department would complain in case of excess cultivation, and fraudulent cultivation would be thus prevented. Colonel Reynolds observed that although the cultivator might object to the expense of boundary marks and the trouble of girdwari, he still more

objected to the restraint of boundary marks, and to his not being able to cultivate as much land as he could get water for; he was also well aware that with small survey numbers every acre cultivated would have to be paid for. Colonel Reynolds recommended the adoption of the principles in force in Upper Sind, and the employment of some of their survey officers for the new survey and settlement. As to the expense, he urged that if remunerative in Sind it should be so in Kalát, the cost being R9,000 or R10,000 for four years for 200,000 acres. In addition to this cost, the zemindars would be charged 1 anna per acre for cost of measurement, and about 8 annas for earthen boundaries per survey number.

Reply of Rai Bahadur Hittu Ram.

579. On this Hittu Ram argued that the expense and trouble to the zemindars entailed by the Sind system would counterbalance the advantage to be derived from it, and he pointed out that his system differed from the 7-year lease system, in that under the lease system no distinction was made with respect to the quality of lands, the supply of water, and the produce; whereas, under his proposals, account would be taken of these matters by the Settlement Officer. As to fallow, it was urged that many lands could be and were yearly cultivated; the extent of land cultivated would be governed by the amount of water allowed, which would be limited. It was also observed that the zemindars had laid out considerable sums on their lands. As to the control of excess cultivation, Hittu Ram proposed that yearly portions of land be allotted to zemindars instead of small 10-acre plots. Water should, he said, be allowed to channels from the canals in proportion to the extent of the adjacent lands, and would be given to zemindars according to their holdings. The supply of water would control cultivation in excess.

Opinion of the Executive Engineer, Begari canals.

580. The Executive Engineer, Begari canals, was asked his opinion on the proposals. He said that, until land was surveyed, the Irrigation Department could not ascertain whether or not each zemindar got sufficient water to irrigate one third of his holding. The quantity of water wanted for different crops varied so much that, unless the area of each kind of crop was known, it was impossible to determine whether the water admitted into the small channels from the main channels was sufficient or not. It had up to that time been regulated by the amount available and the quantity utilised in former years. The Executive Engineer thought that the expense would be less than was expected, as the ground could be easily laid out in blocks, and then the marks fixed; whereas in Sind the boundaries of old numbers had to be surveyed, and boundary marks could be inexpensively supplied. He disapproved of the proposal to survey only the boundaries of holdings and assess the whole area at a fixed annual rent, as it would give no information as to (1) crops cultivated and (2) as to area irrigated, two points of great importance, correct information as to which would enable the Irrigation Department to determine, when the discharge of the canal was known, how much new land might be given out to cultivation, or in case of scarcity, how much it could be restricted. Fraud under this system in Sind was almost impossible. He strongly recommended the proposed new survey and settlement for Kalát lands.

The question to be settled by discussion.

581. The Agent to the Governor General decided that nothing should be done as to settlement of the question until the cold weather, when the matter should be discussed with Colonel Reynolds and others.

Question with regard to the Sirwah canal, 1882. View taken by Mr. Bruce.

582. It will here be convenient to explain questions which have arisen with respect to the Sirwah canal.

The Sirwah canal, about 35 miles long, was, it seems, partly excavated by men of the Jamali tribe in 1869-70 at their own expense, to some extent with the object, in the opinion of Colonel Phayre (then Superintendent, Upper Sind frontier), of benefiting themselves and other subjects of the Khán exclusively. The excavation of this canal had, it was said, turned a vast desert destitute of water into a fertile country, and had enabled the whole of the powerful Jamali tribe and other subjects of the Khán who were very badly off to settle comfortably, besides yielding a fair amount of revenue to the British Government and the Khán. The amount realised during the year 1881 from the canal was R18,375, of which one half was credited to the British Government on account of water-cess, a result which was capable of considerable development. In and prior to 1882 it seems that the Sind authorities had taken the water of the canal through lands long held by the Jamalis for the benefit of zemindars in the Larkhana district of Sind, who had not shared in the labour and cost of the excavation of the canal, and in April 1882 Mr. Bruce, then Political Agent at Jacobabad, suggested that Government might be moved to desire the Sind authorities not to interfere in the lands in the possession of the Jamali tribe and other subjects of the Khán of Kalát, both in view of complaints made by Jamali headmen and the Khán's vakil, and of the consideration that the Jamali tribe would thereby be cut up into fractions, and of the endless disputes which would arise between them and the Larkhana zemindars. Mr. Bruce said that the holders of the land through which the canal passed had constructed it at a fixed rate paid by the Irrigation Department, and that the Jamalis had urged that the canal cost them considerably more than they had received from Government. The rule which applied to an assessment of R1 per acre on all lands irrigated from British canals applied to the lands irrigated by the Sir canal, which water-rate had always been paid by the Khán.

View taken by the Commissioner in Sind.

583. The Commissioner in Sind urged that the canal had been made to irrigate the Sír lands in the west of the Kambar taluka; after 15 miles of it had been dug and opened for irrigation on the south bank, between the 4th and 15th mile-stones, nearly the whole of it was washed away. The Superintending Engineer visited it after one of the floods, and ordered work to be stopped, as it was useless to carry on work liable to be swept away by floods; as, however, there was surplus water at Khyreeghari, the engineer allowed cultivators on the north bank to use it, on the understanding that the right would cease when the work was carried on again. After the Kusmor band was made, the engineer intended to carry out the original design of the canal, but the overseer sent to carry out the work was met with threats by the zemindars on the north bank, and they should, the Commissioner thought, be disabused of the idea that they had any right in the canal, and that their use of the water had been based on proprietary right and not subject to the strict control of the Public Works Department. With regard to the claim of the zemindars, to the effect that, having dug and paid for the canal, they had the sole right to the water, the Commissioner said that the services of the riparian zemindars had been utilised in excavating the canal, for which they were paid at the rate of R3-8 per 1,000 cubic feet of excavation. and were also permitted to cultivate their lands with the canal water for two years free of assessment. This remuneration was, the Commissioner thought, ample, and their complaints as to extra cost were, he considered, groundless, work on the desert canal having been carried out at the rate of R4 per 1,000 cubic feet.

Result of enquiry by the Political Agent, Jacobabad.

584. On this the Political Agent, Jacobabad, reported that the zemindars said that they had expended R18,000 from their own pockets on the canal, on the understanding that they would, when the canal was completed, be entitled to receive water from

it. No written agreement was made at the time showing to what extent their claims might be valid. The Political Agent quoted from the letters of the engineer in charge of the construction of the canal certain paragraphs from which it might be gathered that it was intended to give the cultivators grants on condition of their supplying labour for the excavation. The Political Agent further quoted a letter from Sir W. Merewether showing that one of the objects of the canal was the irrigation of lands in Kalát, and that it was not intended solely for the benefit of the Larkhana zemindars. He further pointed out that from the time of General Jacob all works of importance undertaken on the frontier had reference to the policy of settling and civilising the frontier tribes; and that consequently the Sír canal was not undertaken for the sole benefit of the Larkhana zemindars. Sir R. Phayre had, moreover, stated, with regard to the canal, that he had "no idea of benefiting the Larkhana zemindars, then or prospectively, by the transaction. . . . I may say in one word that all my efforts, while I was on the frontier, were precisely those of General Jacob, *viz.*, to benefit the Baluch settled in Kalát territory, whose lands were conterminous with the Jacobabad frontier district. Anything that is now represented contrary to that main object, I could and would confidently disclaim as contrary to the leading desire I had always in view, to plant along our frontier as deep a fringe as possible of warlike and predatory tribes, bound to us by the closest possible ties of gratitude and self-interest." The Political Agent urged that the zemindars' rights had been deliberately created, and that to overthrow them would be morally and politically wrong; that the fact of the Sirwah canal having been designed to extend to the Larkhana district should not be allowed to interfere with the privileges of the Kalát zemindars, who were alarmed at the idea of the canal being used simply as a channel for the supply of water to British territory. The canal would, if extended, pass through territory the possession of which was in dispute, and to commence the extension would, the Political Agent said, be highly inexpedient before the settlement of the boundary case, as it would give rise to further complications. The Political Agent thought that the right of watering their lands from the canal should be continued to the Kalát zemindars and should be zealously guarded.

Decision not to extend the canal pending the settlement of the boundary case.

585. Later on the Executive Engineer said that the extension of the canal had been sanctioned by Government, and asked for permission to take up land. The Agent to the Governor General, however, thought that the boundary case should be settled first; he, moreover, objected to the canal being extended without the permission of the Khán, whose representative had objected to it, and before the settlement of the boundary dispute, as it would intensify the quarrel in that case. The boundary case was at that time under enquiry, and pending its settlement the extension of the canal has not been carried out.

Boundary dispute on the Kalát-Sind boundary line, 1884.

586. Mention will now be made of the boundary dispute on the Kalát-Sind boundary. The boundary between Kalát and Sind in the neighbourhood of Jacobabad has now been for several years in dispute. It was originally demarcated by Mr. Stewart, and his demarcation was accepted by the Government of India and the Khán of Kalát. A doubt, however, arose as to the actual boundary settled, and various attempts were made by officers of the Sind Commission and of the Baluchistan Agency to define it, which led to a divergence in views between the officers defining the boundary and also between the Commissioner in Sind and the Agent to the Governor General. During the time that Colonel Berkeley was Political Agent at Jacobabad, he investigated the case and wrote a very lengthy memorandum on it. It is only proposed here to give a brief notice of some of

the chief points in dispute, as a review in detail of the whole case would not be intelligible without the aid of maps, which could not be appended to this report. Colonel Berkeley's memorandum was sent by the Agent to the Governor General to the Government of India, by whom after consideration the question was referred to the Government of Bombay, and it was remarked that "the defective nature of the maps, and the somewhat loose wording of the description given by Mr. Stewart of the boundary laid down by him, have placed the actual position of the boundary line in some obscurity, and to trace that line with absolute accuracy has now become very difficult, if not impossible." It was, however, admitted by several Sind officers that

"the boundary actually observed for a considerable series of years has been that shown in the Bengal revenue survey maps, drawn from surveys made by Major Macdonald in the years 1856-57."

It was then added :—

"The Governor General in Council has carefully considered the arguments set forth in the correspondence forwarded with this letter, and admits the force of the contention that the correct and proper boundary is that laid down by Lieutenant Stewart in 1853-54, but in view of the serious difficulty which has been experienced in ascertaining the precise position of that boundary, and of the fact that the boundary actually observed seems to be undoubtedly that entered on the Bengal revenue survey map, he is of opinion that it would be on all accounts best to accept the existing *status quo* as our guide, instead of opening up disputes along the whole line by entering into a number of complicated and ill-defined questions of title."

After observing that, if the boundary were settled afresh, many claims might be raised on the part of the Khán, which it might be difficult and inconvenient to decide, and that it might be undesirable to claim from the Khán lands long cultivated by his subjects, it was observed, "The Governor General in Council is therefore disposed to direct that the boundary now to be authoritatively fixed should be that shown in the revenue survey map, in so far as it has been actually observed." The views of the Governor of Bombay in Council were asked for. The Government of Bombay referred the matter to the Commissioner in Sind, and that officer met the Political Agent, Jacobabad, on the disputed boundary, but they were unable to effect any settlement. In forwarding the report made by the Political Agent, Jacobabad, to the Government of India, the Agent to the Governor General said, "I fully concur in the opinion of the Government of India, that by far the best basis of settlement is to take the Bengal revenue survey line as the boundary, and I have no doubt that, should this be finally determined on, I shall be able to persuade, without difficulty, the Khán to accept loyally the decision of Government in the matter."

Decision of the Government of India to refer the question, if necessary, to arbitration, February 1885.

587. The Government of India then addressed the Agent to the Governor General on the subject of the disputed boundary, and observed—

"It is beyond dispute that a boundary between the British and Kalát Governments was formally agreed upon in 1854, and in 1862 after its final demarcation received the sanction of the Secretary of State in 1864. It would be contrary to the policy of the Government of India to reopen a question decided twenty years ago by the highest authority, especially since the portion of the boundary now in dispute forms but a very small part of an important frontier demarcation, which rests upon the same basis as that which is now under discussion."

After observing the difficulty experienced in identifying the line fixed on by Lieutenant Stewart, owing to the boundary marks having been washed away by floods, and the variations in the different maps which had been made of the boundary, it was observed that the evidence

"appears to confirm the opinion of the Sind authorities, and the description of the boundary

entered into between the two Governments could hardly be reconciled with the irregular line supported by the Baluchistan Agency. In this state of the evidence political considerations incline to the avoidance of any alterations which would necessitate a departure from a formal agreement, and at the same time introduce a dual control over an important canal.* . . . The Governor General in Council is therefore disposed to decide that the line which should now be demarcated is the line fixed by Captain Macaulay in 1861-62."

* The Sirwah canal.

It was added, however, but before final orders were issued, the Government of India were prepared, if the Agent to the Governor General thought necessary, to refer the whole question to arbitration.

Request of the Agent, Governor General, that the question be referred to arbitration, July 1885.

588. The matter was then again referred to Colonel Reynolds, with a request that he would go over the question with the Khán's vakil, and on receiving a report from Colonel Reynolds, the Agent to the Governor General replied to the Government of India that the whole of the evidence available in the case had not been placed before Government, as the Khán had not pressed his case, nor had the officers of the Agency entered upon the evidence in favour of his claim. Since the Government of India were of opinion that the basis of actual possession should be set aside in the settlement of the case, the Agent to the Governor General urged that the whole question should be gone into, as the Khán would never willingly agree to the proposed demarcation. As to the observation made by the Government of India in regard to the dual control over the canal, the Agent to the Governor General pointed out that in any case that portion of it which had always remained in Kalát territory would still remain in Kalát territory. The Agent to the Governor General further represented that were the decision proposed given, the Khán would be deeply aggrieved, and he requested that the whole matter might be referred to unbiassed arbitration. The matter at present (July 1885) remained under the consideration of Government.

Outrage committed at Gwadar by Dad Muhammad, Dashti, in 1876.

589. An explanation will now be given as to disputes which have arisen at Gwadar. In 1876, Sir W. Merewether reported that Gwadar was a dependency of Maskat, and was governed by a person appointed by the Sultan of that country. In May 1876, a Rind, or, as he was subsequently shown to be, a Dashti, named Dad Muhammad, who usually lived near Dardan on the Dasht river, west of Gwadar, came to Captain Mockler, at that time Assistant Political Agent on the Makrán coast, at Gwadar, with several members of the Hot tribe, and demanded that three slaves who had escaped and taken refuge in Gwadar should be delivered up. Captain Mockler, under instructions from the Commissioner in Sind, informed Dad Muhammad that he had nothing to do with the question of slaves, and that any representations they had to make should be made to the Wali, or representative of the Sultan at Gwadar. Dad Muhammad would not, however, do so, saying that it was the British officer who kept back the slaves, that the Wali unsupported by the British would not dare to do so, and that the Wali had said that he would give back the slaves if the British officer would give the order. In 1873, it should be noted, a treaty had been made between the British Government and the Sultan of Maskat, whereby His Highness bound himself not to deliver up fugitive slaves who had made good their escape into Maskat territory, and consequently the Wali refused to entertain the request without the permission of the British officer at Gwadar. Dad Muhammad would not listen to reason, but departed without going near the Wali, and in retaliation for a fancied grievance cut the telegraph wire near Gwadar, burnt the line-guards' houses, and meeting a Hindustani artificer disarmed him, carried him away, and said he would take him to the head-quarters of the tribe in

place of the slaves. The man was soon after released, but his camel and property were carried off. Dad Muhammad, moreover, sent a letter couched in insolent language to Captain Mockler.

590. Although Gwadar is a dependency of Maskat, the country in the vicinity belongs to the Khán of Kalát, and Captain Mockler therefore wrote to the Khán's naib in charge of Kaláti-Makrán at Kej, informing him of what had occurred, and pointing out the necessity of the offender being promptly and severely punished. The naib, however, had but little power, and although the property taken was restored, Dad Muhammad met with no punishment. Through the territories under the naib of Kej the telegraph wire from Karachi to Persia runs, for the protection of which a subsidy was paid to the naib, and, pending compliance with the requests of the British, the payment of the subsidy was withheld. Beyond this, the Assistant Political Agent at Gwadar had no means of enforcing compliance with his demands, his escort of horse and foot being quite insufficient to follow up and punish disturbers of the peace. At that period the Kalát State was in disorder, and the influence of the Khán in Makrán was, the Commissioner in Sind said, "of the shallowest."

Inability of the Khán's naib of Kaláti-Makrán to punish Dad Muhammad.

591. The condition of slaves on the Makrán coast may here be noted with advantage. Sir W. Merewether said that when once they had reached their location, after capture and transportation,

The condition of slaves in Baluchistan.

"they are far better off and far happier than in their own country. Once admitted within the domestic circle, they are well fed, well clothed, more trusted, and often better cared for than the poorer classes of the country they have entered. It is a well-known fact that slaves, when rescued by Her Majesty's cruisers, though given the option, seldom, if ever, elect to return to their own country."

With respect to this point, Sir R. Sandeman has also given corroborative evidence. Writing in 1884, he said,—

"Domestic slavery is a time-honoured institution in Baluchistan as in other eastern countries, and much of the land is cultivated by slave labour. At the same time it must be remembered that many of the ideas attaching to the word 'slavery,' which are so repellent to civilised minds, are absent from the manners of the Baluch tribes. The condition of the slaves approaches more nearly to that of the serfs of Russia before the emancipation. They are the offspring of parents themselves in the same grade of life. They are, generally speaking, treated kindly, and as members of the family to which they belong. There is no connection with the African slave trade, nor in these later days are the ranks of slavery recruited from captives taken in border forays."

Under these circumstances it can be understood that in this case the Baluchis near Gwadar failed to appreciate the motives which have led the British to strive for the abolition of slavery. In the matter under consideration a harbour of refuge for slaves had been established at their doors, and their resentment took the form of aggression against the British and Maskat Governments.

592. Subsequent to the carrying off of the telegraph subordinate's property, the subsidy was withheld for upwards of two years, and from time to time outrages were reported on the Makrán coast. During 1879 the post of Assistant Political Superintendent, Gwadar, was abolished, and our relations with the Rinds were controlled by the Director of the Persian Gulf Telegraphs. In July 1879 an affray occurred between Maskat soldiers and some Rind traders, in which three of the traders were killed and seven wounded. From October 1880, however, there seems to have been a change for the better, for from that time up to January 1883 no act of lawlessness on their part, either towards the telegraph line or the colony at Gwadar, was reported. In January 1883, however, difficulties again arose, the Rinds under one Nur Muhammad attacked a telegraph working party at Sarchil, 57 miles west of G[...]

Outrage by Rinds on the Makrán coast, 1883.

captives with their camels, &c., burnt the tent and stores belonging to them. The men were allowed to go free, but the jemadar was retained in hope that a ransom would be paid for his release. For this outrage there did not seem to be any special reason. The jemadar was released, but some of the stolen property was retained by the robbers, while some was restored, and the attitude of the tribe remained unsatisfactory. Major Mockler was sent to make an enquiry into this case. He was unable, however, to effect a settlement, and the Government of India agreed with Sir R. Sandeman in thinking that he (the Agent to the Governor General) should take an early opportunity of himself visiting the country.

593. Sir R. Sandeman then addressed the Government of India with respect to (1) the military escort he would require, (2) the co-operation to be sought from the Khán of Kalát, and (3) the expenditure that would fall upon the imperial treasury. As a military escort he asked for 200 native infantry, 80 cavalry, and 2 mountain guns, and he proposed to take with him several of the Saráwán and Jalawan Sirdars, the total cost of the expedition being estimated at R17,740. As regards the co-operation of the Khán, His Highness was asked to depute his son and heir with full powers to act in communication with the Agent to the Governor General. The proposals of the Agent to the Governor General were generally accepted, a sum of about R18,000 was sanctioned, and orders were issued with respect to the provision of the required escort. In the course of his tour the Agent to the Governor General in February 1884 arrived at Kej, where he was met by Major Mockler. The Rinds showed some hesitation in presenting themselves, but eventually joined the Agent to the Governor General near Tump where a darbar was held, at which the Agent to the Governor General told them that he had come to exact such redress as an enquiry might show to be just, and that a Committee would investigate the cases brought against them as well as their claims. The Chiefs assured the Agent to the Governor General that they would accept any decision which he might give. The Committee accordingly sat and made a report as to the claims. There were found to be seventeen cases pending against Rinds, while they, on the other hand, brought eight claims against Gwadar and Kalát subjects. Of these cases, nine were decided at Tump, fifteen were postponed, and two were reserved for the orders of the Government of India. The decisions were announced in darbar, and twelve of the Rind headmen executed a bond for the good behaviour of the tribe, which was witnessed by the chiefs of every tribe of the Brahui confederacy, including the Sirdar next highest in rank to the Khán; it was confirmed by the Khán's vakil and executed by every section of the Mund Rinds, by Sirdar Bahi Khán, Gitchki, and by the Khán's naib, every measure being taken to make it as binding as possible. The Agent to the Governor General was received with respect at Mund, the chief Tump village; but the attendance of Dad Muhammad, then in Persian territory, could not be procured. On the way to Gwadar, the cases pending there were discussed repeatedly with Sirdar Bahi Khán, Gitchki, with the Khán's vakil, the Rind chiefs, and the chiefs of the Brahuis, in view to taking them up on arrival at Gwadar. It then appeared that Dad Muhammad was not a Rind, but belonged to the Dashti tribe. At Gwadar a darbar was held at which the Wali of the Sultan of Maskat attended, but the Wali, although he said at first that he had sufficient authority for the purpose, subsequently changed his mind and declared his inability to settle the cases pending with the Rinds without the authority of the Sultan, which could not be obtained without considerable delay, and as a reference to Government became necessary, the Agent to the Governor General left Gwadar on the 23rd February for Karachi, as he considered that it would not have been consistent with his position to wait there until the Wali should again change his mind. Gwadar was, moreover, dangerously unhealthy for the troops

The mission to Gwadar, and its results.

and following the Agent to the Governor General had with him, and by delay the trooping arrangements of Government would have been interfered with. Moreover, cases between the Chiefs of Kolwah and Lus Beyla were pending at Karachi. While at Karachi the Agent to the Governor General arranged with Colonel Ross, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, that Mr. Ffinch, of the Persian Telegraph Department, should meet Colonel Miles, the Political Agent, Maskat, at Gwadar, in view to arriving at a settlement. The Wali of Gwadar then produced a list of 90 claims against the Rinds. Colonel Miles refused to sanction any enquiry into the validity of these and other claims, unless the Rinds would agree to pay whatever sum was awarded against them as compensation to Gwadar subjects. To this Mr. Ffinch declined to agree, and the negotiations were broken off. The failure to settle the disputes was due to the disinclination of the Wali to incur any responsibility, and the Agent to the Governor General, having already arranged to return with the escort to India, did not think himself justified in incurring the delay which would have taken place had a reply been awaited to a reference to the Sultan. While at Karachi some telegraph cases were settled with Mr. Ffinch.

Question as to how the Rinds should be treated.

594. As regards a claim advanced by the Rinds for compensation for the lives of men killed by Gwadar sepoys, the Agent to the Governor General said that three Rinds had been killed in affray. The Rinds courted an enquiry, to which the Gwadar authorities objected, and the Agent to the Governor General recommended that an enquiry should be held. As to the case in which the jemadar was kidnapped by the Rinds, to which allusion has already been made, it appears that the Committee, who enquired into the case, considered that a light fine should be inflicted, and that Major Mockler pressed for a heavy fine. The jemadar was, the Agent to the Governor General observed, connected with men whom the Rinds regarded as responsible for the death of one of their tribesmen, and that he had been seized as an act of retaliation, not aggression, against the British Government; that the cases against the Rinds did not form a very formidable total; that the claims of the Rinds against Gwadar subjects were of a sufficiently grave nature; that if heavy fines were levied, troops would have to be sent to enforce them; that the Rinds would be alienated by the adoption of rigorous measures and would escape into Persian territory, and that a conciliatory policy should be adopted. The Agent to the Governor General recommended that the Political Agent on the Makrán coast should be deputed to Gwadar to settle pending cases with an authorised agent on the part of the Sultan, to enquire into the cases brought to the notice of Mr. Ffinch, and to report them, and also to enquire into the case of the affray between the Rinds and the Gwadar sepoys. It was at the same time recommended that in the case of the jemadar the decision of the Committee should be ratified. It may here be noted that in April 1884 Dad Muhammad Dashti came to Gwadar, whence he was sent *viá* Karachi to Quetta, where he expressed contrition for his previous conduct. One part of the settlement made in his case was that he should express contrition for the past, and on his doing so he was dismissed.

Decision of the Government of India with respect to the Court.

595. The Government of India considered that suitable reparation from the Rinds should be secured, and that an attempt should be made to institute enquiries into the charges against the Rinds and their counter-charges by a Court consisting of two officers, representing the Baluchistan and Maskat Agencies, *viz.*, Colonel Reynolds and Colonel Miles, with three assessors, representing the Kej authorities, the Sultan, and the Rind Chiefs. The Court was to enquire into all cases, Mr. Ffinch taking the place of Colonel Miles in cases affecting the Government Telegraph Department. Any pleas which the Rinds might put forward after the

decisions of the Court were known, would, it was said, be duly considered, the Government of India being prepared to advance the judgment-debts decreed against the Rinds, provided that they would give security for keeping the peace and for the payment of awards whenever they might be called upon to produce the money, should that course be found requisite in consequence of their conduct. His Highness the Khán was to be held responsible for rendering every assistance to the Court. Thereafter considerable correspondence ensued, into the details of which there is no necessity to go. A supplementary statement as to the cases discussed with Mr. Ffinch at Karachi was sent to the Government of India. Colonel Reynolds met Colonel Miles at Gwadar, and the enquiry made resulted in awards amounting to R5,216 being made in favour of Maskat subjects, and R1,744 in favour of British Indian traders against the Rinds for offences committed within the past twelve years. With regard to a counter-claim made by the Rinds for blood-money for the murder of three of their number in 1879, the Court were not unanimous, and Colonels Miles and Reynolds sent in separate reports. The proceedings were forwarded to. The Government of India, with the opinion of the Agent to the Governor General, the orders of Government have not as yet* been received on the case, and a further account of it in this report would appear to be premature.

* July 1885.

*Dispute near Jacobabad in 1883 regarding certain bunds erected by Brahuis.*

596. During the year 1883 a dispute which eventuated in bloodshed took place between the Khán's Jahnashin at Bhág and the Girani Brahuis who cultivate in the neighbourhood of Haji Shahar regarding the gadibund. While several were wounded on both sides, three sowars of the Khán's cavalry and two of the Girani Brahuis were killed. Colonel Reynolds was deputed to the scene of the fight, and made enquiries into the dispute. The Brahuis, believing that they had the right to construct a bund across the Narí river, proceeded to do so, but His Highness's naib, considering that the bund would cause loss to the Khán, as the lands of His Highness which were situated below the bund would in consequence be deprived of water, sent out a party of sowars under the Jahnashin to prevent the erection being made. While the Brahuis were hesitating to comply with the request of the officer commanding the troops, a shot was fired by one of the Khán's sowars which killed a Brahui. The case was eventually settled by Sir Robert Sandeman at Háji Shahar, the Saráwán Chiefs unanimously agreeing to give up their claim to compensation, although the fight had been commenced by the Khán's troops, and that the loss suffered on both sides should be considered to be equal. The Khán's vakil agreed that in future all the privileges of the Brahui Sirdars should be respected, while the Brahui Sirdars agreed to respect the rights of the Khán and his officials, any future disputes arising between the Sirdars and the Khán's officials as to land or water for irrigation being settled by the vakil and the Sirdars in consultation; in the event of their being unable to settle it, reference should be made to the Khán, and if his decision should prove to be unsatisfactory, the dispute should be referred to the Agent to the Governor General for the orders of the British Government.

*Details of the decision.*

597. In former times the following bunds were erected :—

| | |
|---|---|
| 1. Bakhro. | 8. Gola. |
| 2. Mithrí. | 9. Dandar. |
| 3. Zahrowah. | 10. Takri. |
| 4. Hiri. | 11. Gamun. |
| 5. Airi. | 12. Chandar. |
| 6. Musawah. | 13. Badda. |
| 7. Háji. | |

The first 12 are situated in the jurisdiction of the Brahuis, while the 13th is in the Khán's territory near Bhág. It was agreed that the Brahui Sirdars should erect the old bunds situated within their own jurisdiction, should they wish to do so. Regarding a bund called Gadi, it was agreed that it should not then be erected, but that the Gadi zemindars should be at liberty to dig the Gadi nalla and take water withoutc onstructing a bund. If necessary, it was settled that the Agent to the Governor General should subsequently depute an officer to the spot to make further arrangements in accordance with the requirements of the case. It was also agreed that certain lands which had been given by the Khán to Mannu Girani or his relatives, for the cultivation of which they had made arrangements for irrigation, should remain in their hands, provided they acted in accordance with the sanads; but should they, contrary to the sanads, make any excuse as to the payment of the revenue, injure the crops, or create a disturbance when the revenue was being collected, they should on conviction be ousted from the lands. In 1884 the Khán made a complaint as to the construction of a bund injurious to his interests, the Narí river, however, settled the impending quarrel by coming down in flood and sweeping all the Brahui bunds away while the matter was being enquired into.

598. Some information regarding the Makrán coast telegraph line will now be given. For the first 16 miles up to the Hab river, the Makrán telegraph line passes through British territory; it then enters Lus Beyla territory and continues within it to Khor Kulmut on the sea coast beyond Ormara, a distance of 240 miles. At first the subsidy allowed to the Jám was R10,000 annually, but this was subsequently increased to R15,000. This amount was drawn regularly by Jám Mír Khán, then ruler of Lus Beyla, until the end of 1869, when, having rebelled against the Khán of Kalát, and having been defeated, he fled into British territory. The country of Lus Beyla was then, Sir R. Merewether reported,

The Makrán coast telegraph line.

"regarded as having lapsed to the Khán of Kalát, the Wazir having taken possession of it with the Khán's troops, and the subsidy as well as the conditions for protection and security of the telegraph line were also transferred to His Highness the Khán. An arrangement was afterwards made, under which His Highness the Khán of Kalát allowed R8,000 of the above subsidy to be paid back annually to the British Government for the maintenance of the ex-Jám of Lus Beyla, Sirdar Mír Khán, as long as he resided quietly in British territory, and abstained from all interference in the affairs of the Kalát State. As His Highness the Khán was unable to manage from Kalát for the protection of the line, a further arrangement was made, under which R6,600 were paid yearly to the Deputy Director, Makrán coast telegraph, to meet the cost of the line-riders and watchers. . . . The remaining sum of R400 was credited to the Khán."

Subsequently Sirdar Mír Khán was allowed to return to his country, and in March 1877 Sir W. Merewether suggested that, after paying for the riders and watchers the sum of R6,600, the balance of the sum of R15,000 should be paid through and in the name of His Highness the Khán to the Jám for the safety of the line. The Government of India referred the question to Sir R. Sandeman, who, after considering the question at length, recorded his opinion that,

"the Jám of Lus Beyla should receive the whole of his subsidy as heretofore in accordance with the agreement entered into between him and the Commissioner in Sind at the time the telegraph line was erected. I consider that the maintenance of the telegraph line through the province of Lus can best be secured by the Government, in the words of the resolution, by keenly arraying the Jám's interests on the side of Government. Moreover, I feel convinced that it is in every way to the advantage of Government at the present time to restore the old state of things in regard to the protection of the line that existed previous to the Jám's quarrel with the Khán, which led to his flight and subsequent imprisonment. If this is not done, the

Jám will still consider himself under a cloud, and will feel his dignity lowered, and in consequence will not work so heartily with our officers, as I feel convinced he will now do if we entirely restore him to his former position."

Certain sums of money payable for the line due to the Khán and the Jám were in deposit at Karachi, and these the Agent to the Governor General suggested should be placed to his credit in the Shikarpur Treasury for payment to the chiefs. The Governor General in Council decided to adhere to the terms of the agreement made with the Jám in 1861 for the protection of the telegraph line, and instructed the Agent to the Governor General to make fresh arrangements under that agreement for the maintenance of the line-riders and watchmen; or, if the Jám should desire it, to substitute other men for those employed, and so to arrange matters as not to throw on the British Government any additional charge for compensation to the men who might be discharged; and the sum of money then due to the Khán and the Jám was placed in the Shikarpur Treasury. The Agent to the Governor General made arrangements accordingly, and the accounts were examined and closed.

Subsidies paid for the Makrán coast telegraph line.

599. The following are the chiefs entitled to subsidies for the protection of the telegraph line on the Makrán coast :—

| Names of Chiefs. | Amount of subsidy sanctioned. | Deduction from subsidy on account of line guards for the protection of the telegraph line. | Net amount of subsidy payable. |
|---|---|---|---|
| | R | R | R |
| The Jám of Lus Beyla | 15,000 | 6,600 | 8,400 |
| Naib of Kej | 6,500 | 1,980 | 4,520 |
| Do. of Pasni | 1,000 | 480 | 520 |
| Chief of Pani | 480 | ...... | 480 |
| Do. of Dastyari | 1,000 | ...... | 1,000 |
| Do. of Babs | 1,000 | ...... | 1,000 |
| Do. of Geh | 3,000 | ...... | 3,000 |
| Do. of Jask | 480 | ...... | 480 |
| Wali of Jask | 360 | ...... | 360 |
| TOTAL | 28,820 | 9,060 | 19,760 |

Salt manufactured in Kalát territory, 1881 to 1884.

600. The question of the manufacture of salt in the Kalát territory will now be noted. Between 1879 and 1883, some correspondence took place between the Agent to the Governor General and the Commissioner in Sind in regard to the manufacture of salt in Kalát territory. Eventually the Government of Bombay represented to the Government of India that the salt revenue of Sind was materially affected by the smuggling of salt across the border from works established within quite a recent period in the territory of the Khán of Kalát close to the British frontier. The Government of India observed:

"In the course of the enquiry into the subject, it has been made manifest that the Commissioner in Sind and the Agent to the Governor General, Baluchistan, are at issue with each other on such essential matters of fact as the object with which the works were started and the extent of the illicit traffic. It is alleged, on the one hand, that the works were started after the raising of the salt duty in Sind for the purpose of smuggling; that the works, being remote from the markets, cannot be profitably maintained for the purpose of supplying the people of the Khán's territories with salt; that the illicit traffic is very extensive; and that therefore His Highness should be called upon to suppress them. On the other hand, it is affirmed by the Agent to the Governor General that the works do in fact supply local demands; that the illicit traffic is inconsiderable, and that if His Highness is called upon to suppress them, suitable compensation should be offered. It is desirable that the facts in regard to the nature and extent of the works, and the objects they serve, should be ascertained with precision, and the Governor

General in Council has decided therefore that they should be personally visited and examined by a competent officer of the Northern India Salt Department, in association with an officer of the Political Department."

This was accordingly done with reference to the questions already stated, and the possibility of protecting the revenue, without interference with the works by the establishment of a preventive cordon. For this duty Colonel Reynolds and Mr. Ashton were deputed; and early in 1884 the salt works were visited at Mamul. It was found that the factories were started in 1878 by some Jacobabad bunnias and others, and that the illicit trade was inconsiderable. The Bombay Government, in Resolution No. 1016, dated 1st February 1884, came to the conclusion that

"as the danger to the British salt revenue from the existence of the illicit trade in Kalát salt has now, for the time being at least, been practically removed by the adoption of preventive measures by the Salt Department in Sind, it is unnecessary at present to consider further either the proposal to suppress the Mamul salt works on payment of compensation to His Highness the Khán of Kalát, or to strengthen the salt preventive establishment on the Upper Sind frontier."

Arrangements with respect to the hot pursuit of criminals across the frontier, 1880.

601. The following arrangements with respect to the hot pursuit of offenders across the Sind border were made by the Agent to the Governor General and the Commissioner in Sind in consultation in 1880:—

"When any official of His Highness the Khán of Kalát carries a hot pursuit of a criminal across the border into British territory, whether into Sind or the Assigned District of Sibi, he should be bound to give notice of having done so to the nearest police station or outpost, whether this post belong to the frontier police, the railway, or the Sibi district. Similarly when the Sind police carry a hot pursuit into the territory of the Khán of Kalát or that of the Jám of Lus Beyla, they should give notice of their having done so to the naib of the district, and to the nearest Political officer of the Baluchistan Agency."

The proposals were accepted by the Khán, the Jám, and the Commissioner in Sind. The Commissioner accepted the principle that the Political Officer is the person responsible for crimes and for the recovery of stolen property as soon as the offender has escaped across the Sind frontier into the independent hills. It was noted that notice of all cases should be given as heretofore to the frontier post, who would act under military orders as formerly.

Districts in which the Khán and the Jám have officials.

602. It may be here mentioned that the Khán has naibs in (1) the frontier districts (Nasirabad), (2) at Lehrí, (3) at Bhág, (4) at Dhádár, (5) in Gandáváh, (6) in Khuzdár, Baghwánah, and the Jalawan Country, (7) at Sohráb, (8) at Nushki, (9) at Zahri, (10) at Mastúng, (11) at Kej, (12) in Panjgur, (13) and in Kolwa in Mashki.

The Jám of Lus Beyla has officials (1) in charge of the Hab river district, (2) in charge of Sonmiáni, (3) in charge of Hotal, and (4) in charge of Liári.

Rules regarding offender's escaping across the British frontier.

603. In the middle of 1883 two Shambani Bugtís robbed a Hindu, and one of the robbers escaped into Bugtí territory. On being communicated with, the Bugtí Sirdar arrested the culprit, and handed him over to the Sind Horse outpost at Soí, with directions that the man should be forwarded to Mr. Bruce, the Political Agent in charge of the Bugtís, in accordance with arrangements made between the Sind and Baluchistan authorities. At Jacobabad the Deputy Commissioner, Upper Sind frontier, did not send the prisoner on to the Political Agent, but tried and sentenced him himself. This case led to a letter being written by the Agent to the Governor General to the Commissioner in Sind, pointing out that the action taken by the District Superintendent of Police in arresting the prisoner had been full of risk, as the Shambanis were at feud with the Bugtí

Sirdars, and by ordering the arrest of a Shamdani without the co-operation of the Shambani Chief, serious complications might have been caused; and that, except through the Political Agent, it was dangerous to deal with the frontier tribes. Moreover, offenders arrested and made over to British authorities by the Chiefs of tribes should be tried by the Political authorities, unless the crimes charged are of a very heinous nature. The Agent to the Governor General stated emphatically that if a practice were made of handing over for trial in regular Criminal Courts offenders arrested and delivered up to British authorities by tribal Chiefs, the Chiefs would probably soon refuse to aid us in this respect; and criminals who once succeeded in escaping to the hills would evade punishment of any description. The following rules were then proposed by the Agent to the Governor General to be followed in the case of any member of a tribe under the Baluchistan Agency, who having committed an offence might escape across the Sind frontier :—

(a) The Sind officials concerned shall communicate direct with the Political officer in charge of the tribe, and not with the Chiefs of the tribe itself.

(b) The Political Agent will use every endeavour to procure the arrest of the offender through the tribal headmen.

(c) An offender so arrested shall be tried by the Political officer, unless the express sanction of the Agent to the Governor General is obtained to the case being transferred to the Criminal Courts of Sind.

These rules were accepted by the Commissioner in Sind. The proposals made were not intended to refer to British subjects who would be dealt with in British Courts, nor were they intended to affect existing rules respecting the hot pursuit of criminals across the border.

# CHAPTER X.

Introduction.

604. In previous chapters accounts have been given of political and administrative affairs in the districts of Quetta, Pishín, Thal-Chotiálí, and Sibi; of matters in which the Khán of Kalát has been directly concerned, and of affairs which come within the cognizance of the Political Agent at Jacobabad and Karachi. The business with which the Baluchistan Agency is concerned does not, however, end there. To the western side of the Agency lie the territories which are under the direct control of Azad Khán, the aged and influential Chief of Khárán, regarding whom some account* will be given in this chapter. Disputes between Gauhar Khán, the Chief of the Jallawan tribes, and the Musianis, and others have from time to time arisen, and have occasionally assumed a somewhat serious aspect. In this report a brief account of them and their settlement may fitly be included. To the south-west of Baluchistan are the districts of Panjgur and Kolwah; here also disputes have been arranged either by or under the directions of Sir R. Sandeman. A notice of these settlements will also be given.

Tour of the Agent to the Governor General in South-West Baluchistan in 1883.

605. In November 1883, the Agent to the Governor General commenced a tour in South-Western Baluchistan, accompanied by Mr. Duke, Rai Bahadur Hittu Ram, C.I.E., together with certain Sirdars, and an escort. At Háji Shahar, he settled a dispute between the Giranis and the Khán, which had caused a fight in August 1883. At Bhág a case was settled by Rai Bahadur Hittu Ram between the Khán's naib of Bhág and Saleh Muhammad Bangalzai, both parties having agreed to the arbitrament. A minor case between the Khán and one Ashraf Girani was also settled here, and Sirdar Azad Khán withdrew a claim he had made to certain lands. At Shoran Wadera Sirdar Khán was recognised as the chief authority over the Rinds and Baluchis in this part of the country, the claim to which position was disputed by Mír Taj Muhammad. At Khuzdár an important feud between the Zahris and Musianis, which had been previously settled, and cemented by Sirdar Gauhar Khán Zahri, giving his daughter in marriage to Saleh Muhammad Musiani, was found to have broken out afresh, in consequence of a dispute as to the leadership of the Musiani tibe, matters ended in Umed Alí being reinstated as Chief, and the opportunity was taken by the Jallawan Chiefs to recognise Sirdar Gauhar Khán as leader. At Khárán the Agent to the Governor General met Sirdar Azad Khán, who desired that his territories should be kept intact after his death, and that his eldest son, Naoroz Khán, should be assured the succession on his father's death, and this was done, Azad Khán having previously obtained the acquiescence of the Amír of Kabul in his proposals. While at Khárán cases between the Khán and Azad Khán were settled by arbitrators. The Khán was inclined to regard Azad Khán with determined hostility, but the Agent to the Governor General addressed him as to the restoration of the estates of Kodábádán and Tasp, and all cases were eventually settled. A quarrel between the Zagar Mingals of Nushki was also settled. At Panjgur a number of cases were settled by a committee of officers and Sirdars, between His Highness and Azad Khán, and between Azad Khán and the Gitchkis, and disputes among the Gitchkis themselves were terminated. When the Khán succeeded to the throne

* Since this was written news has been received that Azad Khán has died. He has been succeeded by his son Naorz Khán.

of Kalát, he had to contend with certain rebel Sirdars whose object was said to be to place Azad Khán on the throne, and the breach between the Khán and Azad Khán was further widened by the daughter of Azad Khán, who had been married to Nasir Khán (formerly Khán of Kalát), refusing to comply with the present Khán's wishes in marrying him. During the dispute Azad Khán appeared on the scene at Kalát with a large force, and took his daughter back with him to Khárán, thus deeply insulting the Khán who never forgave either party, and in revenge repeatedly seized Kodábádán and Tasp which had been granted to Azad Khán by Mír Nasir Khán. The possession of these places was still in dispute, but the committee were of opinion that they should belong to Azad Khán. The Sirdar's claim was also proved to lands in Sir-i-Kouran, and some lands in Garmkan, which were transferred to the heirs of Mír Gajian Gitchki in compensation for the death of their relative. The disputed right of Baluch Khán, Naosherwani, to the revenue of lands in the village of Jatkan was confirmed, while his claim to lands called Bat in Kej was rejected. The claim of His Highness to Saráwán lands in the Khárán plain was rejected. These decisions were confirmed by the Agent to the Governor General, who considered that the Khán's treatment of Azad Khán had been high-handed in the extreme, and impressed upon him that he would fail to act up to the treaty of 1876 if he did not accept the arbitration of the British Government. Quarrels and disputes in Gitchki were also settled. It appears that the Sirdarship of the Gitchkis had been given by the Khán of Kalát to Mír Ísá—a proceeding which was high-handed and illegal; the Sirdarship was given to Amír Khán, Mír Gajian's heir, the decision being based strictly on tribal usage. Two cases were settled at Kej of minor importance.

Personal account of Azad Khán.

606. The political position of Sirdar Azad Khán of Khárán, and a desire expressed by him to be recognised as a member of the Baluch confederacy, will now be presently considered. The Agent to the Governor General reported that—

In spite of his great age, which we ascertained to be about 97 years, Azad Khán retains his mental faculties unimpaired. His memory is perfectly clear, and I never found his powers of observation at fault. In the prime of life he must have been a singularly handsome man, of unusual stature, and of great physical power. The stories told of his bodily strength are, indeed, such as would more fitly belong to the heroes of a mythical age than to a man still living. Bowed by age he is unable to mount his horse without assistance, but once in the saddle his endurance is greater than that of many a younger man, possessed of unflinching resolution, impatient of wrong, generous to reward, stern and relentless in punishment, Sirdar Azad Khán has above all things enjoyed a reputation for unswerving honesty. He is never known to depart from his word once given, and has a sincere contempt for chicanery or falsehood. There is therefore no reason to wonder at the immense influence which he has enjoyed in Baluchistan for half a century past.

Political position of Azad Khán.

607. The Amir of Afghanistan, to whom Azad Khan has latterly considered himself subject, has acquiesced in the Sirdars being admitted to the Baluch confederacy. In reporting on the matter the Agent to the Governor General observed that—

"Azad Khán is totally estranged from both Persia and Kalát. It appears to me that the opportunity which he has taken to declare himself a Baluch Sirdar is most felicitous; and I would earnestly advocate that full advantage be taken of it. In order to accomplish this it will not be sufficient to maintain an entirely passive attitude towards the Sirdar. The Government must not expect to have all the advantages of controlling Khárán, and to have to do nothing in return. The position of Khárán exposes its ruler to peculiar temptations; powers whose friendship to us may not endure for ever can offer him a substantial return for his alliance, and it is therefore incumbent on us, if we wish to see English influence paramount in Khárán, to take an active interest in the affairs of the Naosherawanis. Sirdar Azad Khán himself has one supreme desire. If he were satisfied that after his death the British Govern-

ment would assure the succession of Naoroz Khán, and prevent the country from being distracted by a disputed succession, he would serve us faithfully during the few years of life that are left him. His great fear is that whilst his sons are fighting for the Sirdarship, Persia will step in and seize the country. Again, if we decide to support Naoroz Khán on his father's death as we should support the rightful heir in any of the protected States of India, he will be loyal and true to us. With the ruler on our side, a small amount in the shape of service would win over the people also. Sirdar Azad Khán stated that the Amir used to grant him R6,000 a year, and I think that it would be of the greatest advantage if we were to give the tribe service to about the same amount."

Advantage of having Khárán under British control.

608. "Should any one doubt whether, after all, there is any great advantage in having Khárán under our control, I would beg to refer him to the map which accompanies this report. This will show him that Khárán territory extends to within 12 miles of Gidar, and dominates the Mulla Pass route, while at the same time it flanks the whole line of communication between Panjgur and Kalát. Let him at the same time remember that it is not a choice between Khárán protected by us and Khárán strong, independent, and, perhaps, friendly. The choice is between Khárán protected by us and Khárán protected by Persia or Afghanistan. Either of these powers may be to-morrow engaged in open hostility with us. Khárán territory extends to within 40 miles of Kalát itself, and its occupation by an hostile army would threaten the whole of this frontier, including the railway from Jacobabad onwards. The roads from Khárán to Sind, Kalát, and the Panjab present no great difficulties to the passage of troops. Any such demonstration would, if nothing worse resulted, keep a number of troops locked up at a time when their presence elsewhere might be of the first importance. These are, what I may term, the negative advantages of holding Khárán under our immediate control."

The value of Khárán for defensive purposes.

609. "The positive advantages are still greater. In the first place Khárán is a focus where the roads converge from India, on the one hand, and from Persia and Afghanistan on the other. It is situated on a possible line for an army invading India. Doubts have of course always existed as to whether supplies sufficient for a large body of men would be found along this road. On this point, and with regard to the character of some of the marches between Khárán and the Helmand, our information is still insufficient to enable me to form any decided opinion; and I will merely say that I saw nothing during my last tour to make me consider the route impracticable for a considerable force. On the contrary, I was left with the impression that there is a good deal of water in the country available for irrigation, and I do not believe it too much to say that, if peace is restored, the capabilities for cultivation in Khárán are equal to those in any of the Panjab Frontier districts, excepting of course the tracts irrigated from the River Indus. On this point, however, further enquiry would be very valuable. If there is a bare possibility of India being threatened from this direction, Khárán itself becomes a strategic point of the first importance. It would be of immense advantage for us to be able to occupy it as the friends of the people, and to have the resources of the country placed at our disposal and not at the disposal of the enemy."

The value of Khárán for offensive purposes.

610. "In the second place I believe that Khárán might prove of great value for offensive purposes. It is true that our present knowledge of the country lying south of the Helmand, between Girishk and Kamal Khan-ka-Bander, is far from complete, and I would beg the Government of India to bear this in mind in considering what I write on this part of my subject. At the same time there are well-known kafila routes from Khárán to the Helmand at Rudbar, and the tract of country on the Helmand, called Garmsel, is known to be one of considerable fertility. In short, all the information which I could glean inclines me to believe that a compact well-equipped force of 8,000 or 10,000 men, with the railway at its base, would find no difficulty in marching by way of Khárán to Rudbar. By this means the flank of an army advancing on Kandahar, through Farrah and Girishk, would be seriously threatened."

"The conduct of the late Amir Sher Alí Khán and of the Persians during the past goes far to prove that I am taking a correct view of the importance of Khárán. They at all events should have possessed the information requisite for forming an accurate judgment on the point. When the late war broke out, the Amir Sher Alí Khán sent Sirdar Azad Khán a present of arms and money. There can be no doubt that, had the Amir received the assistance from the Russians which he expected, or had his arms met with success, our position in Baluchistan would have been menaced from Khárán in a manner which would have been exceedingly inconvenient to us. The Persians again have made repeated overtures to Sirdar Azad Khán, at a time when they have been constantly representing his conduct to Her Britannic Majesty's

Minister at Teheran in the worst possible light. They have persistently tried to persuade him to renounce the Afghan alliance and join them."

Possible influence of Persia in Khárán.

611. After Azad Khán's death it is not improbable that Mír Azim Khán may apply to Persia to assist him to obtain the masnad, a claim which Persia would willingly support. Persia is doubtless eager to advance her eastern boundary, and if Khárán should not be included in the confederation of Baluchistan, it is probable that Mír Azim Khán might in a few years be ruling Khárán as a vassal of Persia.

"The first step towards carrying out the policy which I have indicated above is to ascertain the limits of Baluchistan on the north and west. The boundary between Baluchistan and Afghanistan has never been defined at all, and that between Baluchistan and Persia has only been partially laid down. I imagine there would be no great difficulty with regard to the former boundary, for I understand the Amir has no desire to extend his territory to any degree south of the Helmand. Indeed, he has no inducement to do so. There is, I take it, no doubt of his right to the cultivated strip on the left bank of the river, and beyond this there is little worth claiming. At the same time it might be of great importance to us to have the line accurately defined and to have it admitted, once for all, that people like the Sinjeranis of Chageh are subjects of the Khán of Kalát."

Objection on the part of Persia to a settlement of the boundary.

612. A considerable portion of the Khárán boundary where it marches with Persia was not defined by Sir F. Goldsmid. Persia would doubtless object to the definition of the line, as she would be thereby prevented from continuing the unjustifiable efforts at encroachment, which she has already made from time to time. She has alternately tried to harry and cajole Azad Khán into becoming her subject, but he has refused the overtures made to him. A settlement of the boundary would not only prevent Persian encroachment, but it would preserve peace in the country. The very reluctance of Persia to have the boundary fixed is a strong reason for doing so. Sir F. Goldsmid gave Jalk to Persia, and if Azad Khán could prove his claim to it, the Agent to the Governor General said that some compensation might be given to him, as at the time the boundary was fixed, no opportunity was given him to produce the evidence on which he relied. The status of Kohak has never been defined, and the Agent to the Governor General thought that it might be given to him if he could prove his claim to it; at the same time adding that until the ownership of these three places was decided, there would be little hope of preventing raiding from Khárán, or of the cessation of complaints in consequence on the part of Persia.

Opinion of the Government of India on the Agent to the Governor General's report.

613. After receiving this report the Government of India observed that much importance was attached to a reconciliation between the Khán and the Chief of Khárán, but as no settlement was likely to be permanent which had not been accepted by both parties, enquiry was made as to whether the Khán of Kalát had accepted the arrangement which had been come to. With regard to the proposed bringing of Azad Khán within the Baluch confederacy, the payment to him of a subsidy, the rectification of his frontier, and the quasi-guarantee of the execution of his will, it was said that the Governor General in Council was not entirely prepared to accept the responsibilities advocated with respect to the demarcation of the boundary and the guarantee of the execution of the will.

Further report submitted by the Agent to the Governor General.

614. On this the Agent to the Governor General submitted a supplementary report, saying with regard to Sirdar Khán, Rind, that there should be no difficulty in carrying out the settlement which had been made, as Taj Muhammad had declared that he fully recognised Sirdar Khán as head of the tribe. The Khán, it was at the same time observed, had never protested against the settlement made with Azad Khán.

His Highness had moreover, on a previous occasion, expressed a wish that the Agent to the Governor General should arbitrate between him and Azad Khán, and had promised to abide faithfully by whatever settlement was made. The Khán's vakil had also been on the committee, on the recommendations of which the settlement had been made and the mustaufi had sealed the agreement on the part of the Khán. Under the circumstances, the Agent to the Governor General added, the Khán had accepted the settlement without demur. Indeed, he had never made any attempt to object to the submission of disputes between himself and others to the arbitration of the Agent to the Governor General or the execution of the awards made, even in cases in which the awards made had not been in accordance with his own views. No difficulty had been raised by the Khán as to the carrying out of the engagements to which he was bound under the treaty of 1876. As to Azad Khán of Khárán. the Agent to the Governor General reported that he was only deterred from making an attempt to gain by force what he considered to be his possessions on the Persian frontier, by his desire not to offend the British Government, and that possibly he might attempt to carry out his design, if he obtained an unfavourable reply to the overtures which he had made. The value of the friendship of the Ruler of Khárán was shown during the march from Nushki to Khwaja Alí, of the Afghan Boundary Commission, which, without the aid that he freely accorded, would have experienced considerable difficulty on the march. The Agent to the Governor General further urged that Persian or Afghan influence might become paramount in Khárán, unless interest were taken in Azad Khán, and if preventive measures were not taken, Azad Khán's death would be followed by a disputed succession. In short, the Agent to the Governor General considered the establishment of British influence in Western Baluchistan to be of the greatest importance.

Orders of the Government of India on the report.

615. The proceedings of the Agent to the Governor General, recognising Sardar Khán as the Chief of the Saráwán Rinds, was approved of by the Government of India, and the proceedings taken for the settlement of disputes between the Khán of Kalát and Azad Khán were confirmed. As to the latter Sirdar, the expenditure of R6,000 per annum on tribal service in Khárán was sanctioned, and the Sirdar's eldest son was acknowledged as his successor. It was, however, decided that no delimitation of the Baluch frontier to the north and west could be undertaken, nor could a will be guaranteed, which might possibly dispose of lands in the possession of Persia.

Assistance given by Azad Khán on the occasion of the despatch of the Boundary Commission to Afghanistan, 1884.

616. In August 1884, Mr. Barnes was sent to Nushki, in order to make arrangements for the Boundary Commission, which was then about to proceed to the western frontier of Afghanistan, and with the assistance of Azad Khán obtained 250 riding camels for the Mission, which proceeded to the Helmand in charge of the Sirdar's son, Amir Khán. For 150 of these, the Sirdar's own property, he refused to accept any remuneration as hire. Out of these, 38 were lost or died in the desert. The advantage of being able to mount so many soldiers and followers in the desert marches was very great. For these services a reward of R5,000 was recommended and sanctioned. For the bestowal of this khillat, and in order to arrange for the grant of service to the extent of R6,000, the Sirdar was invited to Quetta, and on the 17th May he arrived at that place. It was then agreed that the Sirdar should appoint one of his sons as Ressaldar on R100 per mensem and 20 sowars of his tribe on R20 each to protect the trade routes passing through Khárán, to maintain peace, and provide for the safety of traders and British officers when passing through Khárán territory as well as on the route

from Nushki to the Helmand. It was arranged that the Ressaldar and sowars should, if required, attend British officers within Khárán limits. On the 5th June a large darbar was assembled, before whom the agreement was read out and khillats were bestowed both on the Sirdars and members of Mr. Barnes' establishment, who had rendered services to the Mission *en route* to the Afghan frontier.

Disputes between Gauhar Khán, the Musianis, and others.

617. In 1876 Sirdar Gauhar Khán was installed as Chief of the Jallawans. From that period a variety of quarrels have taken place between him and the Musianis, in which other tribes of the Jallawans have been involved. The animosity between Gauhar Khán and the Musianis, and also the Raisani Sirdar, seems originally to have arisen from a claim made by Gauhar Khán to marry the wives of his predecessor in the Chieftainship Taj Muhammad, who were related to members of the Musiani and Raisani tribes, both of which declined to accede to Gauhar Khán's views. In the course of quarrels which arose, the son of Saleh Muhammad Musiani was killed by Passand Khán, Gauhar Khán's brother. In 1879 the Agent to the Governor General made a settlement of Jallawan affairs, and Saleh Muhammad Musiani forgave the blood of his son, and it was understood that Gauhar Khán would give in betrothal a daughter of his tribe to Saleh Muhammad. The quarrel, however, subsequently broke out again. Gauhar Khán seems to have been on intimate terms with the Khán of Kalát, and in 1882 it was reported that the Khán's Pathan troops were helping him to plunder the Musiani villages, and to establish himself in Zahri as a despot. At Zahri a post of policemen was placed in view to the maintenance of the peace. During the dissensions, however, one of the men was wounded and his horse killed. The post was afterwards withdrawn, and the country returned to its disturbed condition. Sirdar Gauhar Khán had in the meantime raised a party of Pathan sepoys, and then declared himself to be independent of the Brahuis, and became estranged from his brother Passand Khán, and from Sabzil Khan, Lothani, who had previously aided him in disputes. A drug-debauched profligate, Umar Khán, was nominated Sirdar of the Musianis; this state of affairs could not last long, and in December 1883, the Agent to the Governor General held a darbar at Khozdar, and Saleh Muhammad was recognised as Chief. Gauhar Khán, however, had set the Jallawans against himself, and in 1884 the Political Agent, Kalát, reported that he was sending out parties to fight with the Musianis, Lothanis, Magzis, and others, who were combined against him. The Jallawans regarded Gauhar Khán's following with the greatest aversion, and seemed at the same time to have much feared the power of the Chief, who endeavoured to rally round himself the Mamasanis of Jibri, the Mingals, and the Jám of Lus Beyla. The Political Agent, Kalát, did not anticipate that the Khán would be able to afford aid in settling the affair. In June 1884, the Zahris made a night attack on the Musianis, and killed among others Muhammad Khán Musiani, whose son was married to Gauhar Khán's sister.

Orders for the investigation of the case.

618. The Agent to the Governor General observed that in the settlement made at Khuzdár, it was decided that, should any of the parties to it act contrary to the terms agreed on, he would be held responsible for his own action; that Sirdar Umed Alí had, in making a combination against Gauhar and raiding his territory, acted contrary to the agreement; that the Khán had apparently supported the Musianis; and that the case should be thoroughly investigated by Mr. Duke and reported. Mr. Duke then sent a complicated account of the disputes which had arisen between the Zahris and the Magzis, Musianis and Lothanis. As there was a gathering against Gauhar Khán, Mr. Duke ordered the Chiefs concerned to dis-

perse, and after they had done so, the raid previously alluded to was made by the Zahris on the Musianis, in which some of the latter were killed. In accordance with the Agent to the Governor General's order, Mr. Duke summoned the Chiefs concerned to Kalát, heard what they had to say, and made a preliminary report on the state of affairs pending an investigation to be held at Mastúng. The enquiry there made was held by a jirgah, and a report was sent in by Rai Bahadur Hittu Ram. The jirgah did not, however, consider themselves to be in a position to deal with the general question of the political condition of the Jallawan tribes, and their proceedings did not constitute a final pacification of the Jallawan country. On receiving the reports the Agent to the Governor General decided to himself settle Jallawan affairs, and intended to hold an enquiry at Sibi.

Final settlement of the dispute.

619. It was subsequently found, however, that the parties could not be assembled at Sibi, and the case was handed over to Captain Hope, who had in the mean time succeeded Mr. Duke as Political Agent at Kalát. Captain Hope, after investigating the case, came to the conclusion that there was but little advantage to be gained by enquiring further into the former causes of disputes between Gauhar Khán and the minor Jallawan Chiefs; that the enquiry which had been made in 1884 gave all requisite particulars; that in respect to the recent quarrels between Gauhar Khán and the Musianis nothing remained to be done except to carry out and confirm the proceedings of the jirgah which had met at Mastúng, and that all those concerned should be warned of the serious responsibility they would incur by further infraction of the agreements entered into. Captain Hope was directed to endeavour to carry out the decree of the jirgah, to effect a reconciliation, and to inform Gauhar Khán that he should pay the amount of blood money which the jirgah had decreed against him. The Political Agent, Kalát, could not, however, effect a settlement of the blood feud between the Musianis and Gauhar Khán, owing to the obstinacy of both parties; but he reported that the Luthianis and Jattaks, who were concerned in the quarrel with Gauhar Khán, had been reconciled to him. When the Agent to the Governor General paid a visit to the Khán at Bhág Gauhar Khán was summoned, and his case discussed in the presence of His Highness and the Chief Brahui Sirdars; and Gauhar Khán agreed to make over to the Musianis land to the full value of the award given against him by the jirgah at Mastúng. A sanad was accordingly drawn up, making over the land in question to the Musianis, and was signed by Gauhar Khán, all the Chiefs in darbar, the Khán, his officials, and the Agent to the Governor General. Gauhar Khán has the right to redeem the land by payment of a sum of R8,000, within one year from the date of the execution of the sanad. Before leaving Bhág a considerable approach towards friendliness between the Saráwáns and Jallawans was effected. The disputes did not very materially differ from the ordinary and very frequent quarrels which constantly arise among the Baluch and Brahui tribes, the basis of every settlement of which should rest on a full restitution of all stolen property, and blood for blood, or else compensation for blood paid in money or property.

Tour of Captain T. Hope, Political Agent, Kalát, in Panjgur, Kolwah, and Lus Beyla during February, March, and April 1885.

620. Captain Hope, Political Agent, Kalát, was verbally ordered by the Governor General's Agent in Baluchistan to proceed to Panjgur, Kolwah, and Lus Beyla, in order to see whether the settlement of 1883, arrived at between the tribes residing in south-western Baluchistan, had been observed, and for the settlement of certain fresh disputes that had arisen in Panjgur since that settlement. Captain Hope accordingly left Sibi on the 2nd February, and arrived at Bhág on the 4th idem, where he was occupied in inquiring into certain cases in dispute between His Highness the Khán of Kalát and certain of the

Brahuis regarding the land of Alí Sher, and secondly, as to land claimed by Mír Muhammad Sháhwani. Both these cases were referred by Captain Hope to the Agent to the Governor General, who brought them up before the Khán at Bhág, where an amicable settlement of the cases were brought about between the parties. On the 14th January 1885 Captain Hope received instructions from the Governor General's Agent for the settlement of a dispute that existed between the Shahizai Mingals and the Kahiris regarding (1) some murders committed, and (2) as to certain revenue demands (battai) on lands, and for the ownership of the land on the Phuleji stream, which land belonged to the Kahiri tribe; the Shahizai Mingals, however, used to take revenue from it under a "muafi grant." Captain Hope referred the case to a jirgah of Sirdars assembled at Sibi. The jirgah considered that murders perpetrated on both sides cancelled each other, and they were also of opinion that the revenues of the disputed lands should be divided in certain shares among the disputing parties. Both parties appeared before Captain Hope and ratified an agreement to abide by the decision of the jirgah. The copy of the above document was submitted to the Governor General's Agent in Baluchistan, and the action taken by Captain Hope in this matter was generally approved of by the Governor General's Agent.

*Settlement of disputes between the Khán of Kalát and certain Sirdars.*

621. On the 30th January 1885 Captain Hope received reports from Nawab Emam Baksh Khán, C.I.E., and Sirdar Muhammad Khán Laghari, who were nominated by the Agent to the Governor General as arbitrators in regard to the following four cases in dispute between His Highness the Khán of Kalát and the Brahui Sirdars:—

(1) His Highness the Khán of Kalát, *versus* Ghazi Khán Badozai. Regarding the revenue demand and other disputes in certain lands known as "Baran" and "Deh Gulan," and a murder arising out of these disputes.

(2) His Highness the Khán of Kalát, *versus* Wadera Ahmad Khan, Bangalzai. Regarding land in "Deh Gulan."

(3) His Highness the Khán of Kalát, *versus* Wadera Ahmad Khan, Bangalzai. Regarding the land known as Alí Sher.

(4) His Highness the Khán of Kalát, *versus* Din Muhammad Khan, Shahnawaz, and Alí Murad Girani. Regarding the lands of Khánpore and Ahmadpur.

In case No. 1 the arbitrators gave their decision that the proprietary right of the land in dispute belonging to the Lasharis was proved, and that the produce of the land should be given to them. The Agent to the Governor General confirmed the decision.

Case No. 2 was not decided by the arbitrators for want of proofs, which the defendant, Wadera Ahmad Khán, promised to produce within two months; in case of his failure, Captain Hope submitted that the case should be given against him. The Agent to the Governor General confirmed the decision.

The decision in case No. 3 raised the question whether the land in dispute was within the limits of the Khán's "Niabat" or the "Dehat" of the Brahuis. The Khán's vakil undertook to produce before Captain Hope proof that the land was within the "Niabat." This case was afterwards settled by the Agent to the Governor General.

In case No. 4 the arbitrators declared themselves quite unable to come to any decision without seeing the land, and they suggested that the arbitrators, who were previously nominated with the Agent to the Governor General's approval in 1883, *viz.*, on behalf of the Khán, Samandar Khán, Lehri, and on behalf of the Shahwanis, Mehrulla Khán Raisani, should be restored, and Captain Hope ordered that they should meet him at Bhág. This case was

afterwards settled by the Governor General's Agent. Captain Hope on the 14th February 1885 submitted further reports on the cases of land of Alí Sher and the Shahwanis, and the cases were finally disposed of by the Agent to the Governor General himself at Bhág. The parties came to a mutual agreement.

622. Captain Hope left Bhág on the 10th February and arrived at Kotra on the 13th, where he endeavoured to compose the differences between Sirdar Gauhar Khán and the Musiani tribe, and to make such arrangements as might ensure the carrying out of the settlements of their disputes which were arrived at previously by an assembly of Brahui Sirdars. There had long existed ill-feeling between the Musiani and Zahri sections of the Jhallawan Brahuis, an account of which has been previously given. Captain Hope, however, failed to effect any satisfactory arrangement, and issued orders that both parties should send their respective hostages which they had given to Sibi and report themselves to the Agent to the Governor General within eight days. The Agent to the Governor General approved of Captain Hope's proceedings, and, as has been previously explained, took a written agreement from Sirdar Gauhar Khán on the 8th March 1885, at Bhág, to the effect that he should pay either R8,000 in cash to the Musianis or give up one-half the Khatan lands. The Sirdar being unable to pay the above amount, hypothecated the Khatan lands to the Musianis, on the condition that if he paid the sum of R8,000 within one year, he would have the Khatan lands back, otherwise the above lands should remain in the possession of the Musianis for ever.

*Disputes between the Zabris and Musianis.*

623. In addition to the Musiani case, Captain Hope tried to put a stop to serious complaints made by the bunniah community of Kotra as to the insecurity of life and property in the Mulla Pass, and the oppression which they suffered in the Jhallawan country generally. He induced the Jhallawan Chief Gauhar Khán and the Chiefs of the minor tribes in the neighbourhood of the Mulla Pass to enter into an engagement to impose some check on the murder and plunder of travellers through the pass.

*Complaints as to insecurity in the Mulla Pass.*

624. Captain Hope left Kotra on the 18th February, and marching up the Mulla Pass arrived at Khuzdár, and travelled thence *viá* Nal to the Giresha valley, the head-quarters of the Sajadi Chief Mír Hyat Khán, who made a representation to that officer regarding his affairs with bitter complaints against Sirdar Azad Khán Nausherawani of Khárán, the whole of which, with the reply of Sirdar Azad Khán's vakil, was submitted to the Governor General's Agent for his consideration. Sir R. Sandeman forwarded this document to the Political Agent, Kalát, for inquiry and report. The case has not yet been settled.

*Dispute between Sirdar Azad Khán and Hyat Khán Sajadi.*

625. Marching through the Giresha district Captain Hope arrived at Jebri, the head-quarters of the Muhammad Hassani Sirdar, Mír Yusaf Khán. The Muhammad Hassani tribe is said to be very numerous, and is popularly supposed to number, with the Zahris and Mingals, 18,000 men. The Sirdar made a representation on the subject of the lands which had formerly belonged to him and which were confiscated by the Khán of Kalát. His representation was submitted to the Agent to the Governor General for consideration. Sir R. Sandeman, in his letter No. 1532, dated 17th April 1885, stated that he was unable to take any action in the matter, as it was distinctly agreed at the Mastúng settlement that cases of this nature would not be taken up by the British Government, and if the Sirdar's case was a sound one, he should have come forward there. It was added that the proper course for the Sirdar was to represent his claim to the restoration of his property to His Highness the Khán.

*Representation made by Sirdar Yusaf Khán, Muhammad Hassani.*

626. From Jebri, Captain Hope marched on to Panjgur, the chief place in the Mashkai district, and thence entering the Panjgur district arrived at Ísá, the Capital of Panjgur, on the 10th March 1884. The road between Mashkai and Panjgur has been reported on by Captain P. J. Maitland from a military point of view. Captain Hope, however, found that that officer had misplaced Gwank Mushtak on his map, and that the bed of the river from Tonk to Gwank Mushtak was, probably owing to heavy rains, much more difficult than it would appear to be from Captain Maitland's description. Panjgur was the principal objective point of Captain Hope's tour, and he found that the settlements made by the Governor General's Agent in 1883-84 had been carried out and were working well. The only matters which really required the consideration of a British officer in this district were—(1) a complaint made by Bibi Mariam, widow of Mír Gajian, the late Gitchki Sirdar, against Mír Muhammad Alí Gitchki, the brother of the deceased Sirdar. She represented that Muhammad Alí endeavoured to take the property given to Mussamut Mariam's daughter by their father Mír Gajian during his lifetime; and that (2) a quarrel had occurred between Mír Muhammad Alí and Mír Muhammad Hassan, Gitchkis of Panjgur, for the possession of a fort situated at Panjgur. She also brought to notice (3) certain small matters in connection with the carrying out of the settlements made by the Agent to the Governor General in 1883. She further made (4) complaints of plundering by the Nausherawanis since the settlement of 1883.

Panjgur affairs.

Case No. 1 was mutually settled between Bibi Mariam and Muhammad Alí Gitchki, and the former made no formal complaint.

Case No. 2, at the request of both parties, was referred for settlement to His Highness the Khán of Kalát, as the parties were both Gitchkis and relatives of the Khán of Kalát.

Captain Hope, with reference to case No. 3, reported that the settlements made by the Agent to the Governor General in 1883 were working well and satisfactorily, with the exception of only small matters of detail which were not settled that year.

627. In Tasp, in the Panjgur district, there are two karezes which Muhammad Gitchki asserted always formed part of the rights of the Gitchki Sirdar, from which, he said, the Khán never took any revenue. Sirdar Azad Khán proposed that one karez should be enjoyed by him and the other by the Gitchkis, but Muhammad Alí would not agree. Muhammad Alí asserted that he could bring proof that the Khán had never taken revenue from either karez, and it was agreed that if he produced such proof within 24 hours, he should have both. He failed to produce proof; hence Captain Hope ordered both parties to abide by the division formerly proposed, *i.e.*, one karez should be enjoyed by the Gitchkis and the other by Sirdar Azad Khán.

Dispute between Sirdar Azad Khán and Muhammad Alí Gitchki.

628. There was also a dispute regarding the collection of the "sang" of Tasp. Half of this village belongs to Sirdar Azad Khán and the other half to the Gitchkis. The settlement of 1883-84 made under direction of Agent to the Governor General assigned half of Tasp to each party, and Captain Hope decided that each should take the "sang" and the other dues accruing in their own share of the village.

Dispute as to the sang of Tasp.

629. At Siri Kauran, in the Panjgur district, there was a dispute as to the division of the Zar-i-Sháh between Sirdar Azad Khán and His Highness the Khán. The settlement made under direction of the Agent to the Governor General in 1883-84 divided the Zar-i-Sháh between the two parties. Muhammad Alí complained that the Nausherawanis did not give half of the dues called "sang"

Dispute between Sirdar Azad Khán and His Highness the Khán as to Zar-i-Sháh.

and "bait-ul-mal" (a kind of tax) which are included in "Zar-i-Sháh," and which he claimed to be the right of the Khán of Kalát. Murad Khán, the Agent of Sirdar Azad Khán, stated that Mír Gajian granted to Sirdar Azad Khán the "bait-ul-mal" of Siri-Kauran in compensation for two persons killed, and he believed the "sang" also was given with the same object. He asked for three months' time in which to produce proof. Captain Hope granted his request, and decided that if Sirdar Azad Khán, Nausherawani, adduced satisfactory proof within the time allowed him, his claim would be admitted, otherwise the Sirdar would have to give up half of all the dues which were included in Zar-i-Sháh. There were certain other complaints brought forward by Muhammad Alí Gitchki against Sirdar Azad Khán's people, regarding the plunder of his people and the levy of revenue, but these were without proof. Captain Hope decided that vague complaints of this sort could not be settled with satisfaction to either party.

Disputes between Mír Baluch Khán, Nausherawani, and Kanda Dost Muhammad.

630. Captain Hope left Panjgur on the 16th March 1885, and arrived at Kuldan, the first place on the Kolwah side of the hills, on the 20th idem, after marching over most desolate country, where for three days he saw no signs of inhabitants or cultivation, and hardly any living creatures, birds or beasts. Captain Hope arrived at Kolwah, where Mír Baluch Khán, Nausherawani, and Kanda Dost Muhammad, the representative of the Kanda tribe, laid before him claims to certain dues in cattle and grain, and their cases were decided by that officer to the satisfaction of both parties. Mír Baluch Khán produced a sanad, under which he was entitled to certain taxes from the Kanda tribe, and on the sanad being proved to be genuine, Dost Muhammad agreed to continue to pay the taxes as heretofore. During his tour through Kolwah Captain Hope observed considerably increased cultivation, no doubt in great measure due to the settlements made in this country during previous years by the Agent to the Governor General. It was, he said, gratifying to find both in Panjgur and Kolwah the gratitude with which the poorer and weaker classes looked up to the power of the British Government as protecting them from oppression and enabling them to live at peace and enjoy the fruits of their labour.

Captain Hope reached Bazdad on the 24th March 1885, and was met by Mír Safar Khán, Bezanjo, brother of the Bezanjo Sirdar Mír Khaira, for the settlement of matters in dispute between the Bezanjo tribe on the one hand and the Nausherawanis and Mirwanis on the other. The claim is based on the following ground. The matter for settlement was regarding the Kanda tribe, who at present reside in Kolwah as "Hamsaya" to the Bezanjos. Baluch Khán, Nausherawani, stated that they belonged to his tribe, but the Bezanjos stated that they were subjects of the Khán of Kalát, and lived with the Bezanjos as "Hamsaya."

The Agent to the Governor General's order was that—

> the settlement had been attested before him, that the question about the Kandas would be settled at Quetta, and that both parties should be enjoined to interfere in no way for the present with the Kandas, and that Mír Baluch Khán must send his sanads and other proofs to the Agent to the Governor General at Quetta on his arrival there, and the matter will be taken up in the presence of the Khán's vakil.

On Captain Hope's arrival in Bazdad, he was told by Mír Safar Khán, the Bezanjo Sirdar's brother, that he had heard nothing of either Sirdar Mír Khaira or his son Mír Fakir Muhammad's coming to Kolwah, notwithstanding that Captain Hope had fully warned Mír Khaira at Bhág early in February and subsequently his son Fakir Muhammad at Giresha on the 28th February 1885 of his intention to visit Kolwah, to settle the dispute that existed between the Bezanjos and Nausherawanis and Mirwanis, but they both failed either to

present themselves or to send any properly authorised representative. Captain Hope suspected that the Bezanjo Sirdar had an object in not appearing on that occasion, and that he was aware that there were good grounds of complaint against the action of his people since the settlement in 1883 of affairs. Mír Safar Khán, to whom the Bezanjo Sirdar in conversation at Bhág referred Captain Hope in respect of all matters connected with Kolwah, entirely declined to assist Captain Hope in any way, either in his enquiries or in the settlement of any claims that arose. Safar Khán stated that the agreement of March 1884 had been made by his brother Mír Khaira, that he had no hand in it, that his brother had not compensated him for the loss of his son, who was killed in course of fighting with Mír Abdul Karim Mirwani, and that he would not be satisfied with the settlement until his brother gave him satisfaction for his son's death. Both parties, *viz.*, Mirwanis and Nausherawanis on one side and the Bezanjos on the other, produced cases of some importance and with a considerable semblance of truth, showing violation of the settlement of 1883-84. Mír Safar Khán admitted the occurrence of three out of the five cases, in which the Bezanjos had not observed the settlement of 1883-84, and he produced no charge whatever against the Mirwanis, except a few frivolous charges against Mír Baluch Khán, Nausherawani. Captain Hope suggested in his report that Mír Khaira, the Bezanjo Sirdar, be summoned to Quetta to answer to the charges which were made against him. The case is pending in the Agent to the Govenor General's office.

631. On the 1st April 1885, Captain Hope arrived at Lus Beyla, and was received with the usual salute of guns by His Highness the Jám of Lus Beyla.

Failure of the post.

On the 19th April 1885 Captain Hope arrived in Kalát, and after two days' stay left for Quetta, which he reached on the 26th idem. Captain Hope complained that posts reached him with very great irregularity and after much delay. The posts he despatched were even more irregular in their arrival at the Kalát post office. Very little trouble taken by the Khán in making arrangements would have made a great difference in the regularity of delivery and speed of the post. Captain Hope thought that His Highness might reasonably be requested to make arrangements for the future in a better manner than they had been made in the past. He also remarked that he was accompanied on his tour by an escort consisting of a duffadar and 6 sowars of the 1st Bombay Lancers and a havildar and 18 sepoys of the 26th Bombay Native Infantry. Their presence gave rise to many difficulties in the matter of supplies and caused much account-keeping and correspondence with the Commissariat Department, and he suggested that instead of a military guard, an escort of a good native officer and 25 levy sowars, for the purpose of travelling through the more remote districts, would prove most useful. As these men make their own arrangements for feeding themselves and their horses, they could be trusted to protect the Political Agent's baggage on the march, to mount guard over his tents at night, and to protect the treasure chest from robbery, and being people of the country, would get on better with the inhabitants of the country. If such a guard could be established for the Kalát Agency, he believed that the Political Agent would be able to move about the country much more freely and speedily than he could then.

# CHAPTER XI.

632. Before the arrival of the British in Quetta in 1877, the valley had always been in the hands of natives, and consequently, as might have been expected, anything in the shape of a road or any work to facilitate communications beyond a caravan tract was entirely unknown. When Quetta was occupied, troops were sent up for whom lines were required, a house for the Agent to the Governor General was commenced, and attention was paid to the native fort then in existence. When in 1878 the war with the Amir of Afghanistan broke out, a large number of troops were from time to time passing through Quetta, the garrison was increased and a variety of roads, houses, and public works requisite for a considerable garrison had to be undertaken. Some account will be given in this chapter of the works which have been from time to time constructed and undertaken by the Department, Public Works, together with the expenses which have been incurred throughout the districts embraced by the Agency. Military works will not be noticed, as their construction does not come under the immediate cognizance of the Agent to the Governor General. Notice will, however, be taken of the telegraph lines and offices now in existence in Baluchistan; and mention will be made of the railway which during the Afghan war was constructed from Rukh on the Indus Valley line to Rindli, at the entrance of the Bolan and which is now under construction up the Harnái route into the Pishín Valley. In this chapter will also be included an account of forest administration in the Agency, the measures which have been from time to time taken in view to preventing the unnecessary destruction of such jungles as existed after the occupation of the country by the British, together with the efforts that have been made to create a fresh supply of wood to replace that used for fuel.

*Scope of the chapter.*

633. The Public Works Department establishment and expenditure were, up to the 1st January 1882, under the charge of the Agent to the Governor General; after that date the control of the military works expenditure was transferred to the Military Department, while the Agent to the Governor General retained the control of the civil expenditure under the Government of India in the Public Works Department.

*Control of the Department, Public Works.*

634. The following officers have filled the post of Secretary to the Agent to the Governor General in the Public Works Department:—

*Officers who have held the post of Secretary.*

| | |
|---|---|
| Lieutenant-Colonel J. Browne, R.E. | Major T. F. Dowden, R.E. |
| " " deBourbel, R.E. | Lieutenant-Colonel Lang, R.E. |

Major W. P. Tomkins, who has held the post from December 1882 up to the present time.

635. In 1877 a building was commenced at Quetta for the residence of the Agent to the Governor General near the fort, and combined with it there was to be a darbar hall. After R18,000 were expended on it, Mr. Hewson, R.E., was murdered during a fanatical outbreak among the Pathan labourers, and work was consequently suspended, and from a variety of causes was not again resumed until 1881. The darbar hall contains a fine room for darbar purposes, measuring 48′ × 28′, together with several rooms for office use, the chief room being used as a church, as no sacred edifice exists in Quetta. The roof is pointed, of corrugated iron,

*The darbar hall, Quetta.*

lined with wood. The total cost of the building, including the acquisition of the land, was R67,000.

The Residency, Quetta.

636. The Residency was originally intended for the Assistant Agent to the Governor General, and was one of the first houses built in Quetta; it has been considerably added to by degrees, and up to 1882-83 R25,462 had been expended on it. The building, together with the darbar hall, stands in a large enclosure, the wall of which, together with the guard-room for the guard mounted over the Residency, cost R5,234. Additions and improvements were made to the residency in 1883-84, the cost of which, including the re-payment of some money advanced for the construction of the house, was R14,206. A godown was added in 1883-84, and quarters for khalassis at a cost of R3,790.

Buildings connected with Political Department.

637. A house for the First Assistant Resident was obtained by the Department, Public Works, for R9,718. A house originally erected for the Second Assistant Resident has been made over to the Political Agent, Quetta and Pishín, for the site of which R1,042 were paid as compensation. The house cost R6,980. Further outlay was incurred in 1883-84 for servants' quarters.

The Quetta treasury buildings.

638. The present treasury buildings have been gradually added to, and a permanent treasure room built; the amount of silver for the payment of troops and establishments, &c., kept in Quetta being considerable. The cost of the buildings up to 1882-83 was R18,911. The Treasury Officer's house was built at a cost of R4,245.

The Agency house at Kalát.

639. At Kalát a house for the Agent has been built at a cost of R9,190.

Buildings at Sibi.

640. At Sibi the house of the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí, cost R6,846; some additions to it were made at a trifling expense during 1884-85. In 1884-85, R2,968 were expended in diverting flood waters from the Sibi civil buildings. The quarters of the Commandant of the Baluch Guides at Sibi cost R3,890.

Buildings connected with the Postal Department.

641. A post office has been built at Quetta at a cost of R7,948. To this a few out-houses were added in 1883-84, and some out-houses were built at Sibi. During 1884-85, trifling additions were made to the out-houses at Quetta. A house for the Superintendent of Mails was built at a cost of R2,258.

Buildings connected with the Woods and Forest Department.

642. A house for the Assistant Conservator of Forests was purchased at Jacobabad for R1,500. As it was subsequently found more convenient that this officer should live at Quetta, the Jacobabad house was sold and a small building, previously used by the Superintendent of Mails, was utilised for him, the accommodation being added to.

Buildings connected with the Telegraph Department.

643. Telegraph offices were erected at Quetta, Sibi, and Kalát, at a cost of R13,000. Temporary offices at Gandakinduff and Mach were put up. In 1883-84 the Sibi Telegraph office was extended at a cost of R2,340, and was completed in the following year, the total outlay being R4,046. The house of the Chief Superintendent of Telegraphs was built at Quetta for R6,622.

Buildings connected with Law and Justice.

644. A tahsil and thana has been built at Sibi at a cost of R33,982 by the Public Works Department. At Quetta a godown has been built for the storage of grain for R3,349.

Ecclesiastical undertakings.

645. Before 1882-83, a cemetery existed in Quetta, to which a wall at a cost of R1,335 has been added, while on a new cemetery R4,756 were spent. The enclosure wall and rooms for waiting, begun in 1882-83, were completed in 1883-84. An existing cemetery was provided with a wall for R452.

Buildings connected with Police.

646. The guard-room and lines for the sowars of the Baluch Guide Corps have cost R15,492. A kotwali in Quetta has been built at a cost of R1,774, and sum of R1,946 was spent on police huts. New police lines were built in Quetta at a cost of R12,666; these lines were afterwards utilised for the levies. The outlay on the buildings during 1883-84 amounted to R2,537. On fort police lines the outlay incurred in 1883-84 was R10,551. In 1884-85 the lines were completed at a total cost of R17,255. A small guard-room for levies was constructed at the gate bridge over the Bheji river, near Chotiálí. At Kalát R2,000 were expended in connection with the minor wants of the police. For police posts in the Bolan, an expenditure of R15,117 was incurred. In Pishín the lines and stables of 30 sowars were constructed at a cost of R10,649.

Buildings connected with the Medical Department.

647. In Quetta buildings for the Residency Surgeon at a cost of R8,184, and the civil dispensary at a cost of R5,677, have been put up. A police hospital in Quetta has been erected at a cost of R2,000. In Kalát a civil dispensary was established at a cost of R2,858. In Sibi the civil dispensary cost about R7,000.

Buildings connected with the Department, Public Works.

648. The Superintending Engineer's house has been built at a cost of R18,339, a portion being built as an experiment prior to building the darbar hall, in view to discovering the quality of the materials used, which accounts for a portion of the cost. The Superintending Engineer's office cost R8,575. The Executive Engineer's house cost R13,265. The house of the Executive Engineer, Quetta Division, cost R7,309. Quarters for Public Works Department subordinates cost R16,612. In Sibi a sum of R6,217 was expended in constructing quarters for the Executive Engineer's subordinates. Buildings for the clerks of the Agent to the Governor General cost R7,000 and R7,500 respectively. In 1883-84 a house and office for the Executive Engineer, Sibi Division, were purchased for R13,421.

Roads.

649. The outlay for the high level road in the Bolan in 1882-83 amounted to R87,364. The cost of this road was subsequently considerable. On the Quetta Gulistán road and on the Gurki defile R19,814 were expended. In 1884-85, work was commenced on the Quetta and Thal road *viâ* Kachh and Ziarat, 15½ miles were constructed between Kachh and Kahan. The amount laid out was R32,225. The road from Sibi to Kattan was also constructed; it is 58 miles long; the gradient is for the most part 1—15; the cost was R21,800. R3,375 were spent in improving the Sambar Pass road. A small sum was expended in opening a bridle path between Dúkí and Sinarai. On the road from Manji to Ziarat *viâ* Kasim Tangi, R8,200 were laid out. R2,079 were spent in Quetta on station roads and culverts, and R493 on roads in Sibi. The following are the chief roads in the Agency:—

| | |
|---|---|
| Rindli to Quetta. | Quetta to Chaman. |
| Sibi to Kachh. | Quetta to Kachh *viâ* the Sarakulla Pass. |
| Gandakinduff to Thal-Chotiálí. | Sibi to Kattan. |
| Quetta to Kalát. | Quetta to Kachh *viâ* Kuchlak, Gwal, and Gurki. |

In 1883-84 R10,409 were expended on the Quetta-Pishín road.

650. For rest-houses and inspection bungalows on the Bolan road ₨19,341 were expended. For the Executive Engineer and subordinates' quarters on this route ₨2,397 were expended. The dâk bungalows at Quetta cost ₨3,372, and that at Sibi cost ₨15,198. In 1883-84, a dâk bungalow was commenced at Rindli, and ₨3,623 were expended on it. In 1884-85, it was completed, the total cost being ₨9,092.

Dâk bungalows and rest-houses.

651. A well at Darwaza cost ₨8,099, and an expenditure of ₨546 was incurred in making a masonry tank at Bibinani. Two projects for water-supply in Pishín, the Shebo canal and the Khushdil Khán reservoir, are being matured.

Water-supply.

652. The civil station at Pishín consists of the Political Agent's house, the kacheri, a tahsil and thana, granaries, a treasury, a jail, and police and levy lines. The sanctioned estimate for these was ₨73,978, and the outlay for completion was ₨65,000, in 1883-84. A sum of ₨2,500 was expended in making roads.

Buildings in the civil station of Pishín.

653. A treasury in the Quetta fort was constructed in 1883-84 at a cost of ₨5,457.

The Fort treasury.

654. A bridge over the Bheji river in the Thal-Chotiálí district was commenced in 1883-84, and ₨9,386 were expended on it. It was completed in 1884-85, the total cost being ₨18,790. The bridge has been tested by severe floods, and has stood well. In 1883-84, a bridge in Quetta was erected at a cost of ₨7,562.

Bridges.

655. During the year 1883-84 considerable changes were made in the telegraph lines, the total length of which was reduced by 37 miles. At the end of 1883-84 the lines in Baluchistan were as follows:—

Telegraph lines.

| | Miles. |
|---|---|
| 1. Quetta to Gulistán and Khushdil Khán . . . | 75 |
| 2. Quetta to Kachh . . . . . . | 28 |
| 3. Kachh to Sháhrig . . . . . . | 36 |
| 4. Transfer of the section Nari gorge to Sibi to the Sind division . | 7 |
| 5. Permanent line from Quetta to Pishín . . . . | 29 |
| 6. Semi-permanent line from Gandakindaff to Thal-Chotiálí and Dúkí | 80 |
| Total . | 255 |

An alternative line of communication with India from Sháhrig *viâ* Kachh, Gurkhai, Kassim Killa to Quetta exists. The permanent telegraph line to Quetta runs through the Bolan, whence it goes to Kalát and Pishín; the temporary line runs *viâ* Harnái and Dúkí. The following are the telegraph offices which existed in 1883-84:—Departmental offices—Quetta and Kalát; Field offices—Dúkí, Gandakindaff, Sháhrig, Mangi, Kachh, Gurkhai, Pishín, and Mach. During the year 1884-85, an increase in the miles of line was made of 68 miles, and an increase in the miles of wire of 17 miles, caused by the erection of a temporary line from Kuchlak to Sháhrig, and an additional wire from Kuchlak to Quetta, which completed the alternative route from India *viâ* the Harnái. A permanent line with three wires was erected between Nari gorge and Sháhrig, and an additional wire between Nari gorge and Sibi. The wire between Darwaza and Pirchauki was moved to within sight of the road, it being considered that it was safer there than over the tops of the hills.

656. During 1883-84, a site for a civil station was selected at Dúkí, but it was too late then to make progress in buildings owing to the frost. The work was, however, completed in 1884-85. The houses and out-houses of the Assistant Political Agents were completed at a cost of ₨9,363. The tahsil treasury and thana at Dúkí were

The civil station at Dúkí.

completed for R13,928. A small sum was spent in walling in the cemetery at Duki. Police and levy lines were built at a cost of R1,067. In April 1884 a raid was made by certain Kakar Pathans on the Public Works Department work-people, and several were killed and wounded. It became necessary to build an enclosure for the work-people and to give them compensation; these measures cost R3,416. A sum of R3,016 was expended on a karez to supply water to the station.

Total expenditure.

657. The revised estimate of expenditure in the year 1882-83 was R2,46,000; the actual outlay was R2,55,909. The excess expenditure was small. The total amount granted in 1883-84 for public works was R3,12,149, while the actual outlay was R3,05,029, the amount expended being about R7,000 under the amount granted. "The following table exhibits the estimates and outlay of the civil buildings, roads, &c., in 1884-85," as reported by the Secretary in the Public Works Department:—

| | | Budget Estimate, 1884-85. | Revised Estimate, 1884-85. | Final Grants, 1884-85. | Actual outlay, 1884-85. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | R | R | R | R |
| Civil Buildings | Original Works | 41,900 | 36,000 | 40,700 | 44,401 |
| | Repairs | 28,400 | 26,900 | 27,800 | 27,328 |
| Communications | Original Works | 10,000 | 70,200 | 70,500 | 70,762 |
| | Repairs | 31,700 | 31,200 | 30,900 | 29,318 |
| Miscellaneous Public Improvements. | Original Works | ... | 4,300 | 5,800 | 5,984 |
| | Repairs | 3,000 | 5,000 | 4,400 | 4,458 |
| Irrigation | | ... | ... | ... | 1,055 |
| Establishment | | 26,300 | 39,130 | 39,130 | 39,130 |
| Tools and Plant | | 1,700 | 2,570 | 2,570 | 2,570 |
| | TOTAL | 1,43,000 | 2,15,300 | 2,21,800 | 2,25,006 |

"The difference between the final grants and the revised estimate is accounted for thus:— The revised estimate was submitted for a total of R41,000 under the head of Civil Buildings, but as there had been a refund of R5,000 during the year for Residency furniture, which had been advanced to the Agent to the Governor General in 1883-84, the grant for 1884-85 was reduced by that amount, but no corresponding reduction was made in specific allotments to works.

"A contribution of R1,500 was made by the Military Works Department for the construction of a karez at Dúkí, which was to serve for both the cantouments and civil lines at that station. This amount is included in the final grant for Miscellaneous Public Improvements, but not in the revised estimate.

"If the abovementioned sums of R5,000 and R1,500 be added to the total amount of the revised estimate, the total amount of the final grants, *viz.*, R2,21,800, is arrived at.

"The differences between the outlay and the final grants are so trifling as to call for no remarks, except in the case of 'Civil Buildings' The difference here is due to the orders of Government, that the outlay of R3,416 in connection with Kakar raid should be debited to 'Civil Buildings,' having only been received after the year had been closed. Had it not been for this, the outlay of the year would have corresponded very closely with the final grant."

Construction of the railway from Rukh to the mouth of the Bolan, and the cession of land for railway purposes.

658. The renewal of hostilities with Afghanistan during the year 1879 induced the Government of India to put into execution a scheme of railway which had been projected from the Indus valley to the entrance of the Bolan Pass. On the 16th September 1879, Sir R. Temple, Governor of Bombay, telegraphed tc the Agent to the Governor General

that the Viceroy had ordered the construction of a broad-gauge surface railway from Rukh, a point close to Sakar, on the Indus Valley State line, to the mouth of the Bolan Pass, the work being under the general control of the Governor of Bombay. As His Highness the Khán had, during the negotiations when the Agency was established, been assured that before railways were constructed he would be consulted, the Agent to the Governor General was authorised to communicate with the Khán under article 7 of the treaty which had been concluded with him in 1876, and to arrange the preliminaries, explaining that the urgency of the work was due to complications with the Afghan Government. The advantages to be expected from the development of the Bolan Pass route were brought to his notice, and at the same time he was requested to place the resources of the country at the disposal of Government. The Khán acquiesced in the proposals, and Mr. Lambert, Deputy Collector in Sind, was deputed to settle with the Khán's vakil all questions relating to the acquisition of land. His Highness the Khán made over in perpetuity to the British Government the lands on which the railway was constructed, together with the lands on either side of the railway to a distance of 200 yards, as well as the lands on which railway stations and buildings were erected. The British Government have the right to protect life and property within railway limits without reference to the laws of the Kalát State.

Rapid construction of the line to Sibi.

659. The construction of the line was entrusted to Colonel Lindsay, R.E., and was under him most rapidly pushed on. The surface line through Sind and Kachhi was laid throughout by the 16th January 1880, the first engine reaching Sibi on that day; 133½ miles of railway on the standard 5′ 6″ gauge were laid in 101 days, the last 100 miles being across the part which is destitute of water, wood, forage, and supplies.

"Everything had to be brought to the rail tip, not only permanent-way materials and railway stores, but water, food, and supplies of all kinds for the immense gangs of labourers, and the staff employed. The success of this operation is due to the great skill and energy of the Engineer-in-Chief, Lieutenant-Colonel J. G. Lindsay, R.E., and of the members of his staff, stimulated by the presence of, and aided by the resources placed at their disposal by, His Excellency Sir R. Temple."

Selection of the Harnái route for the railway, and the commencement of the work.

660. It seems that it was at first proposed to carry a small temporary tramway in continuation of this railway along the road which had already been constructed by General Phayre up the Bolan Pass, a notice of which has already been given in this administration report. Owing, however, to the fact that the cart road was up the river bed, which was subject to sudden and high floods, this idea was for the time given up, and orders were given to survey routes for a railway to be constructed to Pishín and thence to Kandahar. With regard to the Bolan Pass route, it was known that the gradients in places were extremely steep, and the curves very sharp, while the construction of a permanent* railway up the bed of the Bolan would be precluded by floods in the river. It was found, moreover, that the construction of a line above flood level could only be carried out at enormous cost. Attention was thus directed to the route from Pishín through the Chhapar rift and down the Nari gorge *viá* Harnái. In October 1879, Sir R. Temple visited Baluchistan and with Sir R. Sandeman inspected the three routes *viá* the Bolan, Tiri, and the Chhapar rift. In concurrence with the Agent to the Governor General he recommended, subject to further survey, for the projected railway the route from Sibi *viá* Harnái and

* A temporary railway up the Bolan was begun during the year 1885, and is still (August 1885) under construction. It is understood that in any case it will be subject to more or less lengthy interruptions during floods. It is hoped, however, that damages done will be repaired without any great difficulty, and that the interruption in the communications will be kept within reasonable bounds.

Chhapar to a point near Gwal in Pishín. This route, although somewhat longer than the Bolan Pass route, assured an easier gradient. This line was eventually adopted by the Government of India, and the preliminary surveys were actively pushed on from Sibi to Gwal by Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay. During the year 1879-80 a large body of labourers was collected and employed in cutting the line *viâ* the Nari gorge, where a large number of Pathans came to work of their own free will, attracted by the high wages, the prospect of getting small contracts, and the chance of permanent employment on the line. In July 1880, however, the reverse at Maiwand took place, and in consequence the troops guarding the works had to be withdrawn from that line, and with them the working parties were forced to retire. During this retirement the Kuchali raid, of which a detailed account has been previously given, took place, and after the abandonment of the line injury was done to the stores, &c., which had been collected. The battle of Kandahar in which Ayub Khán was defeated restored order to the country, and towards the close of the year 1880 and during the commencement of the following year work was recommenced on the line.

The discontinuance and subsequent recontinuance of work on the railway line.

661. In 1880, however, the Liberal party came into power, and orders were issued in 1881 to discontinue the railway works. Nothing more was consequently done until the year 1883-84, when the Government of India sanctioned the recommencement of the railway line, and work was again fairly commenced in December of that year. From that time work has been steadily carried on over the line. It had been originally proposed to construct the line on the metre gauge, but when it was recommenced it was decided to construct it on the broad gauge. Although portions of the roadway had been constructed, the heavy portions of the work were untouched, and to these attention was then directed. At the Nari gorge a portion of the work previously done in 1880 had been destroyed by floods in the succeeding years, and had to be reconstructed. A tunnel excavated in 1880 had partially fallen in, and was repaired. At Tanduri the Nari river had to be crossed, and a bridge was begun there. At Kalát-i-killa a very heavy cutting was undertaken by the 23rd Panjab Pioneers, and work of a similar nature was done by the Madras Pioneers. Below Babakach three bridges were commenced, also a tunnel and works in the Kuchali defile, where several bridges and a tunnel were undertaken. Between Kuchali and Spintangi cuttings and embankments were carried out, and at Spintangi a tunnel through marble rock was made.

Railway works carried on during 1884-85.

662. Up to this time the works had been confined to those which would be suitable for a road, pending the settlement of the question as to whether a railway should be constructed, which was much discussed. In July 1884 definite sanction was accorded to the construction of the Sind-Pishín State Railway. Very careful surveys of the line were made by the engineers, with the result that practically the whole line from Harnáí to Quetta was realigned. Work was then begun on the Chhapar tunnels, and plate-laying was begun at the Nari end. The military working parties were reinforced by the 23rd and 32nd Panjab Pioneers and the 4th Madras Pioneers. By the 14th March 1885, the plate-laying had reached a point 14½ miles from Nari gorge, but its progress was entirely stopped by floods in March and April. In the Nari gorge work in several bridges was carried on, but great damage was done by floods which swept away pumps, cranes, and railway plant. The works in two tunnels and four bridges were completed during 1884-85, and made ready for girders and rails. Three large and several small bridges were made near Spintangi, where the tunnel was completed through marble. Near Harnáí, three large bridges were begun, and several small bridges

were finished, but much damage was done by floods. Near Sháhrig the earthwork was completed, and at the Chhapar rift the tunnel work was carried on. The work was done in the face of fever, cholera, floods, and high prices for both food, carriage, and labour, and in fact of nearly every possible difficulty.

Petroleum at Kattan in Thal-Chotiálí, 1883-84-85.

663. The following interesting report regarding the petroleum springs at Kattan has been supplied by Major Tomkins, Secretary to the Agent to the Governor General in the Public Works Department:—

"At the close of the year 1883 the Government of India deputed Mr. R. A. Townsend, a gentleman who had had a very large experience of petroleum wells in Canada, America, and Germany, to visit and report on the petroleum springs which were known to exist at a place called Kattan, about 40 miles east of Sibi.

"The geological formation at Kattan is pronounced by Mr. Townsend to be of the tertiary or post-tertiary period, and the petroleum is found in shales which are strikingly similar in character to those in which it is found in Canada, only that in the latter country the rocks are of the secondary period.

"Kattan lies in a narrow valley to the east of the horse-shoe-shaped Maurani hill. The valley has been formed by denudation, and the river bed is now in shales which underlie limestone rocks. At Kattan itself there are what are known as oil 'shows' in springs of sulphur water, and higher up the valley 'shows' are also met with in cracks and fissures of the rocks. The antiquity of the oil deposits is shown by the dry petroleum residuum (like black sealing wax) being found in intercalated bands and in fissures for some hundreds of feet above where it is now flowing and in the fact of large crystals of carbonate of lime having petroleum incorporated with them.

"The best 'shows' are in the springs which rise in the shales forming the vertical banks of the river channel. These springs are very sulphurous and have a temperature of 102° F. The petroleum issues in the form of bubbles, these rise to the surface of the water and there breaking the oil floats away as a disc, of tar-like colour and consistency, about an inch in diameter.

"On his arrival at Kattan in the winter of 1883-84 Mr. Townsend was favourably impressed with the geological conditions of the locality, as they were identical with those which his experience had taught him were oftenest associated with productive oilfields.

"He collected some 12 or 15 ℔ of semi-solid petroleum residuum with sand and gravel intermixed and proceeded to Sibi to test it.

"He improvised a still and having distilled sufficient kerosine for his purpose he was able to take it to Quetta and (in May 1884) show its illuminating property to the Honourable Mr. T. C. Hope, Member of Council, and to the Agent to the Governor General for Baluchistan, by burning it in an ordinary kerosine lamp.

"His report of the springs and of the character of the oil was so favourable that the Government of India determined to prosecute more extended investigations into the extent and yield of the oilfield. With this object Mr. Townsend was deputed to England and Canada to engage the necessary skilled labour and to purchase the machinery required.

"The summer of 1884 was spent by Mr. Townsend in engaging the service of four Canadian assistants who had large experience in sinking oilwells and in procuring in Canada and England the necessary engine and boring apparatus.

"While Mr. Townsend was absent a road was being made to connect Sibi and Kattan; the timber for the staging was being converted in the I. V. S. Railway workshops at Sukkur and the loan of two elephants from Deesa, to carry the heavier portions of the machinery, was arranged for by the kindness of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of Bombay.

"By December 1884 Mr. Townsend had returned to Sibi, bringing with him four Canadian assistants, and very shortly afterwards the machinery arrived. Some little time was necessarily spent in sorting the tools, casing, pumps, &c., &c., in Sibi and in transporting everything to Kattan, but by the first week in February 1885 the staging, 54 feet in height, was erected and everything in readiness to make the first boring.

"Difficulties were at once encountered with the boiler, the water at Kattan is so charged with sulphur and alkalies that the packing of the joints of the boiler were corroded daily, and further difficulties were caused by an unusually wet season.

"However, drilling was persevered with. At 22 feet down, oil was met with, and at 28 feet and 56 feet other veins were found.

"About 60 barrels or 2,000 gallons of this oil were brought to the surface early in March and when pumping was discontinued, owing to there being no means of conveniently storing the oil, the supply gave no indications of being exhausted.

"The petroleum came up mixed with water charged with sulphur and is of a heavy gravity.

"By the end of the year under review the boring had been carried to a depth of 300 feet, but without meeting with other oil veins. This depth of drilling had not been reached, however, without great difficulty. For 200 feet the boring passes through hard limestones and shales which are cracked and fissured in all directions and have a considerable dip; owing to this feature small pieces of rock become detached and get jammed between the boring tools and the sides of the bore hole to the great risk of the engine and boring tools. Besides the above drawback, water was met with in very large quantities, and it may be mentioned that the presence of water in an oil field is attended with grave danger to the success of the enterprise.

"Besides the oil springs at Kattan, Mr. Townsend visited a place called Shorin, about 50 or 60 miles south south-west of Sibi; he found an abandoned sulphur mine, and in it there were sulphuric or sulphurous acid and petroleum tar. Mr. Townsend has no doubt that the oil he obtained from Shorin is essentially the same as that at Kattan, and that it has its origin in the same bituminous shales or limestones of the upper cretaceous or lower eocene rocks as occur at Kattan.

"During Mr. Townsend's journeys between Quetta and Sibi and Kattan he has taken every opportunity to examine into the mineral resources of the districts through which he passed. His report is unfavourable, for he states 'that he has never gone over so large an area of country the geological features of which are so beautifully exposed and found such a total absence of minerals of value.' He mentions petroleum, sulphur, and gypsum as present, but considers the sulphur and gypsum of doubtful value."

*Sir R. Temple's minute on forestry in Baluchistan, November 1879.*

664. Towards the close of the year 1879, Sir R. Temple, at that time Governor of Bombay, paid a visit to Baluchistan to confer with the Agent to the Governor General on a variety of questions, and *inter alia* he wrote a minute on the subject of the introduction of forest administration in Baluchistan, where at that time there was no system of forest conservancy in existence. While travelling over the country, His Excellency observed that the railway, the route for which was then under discussion, was about to be brought into Baluchistan, and that if at the same time "the other requirements of civilisation were introduced unaccompanied by restrictions placed on the destructive and wasteful habits of an unsettled country, such as unchecked firing of grass lands and forests, and unlimited grazing, the result could be nothing but a rapid destruction of all forests, so thorough indeed that hereafter no one would believe that these valleys had ever been studded with trees at all." Sir R. Temple proceeded to propose that all forest tracts within workable distance of the railway should be examined; that the rights, interests, and tenures of the people should be settled; that the boundaries should be determined at that time when the matter was a "tabula rasa" in respect of claims and disputes, together with other suggestions of a like nature. The proposals made recommended themselves to Sir R. Sandeman, who brought them to the notice of the Government of India.

*Opinion of the Government of India, and commencement of work in February 1880.*

665. The Government of India agreed that the sources of fuel and timber, which would be of the utmost value to the railway and the populations that might hereafter settle thereon, should be economically managed according to the best principles of forestry, and that an active officer should be placed at the disposal of the Agent to the Governor General for the purpose of reporting on the matter. For this duty Mr. Rind was sent from the North-Western Provinces, together with two native officials of the Forest Department, to inspect the forests and jungles along the proposed railway line, to estimate and indicate their areas in view to forming reserves for railway purposes, and, in communication with the Agent to the Governor General, to settle the claims of the tribes and people with respect to the lands, and also to propose plans for working in rotation for protecting or otherwise using to the best advantage such jungles as might exist, and which it might be unadvisable to wholly reserve. The question

of the operations to be undertaken for making fuel plantations and reproducing forests was to be investigated. Mr. Rind commenced operations in February 1880. He only held the post however for a short time, making over charge to Mr. Watson in June of the same year.

Rules issued in February 1880.

666. In February 1880, rules were issued by the Agent to the Governor General with respect to the Sibi forests, to the effect that (1) wood should not be cut for contractors; (2) branches should be cut in preference to young trees; (3) with certain restrictions, branches might be cut for grazing cattle; (4) the burning of grass might be permitted under supervision in unreserved land; (5) no firing of grass should be allowed without permission. It does not appear, however, that the enforcement of the rules was practicable. On a report made by Mr. Rind in March 1880, about 16,000 acres of land near Sibi were reserved to be protected for forests, and a royalty on firewood leviable in the Sibi bazar was sanctioned; but the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí represented that the wood might have been grown on private land, and the royalty was consequently abolished, and no revenue has therefore been obtained by Government. Mr. Rind did not, however, at first extend his investigations beyond the Nari gorge, and no detailed report as to the important juniper forests in the direction of Khawhás was sent in. A short report was, however, submitted. As to the land to be reserved, the Agent to the Governor General said that the boundaries should be marked out by the Forest officer in communication with Colonel Reynolds. A supplementary report, sent in by Mr. Rind in June 1880, was by no means encouraging. In September 1881, on a representation made by Mr. Watson, further rules were sanctioned for the Sibi forests, to the effect that no one should cultivate, graze cattle, or cut wood in forest limits, without the sanction of the Forest officer, and that damage would be punishable. In February 1881, Mr. Watson submitted a report, and among other things complained of the want of water. This the Agent to the Governor General said would be rectified by the construction of a watercourse from the Nari. A small piece of land near Bakra was sown with babul seeds.

Mr. Watson's report, July 1881.

667. In July 1881, Mr. Watson submitted a report on the Baluchistan forests, from which it appears that, though natural production had progressed, it had been kept in check by the difficulty experienced in keeping the fences in repair owing to the violent storms which annually swept over the plains. The revenue for the year was derived chiefly from fuel, which was partly of tamarisk and partly of khandi, a small sum being realised from the rafters brought in from the tamarisk jangals, and a little timber of larger size was sold. The total revenue for the year amounted to R14,376 against a total expenditure of R16,416, showing a deficit of R2,040. Even this deficit would probably not have existed but for the fact that hardly any revenue was realised during the first quarter of the year. The Government of India considered that the general result of the year's transactions was satisfactory, "since at this early stage of the working of the Forest Department the income nearly counter-balances the expenditure, while at the same time waste is prevented, and the resources of fuel, which are so important, are husbanded."

Further report by Mr. Watson, February 1882.

668. In August 1881, Mr. Watson forwarded, for the sanction of the Agent to the Governor General, which was obtained, forest rules for the Sibi district, to the effect that no one should cultivate, graze cattle, or cut wood, without permission. Mr. Watson also did some work in Quetta, where a nursery was begun. In February 1882, Mr. Watson sent in another report, showing, in the opinion of the Agent to the Governor General, that the forests adjacent to Sibi and Nari on either side of the railway were worthy of special care; that the ex-

tension of cultivation in Sibi was inimical to forest growth; that much damage was done by camels; that the reserve forests had to be demarcated and fenced. It had been proposed that the appointment of a Forest officer should be discontinued, but the Agent to the Governor General was much opposed to this course in view of the work which still remained to be done, as there was much room for improvement and a considerable demand for wood and fuel. The appointment of Mr. Watson was then sanctioned for a further period, and arrangements were made for the regular inspection of forest operations by the Conservator of Forests in Sind. During 1882, the Conservator of Forests brought to notice that the zamindars were injuring the forests by bringing in large quantities of wood for sale in Sibi; and as the royalty had been abolished in the Sibi bazar, and the area of land reserved for forest use had been much diminished under previous orders, the forest revenues were necessarily less than might be expected. In a report recently submitted Mr. Ribbentrop remarked that :—

"The zamindars have been treated with extravagant liberality, and if they have consumed, sold, or destroyed by Kumri cultivation or otherwise the forests on the land which was given to them for cultivation and the supply of domestic and agricultural wants, they must buy in the open market and no new rights should be allowed to spring up, and no further privileges should be granted, and, if possible, the existing one, which cannot be very valuable at present, commuted." "This eventuality," it was added, "the Agent to the Governor General foresaw, but nevertheless the forests have already been destroyed."

Administration Report for 1881-82.

669. In July 1882, Mr. Watson sent in the Administration Report for 1881-82, in which, *inter alia*, many of the points already noted were included. In remarking on it, the Government of India observed that a large portion of the forest area had been removed from the charge of the Forest Department; that it was to be regretted that efforts made to afford general protection by fencing in a few of the blocks had proved to be ineffective owing to the damage done by cattle grazing; that every effort should be made to encourage the growth of the babul; and that the sum of R6,613 incurred for establishment charges was heavy. In December 1882, the Forest officer obtained sanction for fresh rules for the Sibi forests, regarding the grazing of cattle, cultivation in forest reserves, wilful damage, and the scale of grazing fees, which were—

| | | R | a. | p. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| for each | camel | 0 | 4 | 0 | per. mensem. |
| " " | buffalo | 0 | 3 | 0 | do. |
| " " | bullock or cow | 0 | 1 | 6 | do. |
| " " | donkey | 0 | 1 | 0 | do. |
| " " | horse | 0 | 2 | 0 | do. |
| " " | goat | 0 | 0 | 9 | do. |

The rules also provided for the impounding of straying animals, for wood for the villagers whose homes were in the forest reserves, and for cultivation with permission. In forwarding these rules to the Government of India the Agent to the Governor General observed that the operations carried on in Sibi constituted only a very small portion of the work to be accomplished in Baluchistan; that the object was to create rather than preserve forests; that consequently the Department should not be expected to pay its own way; that the ultimate profit, direct and indirect, to Government would be considerable; that while wood was scarce the demand was considerable; and that the supply would be a serious difficulty if efforts to reproduce it were not made. The Agent to the Governor General urged that the services of a Forest officer should be retained.

Mr. Watson's report for 1882-83. Appointments of Mr. Lace.

670. In July 1883, Mr. Watson sent in his report for 1882-83, which showed that the forest area had been reduced from 16,479 acres to 5,191 acres. The deficit for the year was R6,923. Shortly afterwards a report was forwarded by Mr. Whittall, Deputy Conservator of Forests, who had been placed

on special duty with that object. On receipt thereof the Agent to the Governor General recommended that a trained and experienced Forest officer should be sent to the Agency, and Mr. Lace was deputed accordingly. Mr. Whittall's report showed that the juniper forests in the vicinity of Ziarat, and other forests at Sháhrig, Tarai, Harnáí, Thali, &c., needed preservation and economical management; that in order to meet the local demand for fuel and timber in Pishín, it was proposed to make plantations at the rate of about 500 acres per annum for 10 years, and that there was ample work for a trained officer in Baluchistan. Mr. Lace commenced work on the 1st October 1884. The suggestions made by Mr. Whittall were, the taking up and settlement of the Ziarat forest, the Sháhrig and Harnáí blocks, and the Tarai and north Thali blocks, together with the establishment of plantations on the Kairani block and the Khwara block, and the rearing of plants in Quetta.

Report by Mr. Ribbentrop.

671. Early in 1885, the Inspector General of Forests was directed to proceed to Baluchistan to discuss steps to be taken for the advancement of forest conservancy, and a comprehensive scheme of forest administration including a proposal regarding the establishment of a forest nursery at Khwara nalla in Pishín. Mr. Ribbentrop accordingly visited Baluchistan and submitted an interesting and full report to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Home Department, which will be found among the appendices of this report. From his report it seems that but little, under the head of protection, exploitation, and improvement had been effected, continuous protection having been afforded only to the area of about 5,000 acres in Sibi, and that on the areas made over to the villagers in 1882 forest growth had been destroyed, while in Mal and Thal much damage had been occasioned. As to the hill forests, nothing beyond the submission of reports had been effected, and the practical results of forest administration had not been satisfactory from any point of view.

The financial results showed a deficit since the commencement of operations of R27,364, made up as follows:—

| Year. | Revenue. | Charges. | Surplus. | Deficit. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | R | R | R | R |
| 1880-81 . . . | 14,376 | 16,416 | ... | 2,040 |
| 1881-82 . . . | 18,617 | 17,682 | 935 | ... |
| 1882-83 . . . | 5,039 | 11,962 | ... | 6,923 |
| 1883-84 . . . | 4,752 | 16,911 | ... | 12,159 |
| 1884-85 . . . | 6,089 | 13,266 | ... | 7,177 |

While Mr. Ribbentrop was in Quetta in April 1885, a conference of officers met to consider what arrangements should be made, and with regard to artificial plantations it was decided that their commencement on a large scale could not be recommended, on account of the large outlay necessary for the adequate supply of water from artificial tanks to which a guarantee of ultimate success, practical as well as financial, could not be given; but that constant experiments on a small scale as to results obtainable by artificial cultivation under various circumstances and conditions, and of the effects of strict closure on natural reproduction, should be made. It was agreed "that the reservation, protection, exploitation, and improvement of the Ziarat forests must for some time to come form the main part of the work of forest administration in Baluchistan. Mr. Ribbentrop drew up a draft forest regulation for Baluchistan in 8 chapters, regarding the constitution of forests, the protection of trees outside them, the trespassing of cattle, the penalties and procedure to be intro-

duced with regard to offences, the powers to be granted to Forest officers, together with rules as to the relations of Forest officers and Civil officers, &c., &c. The regulation was discussed by the conference and approved of. It was decided that the creation of State forests should not be restricted to those at Sháhrig and Harnáí, but should be extended to the best parts of the outlying juniper forest and to natural forests of pistachio near Gwal and Siriab. The question of State reserves in south and north Tali was reserved for settlement on the spot between the Civil officer of the district and the Forest officer. Mr. Ribbentrop recommended that the draft regulation should be sanctioned; the Forest officer would then select the best blocks, of the Ziarat, Harnáí, Sháhrig, and outlying juniper forests for reserves, to be demarcated, and make recommendations for roads. The Civil officer would then decide as to the question of grazing in the forest reserves, &c. Experiment has shown that almost any trees which can outlive the frost of winter, can grow in Quetta and Pishín if water can be obtained during the hot months. Areas on which the pistachio grows naturally should, it was observed, be entirely protected from all grazing and other interference, as well as favourably situated blocks of juniper. No immediate profit could, however, be expected from forest administration. A saving of 50 per cent. of the firewood at present used might be effected by the introduction of stoves. The provision of the large supply of wood required for troops in Quetta and Pishín was placed under the Forest officer, to prevent wasteful cutting and the destruction of areas which it might be contemplated to secure as State forests.

# APPENDIX I.

From R. I. BRUCE, ESQ., C.I.E., Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí, to LIEUT.-COL. SIR ROBERT SANDEMAN, K.C.S.I., Agent to the Governor General for Baluchistan, No. 1409A, dated 1st April 1884.

Some time ago you expressed a wish that I should write a history of the Marri tribe, which I have now the honor to submit.

2. I have written it so as to show the relations which exist between the Marris and Bugtis.

3. Since intimate relations were first established with the Marris and Bugtis, I am the only officer who has held executive charge of both tribes for any considerable length of time, covering a period altogether of over twelve years, the greater portion of which I served under yourself.

4. I have therefore enjoyed exceptional advantages in making myself acquainted with everything connected with them; and if, in my interpretation of facts and events, and in the conclusions I have drawn, I differ from others, I hope it may not be put down to any spirit to criticism, but simply because I believe it may be useful in the future management of these tribes, to place on record what I believe to be a correct account of all the principal events connected with them in past times.

5. With reference to the history of the fight at Purh, I regret to say that I was myself the source of the former incorrect account of the affair which I gave in 1870. I only lately discovered my mistake. I was constructing a new road over the ridge of the mountain leading from Thal-Chotiálí into the Purh plain, and the workmen turned up a number of the bones of the men who had fallen in the fight.

6. The headmen of the different tribes who had taken part in it were present, and gave me an interesting and circumstantial account of what had actually occurred, as related in the History. It shows how necessary it is to test all such accounts through independent sources.

*History of the Marri-Baluch tribe and its relations with the Bugti tribe.*

The Marri country may be divided into five separate districts, *viz.* :—

1. Kahan, including Tadri, Daho, and Bambhor.
2. Philawar, Nisau, and Jantali.
3. Mamand, Gambuli.
4. Kwat-Mandai and Badra.
5. Kholu.

The district of Philawar, Nisau, and Jantali was wrested by the Marris from the Hasani tribe during the chieftaincy of Bahawalan.

Mamand and Gambuli were taken by them from Zarkuns about ninety years ago.

The valleys of Kwat-Mandai and Badra were formerly part of the Sibi district, and belonged to the Panni Pathans, subject to the Amir of Kabul, from whom the Marris conquered it during the time of Sirdar Nur Muhammad, about forty years ago.

In 1876 a large force of Bugtis, led by the young chief Shahbaz Khan, attacked the Zarkun forts in the Kholu valley, and took them by storm. The Zarkuns lost so heavily that they were obliged to desert the country, and the Kholu district was formally annexed by the Marris in 1878, under Sirdar Mehrulla Khan, and was divided amongst the whole of the tribe. The Zarkuns again returned to Kholu, and were made part proprietors with the Bijarani Marris in their share. The Marri country, as at present constituted, is bounded on the north by the countries of the Tarins and Lunis, extending from the water-shed of the Bolan river to near the Han pass; on the east, by the Khetrans and Gurchanis; on the south by the Bugtis; and on the west by Kachi, Sibi, and the Bolan pass (see Mr. Duke's map of the Marri country).

The Marri trbe is divided into three main sections.

The statement on next page shows the main divisions, sub-divisions, places of residence, and numbers of fighting men in the tribe.

*Statement showing the main branches, sub-divisions, and number of fighting men in the Marri Tribe.*

| Loharani Nehal Khan, Shurbut, 800 fighting men. | | | | Bijarani Kurum Khan and Kotay, 1,430 fighting men. | | | | Ghazni Mehrulla Khan, 1,484 fighting men. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Section. | Headmen. | Place of Residence. | No. | Section. | Headmen. | Place of Residence. | No. | Section. | Headmen. | Place of Residence. | No. |
| | | | | Kalandrani | Kurum Khan Kotay | | | Bahawalanzai | Mehrulla Khan | Kahan | 40 |
| Khunarani | Nehal Khan | Phelawag | 200 | Salarani | Mitha, Pandhi | Kholu | 110 | Aliani | Jaro | Kahan | 120 |
| Sherani | Shahdad, Vazir | Bambhor, Sihaf | 220 | Sumarani | Shadi Khan | Mamund | 50 | | | | ... |
| Mumdani | Khutto | Nisau, Ghand | 180 | Pirdadani | Adam Khan and Batil | Kholu | 60 | Tingiani | Buktiar, Sobdar | Quat | 317 |
| Goosrani | Jumsher Khan | Phelawag, Jantali | 200 | Mundwani | Chutta, Meer | Ditto | 30 | Nozbundgani | Mir Hazar | Kholu | 50 |
| | | | | Ramkani | Piro | Kariak | 180 | Mohundani | Mohomed Khan, Dadali | Ditto | 65 |
| | | | | | | Kholu | 250 | Choori | Allie | Thadri | 60 |
| | | | | Khalwani | Sherhan | Mandai, Jindri | 250 | Lori Kush | Mir Dost | Sohrani Buna | 50 |
| | | | | Kungrani | Pullia | Sandwani | 120 | Mazarani | Sherdil, Kechi | Kholu | 80 |
| | | | | Shahijas | Batil, Azim Khan | Gidri | 200 | Isphani | Shahan Khan | Kahan | 82 |
| | | | | Powadi | Diwa | Kohlu & Makhmar | 180 | Badani | Bahar Khan | Bambhor | 40 |
| | | | | | | | | Jarwar | Hyat Zurkan | Kahan | 60 |
| | | | | | | | | Zing | Tungai | Kholu | 50 |
| | | | | | | | | Langani | Ramel, Daru | Bahdera | 200 |
| | | | | | | | | Chilgarri | Niamut, Hybut | Doongan & Gamboli | 100 |
| | | | | | | | | Mehkani | Khudadad Mundost | Bambhor | 60 |
| | | | | | | | | Shahani | Rehan | Ditto | 30 |
| | | | | | | | | Murgliani | Hyat Khan | Kahan | 55 |
| | | | | | | | | Kahur Khan Zai | ...... | Ditto | 25 |
| | | Total | 800 | | | Total | 1,430 | ...... | ...... | Total | 1,484 |

Total number of fighting men, 4,344.

MAZARANI SECTION OF GHAZNIS.

*Mazarani (as originally composed), 460 fighting men.*

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hejwani . . . | Sherdil, Nawab . . | Bolan Pass . . | 120 |
| Changlani . . . | Kechi, Basheer, Khuda Bux. | Do. . . | 280 |
| Maukani . . . | Nabi Bux . . . | Do. . . | 60 |
| | | TOTAL . | 460 |

*Miscellaneous Marris which have since become affiliated with Mazaranis, 170 fighting men.*

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mehkani (Ghazni) . | Kewul . . . . | Shoran Katchi . . | 20 |
| Aliani (Ghazni) . . | Dada . . . . | Bolan Pass . . | 40 |
| Badani (Ghazni) . . | Bahluk . . . . | Jhul Katchi . . | 50 |
| Sherani (Loherani) . | Khuda Bux . . . | Shoran Katchi . . | 60 |
| | | Total Mazaranis . | 630 |

*Note on the Mazarani Marris.*—The Mazarani Marris were originally Khetrans of Barkhan, and took their names from their ancestor, Mazar Khan. Mazar Khan had two sons, who quarrelled and fought with one another. The son who was worsted in the fight fled with his followers and took refuge with the Marris at Kahan, where they became affiliated to the Ghazni branch of the Marri tribe, and subsequently became known as the Mazarani section of the Ghaznis. The other son remained at Barkhan and became the founder of the Mazarani section of the Khetrans, in which section the chieftainship of the Khetran tribe has since remained.

When the Mazaranis joined the Marris they were made equal shareholders with them in the lands of the different districts of which the Marri country was at that time composed.

At the time when Durri Khan was chief of the Marris, a band of Ramizai Bugtis, who had left their own tribe on account of a quarrel, sought and obtained an asylum from Sirdar Durri Khan. The Sirdar had an agent, one Bandal Khan, Nozbundgani Ghazni. Bandal Khan intrigued with the Mazaranis and Mehkani Ghaznis, and induced them to plunder some cattle belonging to the Ramizai Bugti refugees. The Bugtis immediately complained to Sirdar Durri Khan, who went with his son Sohbani to call the Muzaranis and Mehkanis to account. Angry words passed on either side, which resulted in an encounter in which Sirdar Durri Khan and his son were both killed.

After the fight the Mazaranis and Mehkanis were obliged to fly from the Marri country and took refuge, some of them in the Bolan, and some in Shoran and Jhul, in Katchi.

A few of the Badani section of the Ghaznis and of the Sherani section of the Lohranis, who had sided with them in the fight, were obliged to fly with them, and although still retaining their former names, Badanis and Sheranis, they have since then been amalgamated with the Mazaranis, and are known as a sub-section of that clan.

Sirdar Durri Khan was succeeded in the chieftainship of the Marri tribe by his son, Dostali Khan. During Dostali Khan's lifetime the Marris did not take their revenge on the Mazaranis. Dostali Khan was succeeded by his son, Bahawalan Khan. During the time of Bahawalan Khan the Mazaranis despatched to him a deputation—called *sath*—of 15 men, to try and make their peace with the tribe. When the deputation arrived at Thalli, Mir Muhammad Ghazni (grandfather of the present Marri Wakil Shahan Khan), who had gone to Thalli to purchase grain, heard that the deputation had arrived there, and collected a force of Marris and attacked and killed the 15 Mazaranis at a place called *Khunar*, and informed Bahawalan Khan of what he had done.

After a short while the Mazaranis again negotiated with Bahawalan Khan, and as the debt of blood had been wiped off, peace was reestablished and the Mazarani lands in the Marri country were again restored to them.

In other districts, which were subsequently conquered by the Marris from their neighbours, the Mazaranis also received equal shares with other Marris in the division of the lands, and although only a few of the Mazarani returned to their own country, after the peace was concluded, they are all joint proprietors of the lands of Thadri, Dahoo, Quat Mandai, Mamund, and Kholu, and received their share of the produce. Their connection with their own tribe is therefore maintained up to the present time, which is a curious coincidence.

Subsequently some men of the Aliani Ghaznis, on account of a quarrel, left the Marri country, and came and joined the Mazaranis in the Bolan.


In the above statement will be found full particulars of the Mazarani Marris, including the men of other Marri sections which became affiliated to them.

It will be seen from the statement that the total number of fighting men of the Marri tribe is estimated at 4,344. Of these 510 of the Mazaranis, and other sections who have become affiliated to them, at present reside in the Bolan pass and Kachi. These have been included, as many of them will, no doubt, again return to their own country, as the Hejwanis did in 1876.

There are besides 130 Panis living at Kwat Mandai and Badra, and about 100 Zarkuns at Kolur; so that the number of fighting men in the Marri hills may safely be estimated in round numbers at 4,000. This estimate differs from others that have been made, but it has been tested through the headmen of the Brahuis, Bugtis, and others, and every means has been taken to ensure its being as correct as such an estimate could possibly be.

The genealogy of the Marri chief's family will be found on the next page. The present chief is Sirdar Mehrulla Khan.

# GENEALOGY OF THE MARRI CHIEF'S FAMILY.




* Morad Bakhsh's daughter married Miran Khan, chief of the Dreshaks.

† Dost Ali's daughter married Gozan Khan, chief of the Gurchanis.

‡ Biluch Khan's daughter married Nawab Imam Bakhsh Khan, Mazavani chief.

Before the time of the first Ghazzan Khan, from whom the Ghazzni section takes its name, the chieftainey was in the Bijurani and Aliani sections of the tribe. Vizeer Aliani was Tomandar before Ghazzan, and when he died he left two sons, both

As detailed accounts of the early history of the Marri tribe and its connexion with the great family of Rind Baluchis are to be found in the books and records noted below,* it will simply be necessary to refer to them, and pass on to the time of their first coming into contact with the British in 1839.

A very complete history of the tribe taken from Government records and different authorities from the time that the country fell into a state of anarchy after the death of the great Nasir Khan, Khan of Kelat, up to 1845, which embraced the period of the first Kabul War, is given in Macgregor's Gazetteer; but as that is a strictly confidential publication and only accessible to a favored few, it will be interesting to quote here his account of the most remarkable events which occurred during that period:

"Nasir Khan, better known as the great Nasir Khan, kept the Marris and Bugtis well in hand, and in good order. He claimed them as his subjects, and acknowledged his own responsibilities with regard to them as such. He did not allow them to carry on intestine wars and feuds; and under his powerful sway they occupied and cultivated their respective countries, which he allowed them to hold revenue-free, only obliging them to send a deputation of their headmen to attend his court once a year, and to pay a small tribute. Thus the people were happy, trade flourished, and the country prospered.

"At that time the Harand and Dajal divisions of the Dera Ghazi Khan district, which were bestowed on Nasir Khan by Ahmed Shah Durani, formed part of the Kalát territory, and for a time, some of the trade, which came through the Bolan pass, went through the Marri, Bugti, and Gurchani countries, and the Chachar pass, to Harand and Dajal; but the subsequent anarchy and misrule diverted it into its present route through Kachhi to Shikarpur. They were held responsible for the protection of kafilas within their respective boundaries, for which they received a certain fixed amount for each camel.

"When Nasir Khan died, he was succeeded by his son, Mahmud Khan, who was indolent and debauched. Mahmud Khan was succeeded by his son, Mehrab Khan, who was a weak and incapable ruler. He remained in his citadel at Kalát, and allowed the Baluch tribes on his frontier to conduct themselves as seemed best in their own eyes. The evils of this policy were not long in manifesting themselves. The Marris, Bugtis, Jakranis, Dumkis, and others extended their devastations into the countries of all their neighbours; while at the same time wars and blood-feuds broke out amongst the tribes themselves, which rendered it impossible for them to give up the new life they had taken to until reduced again to order by our powerful ruling hand. This unsatisfactory state of things continued, and was found existing when first our Government came into contact with these tribes in 1839, and to it may be attributed the losses which Lord Keane's army suffered in their march through Kachhi and the Bolan Pass, on their way to Afghanistan. After Lord Keane's army had passed through the Bolan, a force consisting of a detachment, 1st Bombay Grenadiers, one company, 5th Bombay Native Infantry, under Captain Lewis Browne, two howitzers, a small detail of artillery, and sappers and miners under Lieutenant Jacob, was sent under the command of Major Billamore, to punish the offending tribes and render the road more safe for the passage of the convoys for the army. It marched from Sakar *viâ* Shikarpur and Lehri to Pulaji on the 20th October 1839, and was at first employed in punishing the Dumkis and Jakranis in the plains, but they fled to the hills under their leader, Bijar Khan, and abandoned all their villages. In December, Major Billamore proceeded against Kahan, arriving before it on the 29th.

"The Marris, on arrival of the force, totally deserted Kahan, and retired with all their families and property to the northern part of their country, and a detachment of 100 men of the 1st Bombay Grenadiers was left to garrison it under Lieutenant Peacock. They at once assembled in full force to oppose us, but being outmanœuvred, changed their minds, and did not then venture to engage in a struggle. They offered some slight opposition to the work of cutting the road over the Nafusk pass, but did not seriously obstruct the troops in marching through their country. The British force left the hills in February 1840, and in the month of April a detachment was sent under command of Captain Lewis Browne to occupy Kahan permanently.

"This detachment assembled at Pulaji on the 8th April 1840, and consisted of 300 bayonets, 5th Bombay Infantry, under Ensign Taylor; two 12-pounder howitzers, under Lieutenant Erskine; 50 Sind Horse, under Lieutenant Clarke, besides 50 Pathan Horse. This detachment was to convoy 600 camels with four months' supply to Kahan, and Lieutenant Clarke was to return with 80 infantry and 50 horse to escort up four months more. Owing to delays of the Commissariat, the detachment did not start till the 2nd May.

"On the 8th, the detachment marched to the foot of the Sartaf pass, six miles, in five hours; and after a rest, again went out at 4 P.M. for the top of the pass, one mile distant. The road up this was so steep that the last camel did not reach for twelve hours. The gun was dragged up by the men. Here the Marris first showed themselves. Captain Browne encamped on the top of the hill; but, as there was no water there, the men and animals had to go down again in batches to get some.

"On the 9th, the force marched to the foot of the Nafusk pass. The road was much cut by ravines, and the detachment was threatened by the Marris.

"On the 10th, it ascended Nafusk with 100 men, and met with no resistance. The gun took ten hours getting up; the heat was excessive, there being no water. The convoy took twelve hours going up the pass, which is only a quarter-of-a-mile in length.

"The Marris attacked the detachment, but were beaten off. The little force had now been under arms three days and nights.

"On the 11th, the force descended into the Kahan plain, and the Marris seized the top of the pass at once, and kept up a fire at a respectful distance. Lieutenant Clarke was slightly wounded on this day. The force reached Kahan at 5 P.M., and found it deserted.

* History of the Border Tribes of the Dera Ghazi Khan District, by R. I. Bruce, 1870 (published in Selections from the Records of the Government, Punjab, and its Dependencies: New Series, No. II, 1871).
Settlement Report, Dera Ghazi Khan District, by F. W. R. Fryer, C. S., 1869—1874.
History of Thal-Chotiálí and Harnáí, by Surgeon-Major O. T. Duke, 1883.

"On the 12th May, the detachment occupied the fort, and a sepoy was cut up close to it. Lieutenant Clarke pursued the assailants unsuccessfully, but captured fifty camel-loads of wheat.

"On the 16th, the Marris set fire to all they could not carry away, but not before another 50 camel-loads had been secured."

On the 16th, Lieutenant Clarke started *en route* for Pulaji with 160 infantry and his 40 sabres of Sind Horse. Having surmounted the first hill, he sent back 80 of the infantry, and went on with his horse and 80 infantry, and 700 unladen camels. On seeing the last of the camels over the hill, Subadar Bagu Jadao, the native officer in command of the detachment left behind, returned. Halfway down the hill, they fell into an ambush of 2,000 Marris, and though the men fought very gallantly, the numbers were too many for them, and at last the whole party was cut up, only one dooley-bearer escaping. Captain Browne was thus left with 140 men and one gun to defend the fort, which had 900 yards of wall to man.

"Lieutenant Clarke, meanwhile, had made his way to the north fort of the Sartaf pass, 13 miles from Kahan, where he found the Marris assembled in large numbers on the top. After placing his convoy to the best advantage, he advanced to drive them off with 30 men, but the attempt was too great. There were 2,000 men against him with the command of ground in their favor; and so, after fighting nobly for two hours and expending his last cartridge, the whole party of infantry were cut up, except 12 men. The cavalry bolted to Pulaji, and the whole of the camels were captured. The Marris lost 300 men. Thus the 5th Bombay Infantry lost in this one day two native officers and 144 rank and file; but it was a loss which added imperishable glory to the regiment. Captain Browne was not in the least disheartened by this heavy loss, but set to work to put the fort in a state for defence.

"On the 4th June, he received an express to say that no reinforcements could be sent him, but that Captain Bean had been asked to send some Kakars to his assistance; but this was not of much use, for these very Kakars soon after attacked Bean himself in Quetta. The Marris constantly hovered about, coming down on any helpless grass-cutters or followers who strayed too far, but they never attempted the faintest approach to an assault. Bad water and food and hard work soon began to tell on the men, and on the 14th July Captain Browne records that 90 out of his 140 men were unable to put on their belts from ulcers.

"He then commenced putting all his camp-followers through a course of drill. The Marris continued their respectful blockade, stationing small picquets all round beyond range, till about the 10th August, when they began to be more energetic in their harassing, upon which Lieutenant Erskine dropped a shell in the middle of them, killing and wounding 15. On this day the garrison managed to capture 300 sheep and 57 goats, which were grazing too near the fort.

"On the 12th August 1840, a detachment, consisting of 464 bayonets, 1st Bombay Grenadiers, a detail of 34 gunners, and three 12-pounder howitzers marched for Kahan under the command of Major Clibborn.

"It had been intended to send a detachment of H. M.'s 40th Regiment, but for some reason this was countermanded. The detachment had charge of 1,200 camels and 600 bullocks. At Pulaji it was increased by 200 Puna horse and Sind horse under Lieutenants Loch and Malcolm, respectively. The detachment entered the hills on the 24th, and reached the foot of the Sartaf pass in five marches.

"It took 13 or 14 hours, namely, from 2 A. M. to 3 or 4 P.M., to get the convoy and guns up this pass, the latter had to be dragged up by manual labour, the road running up the steep face of the mountain, in many places nearly perpendicular, and being said by those who had seen both to exceed in difficulty the Khojak pass on the road to Kandahar. The suffering of the sepoys employed in this service, and indeed of all, exposed as they were to the burning heat of an August sun, was distressing in the extreme; but it was borne cheerfully and without a complaint. The night was passed on the table land on the summit, with no water nearer than the foot of the pass. The men had little rest; they were under arms the greater part of the night, the Marris keeping up a fire on the picquets and camp from the other side of an impassable ravine. At 2 A.M., on the morning of the 31st August, the march was continued to the foot of the second range of mountains, distance six or seven miles. The road lying along the foot of the mountain was so cut up by ravines that one of the guns upset, occasioning considerable delay in righting and repairing it, the men being all the while exposed to a galling fire from the Marris, which wounded several. Moving on again, the force soon came in sight of the pass of Nafusk, and here the difficulties seemed to increase. The road, which had been reported practicable for guns and camels, rose before the wearied and exhausted troops in a zigzag course up the side of a precipitous mountain the crest was crowded with the enemy, screened under shelter of the rocks, who, on the appearance of the force, set fire to a beacon light. It was now 10 A.M., and the heat fearfully oppressive. A letter from Captain Browne in Kahan, of the 27th, reported that abundance of rain had fallen, and that no doubt a sufficiency of water would be found at the encamping ground below the pass. The reports of the guides on arrival were that there was no water! And the little remaining in the pakals from the last halting-ground on the top of the Sartaf pass was dried up.

"Under these circumstances, it was evident that the whole force and cattle must perish from thirst, unless the pass of Nafusk was carried. Beyond, water was said to be procurable, and the fort of Kahan was only distant about six miles. Major Clibborn waited anxiously till 1-30 P.M. for the arrival of the rear-guard, consisting of the 1st and 2nd companies of the 1st Grenadiers, one howitzer, and the Puna Horse under Lieutenant Loch. At 2 the dispositions for attacking the pass were concluded, and the left flank companies of the 1st and 2nd Grenadiers and 50 Volunteers of the Puna Auxiliary Horse, under Lieutenant Loch, were led on with admirable coolness and order by Captain Raitt, 1st Bombay Grenadiers, followed by a strong support of the Grenadiers. An effective flanking party was posted at the foot of the pass on the right, to keep up a heavy fire on the crest of the hill. The guns were placed so as to throw shrapnel shells to clear the head of the pass, while the storming party advanced up the steep face of the mountain. The remainder of the escort, with the colors, were drawn up on the plain, facing the pass and protecting the guns. With the greatest anxiety the progress of the storming party was watched, as they steadily wound up under a heavy fire from the enemy; in some parts they were only able to advance in single file. The road, at all times barely practicable for guns, had been altogether destroyed: and they found breast-works, topped with thorny bushes, built across the road, in three places most exposed to

the fire from the ridge. These they surmounted; the ledge of the head of the pass was gained, and the party ready to rush on: one sepoy was seen to reach the gap and fire through—when, from every side, they were assailed by a tremendous fire from the enemy, and rocks and stones were hurled from the summit. The Marris with a wild shout, rushed down sword in hand. Hundreds and hundreds poured over the ridges of the mountains, and leaping into the midst of the men, bore all before them. Sepoys and Marris were mingled on the hill. Seeing the attack completely repulsed, and that to make any stand on the steep face of the hill was impossible, the supporting and flanking parties retreated to the colors. The enemy rushed down the mountain, and, although the guns were sweeping the plain with grape, advanced with such determined gallantry and impetuosity, that there was barely time to form the men. The Marris, pouring round in all directions, attacked sword in hand, and throwing in showers of heavy stones, advanced to the very muzzles of the guns. The men, however, behaved admirably, and kept up so brisk a fire that, with well-applied rounds of grape from Captain Stampford's howitzers, the enemy was repulsed with great slaughter, dispersing in all directions, numbers falling in the flight. The loss on the mountain was now found to be very severe. Nearly half the storming-party had fallen, and four officers. Raitt was shot through the thigh about halfway up the mountain, when he turned round and asked Lieutenant Franklin to lead the advance; but seeing him supporting Lieutenant Williams, who had just been shot through the heart, he bound his handkerchief round the wound, and again took his place at the head of his company, where he fell nobly when the rush took place, at which time also Lieutenant Franklin was killed. Lieutenant Moore received two shot wounds, and was afterwards cut down by a Marri in passing. Loch, who led the dismounted sowars, was severely wounded, receiving a sword-cut and several severe bruises from stones on the head; but was forced down the hill by his orderly, and reached one of the guns in a fainting state. Out of the 100 dismounted sowars alone, 53 were killed.

"The enemy had been repulsed with great slaughter, and most of their influential men were lying dead around; but the pass remained in their possession, and their numbers were still very great, the combined tribes of the Baluchis amounting in fact to several thousands. To follow up such a success was impossible; the heat was dreadfully intense; and the sufferings of the men and cattle, from exhaustion and thirst, became painfully apparent. The men grew clamorous for drink, and the cries of the wounded and dying, for water! water! were increasing. The few bottles of beer among the officers' baggage, given to allay the wants of the greatest sufferers, gave rise to scenes of frenzy and despair. Men of all castes rushed and struggled for it; and many a miserable wretch, on getting hold of a bottle and finding it empty, dropped lifeless on the ground. The scene was agonizing to behold. Parties were sent to search for water; and Mir Husen, one of the guides, having reported that they had discovered some in a ravine, about half a *koss* off, the whole of the pakal bhistis and camel pakals, under the escort of the Irregular Horse, were despatched to procure a supply. The gun-horses were sent with the party, being quite unfit, in their exhausted state, to take the guns back, and many of the officers' horses also accompanied them. The evening was spent in collecting and bringing off the wounded, and occasionally firing shells in the hills, from which the enemy still kept up a fire on the skirmishers in the plain. Party after party returned, reporting that no water was to be found; and about sunset some stragglers from Mir Husen's party came in, reporting that the whole had been surrounded in a ravine, the greater part cut to pieces and the horses carried off. 'Under these circumstances' (Major Clibborn states, in his official despatch), 'it became necessary to determine what should be done. I had already lost about 150 men of my small force (small when the nature of the country and the size of the convoy are considered), the remainder being enfeebled with thirst and the exertions of the two previous days; and, to add to our different difficulties, most of the camelmen, dooley-bearers, &c., had absconded during the action, after plundering the commissariat. The gun-horses were gone; and the men of the artillery so prostrated from fatigue and thirst, that latterly they could scarcely rise to fire a gun. In this state, I found it impossible, allowing that I made a successful attack on the pass, to convey either the stores or guns over it, particularly as the road had been destroyed; and after mature deliberation I found that it would be impracticable to carry out the object of the convoy to throw provisions into Kahan; and further, that unless the water-party, horses, &c., returned soon, my whole force, cattle, and followers, must perish of thirst. The sad alternative devolved on me of deciding on the abandonment of the unfortunate garrison of Kahan, the stores and materials of the detachment; and the chance presented itself, by a rapid retreat to the water at Sartaf, of saving the remainder of my men and the numerous followers, with such carriage and stores as their enfeebled state would permit me to carry off. I therefore resolved, unless the gun-horses and water arrived by 10 P. M., to move off quietly with my troops. Such continuing to be the case at that hour, I directed Captain Stampford to spike his guns, and at 11 o'clock we moved with as much quietness as the frantic state of the men would permit. I am grieved to add that we were obliged to abandon nearly everything—guns, stores, camp equipage, &c., the desertion of the camel-drivers having put it out of my power to remove them. The wounded were carried on the few camels we could manage to take with us. We reached the top of the Sartaf, fortunately, without obstruction from the enemy, for the men were completely knocked up. Here all discipline was at an end; the men, rushing down the hill, leaped into the pools of water like madmen. The rear-guard was attacked by a large body of Baluchis, and the slaughter among the followers was very great. As soon as the men could be got from the water they were formed into square, as the Baluchis were reported to have shown themselves on all sides, and we waited for daybreak, when it was found that the whole of the convoy and baggage we had been able to remove had been carried off in the confusion and darkness of the night. The sepoys at Nafusk had been ordered in the evening to put three or four days' supply of flour in their havresacks, but most of the men had been too much exhausted to do so, and we now found ourselves absolutely without food. Not a single tent was saved, either for officers or men; and nothing remained but to make a forced march to Pulaji, distant more than 50 miles. Fortunately we had still a few empty camels, and were joined by others on the road, on which we brought on the wounded.' Lieutenant Loch had a narrow escape. He was carried to Sartaf bound to the back of a sowar, and afterwards brought on lashed to the back of a camel. The sufferings of all on the march to Pulaji, from the intense heat of the weather, rendered more insupportable by the reflection of the sand and standstone rocks, is not to be described. Captain Heighington, of the 1st Grenadiers, died the day after the force reached Pulaji, from the effects of the sun and fatigue, and many of the men died on the march. Major Clibborn's exertions were untiring, and his courage and self-possession, through these trying scenes, were most conspicuous and the admiration of all. In his official despatch he deservedly notices the gallant bravery of Lieutenant Loch of the Puna Irregular Horse, and Lieutenant Malcolm of the Sind Horse. The great number of their men who fell shows how nobly they did their duty; indeed, the conduct of all the men—many

of the 1st Grenadiers raw recruits, who never before had been under fire—was exemplary.

"The officers killed in the disastrous attack on the pass were—

"1st Grenadiers—Captain Raitt, Lieutenant Moore, and Jemadar Jewra Keen Singh. 2nd Grenadiers—Captain Franklin, Ensign Williams, and Subadar Guru Bakhsh.

"The following is the statement of killed and wounded :—

| *Killed.* | | *Wounded.* | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Artillery | 7 | 1st Grenadiers | 62 |
| Pioneers | 4 | 2nd do. | 10 |
| 1st Grenadiers | 86 | Puna Horse | 10 |
| 2nd do. | 26 | Sind Horse | 10 |
| Puna Horse | 36 | | |
| Sind Horse | 20 | TOTAL | 92 |
| TOTAL | 179 | | |

(Out of a force of about six hundred and fifty men.)

"The gallant detachment in Kahan being all this time, as it were, behind the scenes, saw all that went on that day, and this Captain Browne thus graphically describes :—

'About sunrise we saw collected on the very top of the pass about 200 Baluchis and others prowling about in all directions : the distance, as the crow flies, from the fort to the pass is about four miles. In fact, we were completely behind the scenes, and saw all that the Baluchis were at; and fully expecting to see our comrades crown the top every hour, we were highly amused and excited. *Two p. m.*—No sight of convoy coming over the pass; they must be repairing the road up. *Three p. m.*—Saw the shrapnel flying over the hill, and bursting in the midst of the enemy with the most beautiful effect. *Five p. m.*—Still no sight of the convoy. Baluchis still crossing the plains towards the seat of action. Erskine scattered a small body of them with a shell. *Eight p. m.*—Heavy firing of guns and musketry for ten minutes, when all was silent for the rest of the night. I should be very sorry to pass many days of my life like this. I would ten thousand times sooner have been in the thick of it; the excitement and suspense was beyond anything I ever felt before. Knowing the difficulty of the pass, and not seeing our people crown the top, I felt certain there must be much bloodshed going on.'

"Though the garrison thus, as it were, saw all that had been going on, it was not for eight days that they had the slightest idea that any disaster had happened. They thought that Clibborn, finding the Nafusk too strong, had determined to go round by the Dera road. But Captain Browne did not despair. On the 2nd he records :—

"The sepoys are very weak from short rations, and there are only six bags of flour left—a bad look out. Still there is no word of giving in. On the 7th the truth was broken to him, for, looking through his glasses, he saw the three guns belonging to the convoy 'staring us in the face.' 'We must prepare for the worst' is his remark; but even then there is no annoyance in his tone, and he chivalrously adds :—'Many officers and men must have given up their lives before they lost the guns.' On the 8th he remarks :—'The Marris are watching us, knowing we must soon take to flight for want of provisions. They need not be in such a hurry, for we have still some rice and the gun bullocks left.' On the 7th a letter reached him from Brigade-Major Sakar, informing him of the disaster, and leaving him to his 'own resources, it being impossible to send any further relief.' 'Well,' he remarks, 'this decides the matter at once. The number of sick, and the weakly state of the rest of the detachment, give little chance of escape by a night march, but I do not suppose the Marris will agree to any terms I may offer.' Still Captain Browne put the best face on the matter, and, making a calculation, found they could last out until the 15th October on quarter rations and the gun bullocks. He therefore decided on holding out, unless he got honorable terms. The sepoys were in excellent spirits, although well aware that there was some mischief in the wind.

"On the 22nd a messenger came from Doda, chief of the Marris, to say that if Browne 'would leave his fort, he would be happy to make any terms.' To this, knowing he would soon run short of provisions, he replied:—'I will give you back your fort on condition you give us personal security for our safe arrival in the plains. If not, I will remain here two months longer, having provisions for that time.' These terms were agreed to, and on the 28th September the little garrison left the fort. 'We had some trouble in getting off,' said their commander, 'in consequence of the number of sick, and were obliged to tie the poor fellows on the camels;' but they took with them their one gun.

"They commenced the ascent of the Nafusk at 6 A. M., and after immense fatigue and labor got the gun to the top by 2 P. M. The sepoys were regularly overpowered with the fatigue halfway up. The call for water now was dreadful, all that had been brought in the masaks being expended. About 9 o'clock about 300 Marris had assembled in the front, rear and right flank, perched on the top of the hills. They seemed highly amused at the feeble efforts of the gallant garrison in getting the gun up, and when they saw the sepoys completely done up with thirst and fatigue, they called out 'Ah! you will never get the gun down to the plains; you had better give it' to old Doda. Captain Browne then offered them money to show some water, and they said they would for Rs. 1,000! After some talk, they agreed to show some for Rs. 100, which was immediately given them, and there was just enough to give each man a handful or so, and then they set to and got the gun up.

"At the very top of the pass were about 50 of Haibut Khan's followers, who swore the force should not go any further until they had been paid for the flock of sheep captured on the 13th August. However, when it came to the point, and seeing the gun too close to be pleasant, they thought better of it, and begged Rs. 100 for Haibut Khan's family, who, they said, were very poor.

"It was now 4 P. M., and the force had still to descend the Nafusk pass to get water, which the Marri guide reported in abundance three miles from the bottom, in consequence of much rain having fallen. The force commenced descending, when a spectacle, the most horrible to be conceived, met their sight—the bodies of all the officers and men, who fell on the 31st August, were lying unburied, with all their clothes on, having been merely dragged off the road. Raitt's body was the first, being almost on the top of the pass. Through this dreadful scene, they had to lower our gun down the hill, inch by inch. Captain Browne says:—'I would have given worlds to have buried the poor fellows, but this was out of the question. We had then been 14 hours

under arms, and had still to seek for water; besides which, we had no intrenching tools.' The bodies were lying in heaps, which shows what a bitter fight it must have been. The Marris spoke highly of Captain Raitt's desperate bravery, and he lay at the head of his men. After much labour the gun was got down the hill, and the force then proceeded along the table-land to the water, which was in a deep water-course, on the bank of which it bivouacked for the night. Although the men had no food all day, they were so overcome, having been 19 hours under arms, that all (save the picquets) immediately fell asleep without tasting a bit.

"On the 29th the force crossed the Sartaf with great difficulty, and arrived at their ground to find no water. Luckily the sepoys were all so done up that they soon fell asleep and did not complain at all about their thirst. Captain Browne was now warned that the Bugtis would attack him; but though not in much of a fighting condition, half the men being on camels, he remarks, 'with the gun we have not much to fear from them.' On the 1st October they reached Pulaji, emaciated, ragged, hungry, and destitute, yet bringing with them 'their gun' and their honors. Such was the defence of Káhan, and if it tells anything, it surely proves how, even against barbarians, the necessary precautions of war cannot be disregarded, no less than that, if attended to, no odds need be feared by disciplined troops."

From the date of Captain Browne's leaving the Marri hills there was little communication between the British and this tribe until 1845. In this year Sir Charles Napier undertook the chastisement of the predatory tribes of Jakranis, Dumkis, and Bugtis; and as it was an object of great importance to cut off the retreat of these tribes to the north, Sir Charles, in a characteristic letter, asked Captain Jacob to undertake to gain over the Marris, by the promise of the Bugti land at Dera. This was not an easy task, as the Bugtis tried to get up the belief that, directly they were destroyed, the British would serve the Marris in the same manner.

Jacob, however, sent messengers, who found that the Marri chief with all his people had deserted Kahán and retreated to the next valley on the north, and consequently there was considerable difficulty in gaining them round. However, the chiefs were at last persuaded to wait on Captain Jacob at Lehri, and having explained the wishes of the General to them, he induced them to visit him at Dera, and give the necessary co-operation. This they did effectually, and thus closed two lines of retreat to those tribes. Sir Charles Napier treated the chiefs with favor, and gave them handsome presents. He also commenced negotiating with them for the surrender of the three guns abandoned by Major Clibborn's force, which they had in their possession at Káhan.

But owing to Captain Jacob's strong representations as to the impolicy of inducing such barbarians to think they had in their hands a means of inducing acquiescence in their demands, he at length desisted from the negotiation.

It is well to mark here the wide difference of opinion which existed between Sir Charles Napier and Captain Jacob* about the Marris. Sir Charles Napier, in consideration of their having acted in good faith towards Captain Browne and his garrison, and also of the assistance they rendered to him in his campaign against the Dumkis, Jakranis, and Bugtis, was anxious to maintain friendly relations with them, while Captain Jacob took the opposite course. In his report dated 16th April, 1853, Jacob gives reasons for this difference of opinion, and writes:—

"It is certain that these Marris are the worst enemies of the Khan of Kalát; that they have, for many years past, laid waste the best part of this country, and plundered the whole province of Kachhi.

"For many years past the Khan repeatedly and urgently begged for assistance from the British Government to enable him to reduce this rebellious tribe, and put a stop to its predatory inroads.

"Without assistance from us, it is totally out of his power to control these robbers, as he has so often represented, and it is useless to call upon him to do so.

"The British territory has already been violated by the Marris, in the instance of the attack on Kusmor in April, 1849, and the inroad into the Kusmor district on the 3rd April 1853.

"While, in innumerable instances, mentioned in my former letters, the Marris have assembled in arms for hostile purposes near the British border, and on all these occasions have only been prevented invading the British territory by finding the troops on the frontier moving against them, all is disorder, rapine, and bloodshed on the Kachhi side of the desert.

"One of the greatest obstacles now existing to the establishment of an extensive and most valuable trade between Central Asia and the sea is the total want of protection for life and property on the journey through the Bolan and the plain of Kachhi.

"No goods can be brought through that country save by the traders congregating in considerable numbers for mutual protection, and hiring parties of armed men to protect them. Even then they are not safe, for the Marris plunder in such strong parties that they hesitate not to attack the largest kafilas, frequently overpowering the guards, even when they remain faithful, and not seldom murdering as well as robbing the merchants.

"The weak and disreputable state of the Kalát Government, also, as shown by its total inability to crush these robbers, enables all manner of petty marauders to rule with impunity, and enables every contemptible chief of a village to demand and extort payment from all traders under the name of transit duties, of which not a farthing reaches the coffers of the State.

"These appear to me to be some of the evils caused by allowing the Marris to plunder at their will with impunity. It is certain, also, that these mountaineers think that the British Government is afraid of them. This was the case, as I informed Sir Charles Napier, at Pulaji, in March, 1845, when the Marri vakils were with him, and the belief has certainly not since been removed." * * *

* The late General John Jacob.

After the meeting of the Marri chiefs with Sir Charles Napier, at Pulaji, in March, 1845, all friendly relations between them and the British Government appear to have been severed.

Before proceeding to trace the history of the Marri tribe subsequent to that event, it is necessary to explain that it is so intimately bound up together in all relations, both external and internal, with the Bugti tribe, that a history of the former which did not to a great extent include that of the latter would be imperfect. At that time these two tribes occupied a position quite unique in itself. They only, of all other tribes in this country, had completely forsaken the cultivation of the soil as a means of livelihood, and had instead taken systematically to plundering as their chief source of subsistence.

This was not because they did not possess lands to cultivate, as is supposed by some, but because the Marris and Bugtis being themselves hereditary enemies, and having made enemies of all their neighbours, they could not reside in the valleys to carry on the work of agriculture, whereas they could move about with their flocks with comparative safety in their inaccessible mountains. The most remarkable point about these arrangements amongst themselves was that they only buried their own differences in order to plunder outsiders, against whom they made common cause. In all their predatory incursions, whether into the plains of the Panjab, Sind or Kalát, or against the neighbouring tribes in the hills, amongst whom they spread desolation and terror, they worked in concert and shared in the spoils. Thus, while some sections of the two tribes were at war, others were at peace; and peace amongst themselves meant war with their neighbours.

The cause of their adopting this policy doubtless was that their very existence depended on it. If they had always continued to wage war amongst themselves as well as with their neighbours, it must have ended like the fight of the proverbial Kilkenny Cats.

It was therefore these two tribes, taken jointly and severally, which in times past occupied such a formidable position for evil on this frontier. The problem that was to be solved was, how to induce, or persuade, or compel them to give up their life of plunder and bloodshed, and again take to the cultivation of the soil. The root of the difficulty lay in depriving some five or six thousand families occupying a mountainous and inaccessible country of their present means of subsistence, without being able immediately to provide them with an alternative one; as the resuming of the ways of agriculture, and the reclaiming and bringing again under the plough, lands that had lain waste for nearly a century, and thus obtaining a livelihood from the soil, must of necessity be a very slow and gradual process. The difficulty was one which, however, had to be met and overcome, as in that lay the only hope of the permanent civilization of the inhabitants of the country extending from the Dera Ghazi Khan and Sind frontiers to Zhob, and from the Bolan pass and Kachhi to the countries of the Bozdars, Khetrans, and Musa Khels, covering an area of over ten thousand square miles.

The following history will show conclusively that the key of the problem was to be found in the arrangements which were introduced by Captain (now Sir Robert) Sandeman in 1866. Great material advancement in the condition of the Marris and Bugtis may be traced from the gradual development of, and by steadily working on, the lines of the policy then initiated. The results are not due to any isolated measures or spasmodic efforts made at any particular period; and although much has been accomplished, much more still remains to be done. Everything depending on cultivation, as before explained, the process must be slow; and until it is fully completed, none of the existing measures and precautions can be safely withdrawn on any false idea of security, or mistaken notion that these tribes have become civilized and forsaken their old ways, manners, and customs.

It is necessary to draw particular attention to the fact that at the time that Captain Sandeman "took off his coat" to the work in 1866, taking the Bugti tribe as a whole and taking the Marri tribe as a whole, there was no appreciable difference between them, either as regards character, conduct, or attitude, towards the British Government.

The Bugtis had all the advantages on their side. They received allowances and lands, and reaped all the benefits of having free intercourse with British territory, and were better fed, better clothed, and better armed. As we were then unacquainted with the interior working of the tribes, it was usual to give the Bugtis the preference, to which, it subsequently transpired when we came to know them better, they were not entitled. In fact, if it be considered that the Bugti country marches for its entire length with British territory, that they were in a great measure dependent on it, that we had posts of military and levies in their country and along their border; and that, on the other hand, the Marris were mostly separated from us by the Bugti country, and that they were excommunicated from British territory, and were made the scapegoat for the sins of others as well as their own—if it had been possible to draw any distinction at all, it would have been in favor of the Marris.

The same fatal mistake had been made in our dealings with the Bugtis, both in the Punjab and Sind, which was that adventurers and intriguers, who had succeeded in making

themselves troublesome to us, were, as it were, bought off, taken into service, and made much of. Thus, on the Punjab side Kuttoo Khan and Ghoram Khan, and on the Sind border Alam Khan and Sanjar Khan, were appointed resaldars and jemadars of levies, received allowances and jagirs. These men were merely adventurers. They were not even headmen (*makaddams*) in their own tribe, and from their inferior positions were obliged to carry on a double game, playing into the hands of their more powerful brethren in the hills, at the same time that they were eating the salt of the British Government.

The keystone of the radical change which was introduced by Captain Sandeman was the recognition of the hereditary chiefs and headmen, and supporting and working through them, and exacting their responsibilities, and, no matter at what cost or labor, allowing no crime to go unpunished. As soon as the adventurers and their associates understood the line of policy which was being adopted, they immediately foresaw in its success their own downfall, and set themselves strenuously to oppose it by all means at their disposal.

In this they were secretly aided by some of the chiefs within our own frontier, who predicted that if the chiefs beyond the border proved loyal to the Government, their own political importance and power would be diminished. It is, however, satisfactory to be able to note here that in the course of time, when the success of the policy became too strong for them, they dropped the opposition with a good grace, and actively came forward and co-operated in the measures which were being introduced. At first, however, they did oppose them, and intrigues from within and without were set on foot to upset the arrangements, which culminated in the formidable raid which took place on the border near Harand on the 26th January 1867.

The leader was the notorious Gholam Hossein, Bugti. He collected a force of 1,200 men—400 Bugtis, 400 Marris, and 400 Khatrans—with the intention of raiding in British territory. On the 23rd, 24th, and 25th of January, Mr. Bruce, Assistant Commissioner, Rajanpur, received express messages from the Bugti chief, Gholam Murtaza, giving information of Gholam Hossein's movements and intentions. These were communicated to Major Paget, commanding at Rajanpur, who disposed his troops to the best advantage. The chiefs of our own tribes, Mazaris, Drishaks, Gurchanis, Lunds, were also all on the alert, and each had a number of his followers collected at different places along the border.

Before daylight on the morning of the 26th, Gholam Hossein left the hills with his force by the Khosra pass, 10 miles north of Harand, and swept round through the plain. They killed three Gurchanis, and as they failed to secure any plunder, after setting fire to some hamlets, they retreated in the direction of the Kumbi pass.

A force of 600 Gurchanis and Lunds, who were collected, under their chiefs, Gholam Hyder Khan and Mazar Khan, at Thul Ali Mahomed, and a detachment of 27 sabres of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, under Jemadar Imam Khan from the Harand fort, pursued the raiders and overtook them at the entrance of the Kumbi pass. Here they tried to make a stand, and advanced a short distance; but when the cavalry and mounted Gurchanis and Lunds approached them at a trot, they broke, and all attempts of Gholam Hossein to rally them failed. A great number of the enemy were cut down in the first charge, and the others fled along the hill-sides, where they were pursued by the Gurchani and Lund footmen. Gholam Hossein himself, with a chosen band of five men, made a stand on the top of a small hill, where they were all killed. The pursuit was carried on to the foot of the Dragal mountain, where 24 prisoners were taken. The enemy lost 257 killed—92 Bugtis, 70 Marris, and 95 Khetrans.

It will materially assist in taking in the whole aspect of the affairs as they then stood on the frontier, and in drawing correct conclusions—before reporting at length on recent events connected with the Marri tribe—to go back and quote from different official papers and reports in support of the views I advanced above, regarding the position and relations which the Marris and Bugtis occupied jointly.

The first point to be shown is, that up to 1866 the condition of the Bugtis was in no degree better than the Marris, while they were equally inimical to the British Government; and that all depredations committed, in the Punjab, Sind, and Southern Baluchistan, were committed by the two tribes acting in concert, and not by the Marri tribe alone.

It is stated in McGregor's Gazetteer (page 319): "from the time the Bugti prisoners at Larkana were released, about 1852, till the latter part of 1861, the conduct of the Bugtis was most exemplary." The facts do not appear to bear out this opinion. Mr. (now Sir) Lepel Griffin, in Appendix D of his "Memorandum on the Administration of the Punjab and Sind Frontiers," written in 1876 under orders of Her Majesty's Secretary of State, gives lists of offences committed by hill tribes on the lower Derajat border. A copy of the list of those committed by Marris and Bugtis is annexed to this report, marked Appendix A. This list is worthy of perusal, and it will show, as far as the Punjab border was concerned, that the conduct of the Bugtis was no better from 1852 to 1861 than for the years either before or immediately after that period.

If there was any appreciable difference on the Sind side, it was not due to the tribe as a tribe having given up its plundering propensities, but to exceptional and local circumstances, which had no connection with any such general change of life and habits.

Notwithstanding the severe punishment which the Bugtis received at the hands of Lieutenant (the late Sir William) Merewether, on the 1st October, 1847, from that year up to 1851 they committed a most formidable series of raids and offences on the Sind border. No regular list of the offences committed during this period on the Sind border is to be found in the records of the Baluchistan Agency, but some of the most noteworthy are mentioned in McGregor's Gazetteer and other frontier works.

Colonel (now Sir C.) McGregor writes, in his account of what he calls "this irrepressible tribe":—

"On the 26th April, 1848, Major Jacob reported that three Bugti marauders had attempted to plunder some Jats near Kusmor, and on the post pursuing and coming on their tracks close to the Sanri watering-place, discovered itself confronted by 50 armed Bugtis. The jemadar in command at once charged them, killing two and taking two prisoners; the remainder escaped to the top of an inaccessible hill.

"On the 2nd July, 1848, Alam Khan, Kalpur, with 13 horsemen and 20 foot, crossed the border and attacked Sanri; but they were beaten off, not however before they had killed four and wounded two men.

"Several small raids occurred between this and the 21st September, when Sanjar Rind was attacked by a patrol, and his brother killed.

"On the 22nd a party under Alam Khan was pursued by a patrol beyond Hudu, and only escaped by the speed of their mares.

"On the 22nd October, 1848, information having reached the post at Hassan-ka-Ghari of a marauding party being at Sanri, the native officer, Fateh Mamur, at once went in pursuit, and came upon fresh tracks, yet was unable to catch them, though he went by Asareli, Sui, then back to Hudu and Pamun, to Hassan-ka-Ghari, 127 miles.

"On the 26th October, 1848, the Khairi Garhi post pursued and came up with a party of marauders at Shia 60 miles off, and recovered all the cattle they had carried off; 16 of the horses of this party died.

"On the 7th April, 1849, the post at Kusmor, 40 sabres in strength, was relieved by a similar party. Soon after the relieved party had marched off, the new post was attacked at 2 A.M. by a party of 500 Bugtis under Alam Khan, Bugti, and Mir Haji, Khetran. The hillmen rushed in, and, immensely outnumbering the Sind Horse, a hand-to-hand fight took place, which, after a most determined struggle, ended in the enemy being beaten off, leaving a great number of dead on the ground, and causing a loss to the post of five men and four horses killed, besides five men very severely wounded.

"When the attack commenced, the native officer of the relieved party had marched about four miles on the Kanari road, but hearing firing he galloped back, and as he approached Kusmor came on a party of 300 to 400 Bugtis driving off 1,000 camels. The native officer, Karm Ali Khan by name, immediately charged and dispersed the enemy, killing a great number and recovering all the cattle.

"This party of marauders, it was afterwards ascertained, had assembled in the Marau valley, and left the hills on the 6th April *viâ* Gujru and Shori, and attacked the detachment as described on the 7th. The posts of Kunri and Kandkot also turned out and came up with the Bugtis just as they were disappearing in the hills. The loss of the Bugtis was 40 killed, more than that number wounded, and a great number of mares killed, wounded, and taken.

"On the 1st September, 1849, a small party of Bugtis, under Alam Khan, Kalpur, carried off a number of camels from Gornari. They were unsuccessfully pursued, but the camels were recovered.

"On the 8th September, 1849, a party headed by Alam Khan attacked some people coming from Rojan, 16 miles from Kusmor. A party of Sind Horse immediately went in pursuit, and after a long and severe chase of 60 miles, came up with the marauders, and recovered the property; but the Bugtis escaped to a hill.

"On the 24th December, 1850, a party carried off a number of camels from the jungle between Kandkot and Tangwani. Durga Singh, the native officer of the Kandkot detachment of Sind Horse, started in pursuit, and, after a ride of 60 miles, arrived with only three men in the face of the robbers, who numbered 100. Notwithstanding this, the gallant officer charged and killed a great number, losing, however, his own life and that of two of his troopers. The place of his death is pointed out still with unfeigned admiration by the Baluchis, and is known as 'Durga Kushta'!

"On the 8th October, 1850, a party of horsemen attacked some Jats between Rojan and Kusmor, and carried off 40 camels. The Kusmor post, under Resaldar Haider Khan, went in pursuit, and overtaking them in the Sori ravine at Mandu-ka-kund, recovered the camels, though the horsemen escaped.

"On the 2nd February, 1851, a small party attempted to raid some camels near Kusmor, but were captured.

"On the 2nd November, 1851, a party of Mussori Bugtis, under Mangan and Rais, attempted to raid near Kusmor. The Sind Horse post pursued, and the marauders fled towards Rojan, where they were met by a party from that place, attacked, and their two leaders killed.

"On the 3rd April, 1853, a party of marauders carried off some cattle from near Kusmor. The post went in pursuit and came on the enemy, consisting of 80 horse and 80 foot, the latter strongly posted on a hill. The resaldar, Sheik Karim, however, at once attacked them, though he had only 32 men. After a hard fight the enemy fled. The loss of the Sind Horse was eight men and nine horses killed, two men wounded; that of the enemy was not ascertained, owing to the darkness of the night."—Pp. 315—317.

The leaders of these raids were in all instances Bugtis, the raiders being partly Bugtis and partly Marris. Major Jacob, in his letter of the 16th April, 1853, to the Khan of Kalát, accused the Marris of complicity in the raids of the 7th April, 1849, and 3rd April, 1853. It will be seen that the most notorious leaders were Alum Khan and Sanjur Khan, both belonging to the Bugti tribe.

In 1852, on the intercession of Mir Nasir Khan, Khan of Kalát, the Bugti prisoners at Larkana were released.

On the 6th August, 1854, Sanjur Khan surrendered, and was made a duffadar in the Sind frontier levies. About the same time Alum Khan was pardoned, and was appointed a resaldar in the levies, with 25 nominations in the corps, which was afterwards increased to 50.

These measures produced a temporary calm on the Sind frontier, but they bore in themselves the seeds of much future trouble.

The headmen of the Mussori and Shambani Bugtis adopted the same tactics on the Panjab border as Alum Khan and Sanjur did on that of Sind, and unfortunately with the same results. Khutu Khan and Haibat Khan, Mussoris, and Ghoram Khan, Shambani, were made jemadars, and given a certain number of nominations in the frontier militia. These men played fast and loose on the border, and, while pretending to do good service to Government, were acting in league with Gholam Hossein and his associates. Gholam Hossein himself doubtless put down his own price at a very high figure, and believed that he had only to worry long enough, to get himself bought over too.

These circumstances account for the great numbers of raids and robberies committed by the Mussori and Shambani sections of the Bugtis, described in Appendix A.

The conduct of the Bugtis now became worse and worse. Rugga, the head chief of the Kalpur Bugtis, became jealous of the position given to Alum Khan, a minor Kalpur chief, and formed a coalition with Gholam Hossein for the avowed purpose of committing raids on the Sind border. In one raid Rugga carried off 180 camels and other property, and several thefts of cattle on a smaller scale took place. On one occasion the band of raiders was overtaken by the Kosah guide sowars of the Kusmor post, and six Mussoris were killed. In revenge for this during the following year the Mussoris committed four raids on the Sind border and killed nine Kosahs. For these offences the Political Superintendent directed their exclusion from the Sind border, and ordered the Sind posts to enforce a blockade against them.

In most of the above raids the Marris also took part, but, as in the instance of the great Harrand raid, it was a secondary part; and it has now come to be an admitted fact that the Marris are harmless on the Sind frontier, except when acting in concert with the Bugtis; and on the Panjab frontier, except when acting in collusion either with the Bugtis or Gurchanis (Lisharis and Durkanis).

In Mr. Griffin's Memorandum (1876), before referred to, in writing about the Bugtis, he remarks :—

"Like the Marris, this was a tribe absolutely devoted to robbery. Their allegiance to the Khan of Kalát was, like that of the Marris, nominal, and the greater proportion of their robberies and raids were committed in Kalát territory. With the Marris they have been continually at war, only uniting with them to commit raids on the lands of their neighbours. During the last four or five years the conduct of the Bugtis towards the British Government has been satisfactory."

This paragraph gives a very concise and true picture of the Bugti tribe, and of its connection with the Marris.

Another plan for reclaiming the Bugtis from their lawless habits was brought forward by Captain Minchin in 1864. It was proposed to locate the Mussoris and Shambanis on lands in British territory; but, for reasons unnecessary to enter upon at length here, the scheme fell to the ground.

The Bugti chief, Gholam Murtaza Khan, was quite ready to array himself on the side of Government, but up to this time he had not received the confidence or support of the British authorities. The ill-gotten wealth which the turbulent spirits of the tribe had accumulated, and the concessions made to them, had completely turned their heads, and he became powerless to check their plundering in British territory. As he often expressed himself :—"I did all I could, and when I found myself helpless, I sat in my house and let things take their course." Sir Henry Green did not believe in him, or that he had any influence over his tribe; and when animadverting on Captain Minchin's scheme for the location of the Bugtis in British territory, he remarked :—

"Captain Minchin mentions Gholam Murtaza as having quite recovered from his monomania, and that he wishes to regain his former position, and that certain headmen had sworn fealty on the Koran, and bound themselves by oaths, &c., &c. I wonder whether Captain Minchin is aware how often the above farce has been played before, and for what a very short time these oaths are considered binding amongst the Baluch."

Another point on which there seems to have been a good deal of misconception was that the effect of the losses which they had suffered at the hands of Lieutenant Merewether and in their tribal fights seems to have been greatly over-estimated.

It does not appear from any records available that the dead bodies on the field at Kunri were counted, or that the strength of the force engaged was ever ascertained with any precision. Lieutenant Merewether, in his official report, stated :—"I observed a spot in the bed of

the Zamana river, where they had apparently halted for a short time; from the marks I was of opinion that their strength might be 600 or 700 footmen, with a small party of horse;" and again, after describing the surrender of 120 men, he writes:—"Two horsemen alone out of the whole force of the enemy, stated by the prisoners to have been 700 in all, including 25 horsemen, returned to the hills. Among the slain are several chieftains of note—in fact, all the leaders of repute in the tribe." It is now known that Arandu (Hundu), younger brother of Laka, Nothani, was the only leader of standing who was killed. The principal leaders of the tribe at that time, besides the chief, Islam Khan, were: Laka, Yar Muhammad, Mir Muhammad, Dost Muhammad, Balu, and Imam Baksh, Nothanis; Gholam Hossein, Hybut, Batil, Fakir, and Khutu, Mussoris; Rugga Barani and Alum Khan, Kalpurs; Mirza, Ghoram, and Gela, Shambanis.

Again it is recorded in the Gazetteer, page 315:—"The whole tribe, broken and disheartened, fled for refuge to the Khetrans. The Bugti chief, Islam Khan, was married to a sister of Mir Haji, the Khetran chief. The Bugtis and Khetrans then united and attacked the Marris, killing 70 of them, and carrying off a large herd of camels. They again united with the Musa Khel Pathans, and penetrated into the Marri country as far as Mundahi; but the Marris had received intelligence and were collected at a place called Purh, where a fight ensued, in which the Bugtis were totally defeated, losing some 500 men, while the loss on the Marri side was trifling. Amongst the Bugtis who fell were Balu, father of Mewa, and Imam Baksh, father of Dilijan, Nothani chief, and many other men of note."

The true history of the fight at Purh is as follows:—The Khetran chief, Mir Haji—who was accounted the ablest chief and most dashing leader in this country— collected a force of 2,000 men, consisting of Khetrans, Bugtis, Lunis, Shadozais, and Kakars, to attack the Marris. They marched through the Thal-Chotiálí plain, and encamped for the night at the fort of the Sialu mountain.

The Marris, who had received warning of their approach, lay in wait at the top of the ridge which separates the Thal-Chotiálí and Purh plains. Early in the morning, Mir Haji sent on 14 spies to see that the ridge was clear. When they had nearly reached the top, the Marris, who saw them approaching, surrounded them and killed them all. The main body, under Mir Haji, followed after, and concluding that the coast was clear, as no alarm had been given and none of the spies had returned, marched right into the Marri ambuscade. The Marris, suddenly appearing, rushed down the side of the mountain, and, attacking them with great fury, utterly routed them and pursued them nearly to the foot of the mountain. Mir Haji and his force were completely defeated, and lost 220 men killed. Of these, however, only 80 were Bugtis.

If the Bugtis had been really so completely broken up and disorganized as was supposed by some, they could not have gained such a victory as they did over the Marris at Chambri in 1858. This was a fair hand-to-hand fight in the open plain, and a short account of it will not be out of place here.

The Bugti chief, Gholam Murtaza Khan, with 700 of his clan, made a raid on the Marris. He passed by Kahan itself and attacked the Bijaranis, who were encamped at Kolu, killed 13 of them, and carried off an immense booty, consisting of 12,000 sheep and goats, 1,100 cows, and 120 female camels, and returned by the Gazbor road. The Marris collected a large force, and tried to intercept the Bugtis. The two clans came within sight of each other at night at the northern side of the Sham plain. Islam Khan and some of the Bugtis proposed that they should return the Marri property and make a truce, or that they should retreat to the Khetran country; but Gholam Murtaza, who was backed up by the Nothani and Mussori chiefs, stoutly refused either to return the cattle or to retreat. In the morning Gholam Murtaza attacked the Marris at a place called Chambri, where a hand-to-hand fight with sword and shield took place, which lasted throughout the greater part of the day, but which ended by the Bugtis gaining a complete victory. The Marris retreated, leaving 130 of their number dead on the scene of action, and many more died of the wounds which they received. Amongst those killed were Jinda, Sona, and Syad Ali, Bijarani chiefs, and Dad Muhammad, father of Shahan Ghazani.

The Bugtis lost 40 men killed and a great number wounded. Gholam Murtaza was himself severely wounded. They returned home, bringing with them their booty, which was increased by the addition of 84 mares and the arms of the Marris who had fallen in the conflict. This victory completely wiped out the defeat they had suffered at Purh.

See Bruce's "History of Frontier Tribes," 1870.

There is no use in blinking the fact that in those times the Marri and Bugti countries so far as any practical knowledge of the actual condition, working, and organization of the tribes was concerned, were to us as much a sealed book as the country stretching northward from where the Dera Ghazi Khan district terminates, and marching with our border for some

90 miles (between the parallels of 30° and 31°½) is at the present day. A comparison of the records of late years with those of the past will show this to be the case. It is true that British officers had been partly through the country, but they were always accompanied by a large military force, and marched as if in the presence of an enemy, which were not favourable conditions for becoming acquainted with the people.

Before returning more particularly to the history of the Marri tribe itself, it is necessary to bear in mind that it is as absolutely essential to all permanent progress in the country that peace should be maintained between the Bugtis and Marris themselves, as it is that they should be prevented from plundering others. As before explained, everything depends on their settling down to an agricultural life, which they could no more do when fighting amongst themselves than they could when at war with their neighbours.

As it was with the Bugtis, so also it was with the Marris. From the time of the great Nasir Khan up to 1867, no punitive measures which had been taken to reduce them to order had secured any lasting results whatever. Their depredations, carried on jointly with Bugtis and Gurchanis (Lisharis and Durkanis) in British territory, were but small indeed when compared with their systematic plundering in the territories of their *quasi* sovereign, the Khan of Kalát.

McGregor's Gazetteer, in alluding to a remark made in Bruce's "History of the Frontier Tribes" (1870), regarding certain measures adopted by the Khan to punish the Marris, and their results, writes :—" Mr. Bruce, in his report, states that this expedition did not prove successful, and in December 1862, the Khan was obliged to take another force into the hills without apparently much beneficial result." Sir William Merewether, however, informs me that " no expedition took place in 1862."

As the different authorities who have written on the subject do not appear to agree, and as it is an important point, it is well that it should be cleared up if possible.

It would appear that Major ( now Sir ) Henry Green, who accompanied the Khan, did not himself consider the results of the expedition of 1858-59 satisfactory. This is evident from the description of the termination of the affair given by Colonel McGregor, in which he writes :—

"Negotiations were here opened with the Marris, who professed their willingness to accede to any terms offered to them, and to acknowledge His Highness the Khan as their lawful prince, and also offering hostages for their future good conduct. To this arrangement Sir Henry Green was most averse, for though there was little doubt but that the tribe had met with most severe punishment, their people having been killed, their fields and forts destroyed, all their supplies of grain and 1,800 head of cattle captured, yet his experience and knowledge of the innate love of plunder of these robber tribes made him fear that if some very severe example was not made of them, when within his grasp, they would soon again return to their old habits. However, His Highness the Khan considered that they had been sufficiently punished, and perceiving that a similar opinion obtained amongst many of the chiefs, some of whom were intermarried with the Marris (Baluch Khan, Dumki, and Mir Khan, Magzi), and as His Highness had been the principal sufferer by the Marri depredations, he considered that it would not be judicious to attempt to force further hostilities. He therefore informed His Highness that he was at liberty to act as he pleased, but that he would be held responsible for any depredations made by this tribe on the British territory at any future period."

Mr. (now Sir Lepel) Griffin, in a memorandum submitted by him to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab in 1869, thus describes the result of the expedition :—

"For 18 months after this expedition the Marris remained quiet, but then broke out into rebellion ; the hostages at Kalát fled on the 9th September , 1860, and although the Khan sent troops in pursuit, the Marri chiefs escaped. The tribes renewed their old habits of plundering, and in May, 1862, the Government of India stopped the extra grant of Rs. 50,000 until they heard what punishments had been inflicted on the Marri marauders, who committed a raid at Asni, on the Punjab frontier, in the early part of that year."

The measures adopted by the Khan in 1862 may not be considered worthy of the dignity of being entitled an "expedition," but apparently a very formidable demonstration was made.

The following is an account of what occurred, given by Nawab Mahomed Khan, vakil to His Highness the Khan. When the hostages, Mehrulla Khan and Gamun Khan, fled from Kalát, and returned to Kahan, the tribe again commenced to plunder in Kachhi. Shortly afterwards the Mussori and Kalpur sections of the Bugtis left their own tribe on account of a quarrel, and took refuge with the Marris, and in collusion with them committed some raids in Sind. The Political Agent called His Highness the Khan to account, and requested him to prevent the Marris from plundering in Sind. The Khan got angry with the Marris, and collected a large force of Baluchis at Bagh, and marched for the Marri-Bugti country. On arrival at Poleji the headmen of the Kalpur and Mussori Bugtis, who had joined the Marris as described, came in and tendered their submission. When the force arrived at Sangsila, Morad Bakhsh and Assad, the representatives of the Marri chief Mir Mahomed, also came in and paid their respects to the Khan ; and on their undertaking that the Marris would be better behaved for the future, and would abstain from plundering in Kachhi and Sind, after presenting them

with khillats, he gave them leave to depart, and returned with his force to Shahpur in Kachhi.

These documents bear out the opinion that the coercive measures used by the Khan against the Marris had no permanent beneficial effect. The following is a brief summary of some of the offences committed by the Marris in British territory, besides those enumerated in Appendix A, during the period from 1850 to 1867.

On the 25th September, 1850, a band of Marris made a raid on Omurkot, and killed two men and carried off 600 head of cattle; 100 of the cattle were recovered.

On the 18th November, 1850, eighty Marri and Bugti horsemen attacked the village of Kotla Hussun Shah, and carried off 80 camels.

On the 25th August, 1852, 30 Marris and Bugtis carried off 1,200 sheep and goats from near Asni.

On the 3rd March, 1853, the Marris carried off 300 cattle from near Kin, but being pursued by the cavalry detachment were obliged to abandon them.

On 1st March, 1853, four hundred Marris carried off all the cattle grazing near the Drigri post; the detachment of 3rd Punjab Cavalry there, being only 15 strong, were too weak to oppose them.

On the 15th April, 1853, 150 Marri horsemen drove off 137 camels by the lower Sori pass; a small detachment of cavalry pursuing them were driven back.

On the 18th May, 1853, 180 Marris and Lisharis attacked a small detachment of the 4th Punjab Cavalry, and cut off six grass-cutters, five of the escort, three horses, and two ponies.

On the 27th April, 1854, a force of 3,000 to 4,000 Marris and Bugtis swept round in front of Kusmor and Rojhan, but finding the post on the alert they retired by the Zangi pass.

On the 16th September, 1854, a party of Marris and Lisharis made a raid on Hajipur, and carried off some cattle, which were recovered by the cavalry detachment.

On the 17th August, 1857, 220 Marri horsemen entered the plains by the Bogari pass and divided into two parties; one party went in the direction of Drigri and Bukkarpur, and the other in the direction of Muhammadpur and Fatehpur. They drove off an immense number of cattle, and killed seven herdsmen and made for the Bagari Pass. Bijur Khan, the Drishak chief, who, with his brother Nindu Khan, his son Drehan Khan, and about 60 horse and foot, was patrolling in that direction, heard of the raid, and having sent word to the posts, went in pursuit. After a while he was joined by Khutu Khan, Mussori Bugti, and Gola Khan. Shambani, with about 50 horse and foot. The party under Bijur Khan, being thus reinforced, he attacked the raiders; but as the latter were more than double their number, they were ultimately defeated, with great slaughter, and the marauders made good their retreat, carrying their booty with them.

The men who acted as spies and led the Marri force into the plains were Shambani Bugtis and Lisharis. Ghoram Khan, Shambani Bugti, and Khutu Khan, Mussori, who were both in Government service, were suspected of complicity in the raid, and Ghoram Khan was dismissed from the service.*

On the 17th December, 1857, 60 Marris and Bugtis carried off 500 cattle from Mat, and killed 12 graziers.

On the 29th March, 1858, a party of 40 police and levies, following up some stolen cattle on the hills, were attacked by a party of 100 Marris, and were defeated with some loss.

On the 8th February, 1862, a band of Marris attacked and killed a party of 5 Drishak wood-cutters in the Pitok pass, and carried off some camels. They were pursued by a party of Drishak and Bugti levies under Kalu Khan, who came up with them in the Marri hills beyond the Sham plain, and attacked them and killed several, and recovered the camels they had plundered.

On the 1st January, 1863, a party of Marris came down by the Sori pass, and carried off 45 head of a cattle from Karm-ka-Thul.

On the 2nd February, 1864, a party of 100 Marris started to plunder the Gurchanis, but hearing that the Drigri post had been reinforced, they returned.

On the 1st April, 1864, a party came down and murdered three Jats near Mahammadpur.

On the 10th July, 1864, a party of 34 Marris murdered some Mazaris near Sukhain, 10 miles from Bandawala, and drove off 100 head of cattle. They were followed by Imam Bakhsh, Mazari, with 1,200 of his clan, as far as the Sham plain, who recovered all the cattle and killed three of the Marris.

On the 5th October, 1866, they attacked an encampment of Shambani Bugtis at Sabzilkot, and carried off 1,500 sheep and goats.

* Ghoram Khan was afterwards reinstated.

On the 1st January, 1867, they carried off 97 head of camels and retired by the Pitok pass. They were unsuccessfully pursued.

The events above related speak for themselves, and from them the condition of the Marri tribe up to that time may be fairly judged.

No conciliatory measures had been tried with them since 1845, and the coercive measures which had been tried had failed. Whether justly or unjustly, they were universally regarded as incorrigible and beyond the pale, and were openly declared to be enemies of the British and Kalát Governments, and were excluded from all intercourse with their territories. Their country was a refuge for all outlaws; and the name of Marri was used by all other tribes with whom we had dealings as a convenient veil (*párdah*) behind which to conceal or disguise their own offences or laches.

Before passing on to later events, it must, in justice to the Marris, be recorded—and it is worthy of note—that the Marris themselves did make overtures to the British Government, which were rejected.

In 1853, the Marri chief sent a proposal through the Mazaris to the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khan, Mr. Cortland, asking him to take a body of Marris into service, and that he would hold himself responsible for the conduct of his tribes on the Rajanpur frontier. The Commissioner, in forwarding the proposal for the views of the Chief Commissioner, wrote :—

"A compliance with the proposal of the Marri chief would no doubt secure the country about Mithankot and southward to the frontier from the aggression of the Marris, which, during the last season, were very daring, and, to a certain extent, successful; but I think it would be more dignified were we to trust to our own means of repelling aggression rather than to secure indemnity from attack by taking a body of Marris into service."

The Chief Commissioner, Sir John (the late Lord) Lawrence, in replying, remarked :—

"The Chief Commissioner himself does not think that the proposal of the Marri chief is admissible. He places no confidence in his faith and honor, or in that of his tribe, who would be much more ready to promise than to perform.

"Further, the Chief Commissioner cannot see in what mode we could enforce the Marri chief's responsibility, if he failed in his engagements, without actually invading his country, which we could not do, in retaliation of their misconduct. As to the Mazari tribe giving security for the Marris, it would be perfectly futile for good, and might lead to mischief by forcing the latter to make common cause with them."

Viewed by the light of subsequent experience, it appears quite possible than the proposal of the chief was made in good faith, and that, if accepted, the arrangements made in recent years might have been anticipated in 1853; but it is easy to be wise after the event.

In describing the peculiar nature of the relations which exist between the Marri and Bugti tribes, some particulars of the great combined Marri-Bugti-Khetran raid on Harrand in 1867 were given. It was on this occasion that Captain Sandeman took the Marri question vigorously in hand. He applied to the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, Sir Henry Green, to obtain from the Khan of Kalát compensation for loss of life and property caused by the raid. Sir Henry Green replied that the Khán had no control over the Marris, and remarked :—

"The Marris, being Baluch, are certainly nominally subjects of the Khán of Kalát, and are held by him under about the same control as the Afridis of the hills bounding the Peshawar valley are by the ruler of Kabul; and every complaint of their conduct to the Khan would be of as much use as the Commissioner of Peshawar bringing to the notice of the Amir the conduct of the said Afridis."

This brought matters to a crisis. It was obvious that the position assumed by the Khán was not a tenable one, as by his treaty with the British Government of 1854 he acknowledged the Marris and Bugtis as being his subjects, and bound himself to keep them in order. As, however, he declined to accept his responsibilities, Captain Sandeman was compelled to take action himself, and to rely on his own resources to protect and obtain redress for British subjects.

By referring to the account of the Harrand raid, it will be seen that our Baluch levies, Gurchanis and Lunds, took 24 prisoners. Most of the prisoners were Marris, including two men of note in the tribe.

Ghazzan Khán, the Marri chief, wrote to Captain Sandeman and sued for the release of the prisoners; but he was informed in reply that his petition could not be listened to unless he came in himself. Shortly afterwards, in April 1867, Ghazzan himself, with the whole council of headmen (*jirga*) of his tribe, came in and tendered their submission. This was the commencement of the intimate relations which have since then existed between the Marri tribe and our Government.

A full inquiry was made into all matters connected with the tribe. There was much force in the reasons given by the Marri chief to account for the previous conduct of his tribe,

and he did not hesitate to declare that the British and Kalát Governments could not be held free from a large share of responsibility for the state of things which existed, as he declared that he had been ready and willing to serve the Government, if he received proper support.

Having settled old scores between the Marris and our subjects, Captain Sandeman entered into agreements with them of a similar nature to those which he had established with the Bugtis in the previous year, and which had been found to work so well. With the sanction of the Government of India he took Ghazzan Khán himself into service with 20 horsemen of his tribe, to be employed in maintaining communications between the Marri head-quarters at Kahan and the political authorities on the Dera Ghazi Khán frontier. The prisoners were then released.

Gholam Murtaza Khán, the Bugti chief, had, as has been shown, given convincing proof of his appreciation of the efforts that were being made to constitute him the responsible chief and head of his tribe, and of his loyalty, by reporting the movements of Gholam Hossein, which resulted in the defeat and death of that daring leader and minor chief of his own tribe.

It was equally fortunate that the Marri sirdar, Ghazzan Khán, was found to be both able and willing to accept similar responsibility with regard to the more formidable Marri tribe.

Sirdar Ghazzan Khán led the life of a fakir, and hardly ever left his house. The Marris have a belief that certain supernatural powers are inherent in the chief's family, and the ascetic life led by Ghazzan Khán tended to strengthen the belief in him individually, and gave him immense control over the wild spirits in his tribe. He was also a weak sickly man, and, like most delicate people, required humouring and management in order to secure the great influence which he possessed on the side of Government.

Having thus secured the good services of the Marri and Bugti chiefs, the next step taken by Captain Sandeman was a most important one. He marched throughout the Marri and Bugti countries escorted only by the Baluch chiefs themselves and their followers from within and without the border.

This was entirely a new departure in frontier management. It was no doubt a bold step to take; but no step that has as yet been taken in connection with our dealings with the border tribes has been productive of so much real good, or has had such a widely civilizing influence. It enabled a thorough knowledge of the country and its inhabitants to be gained in a peaceful, friendly way without strife or bloodshed. It made us acquainted with the arrangements of the tribes amongst themselves—their feuds, factions, and intrigues, as well as with the weak points in our own tribal management; and showed where the remedy for many of the existing evils, both within and without the border, lay. Nothing succeeds like success. The ice was broken, and the Government gratefully accepted the results; and from that time friendly tribal expeditions have become recognized as an essential part of the southern frontier administration.

It would lengthen this report too much to give an account of the several events which subsequently occurred on the Derajat frontier which proved the success of the policy then adopted, and which on different occasions obtained for it expressions of marked approval from the Local Government, the Government of India, and the Home Government.

Mr. Griffin, in his Memorandum of 1871, before referred to, wrote regarding it:—

"The policy of the Punjab frontier officers may be said to be that of Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khán; and whatever criticism may be applied to it, has certainly in its favor the argument of success, so far as success signifies the peace of the Punjab border.

"It was only in 1867, as has before been stated, that the Deputy Commissioner entered into relations with the Marris and Bugtis; and on failure to obtain, through the Political Superintendent in Sind, any compensation for the combined raid of the above-named tribes in January, 1867, when the fort of Harrand was attacked several British villages burnt, and several British subjects murdered, Captain Sandeman (letter dated 12th December, 1868,) was compelled to take action himself, and having no authority to correspond with Kalát, and probably thinking, after Sir H. Green's reply, absolving the Khán from responsibility, that such reference would be useless, he, after some difficulty, assembled the Marri chiefs, redressed certain grievances, which they had against British subjects, and entered into agreements with them, taking the principal chief, Ghazzan, into service with about 20 of his tribe to be employed as mounted messengers between the Marri head-quarters at Káhan and the Punjab outposts. The result of this arrangement has been, that the peace of the Punjab border has been preserved and the Marri chiefs have been faithful to their engagements."

The measures introduced by Captain Sandeman led to a lengthy correspondence with Colonel Phayre, Political Superintendent of the Upper Sind Frontier. Subsequently, on the 5th December, 1868, Captain Sandeman visited Colonel Phayre at Jacobabad, and discussed the whole question with him. It was arranged at this meeting that Captain Sandeman should send the principal Marri chiefs to have a personal interview with the Political Superintendent at Jacobabad. Accordingly Captain Sandeman deputed Mr. Bruce to carry out the arrangements, who arrived at Jacobabad on the 1st February, 1869, with the Marri chief and headmen. He was also accompanied by the Bugti, Mazari, and Drishak chiefs. As Colonel Phayre recognized the

successful results of the arrangements which had been made as regards the British border, he expressed his desire that they should be extended so as to include the border of Kachhi in the Khán's territory stretching for a distance of 150 miles, from the Sind frontier to the Bolan pass. The Marri chiefs expressed themselves quite willing to agree to the proposed arrangements, and an agreement was entered into by which 40 Marri horsemen were entertained, at a cost of R600 a month, for the protection of the Kachhi border.

It has been argued by some that the scheme was simply one of paying black mail, but this idea is due to a misconception of the principles on which it is founded and worked; and on the contrary, it will be shown further on that Captain Sandeman's scheme abolished the system of black mail, which had hitherto been in force, and which has never since been revived.

The correct definition of black mail and the results which a system of black mail would inevitably produce are very forcibly given in a letter from the Governor-General of India (Lord Dalhousie) to the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab (No. 241, of 7th September, 1853). In writing of a proposal to subsidize the Marris he remarked :—

"In the case of the Marris, it would be neither more nor less than the payment of black mail. We are perfectly able to defend our frontier against the Marris and everybody else. To pay them virtually for abstaining from attacking it would be a short-sighted policy; since it would set on every one of the many tribes along the frontier to worry us by attacks, in order that we might bribe them, like the Marris, into quiescence."

The term might therefore appropriately be applied to the system which granted allowances and jagirs to such men as Alum Khán, Sanjar Khán, Goram Khán, and Khuttu Khán, and the results of which were precisely those described by Lord Dalhousie, namely, to set on other bad characters along the frontier to worry us by attacks in order that we might bribe them also.

The essential principle of the new policy is that payments are made only to the well-disposed for active service, as distinguished from bribes to induce adventurers and bad characters to keep quiet.

Under it a chain of responsibility from the chief through the headmen of the different sections has been established according to recognized custom in the tribes; and, through it, compliance in the following matters is strictly enforced. The chiefs are required to exercise active police measures throughout their respective jurisdictions; to surrender as prisoners, when called upon to do so, men of their own tribes accused of heinous offences, as well as outlaws and criminals—British subjects—who may have taken refuge in their country; to return all stolen property; to submit causes of feuds and quarrels with other tribes for the arbitration of the political authorities. To keep trade routes, lines of communication, telegraph and postal lines, through their country, safe and open at all times.

The proof that this is not a system of black mail lies in the results. Instead of others being encouraged by it "to worry us by attacks," it has done the very reverse, and completely put a stop to the attacks from which we suffered for so many years. The occupation of the unruly spirits is gone. Khuttu Khán, Sanjar Khán, and Goram Khán are still alive; but they now occupy their legitimate positions in the tribe, and no longer possess the power to do mischief.

In Mr. Duke's memorandum on the Marris, written in 1882, he remarks :—"Formerly a lump sum was paid to the Marris, and the value of any property which could not be recovered was simply cut from the subsidy. Thus the thieves fully enjoyed any plunder which they could secure." Probably he was not fully acquainted with the details of what had occurred, or the lines on which the tribe had been worked for the previous fifteen years. The records of Government show that it was the rule to oblige thieves to disgorge stolen property, or, when it had been consumed, the value of it; and it was only under very exceptional circumstances, such as proof of connivance on the part of those who received pay from Government, that anything was cut from such pay.

The following records will clearly illustrate the nature of the procedure which was in force.

The Secretary to the Punjab Government in his Memorandum of 1876, writes :—

"Upwards of a thousand head of cattle, stolen from Upper Sind by members of the Marri or Bugti tribes, were either restored to their owners, or an equivalent exacted from the offending tribe, through the District Officer of Dera Ghazi Khán and his Assistant at Rajanpur, and the headmen of the Baluch tribes on the lower portion of the Dera Ghazi Khán frontier, the assistance of the Mazari chief being very conspicuous."

In February, 1877, under the orders of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and the Agent to the Governor-General, Baluchistan, a meeting was arranged between the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khán, and the 1st Assistant Agent, Governor-General, Baluchistan, at Bugti Dera, to settle some claims that were outstanding against the Marris and Bugtis on account of cattle stolen from the Punjab. A number of stolen cattle had already been recovered, and arrangements were made at the meeting for the recovery of the rest. The Deputy

Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khán, in his report to the Agent to the Governor-General, dated 13th March, 1877, giving an account of the proceedings, wrote as follows :—

"Mehrulla Khán has shown the same desire to meet the wishes of the British Government, with regard to the Punjab border, that he has in the circumstance before referred to. The cases against his tribe on the Punjab border were miscellaneous cattle-thefts. There were no raids. There was one murder case in which the Marris claim five lives from the Darkanis Mr. Bruce and I, not considering the terms proposed by the Marris for the Darkanis reasonable, thought the case had better be put off for the present. A truce has therefore been made for nine months, before the expiration of which the case will be laid before Major Sandeman.

"With regard to the thefts, altogether 170 camels, cows, sheep, &c., had been stolen and bought by the Marris. Of these 78 were returned last hot weather on my addressing the Marri chief, who had agreed to give them all up. Unfortunately in the meantime Ghazzan Khán died, and though Mehrulla Khán returned a certain number, circumstances prevented him from completely fulfilling the promise given. Of the 92 thus left, Mehrulla Khán acknowledges 27 as being still with the tribe, and says that if the owners accompany him he will make inquiries as to the others. Such as are proved to be with the tribe will be given up.

"The thefts appear to have been committed by three classes of men—(1) Marris, (2) refugees from our frontier residing with the Marris, (3) British subjects. The Marris unaided can do little, as they are not acquainted with localities. The men who do the mischief are the men of the 2nd and 3rd classes, especially those of the 2nd, as we have no hold over them. Mehrulla Khán has given us lists of all the men of the different classes who have engaged in these thefts. He accuses six Marris, twelve refugees (all from the Gurchani tribes), and five British subjects. He says further that there are more, and that he will send their names when he can ascertain them.

* * * * * *

"For the Sind and Kachhi borders Mr. Bruce has made such arrangements with the Marris and Bugtis as will go far to prevent depredations in that direction. A feud that existed between the Bugtis and Jakaranis was settled by Mr. Bruce before leaving."

It will be seen that a short time previous to this meeting—in 1876—Ghazzan Khán died. Up to the time of his death he continued to do good service, and to act up to his agreements with Government. He was succeeded in the chieftaincy of the tribes by his brother, Mehrulla Khán. Mehrulla Khán was also a man of delicate constitution, but was much more active in his habits than Ghazzan, and consequently it was found easier to work the tribe satisfactorily through him.

In October of the same year Mr. Bruce was again deputed to the Marri-Bugti country for the purpose of completing the arrangements which had been made in February, where, by appointment with the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khán, he was met by the Baluch sirdars of that district.

On the conclusion of the negotiations a joint memorandum was drawn up and signed by Mr. Fryer, Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khán, Mr. Gladstone, Assistant Commissioner of Rajanpur, and Mr. Bruce, 1st Assistant Agent, Governor-General. That document is an interesting one, as it shows clearly the satisfactory condition of the Marri tribe at the time. It is well therefore to copy it here. It runs as follows :—

MEMORANDUM.

*Cases pending Decision.*

I.—Jeta, Leghari, claims a mare that he declares was tracked into the Marri territory. This case was brought up at Bugti Dera in March, 1877. Jemal Khan says that at the wedding of his son, Muhammed Khan, Leghari, shortly to be celebrated in Barkhan, he will prove that the mare is with the Loharani Marris. If he does, Mr. Bruce will restore the mare and pay all reasonable expenses.*

II.—Two Afghans with Mitta Lund as escort were going through the hills when they were robbed by Khaira and Hamal, Pitafi refugees. Mr. Bruce agrees to have the amount, Rs. 90, cut out of the fine to be paid by the Durkanis to the Marris.†

III.—Jewan, of Choti Bala, charges refugees, Pirak Durknai and Fazil, Lashari, now with Mamdani Marris, with stealing three cows worth Rs. 45. Mr. Bruce will settle return of cattle.‡

IV.—The Haddianis in Bugti Dera in March had a claim of five cows; they now have a claim of four cows against the Marris and Khetrans. The four cows left have been proved to be with the Samin Khetrans, but as it is doubtful

* Jeta, Leghari, appeared before the undersigned in the hills, and the Marri chief agreed to return the mare if traced to his Tuman.—(Sd.) R. I. BRUCE, Assistant Agent, Governor-General, Baluchistan.

† This case was settled by the undersigned amongst the other Marri-Gurchani cases.—(Sd.) R. I. BRUCE, Assistant Agent, Governor-General, Baluchistan.

‡ The Marri chief agreed to pay the money or return the cattle.—(Sd.) R. I. BRUCE, Assistant Agent, Governor-General, Baluchistan.

whether these Samins are in fact in the Marri or Khetran ilaqua, Mr. Bruce will inquire into the fact of who is actually responsible.*

V.—Mujawars, of Sakhi Sarwar, have a claim of six cows, ₨24 in cash, and ₨10 in grain, against Bagu, Mamdani. The cows have been returned. Mr. Bruce will inquire about the rest.

VI.—Chiman and Lurinda, Banihas, certain donkey drivers, and Fazil Khán, Gurchani, have a claim against four Marris for six donkeys worth ₨130 and miscellaneous property to the amount of ₨36-12. Mr. Bruce will inquire.

VII.—Ghazi, of Dalana, had a claim for two camels against Jam Bugti. One camel was killed and its price, ₨28, paid.

The other camel was ₨31; its price will be paid by Mr. Bruce, unless Ahmed, the purchaser of the camel, has already been paid.

VIII.—Saida, Lishari, left two camels on trust with Morad Bugti, agreeing to pay one-fourth of their value. Mr. Bruce will inquire why they have not been returned.†

IX.—Miran, Jogiani, wounded by Pir Bakhs, and another Mussori.

This case will be settled by Major Sandeman and Mr. Fryer this cold weather, if not settled privately previously.

F. W. R. Fryer,
*Offg. Deputy Commissioner.*

*22nd October 1877.*

Note.—All other pending cases have been disposed of except as regards the refugee British subjects.

F. W. R. Fryer,
*Offg. Deputy Commissioner.*

R. I. Bruce,
*Assistant Agent, Governor-General.*

C. E. Gladstone,
*Assistant Commissioner.*

This record speaks for itself. The arrangements made with the Marris and Bugtis had then been working for over ten years, and the list shows that there were only six petty claims by Punjab British subjects pending against the Marris.

At that time there were no charges pending against the Marris on account of offences committed on the Sind border, and only a few against the Bugtis.

The intolerable condition of anarchy into which the Kalát State fell upset the arrangements made, first by Colonel Phayre in February, 1869, and afterwards at the Mithankot conference, for the protection of that country from the depredations of the Marris and Bugtis.

It would be superfluous in this report to enter into a detailed account of the complications which occurred. It will be sufficient to mention that the Central Asian trade by the Bolan pass route was completely paralysed, and the frontier of Katch Gundawa, from the Bolan pass to the Sind border, was desolated and laid waste.

Mulla Muhammad, the Sarawan chief, and others of the Brahui sirdars who were in rebellion against the Khán, had taken refuge with the Marris, and they plundered at their will both in Kachhi and the Bolan, and burned several villages. They continued at the same time to respect the British border, and remained faithful to their agreements with the British Government.

Such was the condition of affairs when Major Sandeman was deputed by the Government of India on his first mission to Kalát in 1875.

He marched by the Marri and Bugti hills, where he was joined by the principal Marri and Bugti chiefs, who accompanied him to Kalát.

After Quetta had been occupied and the complications in the Kalát State had been brought to a satisfactory settlement, and the British Government undertook the protection of the Bolan trade route, it became necessary to stop the Marris from plundering there as well as in Kachhi. The number of Marri levies was therefore increased, and Marri posts were established at Kirta and Kundilani in the Bolan; and at Quat Mandai, for the protection of Kachhi, Jalab Khan, of the chief's family, was appointed jemadar of these levies, and the chief's agent, Sehan, was appointed with a few sowars to keep up communication between Káhan and the political authorities at Quetta. These arrangements worked well.

When the Afghan War broke out in 1878, the district of Sibi was taken possession of by the British Government. It may be remembered that about forty years before the Marris had

* This claim has since been settled.—(Sd.) R. I. Bruce, Assistant Agent, Governor-General, Baluchistan.

† It is now reported that the offenders were Gurchani refugees.—(Sd.) R. I. Bruce, Assistant Agent, Governor-General, Baluchistan.

taken possession of a large portion of Sibi district, including Quat Mandai and Badra, and since that time they had been slowly but surely reducing the remainder to the condition of a dependency of their own. They reduced several of the villages to ruins, murdered the inhabitants, and plundered their property; and those villages that remained only preserved their existence by paying them black mail known by the name of *"baiat."*

When the British Government assumed the administration of the country measures were adopted to put a stop to such a state of things. A detachment of troops was stationed at Sibi, and three posts of levies, garrisoned half by Marris and half by people of the country, were established at Thali, Mal, and Sibi.

Thus, in the course of events, as more responsibilities were put on the tribe, more men were enlisted, and during the whole of the first stage of the Afghan war they continued to render excellent service, and no cases against them occurred more worthy of note than those already alluded to. Notwithstanding that the chief Mehrulla Khan received many letters and messages from the Amir of Kábal and his agents, he continued loyal.

Later on, in the commencement of 1880, our occupation of Thal-Chotiáli and Harnāi rendered an extension of protective arrangements for those districts necessary. These districts were found to be in precisely the same state as that from which Sibi and Kachhi had been rescued. The Marris had thoroughly established their reign of terror in them, with the same disastrous results as elsewhere.

When, therefore, they found themselves so rapidly being shut out from so many of their old hunting grounds, it cannot be wondered at if it required careful manipulation of the tribe to reconcile the different members to the impending changes, as well as their own individual interests, which were involved in them.

The extension of the railway line from Sibi, through their country, further intensified the situation, as, on account of the troops being fully occupied on the Sind and Kandahár line of communications, its protection had almost entirely to be provided for by Marri levies.

Still nothing more serious occurred than some cases of robbery on the line, caused by jealousy in the division of service, or on account of minor chiefs being dealt with separately. These differences were satisfactorily disposed of by Sir Robert Sandeman in March, 1880, who wrote:—

"What I have now done is to consolidate the system on which service to the Marri clan for the purpose named* is granted. I found this to be necessary, to enable me to arrive at a workable understanding with the sirdar, Mehrulla Khán, and his headmen, who, as stated in my memorandum accompanying the agreement, are naturally jealous of their rights, and fear that their power over, and the organization of, the clan may be destroyed by our entering into separate relations with smaller sirdars, as was at first done, to save time, in assisting the railway authorities."

* * * * * *

"It is absolutely necessary that the railway officers should not themselves directly engage the services of any Marri sowar or footman, but should apply to Mr. Duke for such men as they require."

Sirdar Mehrulla Khán had returned from his interview with Sir Robert Sandeman, and everything promised to go on smoothly, when a most unfortunate affair took place. A syce, belonging to the Sind Horse, was robbed near Thalli. A party of Sind Horse, with some Baluch Guides and villagers (Sylachis) went in pursuit, and came up with a party of six Phirdadani (a sub-section of the Bijiranis) Marris, who were said to be the thieves. They attacked and shot down the whole of them; and, not content with this, for some reason that has not been explained, they cut off all their heads, and carried them off tied to the pummels of their saddles, and threw them into the Beji river, which was in flood at the time.

Two of those killed were the sons of the headman (*mukkadam*) of the Phirdadanis. When the Marris heard of it, they became greatly incensed, especially the Bijiranis, and in revenge they seized and carried off some Sylachis from Thalli, who they believed were present and took part in the affair. After this they stole a number of cattle from the Brahuis, and wounded one of the owners.

The Brahuis, in return, seized some cattle belonging to the Bijirani chiefs that were grazing near Thalli. When Sir Robert Sandeman heard of these occurrences, he sent his native assistant, Rai Hittu Ram, to arrange matters. Rai Hittu Ram recovered the cattle from the Brahuis; but before it was possible to settle the different questions involved, the Maiwand disaster occurred, followed by orders for the withdrawal of the troops from Thal-Chotiálli and Harnāi, and for the abandonment of the railway extension works and line.

Major-General Phayre, C.B., in communication with Sir Robert Sandeman, issued the orders for the withdrawal, which were to the effect that Colonel Roome should retire with the Thal-Chotiáli Field Force to Spintangi. On arrival at Spintangi, he was to arrange, in communication with the Political Officer, Mr. Duke, to move northward by way of Harnai,

* To protect the railway line.

Sharigh, and Kachh, to Pishín, picking up the different detachments of troops *en route*, and such Government property as could be conveniently moved; and making over all Government stores, which could not be carried away, to the headmen (maliks) of the villages. The Officer Commanding 23rd Native Light Infantry was to act simultaneously and in concert with Colonel Roome; and when the latter arrived at Spintangi, he was to move down to Sibi, making similar arrangements for the Government property lying between Spintangi and Nari Gorge, as Colonel Roome was to do from Spintangi northward to Pishín.

It would appear as if these orders of General Phayre's had not been quite correctly interpreted, as instead of Colonel Roome bringing with him railway stores and Government property, north of Spintangi, all such stores, including treasure to the amount of ₹1,73,500, for which transport could be found, were moved from Sharigh downwards, in charge of a weak detachment of 114 men of the 23rd Native Light Infantry and twenty-five sabres, 1st Sind Horse, to be taken to Sibi. Colonel Roome met them *en route* to Sibi at Spintangi, and left them there, continuing his march to Pishín.

At daybreak on the morning of the 6th, the Sibi convoy marched from Spintangi. It was protected by 82 effective bayonets and 25 Sind horsemen, and consisted of about 170 carts, 50 sick sepoys, 2,000 coolies, and 19 subordinate clerks belonging to the Transport, Commissariat, and Telegraph Departments.

Before they reached the first stage at Kuchali, Peara and Jumal, Tinganis, and Gul Muhammad, Chilgari—notorious robbers—commenced to rob stragglers, and made an attack on the rear of the convoy, but were driven off by Lieutenant Tobin, who commanded the detachment. It was then in all probability that they conceived the idea of making a bolder attack, and communicated with their brethren, Sobdar, Tingani, Sheran, Khaiwani, Batel and Azim, Shahejas, who had also a number of their men collected in the hills at Kuchali.

Almost immediately after the convoy got into the gorge after passing Kuchali, a number of Marris, estimated from 30 to 50, charged down into the middle of it, and cut up a great number of coolies. The European subordinates, who were in rear of the column, were attacked at the same time and killed.

Lieutenant Tobin, who was suffering severely from a wound he received on his elbow on the previous day, did his utmost and got about 100 of his men together, and attacked the Marris and drove them into the hills, from whence they continued to fire into the convoy from under cover; and as the bullock-drivers became panic-stricken, the bullocks could not be got on, and the carts were abandoned, including those that contained the treasure. As soon as the Marris had got the treasure into their hands, they desisted from further molesting the convoy, and remained behind to divide the spoils. The numbers of the Marri force has been variously estimated at from 200 to 400 men. The following statement shows the military details, also the names of the Railway, Transport, and Commissariat employés who were killed or missed :—

*Military Losses.*

| | Fit to march. | Sick. | Killed. | Wounded. | Missing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 23rd Regiment | 114 | 17 | 6 | 6 | ... |
| M. C. Battery | ... | 2 | ... | ... | ... |
| 5th Regiment | ... | 36 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| 3rd do. | ... | 7 | 2 | ... | ... |
| 2nd Bombay Cavalry | ... | 3 | 2 | ... | ... |
| 1st Sind Horse | 25 | ... | ... | 2 | ... |
| Total | 139 | 65 | 13 | 10 | |

*Camp-followers.*

| | Killed. | Missing. |
|---|---|---|
| Other men of the 23rd Regiment were picked up at Gundakin Daff and Khelati Killa, after the fight was over | 3 | 1 |

*Names of killed and missing Railway, Transport, and Commissariat employés.*

| | |
|---|---|
| 1. Mr. Angelo, Transport Inspector | Killed. |
| 2. Mr. Bond, do. | do. |
| (There were also 20 "coolies killed") | |
| 3. Mr. Luther, Telegraph Inspector | Killed. |
| 4. Mr. Hannah, Signaller | Missing. |
| 5. Mr. Phillips | Killed. |
| 6. Mr. Sandial, missing; known to have been severely wounded. | |
| 7. Mr. Sandial's son | Missing. |
| 8. Mr. Beattie seemed to have died from the shock; he was very ill, and lay dead in cart, but was not wounded. | |
| 9. Commissariat Inspector Muhammad Ibrahim, badly wounded and missing. | |
| 10. Transport Inspector Corporal Douglas, | Killed. |

Another unfortunate incident connected with the affair was the delay which took place in despatching the convoy from Sharagh. The orders given to Major Peters, R.E., Executive Engineer in charge, were to arrange that the last carts were to leave Sharagh not later than the 1st August. He, however, waited for some carts that were returning from Dirgai, which prevented the last of the carts starting from Sharagh until the 2nd, and they did not reach Spintangi until the 4th. Had the whole of the convoy arrived on the 3rd and passed on before Colonel Roome's force left Spintangi, the subsequent disaster might possibly have been avoided.

The actual attack on the convoy was confined to some men of those sections of the Marris, the Tinganis, Khalwanis, Chilgiris, and Shahejas, who resided in the neighbourhood, led by a few celebrated bad characters (*badmashes*).

Karm Khán, the chief of the Bijirani Marris, did not actually take part in it; but he was close by at the time, and was supposed to have been implicated, and afterwards presided over the distribution of the plunder.

Khair Bakhsh Khán, the son of the Marri chief Mehrulla Khán, who had been sent by his father from Káhan to meet Mr. Duke, was also in the vicinity, but the headmen would not allow him to join that officer. It is very probable that if he had been with Mr. Duke the outrage would not have occurred, and he immediately reported the circumstances to Sir Robert Sandeman. He also communicated the news in a characteristic manner to his father by sending him a piece of paper smeared on both sides with ink, with a message that his tribesmen had blackened both their faces.

When the distribution of the plunder took place several shares were given to men who took no part in the raid, with the object of compromising them and forcing them to make common cause with those who had committed themselves. Forty-five oxen and R300 cash were sent to Mehrulla Khán as the chieftain's share (*panjak*); but he immediately informed the Agent to the Governor-General, and afterwards sent the oxen into Sibi and made them over.

The Langani section of Badra did not join in the raid. Their headman, Duru, with some of the minor Marri sirdars, accompanied and rode under fire with Mr. Duke, and did their best to render assistance, but were powerless to restrain their tribesmen.

The chief, Mehrulla Khán, was at his home at Káhan at the time, and could not be held to be in any way responsible. In fact, under the circumstances, unless he had had the gift of prophecy, it was almost impossible that he could have been implicated, or have known anything about it until after it had occurred.

The Maiwand disaster took place on the 27th July. The orders for withdrawal from the railway line were received at Sharagh on the 28th, and the raid occurred at Kuchali on the morning of the 6th August.

Sharagh is only 48 miles distant from Kuchali, but it is 107 miles from Kuchali to Káhan; total 155 miles. A messenger going at the rate of 25 miles a day would have taken six days to reach Káhan, and on such information the chief could not then have foretold that a large amount of treasure would have come down under a small guard, or have had time to act on it.

If the chief had been a party to the raid, or if it had been a tribal affair, other sections, such as the Ghaznis and Loharanis, would have joined, and it would not have been confined to a few men from amongst some of the local sections on the spot. This is further proved by the fact that on the day the outrage was committed Mir Hazar Khán, Nozbandagani, one of the most influential headmen of the tribe, and Futteh Khan, brother of the Bijrani chief, were in the Sibi district, where they had come to receive back their cattle which had been stolen by the Brahuis.

Moreover, the whole history of the antecedents of Mehrulla Khán and of his brother Ghazzan, and of the nature of the relations which existed between them and our Government for the previous thirteen years, could not be reconciled with the theory of his having been a party to such an outrage.

This point has been fully explained, as it is of the utmost importance that it should not be left open to doubt. If it was really proved that the Marri chief had played false in such an affair, nothing would so much tend to discredit the policy which had worked since 1866 with such eminent success.

The above view was that taken by Sir Robert Sandeman, who wrote:—

"The letter I submit from the Marri sirdar expresses, I believe, his true sentiments towards the British Government, and no one, probably, more deeply regrets what has occurred than he does. He, however, feels himself unable, without the aid and protection of our Government, to compel the robbers belonging to the Kot Mandai section of his clan to make restitution."

This opinion was also shared in by Rai Hittu Ram and others who knew the Marri tribe well, and even Mehrulla Khán's enemies—and the Marris have no friends—do not accuse him of instigating, or of having had any part, in the affair.

There was of course plenty of time for news to reach Kuchali and Quat Mandai, which lie on the borders of the Pathan country, and, as is always the case on such occasions, wild and exaggerated reports were passed along by the Pathans that we had been completely worsted at Kandahár, and were flying from the country with ten lakhs of treasure. This was quite sufficient to cause the Marri bad characters in the vicinity of the line to assemble to see what they could pick up, which led to what followed. Sir Robert Sandeman thus describes what took place :—

"Unfortunately the reverse sustained by British troops at the hands of Sirdar Mahomed Ayub Khán at Maiwand, and the consequent siege of Kandahár, rendered it necessary for the work on the railway line to be suspended, and for the troops to be entirely withdrawn, for a time, from the whole line. This operation had to be carried out with the greatest possible expedition, and many valuable stores were necessarily abandoned owing to the want of means to carry them away. Besides the apparent and actual hurriedness of the retirement, there were not wanting numerous unfriendly Pathans who diligently spread reports of the reverse sustained by the British, doubtless much exaggerated, and who represented that we were flying from the country never to return, which they believed we had once before, in 1842, been compelled to do.

* * * * * * *

"The Marris, who had been much disturbed before by the manner in which they had been completely cut off from their usual haunts, saw the British retiring in haste from the railway line, abandoning large quantities of valuable stores; and, last of all, intimation was given then that a convoy was returning to Sibi with considerable treasure, the amount of which had been magnified ten-fold by popular rumour, with a weak escort hampered by 2,000 non-combatants. The temptation was, as might have been expected, too much for the predatory instincts of such men; and on the 6th August a party of the clan attacked the convoy as it was leaving Kuchali, as I have already fully reported to Government."

The Marris having thus seriously committed themselves with the Government, continued, after the raid, to assume an openly hostile attitude. Various bands collected at different places for the purpose of raiding in Sibi and Kachhi.

On the 28th of August a force of 500 Marris—400 footmen and 100 horsemen—made a raid on the village of Mall, and carried off 1,000 head of cattle and 2,000 sheep and goats, and killed one of the shepherds, and retired by the low spur of sand hills which runs out from the Marri hills to the north-west of Mall.

The detachment of Sind Horse which was posted at Mall, with some police and guide sowars and villagers under Wadera Darwesh Khán and Darya Khán, Domkis, pursued the Marris. They also sent intimation to Rai Hittu Ram, who had received warning of the intended raid and was on the alert at Thalli.

On receiving the news, Hittu Ram immediately went in pursuit with a small detachment of Sind Horse and 220 police and villagers, whom he had collected, and joined the pursuing party from Mall. They came up with the Marris on the low ridge of sand hills, and kept up a fire on them, which the Marris returned. As the Marris had the advantage both as regards ground and numbers in their favor, our people did not close with them; but they succeeded in rescuing from them almost all of the plundered animals. Darya Khán and one sowar were killed on our side. Four Marris were seen to fall, but they were carried off by their people, and it is not known how many were killed and wounded.

On the same night Major Douglas with a detachment of Bengal Infantry pursued the Marri raiders into the hills, and in the early morning, when they were cooking their food, he took them by complete surprise, and they fled in disorder without offering any resistance, leaving their arms and clothes and ten mares behind them.

The names of the leaders were Gul Muhammad, Chilgerri, Yar Muhammad, Nozbundagani, Wadera Sobdar, Tingani, Sheran, Kalwani, Sherdil, Mazarani, Bahar Khán, Phirdadani, who it will be seen had also taken part in the Kuchali raid.

11-9 R. A.
260 Rifles.
4th Goorkha Regiment.
3rd Punjab Cavalry.
2nd Sikh Infantry.
3rd Sikh Infantry.
5th Goorkha Regiment.

In consequence of these serious instances of misconduct the Government of India determined to send a military expedition to punish the tribe, and advantage was taken of the return to India of the Kabul-Kandahár Field Force to despatch for this object a brigade as detailed in the margin, under the command of Brigadier-General C. M. MacGregor.

Sir Robert Sandeman had proposed that the following terms should be imposed on the Marris, *viz.* :— ***First,*** restitution of treasure and bullocks plundered from railway convoys; ***second,*** R20,000 fine, to compensate private losses; ***third,*** blood money, according to tribal custom for those slain; ***fourth,*** troops to march through Marri country by Káhan to Harrand; ***fifth,*** approved hostages to be given in future for the good behaviour of the clan.

The Government of India approved of these terms, and it was arranged that, in the event of the Marris accepting them, the military operations were to be confined to a march through the Marri country *viâ* Káhan to Harrand. Specific instructions to this effect were issued by Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts, Commanding Southern Afghanistan, to

General MacGregor, who was ordered to occupy Quat Mandai at once, and there await the result of the negotiations. In the meantime Sir Robert Sandeman communicated the terms to the Marri chief Mehrulla Khán, and ordered him to come to Sibi to arrange to carry them out. But the tide had now set in too strong for the chief to be able to stem it, or of his own action to enforce such rigorous terms; and he was afraid that if he came in himself before the Government had actually resorted to extreme measures, that he would completely lose his influence with the tribe. He therefore continued to make excuses. In the beginning of October, General MacGregor's force began to assemble at Sibi, and the Marris then realized that they were about to be called to serious account.

On the 9th October, Rai Hittu Ram received a letter for the Agent, Governor-General, from Mehrulla Khán, saying that he was collecting the headmen of his tribe, and asked for four or five days' more grace, and that he would bring them with him to Sibi. This proposal was not accepted. On the 11th October, General MacGregor marched for the Marri hills, and occupied Quat Mandai on the 14th. On the 17th he marched for Thal-Chotiálí, and on the 20th he received a letter from Mehrulla Khán, saying that he had started from Káhan to make his submission to the General at Quat. The General, in reply, informed him that he was marching for Thal, and explained to him the terms authorized by the Government of India. On receiving this letter at Quat, Mehrulla Khán followed the General to Thal, and joined his camp near Kolu about the 2nd November, and tendered his submission.

Mehrulla then sent for Karam Khán, the leading headman of the Bijiranis, who came and gave himself up before the force arrived at Mamand. Mehrulla Khán and Karam Khán accepted the terms offered. General MacGregor fixed two lakhs of rupees as the amount which the Marris would have to pay, and agreed to take R50,000 when the force arrived at Káhan, and that Quat Mandai valley should remain in possession of the British Government until the balance was paid up. On the arrival of the force at Káhan, on the 6th November, Mehrulla Khán accordingly paid the R50,000 and gave three hostages—Karam Khán, Akhtrans and Khodadad—as security for the payment of the remainder.

General MacGregor and his force then returned to India, and he sent the three hostages to Sir Robert Sandeman, on whom it devolved, under the orders of the Government of India, to enforce the fulfilment of the other terms.

The Government of India, on the recommendation of Sir Robert Sandeman, remitted the sum of R25,000 from the balance due, in consideration of the crops in Quat Mandai valley having been destroyed by the troops. Government had issued orders that the crops should not be destroyed, but the villages were burned and the crops destroyed before the orders arrived.

Sir Robert Sandeman summoned Mehrulla Khán to Sibi, where he came at once with several of his headmen, but the actual leaders of the raid at Kuchali did not accompany him, and the chief urged that he would require armed assistance to coerce these men, who were the real source of the difficulties into which his tribe had got with the British Government, into compliance.

Sir Robert Sandeman considered the request a reasonable one, and applied to the Government of India for a strong military escort.

The Government concurred in thinking that it was desirable to support the Marri chief in maintaining the responsibility of the whole tribe for the fulfilment of the terms, and in reducing to obedience the refractory members, and sanctioned the escort.

He then started for the Marri hills, and on his arriving at Thalli the whole of the leaders of the Kuchali raid came in with Mehrulla Khán and surrendered themselves, and agreed to the terms. Within a short time R75,000 in cash were realized, and it was arranged, with the sanction of the Government, that the valley of Quat Mandai was to remain pledged for the payment of the balance, the Government to realize one-sixth share of the produce, half of which (one-twelfth) was to be paid to Mehrulla Khán, until the R50,000 were paid up.

Five hostages—two from the Ghazzanis, two from the Bijiranis, and one from the Loharanis—were taken as security for the future good conduct of the tribe.

When these negotiations were concluded, the Marris were again restored to the favour of Government. The chief and the principal headmen, with a number of their followers were again enlisted in our service, and posts of Marri levies on the borders and along the main lines of communication were re-established. All services, pay, and allowances had been stopped from the time the raid took place.

2 Guns No. 2 Jacobabad Mountain Battery.
2nd Bombay Light Cavalry.
15th Bombay Native Infantry.

On the despatch of General MacGregor's expedition the Harnai line and Thal-Chotiálí were re-occupied by troops, and a force, as given in the margin, was detailed to form the garrison of the latter place.

The position occupied by the Marri chief throughout the whole of these complications is

deserving of particular attention. He did not delay to come in as soon as he found he could do so without losing his position and influence of the tribe. The advance of General MacGregor's force gave him the opening, or *purdah*, he required. From the time he came in he was made the medium through whom all negotiations were conducted. He himself urged General MacGregor to take a portion of his force to overawe the leaders of the Kuchali raid who had assembled with their forces in the Nili stronghold. It was unfortunate that unavoidable circumstances prevented this being done, as it would have very much strengthened the chief's hands for the subsequent negotiations.

It was shown by Sir Robert Sandeman that only a portion of the tribe had been implicated, and that Mehrulla Khán was not to blame; and the Government of India, accepting this position, sanctioned a strong military escort for the express purpose of supporting the authority of the Marri chief in reducing to obedience the refractory members of his tribe.

I believe that this is the first instance on record in our connection with the north-western frontier that a military force was sanctioned for the purpose of maintaining and enforcing the authority of a semi-independent chieftain, and the results, which were eminently satisfactory, and approved of by Government, prove that it was a very wise procedure.

In managing the affairs of wild and uncivilized tribes like the Marris, it must not be considered that the chiefs are all-powerful. The headmen of sections have much power, and when the council of elders (*jirga*) consider the honour or usage of the tribe is at stake, the chief is obliged to give way. Thus in an affair like the cutting off the heads of the Pirdadanis, it is idle to expect much from the chief until superior authority intervenes and restores the equilibrium.

There was also at that time a strong opposition faction at work in the chief's family, headed by his nephew, Sher Muhammad, which very much weakened his influence.

This faction has existed for many years, and its disturbing influence was fully noticed in the Baluchistan Blue Book No. 2 of 1877, pp. 330, 331, and 332.

After the negotiations which took place at Bugti Dera in 1877, the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khán, in writing of them to the Agent, Governor-General, remarked:—

"It may appear strange that men should wish to raise up an unfounded charge against their chief. There are no doubt reasons. I purposely did not make studied enquiries on this point, but there is an impression amongst some that Sher Muhammad Khán, Marri, suggested the laying of the charge. It is certain that he will lose much of his power now that an active chief is substituted for a sickly one. He carefully absented himself from our camp, and he was at Rojhan at or about the time the charge against Mehrulla Khán was made. Mehrulla Khán himself means well by the Government, but his hands will have to be strengthened, or he will have difficulty in keeping his very troublesome tribe in order. He will need the hearty support of the Government, and also when possible, of our chiefs along the border, who should avoid all appearance of supporting any headman in any position at all antagonistic to the chief."

There are few chiefs, either Baluch, Pathan, or Brahui, who have not got in their own families feuds of a similar nature to contend with, and unless they receive the judicious support of the political authorities from which their power and influence for good is chiefly derived, their authority is in danger of becoming completely subverted.*

Since friendly relations were re-established with the Marris in March, 1881, everything has gone on smoothly, and few events deserving of any special note have taken place.

During the year 1882 the Bugtis, and some refugees from British territory, committed a good number of cattle thefts in the Dera Ghazi Khán district, and sold some of the stolen cattle to the Marris, which resulted in reprisals on the part of the Mazaris, whose cattle had been stolen.

The Political Agent, Mr. Duke, inquired into the cases, and proposed to meet Mr. Fryer in the hills to settle them. Circumstances occurred which prevented the meeting taking place, and in February, 1882, Mr. Duke sent Mehrulla Khán with his headmen to meet Mr. Fryer at Dera Ghazi Khán. Many matters were then disposed of, and others were put in train for settlement; and on dismissing the Marris, Mr. Fryer wrote—

"I found the Marri chief and his headmen most anxious to meet my wishes and settle their cases. They arrived at Rajanpur on the 26th ultimo, and I was obliged to bring them to Dera Ghazi Khán, where I had to attend the horse fair. Their cases were settled, and they took their leave on the 9th instant. I have to express my acknowledgment to you for the trouble you have taken in collecting the Marris and sending them in, and also for the instructions which you gave them as a result of our meeting in December last, which were the cause of the readiness with which the Marris settled the claims against them."

The accumulation of these cases may be traced to different causes. Sir Robert Sandeman and Mr. Fryer had in the meantime both gone on leave to England; but the chief reason was that the conduct of the affairs of the Marri and Bugti tribes, which had before remained under one officer, became separated, and the Bugtis were placed under the charge of the Political

* Sher Muhammad Khán died last year, so that this danger no longer exists.

Agent, Jacobabad. The consequence was that Mr. Duke, who was in charge of the Marris, was not aware of the part that was being played by the Bugti and refugee thieves, while the reprisals which were being carried on by the Mazaris were neither reported to him, nor to the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khán.

In September, 1882, the Agent, Governor General, deputed the Political Agent to obtain, if practicable, the surrender of the refugee British subjects, and to meet Mr. Fryer at Fort Munro and settle the outstanding cases.

Mr. Bruce first proceeded to the Marri-Bugti country, and after putting some pressure on the headmen obtained the surrender of eight refugees from the Dera Ghazi Khán district, who were all that could be traced to their country. He then proceeded to Fort Munro, and made them over in custody to Mr. Fryer.

After a satisfactory settlement had been concluded, the Deputy Commissioner and the Political Agent drew up a set of rules framed with the view of preventing the possibility of cases of a similar kind accumulating again, and for putting a stop to reprisals.

The rules were approved of and promulgated for future observance by the Governments of India and the Punjab, who also expressed their satisfaction at the arrangements made by Mr. Duke, Mr. Fryer, and Mr. Bruce.

A copy of the rules is attached to this report, marked Appendix B.

Mr. Fryer, in his report, when alluding to the action which the Marri chief had taken in these affairs, remarked—

"I am quite ready to acknowledge the exertions made by Sirdar Mehrulla Khán, Marri, in recovering property stolen from the district. I have ever found the sirdar most anxious to do every thing in his power to keep his tribe well behaved, and to make restitution for any offences they may have committed."

These rules have now been in force for over a year and a-half, and have worked with remarkably good results. Since their introduction no reprisals on the part of British subjects have taken place, and of the cases which have subsequently occurred, there are only two petty charges pending against the Marris and four against the Bugtis, on account of crimes committed in the Dera Ghazi Khán district. There are no cases outstanding against the Marris on the Sind border, and only two petty cases against the Bugtis.

See letter No 517, dated 4th February, 1884, from the Political Agent, Thal-Chotiálí, to the Agent, Governor-General.

It has already been mentioned that it is absolutely essential to the successful adminis. tration of this country, that the Marris and Bugtis should be kept from fighting amongst themselves. Peace had been established and maintained between them for several years, when in January, 1883, hostilities suddenly broke out again.

The breach came about in the following way: Two Loharani Marris went on private business to the Bugti country. A Bugti named Datta Khán, who had a grudge against them, went and reported to the native officer commanding the Sui outpost—which is situated in the centre of the Bugti country—that the two Marris were on their way to plunder in Sind. On receiving this report the native officer sent a party of Sind Horse with a few Baluch guides under the command of a non-commissioned officer to arrest them, and on their refusing to surrender, the Baluch guides, by order of the non-commissioned officer, fired and killed one of them, and took the other prisoner and sent him to Jacobabad.

The Marris immediately killed a Bugti in retaliation.

The young Bugti sirdar, Shavaz Khán, on hearing of this, behaved very intemperately. He collected a force of 1,200 Bugti horse and foot, and, in spite of a warning he received from the Political Agent, attacked the Marris, and killed five Gazuis, and carried off 700 head of cattle, sheep and goats.

After the attack the Bugtis retreated to the vicinity of the Sui outpost, and to the south of it, along the Sind frontier; and into the Mazari hills on the Punjab border, where they believed that the Marris would not venture to attack them, for fear of compromising themselves with the Government.

This was a cloak (*purdah*) which had proved convenient to the Bugtis on many a former occasion. In the present instance, as the Bugtis had been in the wrong throughout, the Agent, Governor-General, Sir Robert Sandeman, considered that it would be very unjust to permit the Bugtis to take such an unfair advantage, as long as they continued openly at war, and he requested the authorities in the Punjab and Sind not to allow them to enter those provinces, or to carry on the war from the shelter of British territory. He also asked the Sind authorities to warn the native officer commanding the Sui outpost not to interfere between the two tribes as long as they remained within the limits of their own territories. The Marris were also obliged to keep within their own boundaries until peace could be again restored.

The Sind authorities complied, but the Punjab authorities took exception to the request of the Agent, Governor-General, and referred the matter for the orders of the Government of

India. The Government of India took the same view as the Agent, Governor-General, and on the 5th March, in reply telegraphed to him :—

"*Number 3:6 E.*—Your telegram No. 017, dated 1st March, and preceding correspondence about Marris and Bugtis. Following telegram despatched to Punjab on 28th February: Your telegram 20th, and other correspondence regarding Bugtis and Marris. Government of India consider that Bugtis or Marris should not be allowed in any way to use British territory as a base for tribal warfare, or to take refuge there after attacking each other."

* * * * * * * *

When these preliminaries were disposed of, Sir Robert Sandeman started with his escort for the Marri-Bugti hills to settle the case.

He had previously summoned the Marri and Bugti chiefs and headmen, and they joined his camp on entering the hills and proceeded with him to Quat. A council was appointed to investigate and report on the whole case, consisting of Mr. Bruce, Political Agent, President; Rai Bahadur Hittu Ram, and the Borozai Chiefs of Sibi.

The council awarded—*1st*, that Data Khán, Bugti, who was the original cause of the quarrel, should be made over in custody to the Political Agent for trial according to Baluch custom; *2nd*, that the Bugtis should pay the Marris fifteen hundred rupees as blood-money for the five Gazni Marris they had killed, and that they should return 200 cows, 350 sheep and goats, 45 camels, 50 donkeys, 11 buffaloes, and 4 horses, raided from the Marris.

The award was approved of by the Agent, Governor-General, and after the terms had been carried out, peace was re-established between the two tribes.

The Home Government and the Government of India expressed their approval of the proceedings, and satisfaction at the settlement which had been arranged.

The Marris and Bugtis are rapidy extending their cultivation, and consequently depending less on their flocks, and on the precarious livelihood obtained by plunder. Each succeeding year sees the cultivated areas increasing, and new tracts brought under the plough; and there is now extensive cultivation at Káhan, Mamand, Jantali, Philawar, Kolu, Gamboli, Dáho, Tadri, Parai, Badra, and Quat Mandai.

During the last year the share of the produce (one-twelfth) of Quat Mandai realized by the Government under the agreement of 1882 amounted to 620 maunds of grain, which shows that the total yield of that valley alone, including revenue-free grants, must have been a good deal over 8,000 maunds.

The year before last the valley of Pajja was cultivated for the first time within the memory of man, and yielded the finest wheat crop in the whole country.

Last year a *karez* was constructed at Parai, and the land was brought under the plough, and if all goes on well, the next few years will see the fertile tracts lying along the Beji River between Pajja and Gamboli under cultivation. The different sections of the Bijirani Marris are fighting about the proprietary right to these lands, and much of the chief's time is now taken up in settling such disputes.

Notwithstanding that there is, therefore, abundant evidence of real substantial progress, there is nothing to be gained, and much might be lost, if we attempt to deceive ourselves with the idea that the Marris and Bugtis have settled down permanently into civilized, orderly, and peaceful agriculturists. Nothing short of a miracle could have wrought such a transformation within the time.

Not only could we not afford to dispense with any of the existing precautions and safeguards, but in order to secure the full benefit of what has been gained, additional measures for maintaining the peace of the country are still absolutely necessary.

In 1866-67 the Marris and Bugtis were stopped from plundering the Punjab and Sind. In 1877 their depredations in Kuchi and the Bolan pass, and in 1879 in Sibi, were put an end to. During the seasons of 1880-81 and 1882, the districts of Sangan, Harnái, and Thal-Chotiáli were taken directly under our protection, and rescued from them and since then peace has been established between them and the Pathan tribes as far north as the Luni boundary.

There thus remains one door, and only one, still open to them, namely, from the Luni boundary to the Khetran country; and they do not fail to take full advantage of it, and raid as vigorously as ever they did on the Musa Khels, Gipzais, and Hamzazais, who in return raid on them.

The strength of the chain is its weakest link, and this is a very important link, as it is the connecting one between Thal-Chotiáli and the Punjab.

The Khetran country has, under the orders of the Government of India, lately been added to the jurisdiction of the Agent, Governor-General, for Baluchistan, and the Assigned Districts. The relations which exist between the Marris and Khetrans are not of a satisfactory nature, although in ordinary times we are able to maintain peace between them. Sir Robert Sande-

man lately submitted a scheme to Government for improving their relations and for establishing peace on the line between Thal-Chotálí and the Punjab.

This scheme, if sanctioned, will go far towards perfecting the chain, and will thereby tend more than any other one measure which has yet been adopted to bring about a permanent settlement of the country. So long as any door for plunder remains open, so long will the restless and aggressive spirit of the people be kept up; but when once the last door is closed, they will accept the inevitable, and resign themselves to peaceful pursuits. Then, if the progress of the past 17 years (since 1867) should continue for 10 years more, and the same policy be continued, the warlike Marris and Bugtis will by that time have settled down to agriculture, which will strengthen our frontier, and enable the military force to be safely reduced, and other precautions to be dispensed with.

The policy commenced with the Marris and Bugtis in 1866-67 has since been extended to many other tribes (Khetrans, Lunis, Barozais, Shadozais, and many branches of Brahuis, Báluches, Tarins, and Kakars) with equally remarkable results, fully evidenced by the state of entire peace and prosperity the country enjoys, under the influence of which ruined towns are springing up again, and agriculture and trade are rapidly spreading and increasing.

If we recognize facts, the lesson which must be drawn from the history of all these tribes during the last 17 years is, that amongst Asiatic tribes independence means bloodshed, desolation, and risk and danger in every possible shape and form, and that, in the interests of peace and civilization, it is absolutely essential that they should be brought under some paramount power. If the Amir or the Khán of Kalat claim tribes as their own, they should admit and act up to their responsibilities and keep them in order. If they are under no rule, the sooner they are brought so the better for themselves and for all concerned.

The only title to independence they possess is like that of the pirate or highway robber —having cut themselves adrift from all wholesome governing authority, and thereby having obtained a license to cut throats and plunder their neighbours.

There is a natural instinct in the minds of every one of these men that this spurious independence is not permanent, and it is only the evil-doers—who make bloodshed and plunder pay—who resist being brought again under a sovereign authority.

The chiefs and men of position who possess landed property and a stake in the country look on the state of affairs as unwholesome, and regard the interference which restores the country to a healthy condition with gratitude.

Nothing has done more mischief than the encouragement of the theory that these tribes are independent, or tends so much to keep them without the pale of civilization.

Although they are not now independent in the sense of being allowed to massacre one another, and spread desolation and terror around them, they have as large a measure of self-government of the kind they really appreciate as could possibly be extended to them consistent with maintaining the peace of the country. In so far as this is not endangered they are left to settle their own inter-tribal disputes, and their tribal organizations are maintained and utilized for police and other measures connected with the general administration of the country; while their religious and local customs, and usages about women and social matters, are not interfered with.

It would be remiss to close a report on the Marri tribe without placing on record an additional testimony to the services of a gallant family whose name occupies a foremost place in its history. In the little English cemetery at Sibi there is a tombstone with the following epitaph engraved on it:—

In Loving Memory of
Lieut.-Colonel Lewis Brown, H. M.'s Bombay Staff Corps,
eldest son of the late Major Lewis Brown,
the gallant Defender of Káhan.
Died of Sunstroke at Sibi, 11th August, 1880.
EN ROUTE TO KANDAHAR.
*Aged 42 years.*
*This monument is erected by his sorrowing mother and brothers as a token of their affection and love for a good son and affectionate brother.*

It was a strange fate which brought the son back to find a soldier's grave so near the place where, more than forty years before, his gallant father had earned the name of "Káhan Brown" and an undying reputation.

## Appendix A.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tribe. | Section. | Mode of Coercion. | | Date. | Cause of Coercion. | Reparation exacted, amount of fines, &c. |
| | | Blockades. | Reprisals, Buhramta. | | | |
| Bugti | Shambani | ... | ... | 2nd October, 1850 | Cattle lifting on the Asmi border. | Four Shambani Bugtis carried off a number of goats from Asmi; they were pursued and arrested by Dost Ali, the Mazari Tomandar, and sentenced to 1½ year's imprisonment each. |
| Ditto | Ditto | ... | ... | 14th December, 1850 | Theft | Nine hillmen (five Bugtis and four Marris) carried off some goats from the Kot Mithan ilaqua. They were pursued by the inhabitants of the place where the theft was committed and two of their number killed and one captured; the other six escaped. The man captured was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and while in jail attacked the keepers and was cut down by a Burkandaz. |
| Ditto | Ditto | ... | | 27th March, 1851 | Highway Robbery | A Shambani named Chutta committed highway robbery near Rajanpur. He was captured by the Thanadar of Kot Mithan, and eventually sentenced to two years' imprisonment. |
| Ditto | Ditto | ... | Reprisal | 1st November, 1851 | Ditto | The Bugtis of the Shambani section robbed a Bania on the highway in British territory, and fled into the hills. They were pursued and overtaken by Imam Bakhsh Khan, Mazari, who killed two; the third robber escaped. By sanction of Commissioner a reward of R100 was given to Imam Bakhsh Khán; the horses and arms of deceased were also made over to him. |
| Ditto | Ditto | ... | Ditto | 14th May, 1852 | Ditto | Three Shambani Bugtis carried off two sheep from Manzar Kin, ilaqua Kot Mithan. Some Mazaris followed them into the hills and killed one of their number. |
| Ditto | Ditto | ... | Ditto | 14th June, 1852 | Ditto | Three persons stole a sheep at Gobalan and made their way into the hills. They were pursued by some shepherds, who recovered the sheep and killed one of the thieves; the other two escaped. |
| Ditto | Ditto | ... | Ditto | 10th November, 1852 | Theft | Twelve persons committed theft in the Rojhan ilaqua and fled into the hills. Some Mazaris pursued and attacked them, killing eight. |
| Ditto | Mussori | ... | Ditto | 15th April, 1856 | Ditto | Fourteen persons committed theft at Harrand and were pursued by Harrand Bazgir and some sowars, who killed one and wounded two of the thieves; the others escaped. |
| Ditto | Ditto | ... | ... | 23rd May, 1856 | Murder | A Mussori Bugti named Dorak committed murder and escaped; he was arrested through Ghulam Murtaza, Tomandar of the Bugtis, and released on security of Kattu Khan. |
| Ditto | Ditto | ... | Ditto | 7th April, 1867 | Theft and mischief | Seven Mussoris carried off six camels; they were pursued by Sher Muhammad Mazari. On being close pressed in the Gobbari pass they slaughtered the animals and continued their flight. They were, however, overtaken and three of their number killed. |
| Ditto | Shambani | ... | ... | 10th December, 1873 | Going armed in British territory. | Nine Shambanis were found strolling about armed and made over to the Mazari Tomandar to be sent back to their toman. |
| Marris | Ditto | ... | ... | 28th July, 1849 | Resisting authority. | A man named Drishan was found strolling about near Harrand. The sowars of Harrand, taking him for a suspicious character, attempted to take him into custody; he, however, attacked them and was killed. |

| 1 | 2 | 3 | | 4 | | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Mode of Coercion. | | | | |
| Tribe. | Section. | Blockades. | Reprisals, Buhramta. | Date. | Cause of Coercion. | Reparation exacted, amount of fines, &c. |
| Marris | Shambani | ... | ... | 18th September, 1850 | Cattle theft | A man named Dildar was charged with the theft of two camels, and while in jail made his escape and has not since been heard of. |
| Bugtis | Mussori | ... | Reprisal | 28th November, 1850 | Ditto | Eighty men plundered some camels in ilaqua Kot Mitti: they were pursued by Kalandar Shah and other Zamindars, who killed two of the thieves; the others escaped into the hills. |
| Ditto | Ditto | ... | Ditto | 25th May, 1855 | Murder and theft | Gul Shera, murderer and noted outlaw, committed theft in the Kot Mithan ilaqua, and made his way into the hills. He was pursued by Harrand Khan's sowars and killed at Sham. |
| Ditto | Ditto | ... | Ditto | 17th August, 1857 | Dacoity and murder | Three hundred Marris raided on Bhakalpur and Drigri. Bijar Khán and Shekh Mahbub Ali, with their followers, attacked and drove them back. Bijar was, however, killed. A number of the raiders were killed and wounded. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 25th April, 1859 | Theft | Three men came into the Harrand ilaqua and committed theft; they were arrested by Bahadur Khán, and eventually sentenced to six years' imprisonment each. |
| Ditto | Mussori | ... | ... | 6th September, 1859 | Ditto | Imam Bakhsh Khán and Pangu, Lisbari, committed theft in the Harrand ilaqua; they were arrested by militia sowars, and sentenced to two years' imprisonment and fine of R200 each. |
| Ditto | Marri | ... | Reprisals | 2nd March, 1860 | Robbery and murder | Seven Marris and Khetrans, who committed robbery and murder at Choti, were pursued and had six of their numbers killed; the seventh escaped. |
| Ditto | Ditto | ... | Ditto | 20th April, 1862 | Theft | Two Marris committed theft in the Harrand ilaqua, and killed Sobdar and Khaira Khán, Pitafis, for which act they received a reward of Rs. 300. |
| Ditto | Ditto | ... | Ditto | 29th November, 1866 | Ditto | Forty Marris carried off 97 camels from Asmi. They were pursued by militia sowars; one of the thieves was wounded, the others escaped in the hills. |
| Ditto | Bugti | ... | Ditto by cavalry | 15th July, 1867 | Dacoity and murder | Ghulam Hossein Khán, Mussori Makadam, with 1,200 Marris, Bugtis, and Khetrans, raided on Pachad Gurchani, near Harrand. A detachment of cavalry with a body of Baluch sowars pursued and killed Hossein with 227 of his followers. The property plundered was recovered, and Khuttu Khán and other Mussori Makadams gave a written agreement that they would do no harm in British territory for the future. |
| Marris | Ditto | ... | Reprisals | 2nd January, 1868 | Theft | Two men who committed theft in the Khojand ilaqua were pursued, and killed by Bahadur Khán and other Majaris. |
| Ditto | Ditto | ... | Ditto | 31st January, 1868 | Ditto | Four men who committed theft in the Harrand ilaqua were pursued by Bazgir, Gurchani, who killed one of the thieves; the rest escaped. |
| Bugtis | ... | ... | Ditto | 8th June, 1853 | Dacoity and murder | The offenders were pursued; one killed and four escaped. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | Ditto | 13th June, 1853 | Robbery | One man killed and nine escaped. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 26th September, 1853 | Dacoity and murder | The offenders were pursued; two were killed and 20 escaped. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 1st October, 1853 | Robbery and causing hurt | Out of five offenders, two were killed; and three made their escape. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 6th March, 1854 | Robbery | One Bugti killed and 18 escaped. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 3rd February, 1855 | Murder | Two persons were fined R200 each. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 9th August, 1855 | Robbery | Makadams ordered to return the property stolen. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 27th August, 1857 | Cattle theft | Two persons imprisoned for three years each. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 2nd April, 1858 | Ditto | One person received 15 stripes. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 24th May, 1858 | Robbery | Three persons were imprisoned. |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 10th June, 1858 | Murder of Bijar Khán, Tomundar, Drishak | Bengal accused, was sentenced to imprisonment for 14 years. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 3rd December, 1858 | Causing hurt | One person imprisoned for five years. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 31st July, 1859 | Robbery | One person sentenced to 2½ years' imprisonment and fine of R200, or in default further imprisonment for two years. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | Reprisals | 18th February, 1862 | Dacoity | Out of eight offenders pursued, two were killed and six escaped. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | Blockade | 19th November, 1862 | Robbery | Orders issued prohibiting them entering British territory. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 30th May, 1864 | Dacoity and murder | Thirty-three persons were pursued; three killed and thirty escaped. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 22nd June, 1865 | Cattle theft | Two men prohibited from entering British territory. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | Reprisals | October, 1864 | Robbery | The robbers were pursued; three killed and four escaped; property recovered. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 21st August, 1865 | Robbery and causing hurt | Four persons sentenced to two years' imprisonment each. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 10th January, 1866 | Cattle theft | One person imprisoned for six months. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 22nd March, 1866 | Robbery | Two persons imprisoned for three years each. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 1st May, 1866 | Ditto | Three of the offenders were wounded, and the property recovered. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 2nd May, 1866 | Cattle theft | Two persons fined Re. 1, and security of R50 taken from each. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | Ditto | Receiving stolen property | Ditto ditto ditto. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 21st July, 1866 | Cattle lifting | Thieves were pursued by Mazaris, and three of them killed. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 30th January, 1866 | Robbery | Three persons sentenced to one year's imprisonment each. |
| Ditto | ... | Blockade | ... | 16th November, 1867 | Dacoity and murder | Order issued prohibiting them from entering British territory. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 20th June, 1867 | Cattle theft | One person sentenced to six months' imprisonment and fine of R15. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 7th August, 1867 | Receiving stolen property | Out of two offenders one was fined R40; the property of the second was confiscated, as he absconded. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 17th September, 1867 | Theft of a camel | Three men killed; one escaped. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 17th April, 1868 | Dacoity and murder | The murderers were pursued by Lisharis, and 16 of them killed. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 5th June, 1868 | Theft of cattle | Two men were killed. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | January, 1870 | Murder of a woman | Kattu and Babil fined R1,500 each. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 27th April, 1869 | Cattle lifting | One person imprisoned for three years. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 7th April, 1870 | Theft | Four persons fined R20 each. |
| Marris | ... | ... | ... | September, 1859 | Dacoity and murder | One Marri was killed and two arrested. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 21st December, 1859 | Ditto | One man sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment and fine of R200; one fined R100, in default one year's imprisonment; and five fined R30 each, in default six months, imprisonment each. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 13th February, 1862 | Robbery | One man killed. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 1st M[illegible] 1866 | Theft | Ditto. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | Janua[illegible], 1867 | Cattle lifting | Two men were killed in the pursuit, and 14 escaped. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 8th April, 1868 | Robbery | One man killed. |
| Ditto | ... | Blockade | ... | 28th June, 1858 | Ditto | Prohibited from entering British territory. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 8th February, 1859 | Theft of a camel | The price of the camel, R70, was recovered. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 18th June, 1863 | Cattle theft | Two persons sentenced to two years' imprisonment and a fine of R200 each, or in default six months' further imprisonment. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 20th October, 1866 | Robbery | One man killed in pursuit. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 29th October, 1868 | Cattle theft | Two persons imprisoned for two years each. |
| Ditto | ... | ... | ... | 20th June, 1870 | Robbery | One person sentenced to imprisonment for two years and a fine. |

## Appendix B.

Rules with reference to the reporting of Border Cases agreed to at Fort Munro, on the 8th September, 1882, between R. J. BRUCE, Esq., C.I.E., 1st Assistant Agent, Governor General, Baluchistan, and F. W. R. FRYER, Esq., Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khán, and notified in Darbar to the assembled chiefs on the 9th September, 1882.

*Rule I.*—In all cases of theft or other crime occurring under such circumstances that the members of one tribe suspect that the offenders belong to another tribe, an immediate report must be made to the Political Officer in charge of the tribe which has suffered, and if no report is made within one month of the occurrence of the case, no redress shall afterwards be given unless good cause be shown for the failure to report.

*Rule II*—In cases in which cattle or other live-stock are missing, and it has not been ascertained whether the cattle or other live-stock have been stolen or have strayed, a report must be made that the property is missing; and should the property be afterwards ascertained to have been stolen or misappropriated, a subsequent report will be required setting forth what tribe or what persons are suspected. Notice that the property is missing must be sent in within a month of its being missed.

*Rule III.*—In cases Nos. 1 and 2 it is not necessary that the thieves, or the tribe to which they are supposed to belong, should be named in the first instance; but information on these points must be given as soon as it is obtained.

*Rule IV.*—In all cases in which members of one tribe seek refuge with any other tribe on account of any crime they may have committed, or on account of alleged grievances, the chiefs of the tribe to which such refugees belong must send an immediate report stating with what tribe the refugees have taken shelter.

*Rule V.*—The chief of any tribe in which a refugee may seek shelter shall inform the Political Officer in charge of his tribe as soon as the act comes to his notice.

*Rule VI.*—Whenever a case which has been duly reported is settled without the intervention of a Political Officer, a report must be submitted by the chief of the tribe or tribes showing the manner in which it has been settled, and such settlement shall be subject to the approval of the Political Officers concerned.

*Rule VII.*—All reports made under these rules to a Political Officer shall be at once communicated by him to the Political Officer who may be in charge of any tribe or tribes implicated in the report.

# APPENDIX II.

## Appendix A

### To Sir R. Sandeman's Report on the Zhob Expedition.

*List of Sardars and Maliks of the Zhob, Kibzai, and Musakhel tribes (not including Bori) who joined the Agent to the Governor General's Camp.*

Zhob Sardars and Maliks including Kibzai.

Of the (Sardar's) Jogizai family—

Sardar Shahbaz Khán, Jelazai.
„ Shamar Khán, „
„ Dost Muhammad, „
„ Bangal, „
„ Muhammad Mir Khán, „
„ Tajudin Khán, „

Of the Ibrahimzai family—

Malik Hyder, Akhterzai.
„ Zarif Khán, „
„ Gura Khán, Daolatzai. This man is the sole leader left of the party who fought against us.
„ Wallo, „
„ Kamal Khán, Ali Khel.
„ Sanjar Khán, „
„ Pastah Khán, „
„ Muzhda Khán, „ (arrested).
„ Daolat Khán, Khwadadzai.
„ Khalik, „
„ Mulla Manik, „ (arrested).
„ Khushdil Khán, „ (arrested).
„ Mulla Hassan, „
„ Jungah, „
„ Mulla Daolat, „ (arrested; still a political prisoner).
„ Bisharat, „

Of the Shamozai family—

Malik Ramzan, Musazai.
„ Dadgul, „
„ Sultan Muhammad, Aluzai.
„ Sanjar Khán, Alladadzai.
„ Kowra Khán, Dostzai.
„ Muto Khán, „

Of the Mirzai family—

Malik Jehan, Fakirzai.
„ Dalel, Husseinzai.
„ Hyder, „
„ Madrak, „
„ Maling, Kamalzai.
„ Dilbar Khán, of Rud.
„ Kayim, Macharzai.
„ Sheikh, Mullazai.
„ Dad Muhammad, Ahmakzai.
„ Khudu, Ahmakzai. Submitted, but was too ill to come into camp.
„ Mir Hazai, Phatozai.
„ Sakandar, Rahimzai.
„ Mulla Purdil, Gordinzai.
„ Yusaf, Abdulzai.
„ Abamak, Khutkizai.
„ Dilosa, Nazardinzai.
„ Mulla Khurdil.
„ Dinak Khán.
„ Gharibjan.
„ Zeb Khá } Urgassi.
„ Mir Alam Khan, } Urgassi.

Of the Jelalzai family—

Malik Mahmud.
„ Gafur.

Malik Bankidad.
" Mulla Ahmed Shah.
" Rozi.
" Mulla Sarfaraz.
" Ramatulla Khán, Kamaldinzai.
" Din Muhammad, "

Of the Barut Khel family—
Malik Saidulla Khán.

Of the Sargari section—
Malik Tamas Khán.
" Shah Hussein.

Of the Batazai section—
Malik Gandak.
" Bisharat (arrested).
" Mulla Gahawar.
" Shadi Khán (arrested).
" Adam Khán.
" Lukman Khán.
" Mir Muhammad.
" Gowhar Khán (arrested).

Of the Ismailzai family—
Mailik Karimdad.
" Bisharat.

Of the Pakkazai section—
Malik Sultan Muhammad.
" Bisharat.
" Umar Khán.

Of the Gorazai section—
Malik Islam Khán.
" Karim Khán.

Of the Kilzai section—
Malik Bangar Khán.
" Mian Khán (arrested).
" Karam Khán.
" Mulla Daba.
" Jangi Khán.
" Samand Khán.

MUSAKHEL MALIKS.

Malik Sanjar Khán.
" Hassan Khán.
" Gul Mir Khán.
" Nadir Khán.

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## Appendix B.

*List of the Members of the Committee constituted to draw up terms of a settlement between the British Government and the Kakar tribes.*

BRAHUI SARDARS.

Sardar Assad Khán of Sarawan, C.I.E.
" Jam Ali Khán of Lus Beyla, C.I.E.
" Gauhar Khán of Jalawan.
Wadira Ahmed Khán, Bangalzai.
Sardar Dost Muhammad Khán, Lehri.
" Said Khán, Muhammadshahi.
Mir Mohim Khán, cousin of Sardar Gauhar Khán.
Sardar Muhammad Khán, Shahwain.

Mir Khán Muhammad Khán, Lango.
„ Saleh Muhammad, Musiani.
„ Umed Ali Khán, „
„ Shahbaz Khán, Jatak.
„ Sabzal Khán, Lothani.
Tomandar Mir Sardar Khán, Rind.
Wadira Fakir Khán, Magasi.

BILUCH SARDARS.

Sardar Mehrulla Khán, Tomandar of Murris.
„ Shahbaz Khan, Bugti.
Risaldar Jalab Khán, cousin of Sardar Mehrulla Khán.
Sardar Biluch Khán, Tomandar of Khetrans.
Mir Mehrab Khán, Dumki.
„ Kechi Khán, Shambani.

BRITISH OFFICERS.

R. I. Bruce, Esquire, C.I.E., Political Agent.
Captain G. Gaisford, B.S.C., Assistant „
Hak Nawaz Khán, Native Assistant Agent to the Governor General, Harnai

PRESIDENT.

Sir R. G. Sandeman, K.C.S.I., Agent to the Governor General.

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## Appendix C.

*Translation of the settlement made between Sardar Shahbaz Khan and the Maliks of Zhob, Bori and Musakhel, and the British Government.*

I.—That we, Sardar Shahbaz Khán, Maliks Dost Muhammad, Tajudin and Muhammad Mir, Jelalzai Jogizais, as well as all other Maliks of Zhob, Bori and Musakhel, now present, execute this agreement in token of our submission to the power and supremacy of the British Government, and we engage to prevent our tribesmen from raiding or committing crimes in British territory. Should any tribesmen commit a raid or an outrage we will seize him and make him over to the British authorities.

II.—That we, Sardars and Chiefs of Zhob, engage to prevent the return to Zhob of Shah Jehan Sardar Khail, excepting with the sanction of the British Government, after Shah Jehan and the other Chiefs who have fled with him have made full submission to the British Government, and on condition that such a request shall only be made by Sardar Shahbaz Khán, and a majority of the council (jirga) of the headmen of Zhob.

III.—That we, Maliks of Zhob and Bori, agree to pay within three months from this date a fine of R20,000 inflicted on us as a punishment for all attacks or offences committed by us against the British Government or its subjects.

IV.—That we the Musakhel Maliks agree to pay within three months a fine of R2,000 in condonement of the outrages committed by us in the raid on the coolies, and all other offences committed in British territory. Further that we will within this time produce Maliks Baik Khán and Wazir Khán to tender their submission.

V.—That we give the following men with two Motabars of the Sardar Khail, approved of by the Agent to the Governor General for Baluchistan, as hostages for the fulfilment of these terms; and they will remain present with the Government officers at Thal-Chotiali until the amount of the above fine is paid by us, or as long as the British Government consider their presence to be necessary.

VI.—It is distinctly agreed to by us, Sardars and assembled Chiefs, that the British Government has the right to protect the railway line and trade routes by placing troops in Bori or in any way that may be deemed desirable by the British Government. Should it be finally decided to occupy Bori, all the Sardars and Maliks will recognise the justice of the measure by becoming the faithful and loyal subjects of the British Government.

VII.—If the Government of India consider it necessary, in order to secure the satisfactory fulfilment of the terms now settled, to place troops in Zhob or elsewhere, they have the right to do so.

VIII.—The request of the Zhob, Bori and Musakhael tribes, that the British Government should take measures to protect the trade routes in their countries and settle internal quarrels and feuds between Sardars and Chiefs in the same manner as they do now with regard to the Maris, Bugtis, Khetrans, Kakars, and other tribes of the Thal-Chotiali district, will be forwarded

by the Governor General's Agent for Baluchistan for the consideration and orders of the Government of India.

☐ SEAL OF SARDAR SHAHBAZ KHÁN, *Jalalzai Jogizai.*
(Sd.) DOST MUHAMMAD KHÁN, *Jalazai.*
„ TAJUDIN, *Jalazai.*
„ PISTA KHÁN, *Alikhel.*
„ KAMAL KHÁN, „
„ SAUJAR KHÁN, „
„ SULTAN MUHAMMAD, *Alizai.*
„ HYDER, *Akhterzai.*
„ ZARIF, „
„ SAUJAR KHÁN, *Dadzai.*
„ RAMZAN, *Musazai.*
„ DADGUL, „
„ KOWRA, *Dostzai.*
„ MUTO.
„ MULLA KHURDIL, *Mirzai.*
„ JEHAN, *Mirzai.*
„ MACHAK, „
„ SIKANDAR „
„ GHARIBJAN, „
„ DINAT „
„ MULLA DALER, „
„ DAULAT KHÁN, *Khwadadzai.*
„ JANGI KHÁN, „
„ KHALIK, „
„ MULLA HASSAN, „
„ MULLA MANIK, „
„ TAHMAS KHÁN, *Sargari.*
„ SHAH HUSSAN, „
„ KHUSHDIL KHÁN, *Khwadadzai.*
„ MIR ALUM KHÁN, *Urgassi.*

(Sd.) GAWAR KHÁN, *Pakkazai.*
„ GANDAK KHÁN, „
„ SHADI KHÁN, „
„ ADAM KHÁN, „
„ LUKMAN KHÁN, „
„ MIR MUHAMMAD, „
„ KARIMDAD, *Ismailzai.*
„ SULTAN MUHAMMAD, *Pakkazai.*
„ BISAHARAT KHÁN, „
„ BISHARAT KHÁN, *Ismailzai.*
„ UMAR KHÁN, *Pakkazai.*
„ ASLAM KHÁN, *Goruzai.*
„ KARIM KHÁN, „
„ BANGAR KHÁN, *Kibzai.*
„ MIAN KHÁN, „
„ KARAM KHÁN, „
„ MULLA DAHA, „
„ SANJAR KHÁN, *Musakhel.*
„ HASSAN KHÁN, „
„ GUL MIR KHÁN, „
„ NADIR KHÁN, „
„ JANGI KHÁN, *Kibzai.*
„ SAMAND KHÁN, „
„ KHANAN, KUDERZAI, *Motibar of Bori.*
„ PAHALWAN, *Motibar, Bori.*
„ ALI KHÁN, *Shahbozai.*
„ AZIM KHÁN, *Alizai.*
„ LUNDAK KHÁN, *Kiderzai.*
„ HAJI, *Utmankhel.*
„ KALAKHAN, „

CAMP DULAI;
*The 22nd November 1884.*

(Sd.) R. G. SANDEMAN, *President,*
*Agent to the Governor General.*

## Appendix D.

**MAKAM.**

- **Ishak.**
  - **Rashid Khan.**
    - **Shahbaz Khan.**
      - Zargun.
    - **Shamar Khan.**
  - **Murgi.**
    - **Dost Muhammad.**
      - **Bangal.**
      - **Kalandar.**
      - **Gul Karam.**
      - **Samandar.**
      - **Sultan.**
      - **Shambi.**
      - **Musa Jan.**
    - **Nur Muhammad.**
      - **Shahin.**
      - **Baz.**
      - **Diwana.**
      - **Batil.**
    - **Fazul.**
      - **Gul Bahram.**
  - **Samand Khan.**
    - **Taj-ud-din.**
      - **Ahmed Yar.**
- **Nawab.**
  - **Shah Jehan.**
    - **Jalandar.** *(Killed.)*
    - **Shingul.**
      - **Muhammad Akbar.**
    - **Abdul Rahman.** *(No issue.)*
    - **Syud Khan.** *(No issue.)*
- **Kanoo.** *(No issue.)*
- **Akhal.** *(Insane.)*

## Appendix E.

*Route taken by the Agent to the Governor General, with approximate distances.*

| Date. | From | To | Miles. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 21st September 1884 | Quetta | Gandak | 15 |
| 22nd „ „ | Gandak | Kach | 16 |
| 23rd „ „ | Kach | Pil | 15 |
| 24th „ „ | Pil | Zandra | 8 |
| 25th „ „ | Halted at | „ | ... |
| 26th „ „ | Zandra | Gwoshki | 10 |
| 27th „ „ | Gwoshki | Chanter | 16 |
| 28th „ „ | Chanter | Wani | 5 |
| 29th „ „ | Wani | Smalan | 21 |
| 30th „ „<br>1st October „ | Halted at | „ | ... |
| 2nd „ „ | Smalan | Bagao | 10 |
| 3rd „ „ | Bagao | Duki | 12 |
| 4th to 7th October 1884 | Halted at | „ | ... |
| 8th October 1884 | Duki | Shabaz China | 18 |
| 9th „ „ | Shabaz China | Anambar | 24 |
| 10th and 11th October 1884 | Halted at | „ | ... |
| 12th October 1884 | Anambar | Dalai | 13 |
| 13th to 18th October 1884 | Halted at | „ | ... |
| 19th October 1884 | Dalai | China Rustomzai | 30 |
| 20th „ „ | China Rustomzai | Ali Kheyl | 16 |
| 21st „ „ | Ali Kheyl | Akhtarzai | 11 |
| 22nd to 26th October 1884 | Halted at | „ | ... |
| 27th October 1884 | Akhtarzai | Killa Saifulla | 11 |
| 28th „ „ | Halted at | „ | ... |
| 29th „ „ | Killa Saifulla | Haider Killa (Kajjah) | 16 |
| 30th and 31st October 1884 | Halted at | „ | ... |
| 1st November 1884 | Haider Killa | Killa Saifulla | 16 |
| 2nd and 3rd November 1884 | Halted at | „ „ | ... |
| 4th November 1884 | Killa Saifulla | Akhterzai | 11 |
| 5th „ „ | Akhterzai | Ali Kheyl | 11 |
| 6th „ „ | Ali Kheyl | Gwal Haiderzai | 13 |
| 7th „ „ | Halted at | „ „ | ... |
| 8th „ „ | Gwal Haiderzai | Ismailzai | 16 |
| 9th and 10th November 1884 | Halted at | „ | ... |
| 11th November 1884 | Ismailzai | Sharan Tangi | 16 |
| 12th November 1884 | Sharan Tangi | Kakha | 10 |
| 13th „ „ | Kakha | Murgha Kilzai | 12 |
| 14th „ „ | Murgha-Kilzai | Tangi | 12 |
| 15th „ „ | Tangi | Pezwan Kach | 8 |
| 16th „ „ | Pezwan Kach | Sara | 12 |
| 17th „ „ | Sara | Viast | 12 |
| 18th „ „ | Viast | Tornaki | 16 |
| 19th „ „ | Tornaki | Akrabai (near Mekhtar). | 21 |
| 20th „ „ | Akrabai | Wahar (near Anambai). | 25 |
| 21st „ „ | Wahar | Dalai | 11 |
| 22nd „ „ | Halted at | „ | ... |
| 23rd „ „ | Dalai | (Pathankôt) | 15 |
| 24th „ „ | (Pathankôt) | Makhlwar (near Saujawi). | 12 |
| 25th „ „ | Makhlwar | Chanter | 23 |
| 26th „ „ | Chanter | Gwoshki | 16 |
| 27th „ „ | Gowshki | Kowas | 12 |
| 28th „ „ | Kowas | Kach | 21 |
| 29th „ „ | Kach | Quetta | 31 |

## Appendix F.

*Saran and Sanetia Kakar Tribes of Zhob, Bori, and Thal-Chotiali.*

| No. | Sanjarkheyl Kakars. Section. | Sub-Section. | Village. | Name of motibar. | No. of fighting men. | Total fighting men. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | I.—Alikhanzai (Shamozai, Jalalzai). | Jogizie | Kushnub, Rodvela, and Kashmir. | Sardar Shabaz-Khan, Dost Muhammad Khan, Taz-ud-din Khan, and Shahjehan | 200 | | |
| 2 | Do. | Thalkhanzai | Hoduk | Muhammad Khan | 755 | | |
| 3 | Do. | Hussanzai | Sinjli | Ghafur Khan | 80 | | |
| 4 | Do. | Aghazai | Guda | Mir Hassan Khan | 100 | | |
| 5 | Do. | Miankhanzai | Khasara and Sinjli | Mula Ghuni | 100 | | |
| 6 | Do. | Kumaldinzai | Indoba | Rahim Khan | 100 | | |
| 7 | Do. | Karimzai | North of Khasara | Hafta Khan | 90 | | |
| 8 | Do. | Shahzai | Tashpa | Malguzar Khan | 260 | | |
| 9 | Do. | Shabozai | Dali, Morgha, and Dak. | Babul Khan | 52 | | |
| 10 | Do. | Mamozai | North of Khasara (Chila). | Rahmund Khan | 40 | | |
| 11 | Alikhanzai (Shamozai, Murdanzai). | Murdanzai | Muchan | Bostan | 750 | | |
| 12 | Alikhanzai (Shamozai, Allahdadzai). | Allahadazai | Talari and Mung | Sunjur Khan | 100 | ... | Alozai is included in Allahdadzai. |
| 13 | Do. | Alozai | Hud Alozai | Sultan Muhammad | 50 | | |
| 14 | Alikhanzai (Shamozai, Muchzai). | Muchzai | Arat Khula | Dadgul | 100 | | |
| 15 | Alikhanzai (Brahimzai, Ismailzai). | Shahzai | Burkha | Kanukhan | 60 | | |
| 16 | Do. | Kalunderzai *alias* Alikheyl. | Alikheyl near Lorha | Muzhda, Pista and Daduk. | 225 | | |
| 17 | Do. | Amozai | Karez and Gumba | Zarif | 150 | | |
| 18 | Do. | Saidzai | Shinkai, Jamalwala | Khilwat Khan | 155 | | |
| 19 | Do. | Mirjanzai | Lorha | Sher Muhammad Khan. | 50 | | |
| 20 | Alikhanzai (Brahimzai, Dowlatzai). | Hassanzai | Karezgi | Alif | 100 | | |
| 21 | Do. | Salavezai | Tirkha and Surtunga. | Dalukhan | 225 | | |
| 22 | Alikhanzai (Brahimzai, Shadozai). | Halimzai | Kujja | Daduk Khan | 200 | | |
| 23 | Do. | Paezai | Shagee | Zindak Khan | 100 | | |
| 24 | Do. | Khoidadzai | Kujja | Bisharut, Dowlut Khan. | 300 | | |
| 25 | Do. | Rahatzai | Hindu Bagh | Khusdil Khan | 100 | | |
| 26 | Do. | Mirdadzai | Khuchan | Saifulla Khan and Anawar Khan. | 100 | | |
| 27 | Alikhanzai (Mirzais). | Fakirzai | Rod | Mula Jehan, Mula Dilbar, and Sadik Khan. | 750 | | |
| 28 | Do. | Kamalzai | Dag | Mullung Khan | 200 | | |
| 29 | Do. | Nukrudinzai | Viala and Kujja | Dalel, Dinak, and Sikundar. | 750 | | |
| 30 | Do. | Ahmukzai | Kutch or Kats | Dad Muhammad and Khadun. | 100 | | |
| 31 | Do. | Mullazai | Malking, Khasara | Sheik Khanan and Dost Muhmmad. | 200 | | |
| 32 | Do. | Muchezai | Shinghur, Moghal China, Ghuz China. | Khushdil Khan | 100 | | |
| 33 | Do. | Paezai | Zhob | Lunda Khan | 30 | | |
| 34 | Alikhanzai (Pachuzai). | Alezai | Puttao Hud Zhob, Toi. | Amir Khan | 100 | | |
| 35 | Do. | Manikzai | Do. | Shadi Khan, Dad Khan. | 375 | | |
| 36 | Do. | Ismailzai | Kinara Toi | Gunduk and Gohar Adam. | 413 | | |
| 37 | Alikhanzai Ghorezai). | Vatarzai | Putao Toi | Majid Khan | 610 | | |
| 38 | Do. | Hotakzai | Do. | Azim Khan | 30 | | |
| 39 | Do. | Mahzai | Do. | Adin Khan | 100 | | |
| 40 | Do. | Shaibzai | Vuch | Islam Khan | 130 | | |
| 41 | Alikhanzai (Ismailzai). | Umarzai | Katki | Karimdad Khan | 70 | | |
| 42 | Do. | Usmanzai | Darri | Timir Khan | 100 | | |
| 43 | Do. | Marsinzai | Turun | Dasmal Khan | 50 | | |
| 44 | Do. | Shinzai | Bund | Lashkar Khan | 20 | | |
| 45 | Do. | Rorzai | Ghoza | Faizulla Khan | 60 | | |
| 46 | Do. | Kurumzai | Khoja | Bakidad Khan | 60 | | |
| 47 | Do. | Munezai | Shahtar | Zola Khan | 30 | | |
| 48 | Do. | Muhammadzai | Talak | Dadun Khan | 15 | | |

*Saran and Sanetia Kakar Tribes of Zhob, Bori, and Thal-Chotiali*—contd.

| No. | Sanjarkheyl Kakars. Section. | Sub-Section. | Village. | Name of Motibar. | No. of fighting-men. | Total fighting-men. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 49 | Alikhanzai (Hyderzai). | Idozai | Gwal | Fakir and Ahmadsha Baram. | 200 | | |
| 50 | Do. | Shadozai | Talak and Sornar | Sherdil Khan | 60 | | |
| 51 | II.—Haramzai | Haramzai | Milawar | Salu Khan | 100 | | |
| 52 | III.—Nathozai | Nathozai | Karezgai | Mulguzar Khan | 25 | | |
| 53 | IV.—Nasozai | Nasozai | Karkacha, Ragha, and Hindu Bagh. | Bashir Khan | 50 | 9,210 | |
| 54 | V.—Arabkheyl | Khudezai | Kurt, Orakai, Zungiwala, Dargai, Karez, Delai, Lahor, Nawa Viala. | Khanan, Puhlwan, Jamal Muhammad, and Shahbaz. | 300 | | |
| 55 | Do. | Shabozai | Dalaizai, Duru, Darzai, Tiruk, Turra, Kishkye, and Watgan. | Alijan and Nasiban. | 250 | | |
| 56 | Do. | Khidirzai | Toi, Viala, Kundur Kunstur, Buta, Baidar, Shikarez, Karez, Sultan Muhammad, China. | Sadak Khan, Sultan Muhammad, Gulzar and Lunduk Khan Raza Khan. | 100 | | |
| 57 | Do. | Alizai | Burnima, Sagri, China, Kuchi, Kuch, Kuran, Dilar, and Shirin. | Azim Khan, Rasul, Mir Hazar Almar. | 200 | 850 | |
| 58 | Arabkheyl (Humzazais). | Rustomzai | Dhund, Khiva Subra. | Lal Khan and Murad Khan. | 60 | | |
| 59 | Do. | Sadezai | Mekhtur | Habib Khan | 100 | | |
| 60 | Do. | Safarzai | Toda | Moman | 150 | | |
| 61 | Do. | Chalakzai | Toda and Mekhtur | Rakshan Khan | 50 | | |
| 62 | Do. | Shamazai | Wahar, Mekhtur, Nali, Kashkye, and Akrai. | Saneta, Azam, Nadan, and Chalo. | 100 | | |
| 63 | Do. | Mummazai | Mekhtur, Burdoda, Under, and Nali. | Sohbut Khan and Murdan. | 150 | | |
| 64 | Do. | Salarzai | Nali and Burdoda. | Sheru Khan | 160 | 770 | |
| 65 | VI.—Utmankheyl | Darzai | Sirka Jungle | Halim Khan | 30 | | |
| 66 | Do. | Malikzai | Karez | Shurab Khan | 60 | | |
| 67 | Do. | Umarzai | Shikarez | Kata Khan | 30 | | |
| 68 | Do. | Hussenzai | Mahol | Adiu Khan | 30 | | |
| 69 | Do. | Brahimzai | Sugur | Kala Khan | 60 | | |
| 70 | Do. | Paezai | Azghurluna | Dadun Khan | 30 | | |
| 71 | Do. | Khidirzai | Arabsin and Sirka Jungle. | Ali Khan | 50 | | |
| 72 | Do. | Shahbozzai | Rodlin | Kulla Khan | 60 | | |
| 73 | Do. | Nakozai | Arabsin | Haji Khan | 30 | | |
| 74 | Do. | Humranzai | Lashti | Usmon Khan | 40 | | |
| 75 | Do. | Idalzai | Arabsin | Dost Muhammad Khan. | 50 | | |
| 76 | Do. | Shahabinzai | Rodlin | Musa Khan | 16 | | |
| 77 | Do. | Adinzai | Lashti | Bhagwan Knan | 30 | | |
| 78 | Do. | Tarakzai | Shikarez | Mikhtar Khan | 12 | | |
| 79 | Do. | Sarkazai | Sugur, Mahud | Sola Khan | 80 | 608 | |
| 80 | VII.—Kibzai on Kiwzai. | Sullemonzai | Gosa | Jungi Khan | 250 | | |
| 81 | Do. | Kabulzai | Ginshi, Murgha | Bungur and Mihan Khan. | 400 | | |
| 82 | Do. | Haidarzai | Kos | Samand Khan | 100 | | |
| 83 | Do. | Gudezai | Toda | Mirsha | 50 | | |
| 84 | Do. | Deszai | Kakha | Mula Daha | 200 | | |
| 85 | Do. | Jamalzai | Herah | Sanea Khan | 30 | | |
| 86 | Do. | Nazurzai | Dubra and Nali | Khanan | 100 | | |
| 87 | Do. | Adinzai | Do. | Sanea Khan | 120 | 1,250 | |
| 88 | VIII.—Abdulazai | Mullezai | Malawar | Umar Khan | 225 | | |
| 89 | Do. | Pakhezai | Mina Bazaar, Karez, and Sawar. | Sultan Muhammad and Bisharut. | 264 | | |
| 90 | Do. | Bahawadinzai | Sinjlar, Kinara, and Lorha. | Dad Khan | 215 | | |
| 91 | Do. | Sawarzai | Sawar | Shinka | 200 | | |
| 92 | Do. | Kurjizai | Zazgi | Mir Ahmed | 40 | | |
| 93 | Do. | Khahzai | Nali | Durnai Khan | 45 | | |
| 94 | Do. | Umezai | Rakhbara | Din Muhammad Khan. | 200 | 1,189 | |
| 95 | IX.—Burut Kheyl | Muzghafarzai | Burut Chinna | Sadulla Khan | 120 | | |
| 96 | Do. | Khojakzai | Chinna | Alapla Khan | 100 | 220 | |
| 97 | X.—Parezunzai | Parezun | Aranbi(Hud Pishin) | ...... | ... | | |
| 98 | XI.—Thumnazai | Thumna | Ilaqua Hirat | ...... | ... | | |
| 98A | XII.—Naharzai | ... .. | ...... | ...... | ... | | |
| 99 | XIII.—Dumars | Hassni | Deh Yaru, Barkum, Thal-Chotiali District. | Narun and Ali Khan. | 375 | | |
| 100 | Do. | Zakpel | Kormai, Chunjun Durgai and Chinali. | Olia Khan | 150 | | |
| 101 | Do. | Yasinzai | Sinlez | Gulzar Khan | 75 | | |

*Saran and Sanetia Kakar Tribes of Zhob, Bori, and Thal-Chotiáli—concld.*

| No. | Sanjarkheyl Kakars. Section. | Sub-Section. | Village. | Name of Motibar. | No. of fighting-men. | Total fighting-men. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 102 | XIII.—Dumars | Khajakzai | Kats or Kuch | Ustrana Khan | 60 | | |
| 103 | Do. | Yakubzai | Zar-istargi | Juma Khan | 60 | | |
| 104 | Do. | Nurozzai | Azhburg (Hud Sinjawi). | Kot Khan | 75 | | |
| 105 | Do. | Khurzai | Baghao | Kurum Khan | 75 | | |
| 106 | Do. | Haidarzai | Do. | Khane Khan | 105 | | |
| 107 | Do. | Lalizai | Smallan | Mir Haji | 30 | | |
| 108 | Do. | Jalalzai | Basrah | Basrah | 60 | | |
| 109 | Do. | Bakezai | Smallan | Babu Khan | 30 | | |
| 110 | Do. | Alozai | Sinjawi | Umaid Khan | 5 | | |
| 111 | Dumars (Kanozai). | Shahizai | Pui | Bashir Khan and Dildar Khan. | 75 | | |
| 112 | Do. | Khananzai | Do. | Rassul Khan | 75 | | |
| 113 | Do. | Usmonzai | Do. | Sher Muhammad Khan. | 150 | | |
| 114 | Do. | Pandozai | Pahar Salam | Pista Khan | 75 | | |
| 115 | Do. | Hajozai | Pui | Mangu Khan | 30 | | |
| 116 | Do. | Khidirzai | Smallan | Ambar Khan | 40 | | |
| 117 | Do. | Bahlolzai | Baghao | Zardad Khan | 75 | | |
| 118 | Do. | Harzanzai | Sinjawi | Alam Khan | 50 | | |
| 119 | Dumars (Shabozai). | Kamalzai | Smallan | Mula Haji | 75 | | |
| 120 | Do. | Khidirzai | Do. | Lal Khan | 75 | | |
| 121 | Do. | Zunuzai | Do. | Abdul Rahim Khan | 50 | | |
| 122 | Do. | Bahawadinzai | Sarghand | Gulgai | 75 | | |
| 123 | Do. | Brahaezai | Smallan | Ramon Khan | 30 | | |
| 124 | Do. | Atalzai | Do. | Brahan Khan | 60 | 1,935 | |
| | | | | TOTAL | ... | 16,032 | |

(Sd.) R. J. BRUCE,
*Political Agent, Thal-Chotiáli.*

## *Musakheyl Tribe.*


| No. | Section. | Sub-section. | Village. | Name of Motibar. | Number of fighting-men. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | I.—Labarzais | Panzai Labarzai | Kajori | Baik Khan | 80 | |
| 2 | Do. | Dewazai | Do. | Sher Khan & Hasan Khan | 48 | |
| 3 | Do. | Mundezai | Do. | Khan Nomran | 80 | |
| 4 | Do. | Balelzai | Do. | Hassan Khan | 48 | |
| 5 | Do. | Khalozai | Do. | Sobha Khan | 40 | |
| 6 | Do | Barakzai | Do. | Moman Khan and Gulmir Khan. | 80 | |
| 7 | Do. | Brahimzai | Do. | Nadir Khan | 40 | |
| 8 | Do. | Ghumanzai | Do. | Umar Khan | 32 | |
| 9 | Do. | Dawatzai | Vadori | Shahbaz Khan | 100 | |
| 10 | Do. | Isazai | Chinee | Gulsher Khan | 32 | |
| 11 | Do. | Jalalzai | Do. | Bulloo Khan and Munduk Khan. | 40 | |
| 12 | Do. | Bashamzai | Do. | Sher Khan and Taib Khan | 48 | |
| 13 | II.—Umerzai | Pasezai | Paramji and Nai | Murghahan | 32 | |
| 14 | Do. | Jalalzai | Do. | Juma Khan | 48 | |
| 15 | *III.—Mungezais. | Lalezai | Kajori and Kulkul | Jalal Khan | 48 | * Descendants of Munge Khan, Durani, who settled in the Musakhel country and married a daughter of Niko Labarzai, to which section he became affiliated. |
| 16 | Do. | Daozai | Do. | Bahadur Khan and Pista Khan. | 20 | |
| 17 | Do. | Neknamzai | Do. | Gulzar Khan | 16 | |
| 18 | Do. | Malakzai | Do. | Chahargul Khan | 48 | |
| 19 | Do. | Ahmedzai | Do. | Dad Khan | 24 | |
| 20 | Do. | Sadozai | Do. | Yobi Khan | 56 | |
| 21 | Do. | Khidezai | Do. | Jan Muhammad Khan | 16 | |
| 22 | Do. | Ahmedzai | Do. | Sardar Khan | 20 | |
| 23 | Do. | Brahimzai | Do. | Dad Khan | 32 | |
| 24 | IV.—Bulelzais | Hamzazai | Bur Sahra & Rod | Validad Khan and Sinjur Khan. | 300 | |
| 25 | Do. | Mulezai | Dilhi Rod | Vazir Khan and Jalal Khan | 100 | |
| 26 | Do. | Hussenzai | Toi and Kasra | Paind Khan and Gullan Khan. | 320 | |
| 27 | Do. | Mughdudzai | Sarabha & Chalat | Jamal Khan and Futteh Muhammad Khan. | 100 | |
| 28 | Do. | Adinzai | Nakhol and Tor Khas Sahra. | Bazar Khan and Samand Khan. | 200 | |
| 29 | Do. | Kudezai | Tup & Chappar | Arab Khan and Malikdad Khan. | 200 | |
| 30 | Do. | Inzai or Hasanzai | Vahoo & Pitava | Ali Muhammad Khan and Gulam Khan. | 200 | |
| 31 | Do. | Jalalzai | Nalli | Lowng Khan, Miran Khan, and Sakhawat Khan. | 280 | |
| 32 | V.—Khundezai *alias* Shaikh. | ...... | Hud Musakhel | Kibla Khan and Bilunda Khan. | 64 | Said to be the ancient inhabitants of the country. |
| 33 | VI.—Alikhel | ...... | Do. | Mian Khan | 40 | |
| 34 | VII.—Murz Ghan. | ...... | Do. | Arsla Khan and Hows Khan | 100 | |
| | | | | Total | 2,93 | |

(Sd.) R. J. BRUCE,

*Political Agent, Thal-Chotiali.*

## "MUSAKHEYL."

It is said that the Musakheyl tribe came originally from Khorasan, and that they are Sarabunds and descended from one Shung Khan.





(Sd). R. J. BRUCE,
*Political Agent, Thal-Chotiali.*

*Sanetia.*

| No. | Section. | Sub-Section. | Place of residence. | Name of headmen. | No of fighting-men. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Mehturzai Mirzai | Mirzai *alias* Urgas | Urgas and Karez | Habu Khan | 20 | |
| 2 | „ „ | Ahmedzai | Urgas | Brech Khan | 40 | |
| 3 | „ „ | Jehanbegzai | „ and Karez | Habu Khan | 20 | |
| 4 | „ „ | Kamaldinzai | Karezgi | Mulla Talut Khan and Shaheamon Khan. | 15 | |
| 5 | „ „ | Esmailzai | „ | Hakim Khan | 5 | |
| 6 | „ „ | Lalukzai | „ | Lahore Khan | 4 | |
| 7 | „ „ | Kajizai | Urgas | Arsla Khan | 30 | |
| 8 | „ „ | Tahozai | Piroz-Kán | Bismilla Khan | 30 | 164 |
| 9 | Mehturzai Fazilzai | Fazilzai | Kán | Akuldin Khan, Dalel Khan, and Allahyar Khan. | 300 | |
| 10 | „ „ | Umerzai | „ | Mulla Shuku Khan | 60 | |
| 11 | „ „ | Karezai | „ | Inayut Khan | 10 | |
| 12 | „ „ | Bukshezai | „ | Koowat Khan | 10 | |
| 13 | „ „ | Jungizai | Piroz-Kán | Bukhtiar Khan | 60 | |
| 14 | „ „ | Muzzafurzai | Murgha | Tor, Gulkhan, Kolu Khan, and Rahimdil Khan. | 100 | |
| 15 | „ „ | Khowaza Khizirzai. | Yakuba | Huzrut Khan | 60 | |
| 16 | „ „ | Lalazai | Tulri and Murgha | Mulla Mir Afzul Khan and Malguzar Khan. | 100 | |
| 17 | „ „ | Hassuzai | Tuliri | Mulla Shah Buzurg Khan | 1,005 | |
| 18 | „ „ | Jamalzai | Kán | Dost Muhammad Khan | 100 | |
| 19 | „ „ | Paharzai | Murgha | Mulla Hamid Khan | 100 | |
| 20 | „ „ | Julalzai | Darrah | Baghwan Khan | 100 | |
| 21 | „ „ | Syedzai | Tor Barga | Aziz Khan | 30 | |
| 22 | „ „ | Kurmuzai | Urgas | Yaghbul Khan | 35 | |
| 23 | „ „ | Abdul Karimzai | Quetta | Malu Khan | 30 | |
| 24 | „ „ | „ „ | Urgas | Kuste Khan | 35 | 2,135 |
| 25 | Panezai | Allahdadzai | Karez in Pishin Hud. | Wahadad Khan | 300 | |
| 26 | „ | Umerzai | Karez in Pishin Hud. | Mulla Karim | 100 | |
| 27 | „ Umerzai | Hamaozai | Chinna | Khalil Khan, Bukhtiar Khan | 100 | |
| 28 | „ „ | Hussun Khanzai | Chuppur | Brahim Khan, Hakim Khan, and Payo Khan. | 25 | |
| 29 | „ „ | Notzai | „ | Pusta Khan | 20 | |
| 30 | „ „ | Shahzai | | Sultan Khan | 2 | |
| 31 | „ „ | Dowlutzai | „ | Kossim Khan | 3 | |
| 32 | „ „ | Brimzai | Gowal and Kuch | Muzdad Khan and Amir Khan | 22 & 40 | |
| 33 | Panezai Umerzai | Ikhtiarzai | Chuppur | Mulla Barat and Alam Khan | 30 | |
| 34 | „ „ | Shadozai | Karez in Pishin Hud. | Khanan Khan | 80 | |
| 35 | „ „ | Dadakzai | Lora in Pishin Hud. | Hárūn and Inayut | 100 | |
| 36 | „ „ | Salehzai | „ „ | Mehur Khan | 50 | |
| 37 | „ „ | Malehkhanzai | „ „ | Malik Khan | 50 | |
| 38 | „ „ | Mundezai | „ „ | Munde Khan | 10 | |
| 39 | „ „ | Mullazai | Kuch | Sulleman Khan | 60 | |
| 40 | „ „ | Shumozai | In Pishin Hud | Guldad Khan | 150 | |
| 40A | ...... | Sarprekra | Gulistan | Pir Muhammad | 50 | 1,193 |
| 41 | Sarangzai | Saezai | Gussahki and Khost. | Bhai Khan and Zikria | 220 | |
| 42 | „ | Brahimzai | Urchum, Laghamana Ispzindai Rod, Hamadun, and Tor Shor. | Baran, Gul Muhammad, Mulla Aslam, Mubin, Dost Muhammad, and Zainudin. | 363 | |
| 43 | „ | Adanzai | Hamadun, Cogai, and Tangi. | Wahab, Mustak, and Azam | 240 | |
| 44 | „ | Timarzai | Zirgai and Chesanamana. | Dowran and Din Muhammad | 200 | |
| 45 | „ | Jamalzai | Dirgi | Gullun Khan | 100 | |
| 46 | „ | Khadakzai | Pishin | ...... | ... | |
| 47 | „ | Mukhulzai | Hamadun and Khost. | Mohabat Salih | 36 | |
| 48 | „ | Surai | Chari Mehtarzai | Lowng | 70 | 1,229 |
| 49 | Bazai | Kuduzai | Burg, east of Quetta. | Majid Khan and Banu Khan, Mulla Baidulla, and Gaibi. | 600 | |
| 50 | „ | Mungezai | Sara Gurg, east of Quetta. | Sydal Khan, Nasir Khan, and Mushki Khan. | 300 | |
| 51 | „ | Atarzai | Lora (Pishin) | Arsla Khan | 100 | |
| 52 | „ | Halimzai | Near Taktu | Halim Khan | 40 | |
| 53 | „ | Gulzai | Injur Hill, south of Hindu Bagh. | Mulla Mir Khan | 50 | |
| 54 | „ | Safarzai | Kossim Killa and Khatokur. | Ikbal Nazir | 55 | |
| 55 | „ | Jullundarzai | Mohat, Barg, and Sarakula. | Mir Afzul and Niabut Khan | 57 | 1,202 |
| | | | | GRAND TOTAL | ... | 5,922 |

R. J. BRUCE,
*Political Agent, Thal-Chotiali.*

## "SANETIA KAKARS A."





R. J. BRUCE,
*Political Agent, Thal-Chotiali.*

*Sarghra Kakars.*

| No. | Section. | Sub-Section. | Place of residence. | Name of headmen. | No. of fighting men. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Sarora *alias* Sarghra | Shamozai | Hindu Bagh | Mulla Mir Khan and Sarfraz Khan. | 50 |
| 2 | " " | " | Ajram, Hud Pishin | " | 50 |
| 3 | " " | Gorezai | Hindu Bagh | Mulla Haroon Khan | 50 |
| 4 | " " | Shamgulzai | " | Shah Hussein Khan, Hamid Khan, and Tamas Khan. | 50 |
| 5 | " " | " | Kochlock | Nasir Khan | 60 |
| 6 | " " | Malezai | Hindu Bagh | Tamas Khan and Mulla Hamid. | 60 |
| | | | | TOTAL | 320 |

R. J. BRUCE,
*Political Agent, Thal-Chotiali.*

"SARGHRA KAKARS."




R. J. BRUCE,
*Political Agent, Thal-Chotiali.*

# APPENDIX III.

## FOREST ADMINISTRATION IN BALUCHISTAN.

### I.—Introduction of Forest Administration into Baluchistan.

Minute by His Excellency the Governor of Bombay, dated November 1879.

In November 1879, Sir Richard Temple, then Governor of Bombay, sounded, in a admirable Minute, the note of warning regarding the i nent destruction of the forests in the Assigned Distri Baluchistan. It was most tersely stated that, if the den made by railways and other requirements of civilization introduced, unaccompanied by restrictions placed on the destructive and wasteful habits unsettled country, such as unchecked firing of grass lands and forests and unlimited gr the result could be nothing but a rapid destruction of all forests; so thorough indeed, that after no one would believe that these valleys had ever been studded with trees at all. certainty of such destruction, however, Sir Richard stated, has been established by ma experience in India.

Most admirable and noteworthy are the suggestions which follow, proposing that rough examination of all forest tracts within workable distance from the railway line shou made; that any rights, interests, or tenures that the people might have in them should b tled; that the boundaries should be summarily determined, &c.,—in fact that permanent estates should be constituted, and that plans for their conservative management shou prepared, considered, and worked up to.

"Now is the time," Sir Richard Temple wrote, "to consider all this equitably in regard to both the and the people, while the matter is still a *tabula rāsa* in respect of claims and disputes."

This note of warning found a ready echo with the Governor General's Agent, Sir R Sandeman, and led ultimately to the appointment of Mr. Rind, of the Forest Departme the North-West Provinces, who joined at Jacobabad on the 23rd February 1880.

### II.—History of Forest Administration from 1880-81 to 1884-85.

#### A.—Sibi Plains Forests.

##### (i) *Forest Rules and Forest Settlement.*

Vernacular proceedings of the Agent to the Governor General, dated 10th February 1880.

2. On the 10th February the Agent to the Gov General issued orders regarding the Sibi Forests in his v cular proceedings, to the following effect:—

*Rules of February 1880 for the Sibi Forests.*

I.—Until proper boundaries of rakhs are fixed, the people are allowed to cut wood jungles not reserved for their own use or for sale to travellers; but the strictly prohibited from cutting and selling wood to any contractor or to the way officers as a contractor.

II.—The people are allowed to cut wood from jungles not reserved, to make plou other materials for cultivation, or for building their own houses; but, as possible, they should do so by cutting the big branches of trees in prefere young trees, and except in cases of an emergency, they are not allowed to cu from the root, and such wood they are strictly forbidden to sell.

III.—The people are allowed to take their cattle to every jungle not reserved to and they can cut small branches of trees to feed cattle, but they oug unnecessarily to cut the high branches of trees for this purpose.

IV.—It is the custom of the people of this country sometimes to set fire to in jungles, so that fresh grass may grow up the next year. This cust allowed to continue for the present under supervision, after obtaining perm of the Native Assistant Agent to the Governor General, who will send so to the spot to see this firing done; but while doing so, care should be that no unnecessary damage may be done to the tree jungles. If any one gently or purposely causes an unnecessary damage by fire to the jungles, them without permission of the Native Assistant Agent to the Go General, he will be liable to punishment. Absolute care must be taken fire shall extend to any reserved forest.

V.—Every one is allowed to cut grass from every jungle not reserved, for his own use or for sale, but no one may set fire to it save by permission as above laid down.

These rules have, it appears, not been annulled, and are still in force as regards undemarcated forests in the Sibi District, though they have been disregarded in practice for some time past; for at present fuel is brought for sale from the Thalli Forest, which is still unsettled, and in which no Government forest estates have as yet been demarcated.

3. Soon after his arrival in Baluchistan, Mr. Rind submitted a Report on the Sibi Forest, to the Agent to the Governor General, in which he recommended that certain areas should be protected and demarcated, and that a royalty should be levied on all timber brought for sale to the Sibi market. These proposals were sanctioned after some correspondence, and the results were that some 16,000 acres of rakh land near Sibi were taken up as a Government protected forest, and that a royalty was fixed and sanctioned on all fuel brought for sale rom open forests. This royalty or tax on all firewood, which was leviable in the Sibi bazar, was abolished from 1st April 1882, on a representation made by the Political Agent of Thal-Chotiali. The tax was abolished apparently on the ground that the wood thus taxed in the bazar might have grown on private land. This argument would seem reasonable; but the Forest Officer neglected at the time to give effect to the rules issued by the Agent to the Governor General and quoted in the last paragraph, in which the general sale of wood from areas still unsettled was strictly prohibited. Such sales seem, however, to have gone on unchecked and without yielding a revenue to Government, to which Sir Robert Sandeman considered at the time (and still considers) Government to be fairly entitled.

Agent to the Governor General's No. 382, dated 3rd June 1880.

Agent to the Governor General's No. 2356 A.G.G., dated 7th August 1882, to Assistant Agent to Governor General, Sibi.

4. In September 1881 the following rules were drawn up and sanctioned for the protection of the forests selected to be reserved:—

Agent to the Governor General's No. 2372 of 2nd September 1881.

*Forest Rules of September 1881 for the Sibi District.*

I.—No one shall cultivate, graze cattle, or cut wood within forest limits in any portion of the jungles enclosed and set apart for reproduction, without the permission of the Forest Officer.

II.—Cattle grazing within forest limits shall only be allowed in such portions of the jungles as the Forest Officer may from time to time determine.

III.—Any one committing any wilful damage in any way within the said forest limits shall be liable to fine, or imprisonment, or both.

5. The forests reserved in 1880, estimated to contain 16,000 acres, seem to have included some cultivation and a considerable amount of culturable land, which, as soon as the country had become secure from raids, were claimed. Whether the forest area contained any cultivation before Government took possession of it as a forest reserve, it would now be almost impossible to prove; or whether the zemindars had any legal right to the culturable land, it would be difficult to decide; but whatever may have been the aspect of the case in 1882, the Acting Agent to the Governor General decided that all cultivation should be excluded from the reserved forest area, and that a sufficiency of culturable land should be made over to the zemindars, as well as a certain area of forest land to meet their domestic and agricultural requirements in that respect

Abandonment of 11,000 acres.

Agent to the Governor General's No. 2465A.G.G., dated 15th August 1882.

The area of the so-called reserved forests was thus reduced, it is to be regretted, from 16,000 to 5,000 acres.

It was at the time proposed to wire-fence the areas left to Government, a proposal which of course is impracticable on account of its cost, as wire-fencing could not be put up under R1,300 per mile, and is unnecessary, as it has been found possible, in the Panjab and other provinces, to exclude grazing from well-demarcated rakhs without a fence.

6. In December 1882 Sir Robert Sandeman issued a new set of rules for the now reduced locally so-called reserved forests, which are still in force:—

Agent to the Governor General's No. 3640 A.G.G., dated 23rd December 1882.

*Forest Rules of December 1882 for the Sibi District.*

I.—No one shall cultivate, graze cattle, cut or collect wood or any forest produce within the limits of the reserved forests without the permission of the Forest Officer.

II.—Any one committing any wilful damage in any way within the said reserved forest limits shall be liable to fine, or imprisonment, or both.

III.—The following scale of grazing fees shall be in force for all cattle permitted by the forest officer to graze within the reserved forest limits:—

| | a. | p. | |
|---|---|---|---|
| For each camel | 4 | 0 | per mensem. |
| " buffalo | 3 | 0 | " |
| " bullock or cow | 1 | 6 | " |
| " donkey | 1 | 0 | " |
| " horse | 2 | 0 | " |
| " goat | 0 | 9 | " |

IV.—All animals found grazing within the reserved forest limits, without permission, shall pay double the rates laid down in Rule III.

V.—Any animal found within the permanent enclosures set apart as plantations or for natural reproduction shall be sent to the pound.

VI.—The zemindars of Bakra, Gulu Shahr, and Dehpal, whose villages are situated near the reserved forests, shall be entitled to wood for *bonâ-fide* repairs to agricultural implements free of charge, upon application to the Forest Officer.

VII.—The Forest Officer shall be entitled to let for cultivation for one season any piece of land within the said reserved forests limits that he may deem it advisable to have cultivated before planting with young trees; and the assessment he may fix upon such land shall be paid to the Forest Department.

The Political Agent, Thal-Chotiali, recommended that in Rule VII wood for the repair, of their houses should be allowed to the zemindars, as well as wood for the repairs to agricultural implements, but this was distinctly negatived by the Agent to the Governor General, as considerable portions of the jungles previously reserved had been handed over to the villagers.

Considering that more than two-thirds of the area originally selected to be reserved for Government, and more or less covered with forest growth, had recently been abandoned in favour of the zemindars, Sir Robert Sandeman's decision must be regarded as final.

Agent to the Governor General's letter No. 2356 A.G.G., dated 7th August 1882, to Assistant Agent to the Governor General, Sibi.

In fact, the zemindars have been treated with extravagant liberality; and, if they have consumed, sold, or destroyed by kumri cultivation or otherwise the forests on the land which was given to them for cultivation and the supply of domestic and agricultural wants, they must buy in the open market, and no new rights should be allowed to spring up, and no further privileges should be granted, and, if possible, the existing one, which cannot be very valuable at present, commuted.

The Agent to the Governor General foresaw the above-noted eventuality, and in 1882 addressed the Political Agent at Sibi in the following words:—

You are aware that it is of much importance that the villagers should not use up the reserves that were given to them for their own consumption, but not for sale in the bazar. If no check is placed upon their doing so, they will in time be reduced to making further applications to Government for jungle land, after pocketing the proceeds of the wood which they have sold.

Nevertheless, the forests have already been destroyed.

(ii) *Protection, Exploitation, and Improvement.*

Protection.

7. The records under the above heads are extremely scanty, and no pre-considered system seems to have been followed. Continuous protection has only been afforded to the area of 5,000 acres, locally known as the Sibi Reserved Forests. On the areas made over to the villagers in 1882, Mr. Lace, the Forest Officer in Baluchistan, states that nearly all forest growth has been destroyed already, and in the Thalli Forests the work of destruction described in Mr. Rind's first Report is said to have proceeded unchecked, contrary to the wishes of the Agent to the Governor General, who, in 1882, writes to the Assistant Agent to the Governor General, Sibi:—

Agent to the Governor General's No. 2356 A.G.G., dated 7th August 1882, to Assistant to the Agent, Governor General, Sibi.

I would remind you that the forests of Mull and Thal are reserved under the department, though no system of guard has been adopted.

As inhabitants return to the areas now secure from Marri raids, they clear land for cultivation, use it for one or two years, and then leave it fallow. They cut and hack trees and saplings, so that their sheep and goats may graze on the leaves and new shoots, and otherwise ruthlessly destroy the forest growth.

*Exploitation.*

8. The areas in the vicinity of Sibi have almost all been cut over of late years, mostly for the supply of railway constructive works. This refers to the Mittri Leased Forest, as well as to all other fuel resources situated sufficiently near Sibi.

*Improvement.*

Babul seed has been sown broadcast over low-lying plots in the protected and leased forests and a small number of other trees seem to have been planted here and there; but no systematic artificial cultivation of any extent appears to have been undertaken.

### *B.*—Hill Forests.

9. Nothing has been done in the hill districts of Baluchistan with regard to forest settlement and demarcation; and though several more or less interesting descriptive reports are forthcoming, no practical proposals, containing even approximately sufficient detail, appear ever to have been submitted to the Governor General's Agent, nor does it seem that the Forest Officer ever selected any areas the reservation of which he would specifically recommend. No forests have ever been protected against axe, fire, or grazing; and it is stated by the Political Agent of Quetta and Pishin that several areas on which a fair growth of pistachio existed a few years ago are now quite barren. The Kairani Valley is said to have contained a fair sprinkling of trees: one lone mulberry now exists just in the mouth of the gorge.

Exploitation by departmental agency has not been undertaken as yet, and artificial cultivation has, till now, been limited to the establishment of a few inconsiderable nurseries, some roadside planting, and some experimental planting, of which it is to be regretted only an insufficient record has been kept.

## III.—Results of Forest Administration up to date.

10. As might be expected, the practical results of a forest administration, such as is chronicled in the foregoing paragraphs, are not satisfactory, either from a general or from a financial point of view.

The only forest area secured to Government as a permanent forest estate is the Sibi Forest, said to contain about 5,000 acres; but even this area is burdened with a right, and is in evident danger of other rights springing up within it.

Moreover, having regard to the abandonment, in 1882, of a large area constituted in the same way, the permanency of the estate seems hardly sufficiently secured. The operations of former exploitation, departmental and otherwise, seem to have resulted in the denudation of all areas in the vicinity of the main centres of demand, though the protection afforded to the Sibi Reserved Forest, above alluded to, has secured an abundant coppice, showing that in many instances a reasonable protection alone is sufficient to secure the continuity of the forest growth.

The final results, as far as can be ascertained, of cultural operations undertaken by the Forest Department, consist in the plains in a small number of babul trees in the Sibi Forest, which, however, have suffered greatly from frost, and a babul nursery at the depot in Sibi, from which a considerable number of plants have been given for transplanting on the roads in and near Sibi.

In Quetta a nursery of two acres is partly stocked, containing a good many thousand plants of apricot and almond trees, 12 months' old, a considerable number of walnut trees, a few small unhealthy-looking chir plants, and some shisham, carob, and other plants, all of which have been cut back by frost. Another nursery containing almond and apricot exists in the forest bungalow compound, and a few beds containing the same species on a piece of ground near the gymkhana. Another small nursery containing several thousand plants is situated near the Langi Lora.

About 4,000 plants, chiefly apricot and almond, have been transplanted to a small piece of land behind the police lines, and 1,500 trees have been made over for road-planting in Quetta.

As regards financial results, the forest administration shows, up to the end of the present financial year, a deficit of R27,364, made up as follows:—

| Year. | Revenue. | Charges. | Surplus. | Deficit. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | R | R | R | R |
| 1880-81 | 14,376 | 16,416 | ... | 2,040 |
| 1881-82 | 18,617 | 17,682 | 935 | |
| 1882-83 | 5,039 | 11,962 | ... | 6,923 |
| 1883-84 | 4,752 | 16,911 | ... | 12,159 |
| 1884-85 | 6,089 | 13,266 | ... | 7,177 |

## IV.—Mr. Whittall's deputation to Baluchistan, and its results.

11. In December 1882 and January 1883, the Agent to the Governor General in Baluchistan, Sir Robert Sandeman, addressed the Government of India with a view to place forest administration in Baluchistan on a more permanent and a sounder footing. His proposals may be shortly summarized as follows.

From Agent to the Governor General, to Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 3641, dated 23rd December 1882.

From Agent to the Governor General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 277, dated 23rd January 1883.

A Forest Department should be retained in Baluchistan, as the work at present taken in hand in the Sibi District constituted only a small portion of the work which might be accomplished in Baluchistan and the Assigned Districts by an intelligent Forest Department.

In a country where it is as much the object to create forests as to preserve those which exist, it should not be expected that the Forest Department should pay its own way, but that by a liberal expenditure at the outset and careful management for a few years, an ultimate profit would probably be realised. The question of the supply of firewood for civil stations and cantonments had already assumed great importance, and in a short time it would probably present very serious difficulties. Sir Robert argued that, for the above reasons, measures to ensure the continuity of the available forest resources must be taken either by the protection of fuel reserves or by the creation of new forests, or by both means, and he proposed that a plan by which this work could be effected should be drawn up; and finally pointed out that the urgency of the question did not permit of any further delay. Sir Robert remarked that, unless the operations of the Forest Department were conducted on a very much more extended scale than hitherto, it would be better to abolish the department altogether and to entrust the work to the various district officers. The results of previous forest administration more than warranted this remark.

12. The result of these letters was the deputation to Baluchistan of Mr. Whittall, Deputy Conservator of Forests, belonging to the Central Provinces, with orders to draw up a comprehensive scheme of forest conservancy for Baluchistan generally.

Inspector General's demi-official to Mr. Whittall, dated 26th July 1883.

Mr. Whittall was instructed to arrange his Report under the two main heads :—

I.—General description of Baluchistan from a forest point of view.

II.—Proposals regarding forest conservancy in the future.

13. Mr. Whittall arrived at Quetta by the end of July 1883, and submitted his Report by the 30th October of the same year.

Mr. Whittall's Report of 30th October 1883.

The descriptive portion of the Report is excellent, but the proposals are not sufficiently complete and detailed to serve as a plan on which the work could at once be carried out.

The Agent to the Governor General submitted therefore to the Government of India, together with Mr. Whittall's Report, a request for the appointment of a trained Forest Officer to work out detailed proposals on the basis of Mr. Whittall's suggestion. This led to the appointment of Mr. Lace, Assistant Conservator of Forests, belonging to the Punjab.

Agent to the Governor General's letter to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 1238, of 8th April 1884.

14. Mr. Whittall's suggestions comprise—

(i) the taking up and settlement of—

(*a*) the Ziarat Forest;

(*b*) the Sharigh and Harnai Blocks on the railway line;

(*c*) the Tarai and North Thalli Blocks in the Sibi plains:

(ii) the establishment of artificial plantations—

(*a*) on the Kairani Block near Quetta;

(*b*) on the Khwara Block in Pishin;

(*c*) the rearing of planting material at Quetta.

Mr. Lace joined on the 1st October 1884, too late for settlement work in the hills, and nothing has therefore as yet been done to give effect to Mr. Whittall's suggestions regarding the settlement of the Ziarat, Sharigh, and Harnai Forests. Mr. Lace examined the plains forest, still unsettled, with a view to creating additional forest estates in the vicinity of Sibi and the railway line, as suggested by Mr. Whittall; but it would appear that the local Civil Officers questioned the necessity of an addition to the State reserves in either the South Thalli or the lower portion of the North Thalli and Tarai. The Forest Officer considered the

reservation of the hillocky, treeless upper portion described by Mr. Whittall as valueless, and the question could not be settled on the spot, as the Civil Officers, on account of urgent political work, could not find the time to visit the forests together with the Forest Officer.

The consequence was that Mr. Lace submitted no detailed proposals, and that nothing was done to further the progress of forest settlement in the plains during the past season.

Mr. Lace thinks that the South Thall should not be entirely abandoned,—an opinion which, it is believed, is shared by Sir Robert Sandeman.

The establishment of plantations on the Kairani Block near Quetta and on the Khwara Block in the Pishin Valley are questions which depend on engineering works of some magnitude, and no final proposals regarding them can be submitted by the Forest Officer till the question of irrigation has been carefully considered and settled by the Irrigation Department.

All ground available for nurseries in Quetta is either stocked with plants twelve months old, or cultivated during October last with apricot and almond seed. It is to be regretted that Mr. Whittall's proposals regarding the collection of pistachio seed were not carried out previously to Mr. Lace's arrival, for, when he came, the season had gone by.

## V.—Deputation of the Officiating Inspector General of Forests.

15. The Government of India decided that I should visit Baluchistan on the earliest opportunity, to discuss with the Agent to the Governor General the whole subject of forest administration in the province under his charge.

I consequently met Sir Robert Sandeman in Quetta on the 25th of March, the day after he arrived from tour. We discussed the main questions of forest administration in Baluchistan in a general way, and I laid before him my views bearing on the improvements I would suggest. It was then agreed that the whole subject should be considered at a Conference consisting of Sir Robert Sandeman, Mr. Barnes, the Political Agent of Quetta and Pishin, Mr. Bruce, the Political Agent of Thal-Chotiali, Captain McIvor, the First Assistant Agent to the Governor General, Mr. Lace, the Forest Officer in Baluchistan, and myself.

16. I had, in the meantime, inspected the localities near Quetta, which Mr. Whittall selected for the establishment of artificial plantations, and had submitted to the Agent to the Governor General the following Memorandum on the questions which I considered should be discussed by the Conference:—

"Sir Robert Sandeman has desired that the questions relating to forest administration in Baluchistan should be discussed at a conference which he will convene as early as possible. For the purpose of discussion, it will be most convenient to divide the province into two main portions—the plains containing the forests round Sibi, and the hills comprising the areas drained by the Quetta, Pishin, Harnai, and Pai Rivers, and their tributaries.

"2. The demand made on the hill forests will be, in the first instance, the requirements of firewood and building timber for the military cantonments in the Quetta and Pishin Valleys and those of the Pishin Railway for firewood.

"The first question to be discussed is, whether the above requirements shall be met from artificial plantations, or from the natural forest resources at our disposal.

"3. Mr. Whittall proposes to rely to a great extent on artificial plantations, irrigated from artificial lakes, and the chief proposal to this effect is the closing of the Kairani gorge. As far as I understand, this scheme has been declared practicable by the engineer officers who visited the spot. By means of a masonry wall, 100 feet high, the rainfall over a drainage area of some 12 square miles could be secured for artificial irrigation. Correct data as to the rainfall are wanting, but there is no doubt that the rainfall is heavier than in Quetta; and I think we might reckon on collecting a sufficiency of water for the irrigation of 1 acre on 4 acres of drainage area. Twelve square miles would therefore suffice to irrigate 3 square miles, or, say, 2,000 acres. A dam, 100 feet high, would probably stow the water back for 1 mile; but the average breadth of the lake thus created would certainly not be above 1,000 feet, and we could hardly count on an average depth of more than 20 feet. The storing capacity would therefore not be more than one thousand lakhs of cubic feet. This would probably suffice, as the lake would refill during thunder-storms, which I am informed occur occasionally during the hot months.

> KAIRANI SCHEME.
>
> *Note taken from Kennedy.*
>
> With dam 140 feet high, capacity of reservoir would be 235,000,000 cubic feet, but rainfall would probably only fill up 222,000,000 cubic feet, with the latter quantity an area of 1,900 acres would be irrigated (allowing 2½ feet of water per year).
>
> The scheme would cost R3,10,000 to carry out, and it would pay 1·84 per cent. for the first 13 years only (R3 per area irrigated being rate paid for water); after which the area irrigable would decrease, year by year, at the rate of 74 acres per annum. In 27½ years the whole reservoir would be silted up.
>
> J. H. L.

"Evaporation however from the superficial area of 50 lakhs of square feet would be very great; and this point must not be left out of consideration.

"4. As regards the cost of the undertaking, I am informed that the dam alone would cost half a lakh, or R25 per acre to be cultivated. Watercuts and channelling at 10 feet apart would not cost less than from R50 to R60 per acre; and what with planting, fencing, &c., the original cost of the undertaking would amount to R100 per acre, which, at the end of ten years, would represent a value of R162, taking it for granted that the cost of supervision and manual labour required for the watering will be repaid by the sale of grass.

"I doubt whether we shall be able to produce on the land in question more than 1,000 cubic feet, or 300 maunds per acre in 10 years. The cost of the wood at Quetta would stand us, therefore, at not less than R7 per 100 maunds, and the plantation would not yield more than 30,000 to 40,000 maunds per annum.

"Wood, which had cost R70 per 100 maunds to produce, could not well be retailed at less than R85.

"5. Mr. Whittall's next proposal comprises an area of 300 acres at Shaldara. The cost of the undertaking

would be somewhat less per acre, but the result would be more problematical and certainly less favourable. As regards the proposals in the Pishin Valley, neither Mr. Lace nor myself has seen the area in question; but Mr. Kennedy, who examined the ground, says that a diversion of the flood water of the Baisher River near Haji Khan would be feasible, and estimates the preparation of the ground per acre at R45 for a slope of 1 in 150, R67 for 1 in 100, R130 for 1 in 50. This plan does not include an artificial storage of water, and we are, therefore, entirely dependent on the rainfall in the hills during the hot months when irrigation is mostly required. I, for one, would not recommend a large outlay on this scheme before the question has been studied in greater detail, mainly with regard to the summer rains in the hills and consequent floods in the river.

"6. This disposes of the proposals made with regard to artificial plantations.

"From a careful study of the descriptions of the outlying tracts of the juniper forest found in Mr. Whittall's Report, it seems clear that nothing can be done towards their systematic working and exploitation, and our attention must consequently, in the first instance, be concentrated on the compact and extensive block called the Ziarat Forest. The area of this forest is said to comprise 400 square miles; and Mr. Whittall estimates that throughout it would yield, on an average, 800 cubic feet per acre, or 5 lakhs of cubic feet per square mile.

"Supposing, therefore, that even only 200 square miles of this forest could be opened up by roads, a fuel supply of 10 lakhs of cubic feet per annum would be secured for the next 100 years.

"7. From measurements on the map, I am inclined to believe that an average of 25 miles of road would bring the produce of this forest to the nearest railway station, distant 60 miles from either Quetta or Pishin. Road carriage at ordinary times, when no railway is building and no troops are moving, should not cost more than R1 per 100 maunds per mile.

"Cutting, loading, &c., would probably cost R10 per 100 maunds; railway carriage at 4 annas per truck per mile would amount to R10 per 100 maunds. This would bring the cost of exploitation and carriage to Quetta to R45 per 100 maunds; and if to this R10 be added for royalty and R10 for a road tax, we should be able to sell the wood in Quetta and Pishin at R65 per 100 maunds, which would be cheaper than we could produce it in artificial plantations. I doubt whether the levy of the road tax would quite repay for the outlay on roads; but we must take into consideration the general beneficial effect the opening out of the country by roads will have in other respects.

"8. If the systematic exploitation of the Ziarat Forests is to be undertaken, the first step that must be taken is the constitution as State reserves of the 200 square miles of the portion of these forests which are most conveniently situated with regard to export to the railway line; and how this is to be done is the next point we ought to consider and discuss.

"I understand from Mr. Bruce's letter, No. 2345, to the Governor General's Agent, that the Pathans claim the ownership in these forests; but that not only could this claim be disregarded, but that on certain conditions they would themselves willingly waive it. On discussing the question with Sir Robert Sandeman, I ascertained that no real proprietary rights exist; that the Pathans come up annually with their herds, which they graze during the summer time and supply themselves with such forest produce as they need for their own requirements, but that they exercise no other proprietary rights; and that in a settlement such as our Government has made in other provinces, the land would in all probability be entered as Government property.

"This being the case, there should be no difficulty in securing the areas required. A definite plan however for securing this end should be agreed upon.

"9. The protection of the areas, after having been constituted State reserves, will be the next point which should be discussed. I accept Mr. Whittall's description of the existing forest area with regard to reproduction, corroborated as it is by Mr. Lace, who has visited other parts of the forest; but I will not believe that the total absence of young growth is due to any unpreventible cause; and Mr. Bruce's statement in the letter above quoted that fires are very common in the higher altitudes, and the remarks made by Mr. Rind in his first report on the effects of fires observed by him, combined with the fact that a considerable amount of grazing takes place in the forest, is quite sufficient to account for the absence of reproduction. It will therefore be found necessary, in order to secure reproduction and a continuity of the forest growth, to exclude fires from the whole area of State reserves, and grazing as much as feasible, and certainly from those blocks which are to be worked for the next 10 years, or have been worked for the last 15 years, which would amount to 25 per cent. of their area.

"The above remarks with regard to selection, formation, and protection of State reserves apply also to the outlying forest blocks near Harnai and Sharigh, which it may be desirable to preserve.

"10. The next question is, whether it is desirable to protect the forest growth outside State reserves by the reservation of certain species of trees or by rules, and whether Government should derive an income from these outlying tracts by either the issue of permits or by taxation of the produce thereof.

I have not provided for this in the appended draft Regulation; and if it be contemplated, rules to that effect must be promulgated.

"11. The situation in the plains forests is, I understand, as follows. Government have assumed proprietorship and control of two forest blocks near Sibi, aggregating 5,000 acres. The area of these forests amounted originally to some 16,000 acres; but 11,000 acres were given up to cultivation in 1882. It seems that much good cannot be done by discussing at present whether the alienation of that area was at the time either necessary or advisable. The land has been given up and denuded of forest growth; but I think we must devise steps similar to those provided in the Forest Act to secure the permanency of the areas left to us, by requiring the sanction of the Government of India for the alienation of areas once constituted as State reserves.

"12. It will next be necessary to discuss the advisability of taking up additional areas in the South and North Thalli and Tarai Forests. I understand that these forests are, as a rule, claimed by the villagers who formerly resided there, but who long ago left them on account of the frequent raids made by the Marris. It is but natural that since security has been given to the country and the land has become valuable, claimants for its possession should come forward; but to me it seems most reasonable and fair that the Government, which by its administration enables cultivators to settle within these areas, should have the first claim to a considerable portion for its own purposes. If this is agreed upon, and it is considered advisable, from an administrative point of view, to extend the area of State forests in the Sibi plains, the way and manner in which the forest settlement should be carried out need only be considered.

"13. With regard to the advisability of increasing this area, I am sorry to say that no experiments have ever been made as to the yield per acre of the forests at our disposal; but I doubt whether an annual outturn of above 5 maunds per acre per annum could be counted upon. This would represent an annual yield of 25,000 maunds from the 5,000 acres contained in the Sibi Forests. At present, however, the whole area has been cut over, and no outturn can be expected for some years to come. Even without additions of new areas, the requirements of the Sibi station might be met; and when the railway has once been completed, the likelihood of sudden demands on account of the movement of troops or for constructive works will probably cease, and the only question to be answered is, whether it would be possible to supply firewood to the railway from the more distant forests at prices sufficiently low to compete with Sind fuel and Kurrachee coal.

"The forest areas in which it might be possible to obtain State forests lie at an average of 16 miles from the railway. At the present rate of carriage, it would be quite impossible to utilize them for railway fuel; the cost would be prohibitive. But we must look further ahead; and I see no reason why, at some future time when military movements and railway construction have ceased in this vicinity, camel carriage should not be as cheap here as in the Punjab; and under these circumstances the cost of transport of fuel to the railway line would not be prohibitive.

"If, however, we postpone the securing of the sources of supply till then, nothing of the forest in all probability will be left. Here again we require rules for the creation and protection of State forests.

"The areas made over to the villagers in 1882 are already, so Mr. Lace informs me, almost entirely denuded of forest growth. Whether, and to what extent, such forest areas in private possession should be protected by the reservation of certain species of trees, or by general rules, might also be discussed.

"14. The Mittri Forest, owned by Sirdar Asad Khan and situated in the Khan of Khelat's territory, is, from its vicinity to Sibi and the railway line, its favourable position on the banks of the Nari River, and its composition of good coppice trees, extremely valuable. The greater portion of this forest has been cut over, and it will be some years before it can yield again. The arrangement at present in force, as regards the working of this forest, is no doubt a financial success, securing to Government half of the net income. It is, however, no safeguard of the permanency of the forest, which already in some portions is cut up by cultivation. Whether it is advisable to ensure this forest against destruction, should be discussed, as well as the means by which this could be effected. The forest being situated in the territory of the Khan of Khelat, I suppose this can only be done by the execution of a formal lease.

"15. It will be necessary to enclose small plots of forest lands in many parts of Baluchistan, in the plains as well as in the hills, against outside interference of any kind, with a view to ascertain by practical experiments the effects of natural reproduction, as well as of planting in all manners of aspects and all manners of conditions represented in this country.

"How effect can be given to this with as little delay as possible, should also form part of our discussion.

"16. The time seems to have arrived for the introduction of Forest Regulations, under which State forests can legally be constituted and protected, which provide for the protection of forest produce in transit, penalties, and procedure, &c.; and I beg to submit a draft of a set of such rules for discussion, which might be submitted for sanction, with such alterations and in such form as may be decided in conference and approved of by the Agent to the Governor General.

"17. The last question that in my opinion needs discussion is the relationship of the Forest Officers in Baluchistan to the Revenue authorities.

"It has been generally acknowledged throughout India that a Forest Officer in charge of a Division should, on the one hand, be the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner in forest work, but that, on the other hand, his powers to issue orders and instructions to tahsildars and other Revenue subordinates, in matters regarding the forest work of the country, should be extended, and that, with the special sanction of the Government, he might be invested with magisterial powers.

"I beg to append a draft notification on this point, which may be discussed by the conference:—

## *Draft Forest Regulation for the Baluchistan Agency.*

## CHAPTER I.

### PRELIMINARY.

"This Regulation may be called the Baluchistan Forest Regulation of 18 . It extends to all territories for the time being part of the Baluchistan Agency: provided that the Governor General's Agent in Baluchistan may, by notification in the Agency orders, exempt any place from its operation; and it shall come into force on such day as the Governor General's Agent in Baluchistan may in the Agency orders direct.

"2. In this Regulation, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context,—

"'Agent' means the Governor General's Agent in Baluchistan.

"'Deputy Commissioner' means the Chief Revenue Officer of the district; also called Political Agent in Baluchistan.

"'Forest' means any land subject to this Regulation.

"'Forest Officer' means any person appointed by name or as holding an office by or under the orders of the Governor General in Council, or the Agent, to be Conservators, Deputy Conservators, Assistant Conservators, Sub-Assistant Conservators, Forest Rangers, Foresters, or Forest Guards, or to discharge any function of a Forest Officer under this Regulation.

"'Tree' includes stumps and brushwood.

"'Timber' includes trees when they have fallen or have been felled and all wood whether cut up, or fashioned, or hollowed out for any purpose or not.

"'Forest produce' includes the following things when found in or brought from a forest, that is to say, minerals including limestone, laterite and earth oil, surface oil, trees, timber, plants, grass, flowers, seeds, fruits, gums, charcoal, honey, wax, skins.

"'Forest offence' means an offence punishable under this Regulation.

"'Cattle' includes camels, buffaloes, horses, mares, geldings, ponies, colts, fillies, mules, asses, rams, ewes, sheep, lambs, goats, and kids.

"'Magistrate' means a magistrate of the 1st or 2nd class, and of the 3rd class when he is specially empowered by the Agent.

## CHAPTER II.

### Of State Forests.

"3. The Agent may, by notification in the Agency orders, constitute any woodland or grazing ground or any other land which is the property of Government a State forest. Such notification shall state the district in which the land is situated, and shall specify its limits according to boundary-marks erected or otherwise, and shall declare the same to be a State forest from a date to be fixed by such notification. From the date thus fixed the land shall be deemed to be a State forest.

"4. The Deputy Commissioner of the district shall, before such date fixed in such notification, cause a translation thereof in the language of the country to be published in the villages in the neighbourhood of the forest, and in such villages which have been accustomed to graze their flocks in, and in the vicinity of, such forest.

"5. Whenever a State forest is not bounded by a road, stream, or other existing well-defined boundary-mark, it shall be demarcated in such other manner as the Agent may direct.

"6. No right of any description adverse to Government shall be acquired in or over a State forest by lapse of time or otherwise.

"7. In any State forest the Chief Forest Officer of Baluchistan may, from time to time, with the concurrence of the Political Agent, and having obtained the previous sanction of the Agent, determine what roads and pathways shall be authorized for public traffic, and may cause all other roads and pathways to be closed, either permanently or for a time only.

"Public notice of the closing of any existing road or pathway shall be duly given.

"8. Any person who—

"(a) sets fire to a State forest, or kindles, or carries any fire, or leaves any fire kindled by him in, or in the vicinity of, a State forest, without effectually preventing the danger of the fire spreading into a State forest, or who in a State forest—

"(b) kindles or carries any fire at such seasons and contrary to such manner as the Forest Officer specially empowered by the Agent in this behalf may from time to time notify;

"(c) trespasses or pastures cattle, or permits cattle to trespass off any road or pathway authorized for any public traffic;

"(d) causes any damage by negligence in felling any tree or in dragging any timber;

"(e) fells, girdles, marks, lops, taps, uproots, or burns any tree or strips off the bark or the leaves from, or otherwise damages the same;

"(f) quarries stone, burns lime or charcoal, or collects or subjects to any manufacturing process, or removes, any forest produce;

"(g) clears, cultivates, or breaks up any land for cultivation or any other purpose;

"(h) poisons water or sets traps or snares;

"(i) hunts, shoots, or fishes—

shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both, in addition to such compensation for damage done to the forest as the convicting Court may direct to be paid.

"9. Nothing in the foregoing section shall be deemed to prohibit any act done—

"(a) under the authority of a Forest Officer duly empowered to grant such authority;

"(b) in pursuance of any privileges recorded at the time the State forest was notified, or hereafter specially permitted under the signature of the Agent. Such privilege may extend to the permission to graze cattle, or remove any forest produce for the use of the person individually or of his family, but not for the purposes of trade;

"(c) under any rules made by the Agent and sanctioned by the Governor General in Council. The Agent may at any time cancel any privilege permitted under this section.

"10. The rules passed under Section 9 (c) may extend to all or any State forests or to part of a State forest; and they may—

"(a) regulate the cutting, sawing, conversion, and removal of trees and timber, the cutting of grass and pasturing of cattle, and the collection and removal of forest produce;

"(b) regulate the quarrying of stone, prospecting for and extraction of oil, and the burning of lime and charcoal;

"(c) regulate hunting, shooting, fishing, and setting of traps and snares;

"(d) prescribe, or authorize any Forest Officer to prescribe, subject to the control of the Agent, the fees, royalties, or other payments for timber, grazing or other natural produce, and the manner in which such fees, royalties, or payments shall be levied, whether in transit or partly in transit or otherwise.

"The Agent may, by notification in the Agency orders, cancel, or, with the previous sanction of the Governor General in Council, modify all or any rules made under this section.

"11. The Agent may, with the previous sanction of the Governor General in Council, by notification in the Agency orders, direct that, from a date fixed by such notification, any State forest or any portion thereof shall cease to be a State forest. From the date so fixed, such forest or portion thereof shall cease to be a State forest.

## CHAPTER III.

### Protection of Trees outside the State Forests.

"12. The Agent may, from time to time by notification in the Agency orders, declare any class of trees growing outside State reserves and on any land not paying revenue at the time being to be reserved to Government from a date fixed by such notification, and may also alter or cancel such declaration.

## CHAPTER IV.

"13. The Chief Forest Officer of Baluchistan may, subject to the control of the Agent, establish stations or chaukis for the examination of timber or other forest produce and for the collection of dues leviable for the same within the limits of or outside any State forests: provided that the name and situation of such station and of the route on which it is situated shall be publicly notified in the towns and villages in the neighbourhood.

"14. No timber or other forest produce shall be taken out of any State forest, except by a route on which such a station has been established, or by such other route as may be sanctioned by the Forest Officer.

## CHAPTER V.

### Of Cattle Trespass.

"15. Cattle trespassing in a State forest shall be deemed to be cattle doing damage to a public plantation within the meaning of the 11th Section of the Cattle Trespass Act, 1871, and may be seized and impounded as such by any Forest Officer or Police Officer specially authorized by the Political Agent of the district, provided that it is optional with the Forest Officer to proceed against the owner of such cattle under Section 8 of this Regulation.

## CHAPTER VI.

### Penalties and Procedure.

"16. When there is reason to believe that a forest offence has been committed in respect of any timber or forest produce, such timber or produce, together with all tools, carts and cattle used in committing any such offence, may be seized by any Forest Officer or Police Officer.

"Every officer seizing any property under this section shall place on such property, or the receptacle (if any) in which it is contained, a mark indicating that the same has been so seized, and shall, as soon as may be, make a report of such seizure to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence on account of which the seizure has been made:

"Provided that when the timber or forest produce with respect to which such offence is believed to have been committed is the property of Government, and the offender is unknown, it shall be sufficient if the officer makes, as soon as may be, a report of the circumstances to his official superior.

"17. Upon the receipt of any such report, the Magistrate shall take such measures as may be necessary for the trial of the accused and the disposal of the property according to law.

"18. When any person is convicted of a forest offence, all timber or forest produce in respect of which such offence has been committed, and all tools, carts, and cattle used in committing such offence, shall be liable, by order of the convicting Magistrate, to confiscation. Such confiscation may be in addition to any other punishment prescribed for such offence.

"19. When the trial of any forest offence is concluded, any timber or forest produce in respect of which such offence has been committed shall, if it is the property of Government, or has been confiscated, be taken possession of by a Forest Officer duly empowered in this behalf; and in any other case may be disposed of in such manner as the Court may order.

"20. When the offender is not known or cannot be found, the Magistrate enquiring into the offence, if he finds that an offence has been committed, may, on application in this behalf, order the property in respect of which the offence has been committed to be confiscated and taken possession of by a Forest Officer duly empowered in this behalf, or to be made over to such Forest Officer or other person as the Magistrate considers entitled to the same:

"Provided that no such order shall be made until the expiration of one month from the date of seizing such property, or without hearing the person (if any) claiming any right thereto and the evidence (if any) which he may produce in support of his claim.

"The Magistrate shall either cause a notice of any application under this section to be served upon any person whom he has reason to believe is interested in the property seized, or shall publish such notice in any way which he thinks fit.

"21. The Magistrate may, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, direct the sale of any property seized under Section 19, and subject to speedy and natural decay, and may deal with the proceeds as he might have dealt with such property if it had not been sold.

"22. Any person claiming to be interested in the property seized under Section 15 may, within one month from the date of any order passed under Sections 17, 18, and 19, present an appeal therefrom to the Court to which orders made by such Magistrate are ordinarily appealable, and the order passed on such appeal shall be final.

"23. When an order for the confiscation of any property has been passed under Section 17 or 19, and the period limited by Section 21 for presenting an appeal from such order has elapsed, and no such appeal has been presented, the Appellate Court may confirm such order in respect of the whole or a portion of such property. Such property or portion, as the case may be, shall vest in the Government free from all incumbrances.

"24. Nothing hereinbefore contained shall be deemed to prevent any officer specially empowered in this behalf by the Agent from directing at any time the immediate release of any property seized under Section 15 and the withdrawal of any charge made in respect of such property.

"25. Whoever, with intent to cause damage or injury to the public or to any person, or to cause wrongful gain as defined in the Indian Penal Code,—

"(*a*) knowingly counterfeits upon any timber or standing tree a mark used by Forest Officers to indicate that such timber or tree is the property of the Government or of some person; or that it may lawfully be cut and removed by some person; or

"(*b*) unlawfully affixes to any timber or standing tree a mark used by Forest Officers; or that it may lawfully be cut and removed by some person; or

"(*c*) alters, defaces, or obliterates any such mark placed on any timber or standing tree by or under the authority of a Forest Officer; or

"(*d*) alters, moves, destroys, or defaces any boundary-mark of any forest—

shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

"26. Any Forest Officer or Police Officer may, with the authority of the Political Agent of the district, and without a warrant, arrest any person reasonably suspected of having been concerned in any forest offence, if such person refuses to give his name or residence, or gives a name or residence which there is reason to believe to be false, or if there is reason to believe that he will abscond. Every officer making an arrest under this section shall, without unnecessary delay, take or send the person arrested before a Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case, or to the nearest police station, and the officer in charge of such station shall thereupon act according to law.

"27. Any Forest Officer or Police Officer who vexatiously and unnecessarily seizes any property on pretence of seizing property liable to confiscation under this Regulation, or who vexatiously and unnecessarily arrests any person, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. Any fine so imposed, or any portion thereof, shall, if the convicting Magistrate so direct, be given as compensation to the person aggrieved by such seizure or arrest.

"28. Every Forest Officer and Police Officer shall prevent, and may interfere for the purpose of preventing, the commission of any forest offence.

"29. Nothing in this Regulation shall be deemed to prevent any person from being prosecuted under any other law for any act or omission which constitutes a forest offence, or from being liable under such other law to any higher punishment or penalty than that provided by this Regulation or the rules made hereunder:

"Provided that no person shall be punished twice for the same offence.

"30. Any Forest Officer specially empowered in this behalf by the Agent may accept from any person reasonably suspected of having committed any forest offence, other than an offence under Section 24 or 26, a sum of money by way of compensation for the offence which may have been committed; and where any property has been seized liable to confiscation, may release the same on payment of the value thereof as estimated by such officer.

"On the payment of such sum of money or such value, or both, as the case may be, to such officer, the accused person, if in custody, shall be discharged, the property seized shall be released, and no further proceedings shall be taken against such person or property.

"31. When in any proceedings taken under this Regulation, or, in consequence of anything done under this Regulation, a question arises as to whether any timber or forest produce is the property of the Government, such timber or produce shall be presumed to be the property of the Government until the contrary is proved.

"32. Any person contravening any provision of this Regulation, and of any rule made under the authority conferred by this Regulation, for the breach of which no special penalty is provided, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.

## CHAPTER VII.

### Of Forest Officers.

"33. The Agent may invest any Forest Officer by name, or as holding an office, with all or any of the following powers (that is to say):—

"(*a*) the powers of a Civil Court to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents;

"(*b*) powers to issue search-warrants under the Code of Criminal Procedure;

"(*c*) power to hold enquiries into forest offences, and in the course of such enquiries to receive and record evidence;

"(*d*) power to notify seasons and manner in which fire may be kindled, kept, or carried in a State forest;

"(*e*) power to grant any permission referred to in Sections 9 (*a*), 10 (*d*), and 16;

"(*f*) power to take possession of property under this Regulation;

"(*g*) power to direct the release of property or withdrawal of charges.

"(*h*) power to accept compensation for forest offences;

and may withdraw any powers so conferred.

"Any evidence recorded under clause (*c*) of this section shall be admissible in any subsequent trial before a Magistrate of the alleged offender: Provided that it has been taken in the presence of the accused person and recorded in the manner provided by Section 333, 334, or 335 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

"34. All Forest Officers shall be deemed to be public servants within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code.

"35. No suit or criminal prosecution shall lie against any public servant for anything done or omitted by him in good faith under this Regulation.

"36. Except with the permission in writing of the Agent, no Forest Officer shall, as principal or agent, trade in timber or forest produce, or be or become interested in any lease or mortgage of any forest, or in any contract for working any forest, whether in British or foreign territory.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### MISCELLANEOUS.

"37. The Agent may make rules consistent with this Regulation—

"(a) to declare by what Forest Officer or class of Forest Officers the powers or duties conferred or imposed by or under this Regulation on a Forest Officer shall be exercised or performed;

"(b) to regulate the rewards to be paid to officers and informers from the proceeds of fines and confiscations under this Regulation, or from the public treasury; and

"(c) generally to carry out the provisions of this Regulation.

"38. Every person who is permitted by the Forest Officer, or under Section 9 (b) of this Regularion, to take any forest produce from, or to pasture cattle in, a State forest; and

"every person who is employed by any such person in such forest; and

"every person in any village contiguous to such forest who is employed by the Government, or who receives emoluments from the Government for services to be performed to the community—

"shall be bound to furnish, without unnecessary delay, to the nearest Forest Officer or Police Officer, any information he may possess respecting the occurrence of a fire in or near such forest, or the commission of, or intention to commit, any forest offence; and shall assist any Forest Officer or Police Officer demanding his aid—

"(a) in extinguishing any fire occurring in such forest;

"(b) in preventing any fire which may occur in the vicinity of such forest from spreading to such forest;

"(c) in preventing the commission in such forest of any forest offence; and

"(d) when there is reason to believe that any such offence has been committed in such forest, in discovering and arresting the offender.

"39. All money, other than fines, payable to Government under this Regulation, or under any rule made hereunder, or on account of the price of any timber or forest produce, or of expenses incurred in the execution of this Regulation in respect of such timber or forest produce, may, if not paid when due, be recovered, under the law for the time being in force, as if it were an arrear of land revenue.

"40. When any such money is payable for or in respect of any forest produce, the amount thereof shall be deemed to be a first charge on such produce; and such produce may be taken possession of by a Forest Officer duly empowered in this behalf, and may be retained by him until such amount has been paid.

"If such amount is not paid when due, such Forest Officer may sell such produce by public auction, and the proceeds of sale shall be applied first in discharging such amount.

"The surplus (if any), if not claimed within two months from the date of the sale by the person entitled thereto, shall be forfeited to Government.

"41. The Government shall not be responsible for any loss or damage which may occur in respect of any timber or other forest produce while at a station established under Section 12, or while detained elsewhere for the purposes of this Regulation; and no Forest Officer shall be responsible for any such loss or damage unless he causes the same negligently, maliciously, or fraudulently.

"42. Whenever it appears to the Agent that any land is required for any of the purposes of this Regulation, such land shall be deemed to be needed for a public purpose within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act 1870, Section 4.

"43. All rules made by the Agent under this Regulation shall be published in the Agency orders, and shall thereupon have the force of law.

"All powers conferred by this Regulation on the Agent may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires.

### *Draft Rules regarding relation of Civil and Forest Officers in Baluchistan.*

"The duties of the Chief Forest Officer in Baluchistan are both those of a Conservator and of a Divisional Officer.

"I.—In his capacity of Conservator, he will be the professional adviser of the Governor General's Agent, and will control matters of finance under the provisions of the Forest Code. He will have the power to make transfers from one district to another, and sanction estimates for works. No transfers shall, however, be made without the consent of the Deputy Commissioner.

"II.—In his capacity of Divisional Officer, the Chief Forest Officer will be subordinate to the Deputy Commissioner in the following manner:—

"The Deputy Commissioner of the district will be *primâ facie* in charge of all Government forests in his district, whether State forests or otherwise.

"The Forest Officer will be his assistant in forest matters, and will receive no orders regarding forest business otherwise than through the Deputy Commissioner. On the other hand, the Deputy Commissioner shall issue no orders regarding forest business but through the Forest Officer.

"The Forest Officer will, as assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, issue orders direct to tahsildars and other revenue subordinates.

"III.—The Forest Officer will submit through the Deputy Commissioner an annual plan of working, arranged under the same main headings as the prescribed annual reports for the sanction of the Governor General's Agent. This plan should reach the Governor General's Agent before the 1st of February.

"IV.—Within the provisions of this sanctioned plan, and on matters of ordinary routine such as the cutting of boundary lines already fixed, repairs of boundary pillars, fire tracing, establishment of plantations in tracts made over, &c., the Forest Officer may issue orders without reference to the Deputy Commissioner, reporting however to the Deputy Commissioner, by means of a weekly diary, any action taken and orders given. Any deviation from the sanctioned plan of working should, as a rule, require the sanction of the Governor General's Agent.

"V.—Matters other than routine will be referred to the Deputy Commissioner by means of an office note, and be answered in the same way.

"The Forest Officer and the Deputy Commissioner will, as a rule, not communicate with each other by official letters.

"VI.—The Deputy Commissioner will in all cases, where he and the Forest Officer hold different opinions, especially with regard to the formation or management of State reserves, submit such cases for the Agent's final orders.

"VII.—The Forest Officer will submit, by the 1st of August, the Forest Budget Estimate of the District to the Deputy Commissioner, who will submit it for the approval of the Governor General's Agent and for incorporation into the provincial budget.

"VIII.—All forest accounts will be prepared by the Forest Officer, and will include the revenue and expenditure of every description of forests and forest produce.

"Credits of revenue realized by Forest Officers will be supported by chalans, and credits of revenue realized by Civil Officers by treasury schedules. Tahsildars will submit all forest accounts to the Forest Officer, who will incorporate them in his accounts.

"IX.—At the close of the financial year a report will be prepared by the Forest Officer showing the progress made during the year in the forests under his charge. This will be forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner, who will make such additions and remarks as he may think fit, and return it for the compilation of the provincial forest report. The report and all remarks thereon must be arranged as prescribed in the Forest Code."

17. The Conference, constituted as mentioned in paragraph 15, met on the 2nd and 3rd of April. It was decided that artificial plantations on a large scale should not at present be recommended, as they would involve a large outlay without a sufficient guarantee of ultimate success, practical as well as financial; but that it would be advisable to make constant experiments on a small scale regarding the results obtainable by artificial cultivation under various circumstances and conditions, and of the effects of strict closure on natural reproduction. In each case it was decided that a minute record should be kept of every detail. It was next agreed upon that the reservation, protection, improvement and exploitation of the Ziarat Forests must, for some time to come, form the main part of the work of the forest administration in Baluchistan.

The fact was recognized that permanent reservation could only be effected on a legal basis, and the draft rules submitted to the Conference, relating to State forests (Chapter II), were discussed and approved of with a few minor alterations, which were at once entered in the draft. It was pointed out at the time by Sir Robert Sandeman and Mr. Barnes that it would be desirable and necessary not to restrict the creation of State forests to the Ziarat, Harnai, and Sharigh Forests only, but apply the rules also to the best selected parts of outlying juniper forests, some of which are as yet known by repute only, and to natural forests of pistachio, two of which Mr. Barnes specially mentioned. One of these is situated at Gwal, opposite Gurki, where the railway debouches from the hills into the Pishin Valley and comprises about 4 square miles; the other at Nazarganj near Siriab below Cheltun Hill.

18. With regard to the protection of State forests, the provisions of the draft Regulation were also accepted; but it was pointed out by the Political Officers that at present such provisions must be given effect to through the instrumentality of Foresters and Guards recruited from people of the country.

This of course is unassailable; and when State reserves of a sufficient extent are once created and the permanency of the Forest Department in Baluchistan is thereby secured, there is no reason why we should not make excellent Forest Officers of some of the young Pathans by means of the Forest School at Dehra Dun.

19. The other chapters of the draft Regulation were next considered and unanimously approved of, with a few alterations, which were at once entered in the draft.

Sir Robert Sandeman expressed it as his opinion that a clause should be entered by which trees growing outside selected State forests might be protected, and Chapter III was consequently added to the original draft.

20. Sir Robert Sandeman and Mr. Lace were in favour of securing additional areas of State reserves in the South and North Thalli and Tarai Forests, in, from a forest point of view, really suitable positions.

Sir Robert declared the reservation of a considerable portion of these areas to be the unqualified right of Government, and it was decided that the question should be settled on the spot in conjunction with the Civil Officer of the district and the Forest Officer.

It was agreed upon that the Regulation, if sanctioned, could be applied to any small plot of waste land which might be required for arboricultural experiments.

With regard to the Mittri Forest, I understand it is considered advisable to allow for the present at least a continuance of the arrangement now in force.

The draft laid before the Conference regarding the relations of Civil and Forest Officers was finally discussed and approved of.

21. I would now advise that the above drafts—"Forest Regulation for the Baluchistan Agency" and "Rules regarding the relations of Civil and Forest Officers in Baluchistan"—be sanctioned as soon as feasible, as, in my opinion, forest administration in that province can make no progress without a proper basis for the work.

22. When the Regulation has been sanctioned, the Forest Officer will find ample and useful employment. As regards forest settlement, he will, in the first instance, have to select the best blocks of the Ziarat, Harnai, Shárigh, and outlying juniper forests for State reserves, and preliminarily demarcate them previous to the sanction of the Agent to the Governor General. In such selection he must be guided by the character of the forest, as well as by the facilities of export. His report on each block should not only comprise a description of the forest in detail and its boundaries, but also proposals for the establishment of forest roads and of roads connecting the forests with the main arteries of transport—the railway or larger roads which it is proposed to construct. His proposals should be in greater or less detail in proportion to the time being nearer or further in which he intends to bring the forest under use.

It will be the Civil Officer's duty to decide, after the forest has been selected, whether grazing in it, to the degree compatible with forest conservancy, is to be permitted as a right, or whether, as a source of future forest revenue, as is the case in all Government rakhs in the Punjab and elsewhere; and whether the boundaries selected by the Forest Officer are accepted or not, &c.

Much valuable time can of course be saved if the Forest Officer and the Civil Officer work together and visit the spot together; but this seems hardly indispensable in a country where the forest area is still so large, and the claims made as yet on it are comparatively few and of no great value.

In addition to the areas selected by the Forest Officer, the Civil Officers might, on their own judgment, demarcate State reserves, especially outlying blocks and forests in danger of being destroyed (such as the pistachio forests mentioned in paragraph 17 of this Note), and submit their proposals direct to the Agent to the Governor General for approval and sanction.

As State forests are gradually formed, the department for their protection should be organized in close consultation between the Civil and Forest Officers.

During the cold season the constitution of additional State reserves in the Sibi District should be considered and proposals submitted.

23. Works of improvement must, for some time to come, still be of an experimental character, and records thereof must consequently be kept in all the greater detail and with the utmost accuracy.

We know that almost any trees that are able to stand the winter frost can be grown in the fertile soil of the Quetta and Pishin Valleys, if a sufficient quantity of water can be given to them during the hot months—the time of growth. Water, however, is scarce, and can be collected only by expensive works, and it will therefore be necessary to ascertain what species of trees can be cultivated with the least expense on account of water and by what method. Areas on which pistachio grows naturally should be entirely protected from all grazing and other interference, as well as favourably situated blocks of the juniper forests; and observations regarding the effect of such closure on natural reproduction should be taken with great accuracy and recorded, to serve as a basis for future working plans; for, in a country where wages are as high as in Baluchistan, it is even less possible to rely entirely on artificial reproduction of our forests than in any other part of India.

The rate of growth of all natural forests should also be studied and, if possible, the improvement which takes place in growth by entire protection and closure of the forest.

The Sibi rakhs are of similar character to those in the Punjab and Sind, and require therefore no particular study as regards their reproduction.

24. The foregoing paragraphs sufficiently prove that there is plenty of work for a really efficient Forest Officer in Baluchistan as regards the settlement of the forests, their protection, improvement and exploitation for a good many years to come; though at present, till the means of communication have been completed, and till the cost of carriage has again decreased and assumed more reasonable limits, an immediate profit cannot be expected from the forest administration in this country.

Nevertheless, it is necessary, and present deficits are well repaid by the acquisition of very valuable permanent forest estates, which will in future not only yield a considerable revenue, but are absolutely necessary for the support of civilization in these outposts of the Empire.

If the State reserves are constituted so as to yield at least hereafter a revenue from grass and grazing, a balance in favour of forest administration will of course be realized with greater facility than if grazing in such reserves was recognized as a free right. This should always be taken into consideration in the original settlement, and rights, which may, at some future time, be extremely valuable, should only be conceded if absolutely necessary.

In a country where fuel is as difficult to obtain and as expensive as in the Quetta and Pishin Valleys and at the same time as indispensable, every effort should be made to reduce its waste by chimneys and open cooking-places, and the general introduction of stoves constructed on the most modern principles and closed hearths should receive the most serious consideration. A saving of 50 per cent. and more of the firewood at present used might easily be effected.

25. The concentration of a large body of troops contemplated to take place in the Quetta and Pishin Valleys will necessitate the immediate collection of large quantities of fuel, estimated at nearly half a lakh of maunds per mensem.

Sir Robert Sandeman has decided to place this work entirely under the Forest Officer, so as to ensure the supply, on the one hand, as far as possible, and, on the other, to prevent wasteful cutting and the destruction of areas which it might be contemplated to secure as State forests.

B. R.,—14-4-85.

# APPENDIX IV.

*Memorandum by*—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR R. G. SANDEMAN, K.C.S.I., *Agent, Governor General, Baluchistan, dated May 3rd, 1881.*

So much difference of opinion exists with regard to the districts of Pishin and Sibi, and so little information is available respecting them, that I think it desirable at the present time to record for general information—

(*a*) Their *status* and geographical position.

(*b*) How these districts came into the possession of the British Government.

(*c*) The object with which the British Government acquired them.

(*d*) The obligations the British Government incurred at the time the Gandamak Treaty was proclaimed and since the murder of Sir Louis Cavagnari, resulting in what is known as the second phase of the Afghan War.

(*e*) Their value to the frontier of India.

(*f*) Our future policy with regard to them, and cost of maintaining them.

Commencing with Sibi, I may remark that since the rule of King Ahmad Shah, Durani, this tract of country virtually ceased to form an integral part of the kingdom of Afghanistan. The history of the first Afghan War explains this. At its close the British made the district over to His Highness the Khan of Kalat (*see* extracts from Sir James Outram's Life, by Goldsmid, Appendix A). His Highness was never able to take back possession of the district, which originally formed part of his dominions for the simple reason that long prior to its being restored the notorious Marri clan had occupied at least one-third of it, and kept the remaining two-thirds in a state of anarchy.

Long prior to this, during the rule of King Ahmad Shah, Durani, that potentate made over the district in Jagir to three brothers known as the Barozai Sirdars of Sibi. The villages of Tali, Kurk, Kajjak, and Mal, situated in the lowlands of Sibi, belonged to the eldest of the three brothers. These lands extended to the Khan of Kalat's niabat, or district, of Lehri. To the second brother belonged Quat, Mandai, Badra, and Sangan, situate to the right of the Bolan Pass, which they cover. About the year 1835 A.D., the Marris took forcible possession of almost the whole of the second brother's estates, which they incorporated in the tribal domain, thus extending their power for 50 miles along the Bolan Pass. This act of the Marri clan resulted in the breaking out of a bitter war between the entire Marri clan and the Barozai Sirdars of Sibi, assisted by the Brahui tribes of Kalat. After many years of guerrila warfare between the two sides, the Marri clan obtained the advantage, and the disputed tract of country was henceforward known as a portion of the Marri country, and the Marri clan became an important factor in the management of the Bolan Pass. The war between the Barozais and the Marris continued, however, in a desultory manner until the Treaty of Gandamak enabled the British Government authoritatively to interfere between the two sides. Prior to the Treaty of Gandamak, the Amir of Kabul did not attempt to interfere between the contending parties, and, indeed, he was quite powerless to do so. As far as His Highness was concerned, the Marris were free to extend their power and possessions over the entire Pathan country up to Harnai, and beyond which they continually invaded and raided, carrying off the flocks and herds of its inhabitants.

To the third brother belonged the Zawar Valley, Harnai, and the district of Thal-Chotiali, including the Khetran and Hasni tribes. The latter tribe was totally destroyed by the Marris, aided by a former Khan of Kalat. The third brother and his descendants for many years tried to maintain their hold over this tract of country against the Marris, but were also, after much fighting, defeated by that clan, and had ultimately to withdraw altogether to the lowland inheritance of the elder brother. The Marris were not able to absorb the inheritance of the third brother into their own dominions, as they had done those of the second brother, but they kept its Pathan inhabitants in a chronic state of terror, and the country, excepting in the neighbourhood of the large fortified villages, gradually became a desert waste. This statement also applies to the Thali district of the elder brother, situated in the Sibi-Plains, where no less than 30 villages lie waste owing to the inroads of the Marris. We find, therefore, as a matter of fact, that when the Sibi district was ceded to the British Government under the provisions of the Treaty of Gandamak, the Amir's Government had not been in possession of it or in any way interested itself about it for at least one generation. The only portion of it from which they at any time derived a fraction of revenue was from the villages of Kurk, Mal, and Khajjak still appertaining to the eldest branch of the Barozai brothers. These three villages were understood to belong to the Jagir, or estate of Sirdar Ghulam Mohai-u-din, of Kandahar, but

as the country lying between them and Kandahar had been taken possession of, as we have seen, by the Marris, the Sirdar could seldom realize any part of his revenue. Moreover, as we had given back the country to the Khan of Kalat at the conclusion of the first Kabul War, the title of the Sirdar to these revenues was a very doubtful one. It was not until the Amir Shere Ali had made good his sway over Kabul and Kandahar that he gave these villages to the Sirdar, and I was assured that he laid claim to them merely to gain a foothold in Kalat, and thus establish his power and influence over His Highness the Khan, as these plain countries of Sibi lie in the very heart of His Highness's dominions. The Amir, morover, by laying claim to Sibi, was able to open out direct communication with the Brahui Sirdars, who graze their cattle in the Sibi wastes. I had absolute proof of this, for not long before the outbreak of the late Afghan War I found that the Amir and his Ministers were in active correspondence with the Brahui Sirdar. If the map of Sibi, Kalat, and Southern Afghanistan is referred to, it will clearly demonstrate how well situated these Sibi villages are for the purpose of carrying on intrigues in Kalat territory.

The boundaries of Sibi are—west, the Bolan Pass; north, Pishín and the country of the Dumar Pathans; east, the Punjab and the Suliman range of mountains; south, Kalat.

The great caravan routes between Kandahar, Dera Ghazi Khan, Mooltan, and Rajputana, *viâ* Bhawalpur, traverse the district of Pishín and Sibi, and have been opened to traffic since these districts fell under the protection of the British Government.

After full inquiries made by me in the Sibi district, I obtained from the present Barozai Sirdar the original sannad, or order, of King Ahmad Shah, Durani, making over the Sibi district to the rule of the Barozais, as above described. The original sannad I sent to the Foreign Office. I must, however, mention that since its date the tripartite treaty of 1838 between the British Government, the Maharaja Ranjit Singh, and Shah Suja-ul-Mulk, was entered into. This treaty ceded to the Maharaja Ranjit Singh the Khan of Kalat's province of Harand-Dajil. This cession of territory was most disastrous in its results. The Baloch tribes would not acknowledge the Sikh Government, and opposed theirs taking possession of the new or ceded territory with much determination. The Marris, Bugtis, and Gurchanies made good their resistance, and on the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh the whole of the province, with the exception of the plain portion, fell into a state of anarchy, in which it was found when the British annexed the Punjab, in which state it has remained ever since. Sir H. Durand's history of the first Afghan War testifies amply to the truth of what I state. (See Appendix B.)

By retaining possession of Pishín and Sibi, and managing them in the interests of all concerned, as proposed by me in a former memorandum, we to great extent rectify the ill-results inflicted by the Treaty of 1838 on the Khan of Kalat and his people. We keep the Marri and Bugti tribes in order, and so put a stop to their devastating the Khan of Kalat's territory, and prevent their raiding on the British provinces of Scind and Punjab. We also enable the Central Asian trade routes of all three provinces to be kept permanently open.

The inhabitants of Sibi belong to mixed tribes of Baluch and Pathan origin. The Baluch belong to the Marri, Chilgiri, and Hasni tribes. The Pathans are Sadozais, Pannis, Dumars, Tarens, and others. The tract of country known as the Pishín may fairly be treated of as a continuation of the Sibi district. It extends to the Amran range of mountains, including Shorawak, and is separated from the province of Kandahar proper by a desert 70 miles wide. Its conditions as to population resemble those of Sibi, except that it contains no Baluch element.

The Kalat district of Nushki joins Pishín at Shorawak, and bounds it on the west. Quetta and Sibi bound it on the south; the Kakar hills and the Zhob and Bori country bound it on the east, and Kandahar desert bounds it on the north.

Pishín is inhabited by Tarens and Syads, with a few Kakar families. There are no Duranis. In other words, neither in Sibi nor in Pishín do any of the ruling Afghan races form part of the population. When Pishin was assigned to the British Government by the Treaty of Gandamak, it had already been administered for a year by British Officers. It was never held by the Amir with troops, and it was only administered by His Highness in a very desultory way.

When General Biddulph's army entered the country I placed it under the Quetta administration, which had already been firmly established, and when the Treaty of Gandamak provided for the cession of Pishín to the British, I everywhere held darbars and announced that we had taken over the country, and had become responsible for its administration. As a result the Tarens, who are the aborigines of the country, and who had ever been oppressed by their Afghan and Kakar neighbours, openly rejoiced, and during the war they actively aided our troops with forage and food. Should the Tarens be again handed over to Afghan rule, I do not hesitate in saying that they will be severely punished, if not destroyed, for the part they took in the war.

An extract from a letter appended to this memorandum (see Appendix C) from Captain H. Wylie, C.S.I., who held executive charge of Pishín during the war, testifies to the fidelity with which the Tarens held to their engagements on the guarantee given by me. It seems to me out of the question to desert these Tarens, who took our side actively on my guaranteeing to them British protection. It has been argued that the Tarens are Pathans. This is true, but they were never protected by the Afghan Government from the inroads of the hill Kakars, any more than were the Pathans of Sibi protected from the Marris. I distinctly assert that the industrious Pathans of these districts, some of whom are wealthy traders, were often at the mercy of the Afghan Durani rulers of Kandahar and of the Kakars of the hills. The Taren headmen have frequently told me that their young girls were carried off to the zenanas of the nobles of Kandahar and Kabul in lieu of revenue. It is, therefore, no wonder that the Tarens and some of the influential Syads hailed the advent of the British rule with satisfaction. Between them and the Durani rulers of Kandahar there never was any sympathy, and owing to local circumstances and causes there never can be.

Another fact of the utmost importance to consider and remember is, that the whole of the tribes—Pathan, Brahui, and Baluch—occupying the country from the Punjab and Dera Ghazi Khan and Sibi, Pishín, and Kalat, to the sea at Karachi, have been deliberately subsidised by the British Government before and during the war, and are now under the influence and management of British officers. This includes the Atchakzai tribe, occupying the Amran range of the mountains. These tribes hold the country up to the real boundary of Southern Afghanistan, but are separated from Afghanistan and from the Duranis by a desert 70 miles wide. Many of these tribes, such as the Marris and Atchakzais, are strong and powerful. We have employed them as levies to protect the trade routes and the great highways to Scind and the Punjab which pass through their country. This service was given to the tribes on fixed and specific arrangements in which no stipulations of their temporary character and probable withdrawal were ever made. To withdraw from such engagements must result in disaster and endanger the safety of the trade routes. Our withdrawal cannot benefit the Amir of Kabul, and will injure him, as well as ourselves and the tribes. The resolution of the Government of India, issued during the Viceroyalty of the Earl of Northbrook, which sent me to restore peace betwen His Highness the Khan of Kalat and Brahui and Pathan tribes of Sibi, directed me to secure the safety of the Bolan Pass, and, if possible, to arrange with the Afghan authorities to re-open the great highway between Kandahar and the Punjab known as the Thal-Chotiali route. At that time His Highness the Amir Sher Ali Khan would not consent to my re-opening this route, giving as his reason that Afghan and British officials were sure to differ as to the management of the tribes along the route. This great difficulty has now been overcome, and the question of the management of the tribes lying between British India and Southern Afghanistan may be considered as at rest for ever, provided that we maintain our present existing arrangements, agreements, and guarantees.

The value to India of holding the great highways of commerce between Scind and the Punjab, Kalat, and Southern Afghanistan cannot be over-estimated. We ensure progress, and with it prosperity, to the country at large, besides securing the trade routes which have existed for centuries, and were only closed temporarily for want of the protection which the British Government has for the last few years afforded them. I earnestly solicit the Government not to disturb the security which has been maintained almost intact throughout the troubles of war. I emphatically assert that to hand over these tribes to Afghan rule will vitally injure our Central Asian trade, nay more, will prove disastrous to the Powers that we desire to benefit—*viz.*, the Amir of Kabul and the Khan of Kalat. I entreat that I may be permitted by Her Majesty's Government to maintain the state of peace which I have established in Pishín and Sibi. In making this earnest request I desire that it should be distinctly recognized that I speak as much in the interests of the Amir of Kabul as in those of the British Government and of the Khan of Kalat. All three Governments must derive enormous benefit from these two districts being maintained, as at present, in a state of peace, instead of, as prior to the Treaty of Gandamak, in a state of anarchy. In evidence of the progress already made I may mention that the Sibi district yielded this year 1 lakh and R5,000 land revenue, and Pishín yielded over half a lakh. I unhesitatingly assert that the Amir of Kabul could not collect this revenue without my aid, and that if our withdrawal from our obligations is proposed in the Amir's interests, we are in our blindness inflicting a severe blow to his interests without any corresponding benefit to ourselves. I merely ask of Her Majesty's Government that the policy that made the Khan of Kalat the friend of Government during the war should, as far as Pishín and Sibi are concerned, be extended to the Amir of Kábul. (See Appendix D.) Were His Highness the Amir to feel that we are really good neighbours, and acting in his interests as much as in our own, who can doubt that the results must be good? Let us finish the nearly

constructed line of railway to Harnai or Quetta, as proposed in the telegram annexed from Agent, Governor General, to Sir D. Stewart (Appendix E), and we shall not only advance our own trade relations, but also establish a bond of union between the Afghan, Pathan, Brahui, and Baluch races and ourselves that will make them the allies in the time of danger that our policy aims at their becoming.

The Tarens and Syads of Pishín and the Afghans of Kandahar are already noted traders. If they feel the advantages the railway must bring to their commercial efforts, which will then be established on a secure basis, satisfactory relations between all must, as a result, be developed by the ties of common interest. On the other hand, if we withdraw from sight and permit the trade routes to be closed again and the old state of anarchy to be re-established among them, is it not to be feared that the only recollection that Princes, Chiefs, and people will retain of the British will be that of the flight and slaughter of our troops at Maiwand, the retreat from a country in which we had caused nothing but damage and final disaster to all concerned? Such a line of policy can never make us the friends of the Afghans, and will probably alienate the Brahuis and Baluchis. We have now the chance of continuing to all the substantial progress of the last three years with every prospect of success, for it is admitted to be a trait of Afghan character that it is open to no influence so strongly as to that of wealth.

In support of what I have said above the opinion of no living authority can exceed in value that of the late Military Member of the Viceroy's Council, Sir D. Stewart, now Commander-in-Chief in India, from whom I received, three years ago, the administrative charge of Pishín and Sibi. Sir Donald thus wrote when discussing our withdrawal from Kandahar in his recent minute—

> "But the question of the evacuation of Pishín seems to me to stand on a totally different footing. That district has been assigned to us by Treaty, and, although that instrument may now be considered inoperative, it has led us into obligations with regard to the population of the assigned districts from which we cannot retreat without discredit and, as I think, humiliation, and on this ground I protest against the immediate of even early rendition of Pishín to any Afghan Government. The time may come when the district can be restored to Afghanistan with the full consent of the people and without detriment to the interests of the Empire, but till that time arrives we are bound to those interests by continuing to acknowledge our obligations before the world. However opinions may differ about the value of Pishín, no one can doubt that the possession of the Amran range is a very important acquisition to our frontier, and it will not be easy to justify to the country any sacrifice of the advantages which accrue to us from the possession of the mountain barrier. If Her Majesty's Government considers that the conditions of the assignment are practically identical with annexation, it would be easy to stipulate that the entire revenues of the district, after payment of civil charges be surrendered to the Afghan Government."

But perhaps the most important point of all remains for me to discuss, namely, the cost to the British Government of retaining administrative control over Pishín and Sibi, for I am aware that it is held to be a doubtful question whether the proposed frontier could be held at securely and as cheaply as the old one. It is also argued that Quetta is unhealthy. With regard to the first point, I would ask here that a reference may be made to the map. We now hold the country from Dera Ghazi Khan to Karachi with five cavalry regiments, three infantry regiments, and one battery of artillery, besides a considerable number of frontier police, militia, and Baluch Guides. It is, however, noteworthy that during the Viceroyalty of the Earl of Northbrook the Jacobabad and Karachi frontier police, who take the duty of our frontier troops, and are entirely distinct from the regular police of the Sind province, and who are stationed at posts along the frontier from Jacobabad to Karachi, owing to local disturbances in Kalat territory, were largely increased, at considerable cost. The total Baluch frontier thus held by troops and police is about 700 miles. Regarding the proposed frontier and cost of holding it, I have to observe that it commences, like the other, at Dera Ghazi Khan, runs in a straight line to Thal-Chotiali, Pishín, Sibi, the Amran range, Shorawak, and ends at Nushki, where the Khan of Kalat's proper frontier commences. Thus the proposed British frontier I roughly estimate at something under 300 miles, and to hold it not a single extra soldier or policeman or Baluch Guide in excess of the establishment just named is required. Reference to the maps will show this. From Nushki to the sea at Gwadar, the territory of His Highness the Khan of Kalat extends, and his authority has not been disputed since the occupation of Quetta, and the establishment of British relations with Kalat under the provisions of the Treaty signed by the Viceroy and His Highness the Khan of Kalat at Jacobabad in 1876. This treaty enabled the Agent to the Viceroy to arbitrate successfully between the Brahui tribes of Nushki and the Khan's Government. So long as our troops garrison Quetta there can be no doubt of the Khan being able to maintain his power from Nushki to the Persian Gulf at Gwadar. Again, from Nushki to Khushdil Khan Killa, taking the Amran range at Chaman as our frontier, we have a desert in front of us for 100 miles. This leaves us about 200 miles of actual frontier to protect, instead of 700. I again emphatically

assert that these 200 miles are far more defensible and require fewer troops, and is thus less expensive to defend than our old frontier of 700 miles. Moreover, by adopting the new line we are able to protect the country advantageously by concentrating our troops at healthy positions, instead of scattering them along a long and unhealthy tract of country. I assert that Thal-Chotiali, Harnai, the Amran range, and Shorawak are healthy stations for troops, while Dera Ghazi Khan, Rajanpur, Jacobabad, and the old frontier posts held by our troops in the plains are most unhealthy, and have been proved by long experience to be so. I notice that in an official paper lately published it was argued that Quetta was unhealthy, as compared with Jacobabad and Dera Ghazi Khan. Such an argument could only be used by those unacquainted with the country and with the facts. I believe that the high official who used them has never visited the country. I was Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan for nearly ten years, and resided in Kalat and Quetta—latterly as Agent to the Viceroy—for nearly six years, and am intimately acquainted with the Scind and Punjab frontiers, and indeed the entire country lying within and beyond the British frontier as far as Kandahar. During the time that Quetta was most unhealthy, when the men were exposed to alternate great heat and cold in tents before barracks were built, the health returns would contrast favourably with the ordinary returns of the troops in garrison at Dera Ghazi Khan and Jacobabad in autumn during an ordinary year. Dera Ghazi Khan and Jacobabad are notorious for their great heat. They are situated in the valley of the Indus, about 800 feet above the sea-level. On the other hand, Quetta is situate 5,800 feet above the sea-level, and has nearly as good a climate as Simla, and its cantonment has been systematically drained by our Royal Engineers since the commencement of the Afghan War. Thal-Chotiali and Harnai are respectively 3,000 and 3,500 feet above the sea-level, or as high as the plateau of Kandahar, and have proved healthy. Since the troops have been in barracks and the cantonment has been drained, there has been no fault to find with the salubrity of Quetta. It ought on no account to be forgotten at the present time that, owing to the Jacobabad cantonment being situated 90 feet below the level of the River Indus, several able engineers who studied the subject have pronounced that in their opinion it is only a work of time for Jacobabad and a portion of the Upper Scind district to be submerged altogether. All concerned admit that on the stability of the embankment at Kusmore, recently built for the protection of the Jacobabad district and military cantonment, depends their safety. This fact must convince the British Government of the value of the great caravan route to India and the Punjab *viâ* Thal-Chotiali, and the Pishín and Sibi districts.

## Appendix A.

### Year 1842.

The whole of chapter IX of Sir James Outram's Life, by General Goldsmid, should be read. The following extracts bear on the subject, and prove what is stated in the text:—

"Early in May, from the furnace of his summer quarters, at the Sukhar Residency, Outram put before the Governor General his proposals—since virtually adopted by Lord Dalhousie and his successors—to substitute pecuniary for military help to the Khan of Kelat upon the withdrawal of British troops from Kandahar. At the same time he enclosed extracts from the demi-official letters which he had addressed to Mr. Colvin on the policy to be pursued with the Kelat State in the contingency that had now arisen, *viz.*, our impending withdrawal from Afghanistan.

"Sir James Outram, between the date of his second despatch to General Nott and this letter to Mr. Muddock—he had written to the former officer, asking for sanction to make over Kelat the districts of Shal (Quetta) and Sibi in the spirit of Lord Auckland's intimation that it might be good policy if the Khan were made to feel our disposition to give him and his tribes this accession of power and of territory, so soon as our difficulties in Afghanistan should be brought to a close."

Sir James wrote to General Nott as follows:—

"It appears to me that, by now placing the territories in question in the Khan's hands (Quetta and Sibi), he will be able to secure their possession before the withdrawal of our troops, and, as I can see no advantage to us from holding them (further than merely continuing their general control, as at present, but on his behalf), I think that, in fairness to the Khan, we should now make them over, and during the remainder of our stay assist him in establishing government. Should any treaty be entered into with any of the Afghan powers, I beg to suggest that the cession of Shal (Quetta) and Sibi be formally stipulated; otherwise, the Khan being in possession of those districts will be a plea for the Afghans making war on him whom we are bound by treaty to protect against foreign enemies. Although the late Khan of Kelat was not possessed of Sibi at the time we took possession of the Khanate—and that district, though once in his possession, had generally continued an appendage to Kandahar—still, as the high-road of the Afghans into Kachi (which the fortress of Sibi commands), as well as being a check on the hill tribes, and as a natural fortress of Kachi, I must strongly recommend that it be not given up to the Duranis on any consideration.

"Outram cut the Gordian knot by making over Shal to the Khan, acquainting the Supreme Government with the circumstance and soliciting authority to dispose in like manner of the district of Sibi.

Again Outram writes to the Supreme Government—

"In the enclosures to my despatch to your address I intimated the necessity for making over Shal (Quetta) and Sibi to Kelat before evacuating Baluchistan, a measure the prospect of which the late Governor General had authorised me to hold out to the Khan."

Outram says the restoration of Quetta to the Khan had "previously been pledged by Lord Auckland." He also explains why there was much to cause "mischief-brewers again to bestir themselves in the endeavour to seduce the Brahoes to join in opposing General England in the Khojak Pass, to close the Bolan Pass." The author adds, "Not a word of objection to his proposal had been communicated by Government." Suffice it to say that there is ample information to be obtained from this chapter (ix) of the life of Outram to show that the tract of country from Sibi, including the Bolan and Khojak Passes, is one and the same tract, is not inhabited by any of the Duranis, and in the common interests of the Kelat State and British India ought never again to be made over to the Duranis.

## APPENDIX B.

*Extract from Durand's History of the First Afghan War, page 226.*

"The fighting was desultory; no systematic defence was attempted, and the citadel of Kelat was carried without difficulty; the ill-starred Mehrab Khan being slain in a struggle which he knew to be hopeless, and from exposure to which he had sent away his son with the farewell warning not hastily after his father's fall to surrender himself to the British Authorities . . . . . . . . . . For former hospitality and for protection from sanguinary pursuers the gratitude of Shah Shooja under British influence awarded to Mehrab Khan (father of the present Khan) the loss of his poor capital and a soldier's death. After his honorable fall documents were found which proved the manner in which the Khan had been betrayed and his endeavours to negotiate frustrated.

"Shah Nawaz Khan (Mehrab Khan's immediate successor) (this chief was put up by the English, was deposed by the Brahui Sirdars, and the present Khan's brother, son of Mehrab Khan, placed on the throne) did not receive the Kelat territory unshorn for the opportunity was taken to transfer the northern province, with Quetta and dependencies, as also Kutch-Gundava, to Shah Shooja; whilst the provinces of Hurrand and Dajil, on the Indus, were made over to the rulers of the Punjab. Entire control of the Bolan Pass, to which at the moment the Governor General attached great importance, was intended to be secured."

*Note by Sir R. Sandeman.*

The present Khan of Kelat's brother received back Shal (Quetta), as Appendix D informs us, from Sir James Outram—Sibi, if restored, was not taken possession of, and has remained in a state of anarchy until the treaty of Gundamak enabled me to provide for its civil administration. The British Government, at the annexation of the Panjab, did not occupy the whole of the late Kelat province of Hurrand-Dajil, taken from the Khan, as testified to by Sir H. Durand. A portion of it had become devastated by the Marris, who made the great caravan route of Thal-Chotiali which traverses it unsafe for trade. I have now rectified this, and the trade routes are at present safe for traffic, and general progress has taken the place lately held by lawlessness and anarchy. The tribes have been subsidised as far as Southern Afghan territory, including the Aitchakzai tribe inhabiting the Khojak Amran range.

## APPENDIX C.

*Extract from a letter from* CAPTAIN H. WYLIE, C.S.I., *Assistant Agent to the Governor General, Baluchistan, to* LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR R. G. SANDEMAN, K.C.S.I., *Agent to the Governor General, Baluchistan.*

DEAR SIR ROBERT,

I am in receipt of your letter regarding Pishin, in which you ask me first:—

"What will happen to the Tarens of Pishin, Amadan, Khawhás and other places (in Pishín) if we withdraw from Pishín altogether?"

* * * * * * * *

With regard to the first question, I am aware, from constant intercourse during two years with all classes and races of people in Pishin, that they considered the assignment of the district to the British as being equivalent to its absorption into the British Empire; and that they constantly expressed themselves of the belief that, although they understood nothing had been definitely settled with regard to Kandahar, there could be no shadow of doubt as to the position of Pishin, *i.e.*, they believed that it had been taken over as a part of British India. It was, I am confident, on account of this belief that the district as a whole remained as quiet as it did, whilst the whole country round was seething with fanatical excitement. The Taren race, as having been the original owners and cultivators of the soil, and still being the principal land-owners in Pishin, recognised in our rule that even justice from which alone they could hope to maintain their rights and their proper position; they, therefore, threw in their lot with us most unreservedly, and, throughout the war, rendered very valuable assistance.

As I do not wish to encroach upon your time, I will only quote two instances of their loyalty to the British, but these could, of course, be multiplied.

About the middle of March 1880, I was encamped at Kil'h Abdula Khan assisting in the passage of General Primrose's division across the Khojak Pass in relief of General Stewart's corps. At the same time the various military posts in Pishin were being taken over by Bombay troops from the Bengal troops who had previously held them. In this manner the fort and cantonment of Khushdil Khan Ka Kil'h were taken over by a detachment of the 28th Bombay No. I., under command of Colonel Newport. A very few days subsequently (*viz.*, 24th March), I received a letter from the native political official at Khushdil Khan, saying he had good information that a large body of Zhob Kakars had assembled above Barshor, and meditated an attack on Khushdil Khan. Although I considered this unlikely, as I should have heard rumours from other sources, yet, as the British officers were new to frontier work, I considered it best to proceed there in person, and make enquiries on the spot. I accordingly rode over to Khushdil Khan—a distance of 30 miles—the same day, and found everybody there in a state of considerable uneasiness, and the troops harassed by heavy outpost and sentry duty. A short enquiry showed me that the native official had been led astray by some designing Kakars in the neighbourhood, and had believed their story without enquiring from other sources as to its truth. I immediately, therefore, assembled the Taren Malliks, who are the principal land-owners around Khushdil Khan, and found out from them that his story was false, and they then very truly said—

"Why sir, who would be the first to suffer by a descent of Kakars into the Pishin Valley? It would be us, who have crops and flocks, and not you English, who have nothing but arms. We would, therefore, be the first to inform the authorities of Khushdil Khan should a raid be contemplated, and will ourselves do the outpost duty."

I consequently entered into an arrangement with the Taren headmen, and never had any cause to regret having done so, for they kept the authorities of Khushdil Khan fully aware of what was going on around, and even after our defeat at Maiwand, were unshaken in their loyalty to us.

It is evident from what I have mentioned how the Tarens of the upper portion of Pishin recognised their true position, and believed that after all the assistance in supplies and carriage they had rendered to us there would be no escape for them from their enemies, the Kakars, unless they were protected by a British garrison. The second instance of Taren loyalty is even more striking. In July, 1880, I was collecting the revenue of Khawhás, a Taren town in a rich and beautiful valley situated in the midst of Kakar hills to the east of the Pishin valley, but of which it is a part. While employed on this duty the news reached me of the battle of Maiwand. Subsequently I heard from you of the same, and you directed me to withdraw as speedily as possible. Feeling, however, that to suddenly relinquish the revenue would make the people imagine some disaster had taken place, and, as I calculated that, except through me, they could not learn the news for a week or ten days, I decided on remaining at Khawhás for two days longer, which I did, and collected all the revenue. Then, however, came the difficulty of transport, and finding I could only convey a portion to Kach, which was the nearest British post, and situated 20 miles away, I handed the balance over to the Tarens of Khawhás to store for us until required. I then marched for Kach and Quetta, and finally for Kandahar. Meanwhile, however, emissaries from Sirdar Ayub Khan had succeeded in raising portions of the Kakar tribe against us, and Shah Jehan, the Chief of Zhob, with a body of his men, attacked Kach, and although repulsed with loss, yet hung about the Khawhás valley for some time. These Kakars, hearing of our revenue grain in Khawhás, demanded it of the Tarens, who, however, shut their gates and fought to keep it, and, although their fields were destroyed, yet they preserved the Government grain committed to their charge until we were able to send a flying column into the Khawhás valley and finally break up the Kakar gathering.

Should we relinquish Khawhás, what could we expect would be the fate of these Tarens? Would not the Kakars punish them in the severest manner for their loyalty to us?

## APPENDIX D.

*Translation of a letter of thanks from* HIS HIGHNESS THE KHAN OF KALAT *to* MAJOR SIR ROBERT SANDEMAN, *Agent, Governor General, Baluchistan.*

"Whereas, you, my friend, are going on leave to your home, and, in accordance with our old friendship, you came yourself to pay me a parting visit, although it is a great happiness to you to go to your native place after so long a time, but for your friends and well-wishers separation from such a faithful and trustworthy friend is very unpleasant. As they say, 'Complaint flows from the stones at the time of parting of friends.' It is now fully five years since you came into Baluchistan, and devoted yourself to the settlement of the disputes of the frontier tribes, and to opening up the trade routes and to the administration of the country and the peace of its

inhabitants. Many difficulties, hard as granite rock, stood in your way, like a mountain without supports on the high road: they were such that my tongue cannot express them, and the two-tongued pen becomes mute before them. But by the boldness, endurance, and perseverance of you, who are desirous of peace, all the difficulties were put aside, and all matters were restored to their orginal state, and in the country peace and tranquillity were established in every way. Any one who knows anything of the past and present state of this country of Baluchistan can justly ascertain the true state of those matters, as is proper. The excellence of your management of all affairs and your services are as clearly seen as the sun by the British Government, and by all people, great and small. There is no necessity to dilate upon them particularly, but, as I am much indebted to your valuable services, I, with heartfelt sincerity, write these few words by way of a letter of thanks, and I hope that in accordance with your former kindness, you will accept them, and, considering me as an old and sincere friend you will not permit remembrance of me to fade from the page of your recollection, and that from time to time in your own country you will think of your sincere friend, who is with you, like a second kernel in one almond. I have every confidence that you will after the expiry of your leave, return to your friend's country. I conclude the letter with my blessing. May you be happy in your going home! May you go and return in safety! May God protect you!

*(Seal of Mir Khodadad Khan, Khan of Kelat.)*
*"Dated 3rd Mohurrum 1297."*

## APPENDIX E.

(STATE TELEGRAM.)

*From* Sir R. G. SANDEMAN, K.C.S.I., *Agent, Governor General, Baluchistan, to the Honorable* Sir D. STEWART, *Mily. Member of Council, (dated Camp, Sibi, 12th February, 1881.)*

My telegram of this morning. I have since its despatch held long consultation with Colonel Lindsay. Since the orders were issued to stop work, he has himself examined the Lower Bolan Pass line, as recommended by General Phayre. His opinion is that a railway through Bolan Pass is almost impracticable, if not quite so, and could only be constructed at great expense. On other hand, Nari line, with exception of placing a few sleepers, has already been constructed up to Kilati Kil'h. As far as Kuchali much work has been taken in hand, and 500,000 pounds spent on work and material. I am more than ever impressed with the deplorable effect the sudden stoppage of work must have on the whole country. Please consider that between Sibi and Kilati Kil'h large and expensive embankments are almost finished. Houses for officials, offices, workshops, and brick manufactories have been completed. After long and earnest consideration I have felt compelled again to represent the matter in the earnest hope that the line may be completed to Kuchali, which is situated beyond the great heat of the plains and well suited for a terminus. The country is open. The tribes have fully accepted the fact of the railway passing through their country, and Lindsay is prepared to certify to my statement that since the re-occupation of the line the country people have been perfectly friendly. In his own words, since my settlement with the Marri clan, not a single crime of any kind has occurred. Do not forget that Lindsay's present examination of the Bolan confirms fully the previous recorded opinions of Molesworth and Furnival, experienced and able railway engineers, namely, that for a railway, the Bolan route at reasonable cost in first construction and future working, is almost impracticable, while there is no comparison regarding the political value of the Nari line, if taken even as far as Kuchali over a line through the Bolan Pass. I have read this telegram to Lindsay and venture to represent to the Government of India my views through you, as I believe you agree that, from a military point of view, the value of the railway will be as great by the one route as the other. The works have only been checked, and Lindsay says he could at early date have the line completed as far as Kuchali. A good cart road, including Chappar Rift, has just been completed from Nari to Quetta.

# APPENDIX V.

## APPEN

*Return of Revenues of the*

| | 1881-82. | | | | 1882-83. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Quantity. | Rate. | Value. | Total. | Quantity. | Rate. | Value. | Total. |
| **SIBI DISTRICT.** | *Mds. s. ch.* | | *R a. p.* | *R a. p.* | *Mds. s. ch.* | | *R a. p.* | *R a. p.* |
| *Rabbi.* | | | | | | | | |
| Wheat | 12,535 24 0 | | 26,638 3 0 | | 15,163 26 0 | | 32,222 12 1 | |
| Barley | 1,357 16 0 | | 2,714 12 11 | | 820 10 0 | | 1,401 4 2 | |
| Mustard | 59 15 0 | | 133 9 6 | | 26 10 0 | | 59 1 9 | |
| Til | ...... | | ...... | | ...... | | ...... | |
| Grass | ...... | | 1,840 14 5 | | 751 33 0 | | 936 5 8 | |
| Land | ...... | | 331 2 7 | | ...... | | 1,087 11 2 | |
| *Kharif.* | | | | | | | | |
| Maize | 11,851 25 0 | | 13,680 13 10 | | 8,868 34 0 | | 9,284 9 3 | |
| Pulse | 44 21 0 | | 121 1 3 | | 95 17 0 | | 189 6 0 | |
| Cotton | 86 6 8 | | 175 4 1 | | 189 30 0 | | 379 8 0 | |
| Sessamum | 5 4 0 | | 20 10 4 | | 7 0 0 | | 35 5 9 | |
| Moat | ...... | | ...... | | 1 3 0 | | 2 2 4 | |
| Bajri | ...... | | ...... | | 92 0 0 | | 119 5 3 | |
| *Miscellaneous.* | | | | | | | | |
| Unclaimed property | ...... | | 2,546 14 4 | | ...... | | 378 5 0 | |
| Fines | ...... | | 5,620 11 0 | | ...... | | 2,987 2 9 | |
| Abkari | ...... | | 60,000 0 0* | | ...... | | 40,150 0 0 | |
| License-fee | ...... | | 680 0 0 | | ...... | | 1,295 0 0 | |
| Court-fee & other stamp | ...... | | 6,008 12 7 | | ...... | | 5,524 0 10 | |
| Salt | ...... | | ...... | | ...... | | 2,311 6 1 | |
| Kharr | ...... | | ...... | | ...... | | 303 8 0 | |
| Total | 25,939 31 8 | | ...... | 1,20,512 13 10 | 26,016 3 0 | | ...... | 98,666 14 1 |
| **THAL-CHOTIÁLÍ DISTRICT.** | | | | | | | | |
| *Rabbi.* | | | | | | | | |
| Wheat | 8,210 38 0 | Different rates. | 17,441 0 2 | | 6,606 30 0 | Different rates. | 14,391 2 4 | |
| Barley | 1,757 38 0 | | 5,268 15 6 | | 1,851 13 0 | | 3,008 6 5 | |
| *Kharif.* | | | | | | | | |
| Jowari | 377 29 0 | | 1,319 1 0 | | 584 8 8 | | 949 5 6 | |
| Bajri | 20 37 0 | | 83 12 0 | | 1 32 8 | | 2 15 1 | |
| Indian corn | 29 14 0 | | 66 0 0 | | 57 5 0 | | 92 13 3 | |
| Moong | 5 28 0 | | 15 0 0 | | 13 26 0 | | 22 2 10 | |
| Rice | 202 20 0 | | 151 14 0 | | 335 28 0 | | 335 11 2 | |
| Kirbee and grass | 300 0 0 | | 300 0 0 | | ...... | | 124 8 3 | |
| Maccai | ...... | | ...... | | ...... | | ...... | |
| Sumka | ...... | | ...... | | ...... | | | |
| *Miscellaneous.* | | | | | | | | |
| Fine | ...... | | 726 0 0 | | ...... | | ...... | |
| Abkari | ...... | | 1,957 8 0 | | ...... | | 1,562 8 0 | |
| Total | 10,905 4 0 | | ...... | 27,329 2 8 | 9,450 23 0 | | ...... | 20,489 8 10 |
| **HARNÁÍ DISTRICT (INCLUDING KACHH, KHAWHÁS, SÁNGÁN, AND QUAT).** | | | | | | | | |
| *Rabbi.* | | | | | | | | |
| Wheat | 4,555 24 9 | | 15,356 14 0 | | 4,286 29 12 | | 8,573 5 1 | |
| Barley | 333 14 0 | | 1,160 4 0 | | 333 14 0 | | 666 11 3 | |
| *Kharif.* | | | | | | | | |
| Tobacco | ...... | | | | | | | |
| Sarsoo | ...... | | ...... | | ...... | | ...... | |
| Rice | 3,975 5 4 | | 3,975 2 9 | | ...... | | ...... | |
| Jowari | ...... | | | | 3,519 11 14 | | 3,519 5 0 | |
| Sessamum | ...... | | ...... | | 478 33 0 | | 957 10 1 | |
| Moong | ...... | | ...... | | ...... | | ...... | |
| | | | ...... | | ...... | | ...... | |
| *Miscellaneous.* | | | | | | | | |
| Fine | ...... | | 273 0 0 | | ...... | | ...... | |
| Abkari | ...... | | 1,957 8 0 | | ...... | | 1,562 8 0 | |
| Total | 8,864 3 13 | | ...... | 22,722 12 9 | 8,618 8 10 | | ...... | 15,279 7 5 |
| GRAND TOTAL | ...... | | ...... | 1,70,564 13 3* | ...... | | ...... | 1,84,435 14 4 |

* The abnormally high figures of the Revenue Total for this year 1881-82, is due to the large sum of R60,000

CAMP GANDAK,
*The 9th September* 1885.

# DIX V.

*Thal-Chotiálí District.*

| 1883-84. | | | | 1884-85. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Quantity. | Rate. | Value. | Total. | Quantity. | Rate. | Value. | Total. |
| Mds. s. ch. | | R a. p. | R a. p. | Mds. s. ch. | | R a. p. | R a. p. |
| 19,389 14 0 | | 44,291 11 1 | | 18,172 10 0 | | 42,357 10 4 | |
| 200 9 0 | | 317 10 2 | | 54 0 0 | | 8 3 11 | |
| 166 4 0 | | 428 3 6 | | 17 0 0 | | 2 13 8 | |
| ...... | | ...... | | ...... | | 36 15 6 | |
| ...... | | ...... | | ...... | | 646 8 5 | |
| ...... | | ...... | | ...... | | ...... | |
| 7,654 10 0 | | 9,638 3 9 | | 8,370 0 0 | | 12,915 11 6 | |
| 281 9 0 | | 400 4 2 | | 91 0 0 | | 202 13 7 | |
| 413 24 0 | | 891 13 2 | | 1,095 6 13 | | 2,137 4 7 | |
| 30 24 0 | | 127 13 9 | | ...... | | ...... | |
| 5 38 0 | | 10 9 4 | | 5 0 0 | | 9 8 0 | |
| 8 14 0 | | 14 9 4 | | 72 30 0 | | 161 12 0 | |
| ...... | | 246 7 3 | | ...... | | 1,870 13 3 | |
| ...... | | 3,268 9 4 | | ...... | | 2,473 6 2 | |
| ...... | | 22,175 0 0 | | ...... | | 85,655 0 0 | |
| ...... | | 1,356 9 10 | | ...... | | 740 0 0 | |
| ...... | | 6,790 9 0 | | ...... | | 10,568 14 0 | |
| ...... | | 1,505 0 0 | | ...... | | 1,518 6 0 | |
| ...... | | 950 0 0 | | ...... | | 750 0 0 | |
| 28,149 26 0 | | ...... | 92,413 1 8 | 27,877 6 13 | | ...... | 1,12,153 12 11 |
| 7,539 26 8 | Different rates. | 16,515 13 3 | | 12,365 1 12 | Different rates. | 28,412 9 9 | |
| 1,952 33 8 | | 3,173 5 4 | | 2,785 38 12 | | 6,964 14 9 | |
| 1,624 1 0 | | 2,639 0 8 | | 1,394 39 8 | | 3,487 7 6 | |
| 2 31 8 | | 4 8 5 | | 9 22 0 | | 16 11 6 | |
| 14 13 8 | | 23 4 9 | | ...... | | ...... | |
| 4 20 0 | | 7 5 0 | | 2 27 0 | | 4 0 3 | |
| 337 8 0 | | 337 3 2 | | 288 19 4 | | 216 5 9 | |
| ...... | | ...... | | ...... | | ...... | |
| ...... | | ...... | | 43 22 0 | | 65 5 3 | |
| 16 24 8 | | 6 3 8 | | 1 0 0 | | 0 6 0 | |
| ...... | | ...... | | ...... | | ...... | |
| ...... | | 2,055 0 0 | | ...... | | 9,800 0 0 | |
| 11,491 38 8 | | ...... | 24,761 12 3 | 16,891 10 4 | | ...... | 48,967 12 9 |
| 4,704 28 0 | | 11,990 12 0 | | 5,495 15 4 | | 13,738 7 3 | |
| 755 26 8 | | 1,511 5 0 | | 341 37 0 | | 854 13 0 | |
| ...... | | ...... | | 0 25 8 | | 3 3 0 | |
| ...... | | ...... | | 0 10 0 | | 1 0 0 | |
| 3,972 7 8 | | 3,972 2 1 | | 3,245 13 4 | | 5,171 6 8 | |
| 276 35 0 | | 553 13 0 | | 627 36 4 | | 1,569 12 3 | |
| 0 7 0 | | 1 0 0 | | 0 38 0 | | 2 1 7 | |
| ...... | | ...... | | 167 12 4 | | 250 15 3 | |
| ...... | | ...... | | ...... | | ...... | |
| ...... | | 2,055 0 0 | | ...... | | 9,800 0 0 | |
| 9,709 24 0 | | ...... | 20,084 0 1 | 9,879 27 8 | | ...... | 31,391 11 0 |
| ...... | | ...... | 1,37,258 14 0 | ...... | | ...... | 1,92,513 4 8 |

realised for the Sibi Abkari contract, consequent on the railway works and movement of troops.

R. J. BRUCE,
*Political Agent, Thal-Chotiáli.*

# APPENDIX VI.

*Report on the working of the Dispensaries in the Baluchistan Agency for the period 1880-84.*

In 1880 there were only two civil dispensaries in Baluchistan, *viz.*, the Quetta and Kalát dispensaries.

Dispensary buildings.

*The Quetta* dispensary buildings were erected in 1877, and are situated about 400 yards to the north of the Residency near the old police lines. This site was selected evidently for its being convenient for the civil establishments, and more easily protected by the police. The native town was at that time inside the fort about a mile off.

The buildings originally consisted of a police ward for 16 beds, two men's wards for 8 beds each, a women's ward for 4 beds, a small dispensary with two store-rooms, a house for the hospital assistant, and a line of servants' huts.

A prisoners' ward consisting of three rooms and a small court-yard was added to the dispensary buildings in the autumn of 1882.

*The Kalát* dispensary is situated close to the road leading between the town of Kalát and the Residency, and about a mile from the town. It was built in 1877, and consists of a large room for the dispensary and stores, a line of huts for patients, a house for the Assistant Surgeon, and a line of servants' huts and store-rooms.

A new cook-room and latrines have been built recently.

Medical officers.

Previous to 1880, in the absence of the Residency Surgeon (Surgeon O. T. Duke) from Quetta, several medical officers had been in charge of the *Quetta* dispensary at different times; among others Surgeons-Major Thompson and Veale. In March 1880 Surgeon J. C. Fullerton assumed charge of the dispensary from Surgeon Kirtaker and has been in charge ever since. Under the Governor General's Agent, Dr. Fullerton as Residency Surgeon also holds charge of all the other Civil dispensaries in the Agency.

The hospital assistants attached to the Quetta dispensary since the beginning of 1880 have been Hospital Assistants Kassim Alí, Nonith Ram, and A. Samuel Pillay. The first named was sent back to India for being untrustworthy and for neglect of duty in June 1881. The second pretended to have lost his health from fright shortly after his arrival in Quetta, and had to be transferred to Sibi, and eventually to India. Hospital Assistant Samuel Pillay has been attached to the dispensary since the summer of 1881, and his conduct and qualifications have been found most satisfactory.

*The Kalát* dispensary has always been in charge of an Assistant Surgeon, and previous to 1880 the Residency Surgeon also lived a good deal at Kalát. Assistant Surgeon Bure Khán was the 1st Assistant Surgeon appointed to the dispensary. He is reported to have been popular, and he is credited with having performed many cures and successful operations in the course of his practice among the people. After him in 1881 came Assistant Surgeon Fuzl-ud-din who was found to be negligent and untrustworthy. He was succeeded on the 4th April 1883 by Assistant Surgeon Shekh Ata Muhammad, a most painstaking and efficient officer. Shekh Ata Muhammad on being promoted to a political appointment was succeeded at Kalát on the 19th July 1884 by Assistant Surgeon Ramzan Bux, who is still in charge and performing his duties satisfactorily.

New dispensaries.

*The Sibi* railway and civil dispensaries were first established in 1880, and in the autumn of 1881 were formed into one civil dispensary under the Agency. This dispensary and the railway line from Jutput to Narí and Pír Chowki were made over to the charge of the medical officer at Sibi, who received an allowance of R150 per mensem for performing the medical duties.

Surgeons-Major Kiernander and Arnott, and Surgeons Wilkins, Aretoon, and Ferguson have held charge of the dispensary. Surgeon Ferguson was relieved in May 1883 by Assistant Apothecary Soaris, when the appointment was reduced by the Government of India to an Apothecary's appointment with a monthly allowance of R100 and R50 in lieu of quarters. Assistant Apothecary Saldanha succeeded Assistant Apothecary Soaris on the 26th November 1884, and is still in charge of the dispensary.

The civil medical duties at Sibi being of a highly important and responsible nature, embracing the civil medical charge of the Sibi district and town, and of the line of railway from near Jacobabad to Rindli, and the large staff of railway officials always stationed at Sibi and Rindli, it is essential for their due performance to have a thoroughly tried, experienced,

and well-qualified Apothecary placed in charge of them. The Apothecaries hitherto appointed have not altogether fulfilled these requirements, as neither of them are senior men of experience. The allowances which are drawn in addition to military pay were intended by Government to secure the services of thoroughly competent and trustworthy men.

In April 1883 four new civil dispensaries were opened, *viz.*, one at each of the following places:—

Thal-Chotiálí.
Khushdil Khán.
Gulistán.
Kachh.

These dispensaries were intended to afford medical aid to the large civil establishments stationed at the places named, and also for the country people who had expressed the desire to have these institutions established among them, and had proved their appreciation of the English system of medicine and surgery by the large attendance of sick people from the more distant parts of the country at the Quetta, Kalát, and Sibi dispensaries, and at the dispensary of the Residency Surgeon when on tour in the districts, and of the medical officers in charge of regiments whenever opportunity offered.

*The Thal-Chotiálí* civil dispensary was opened on the 1st April 1883 at the original station of Thal, and was afterwards removed with the civil establishment to Darbar Kotí, and later on to Duki (present Thal-Chotiálí). Owing to these changes of site and to the very limited number of civil buildings, the dispensary accommodation has necessarily been very limited from the first. Requisitions for dispensary buildings were submitted long ago, but no regular accommodation has yet been provided at Duki, and the Political Agent has given two huts in the Baluch Guides' Lines which serve the purpose for the present.

Under the orders of the Government of India, the medical officer in charge of the troops stationed at Thal was appointed to supervise the dispensary on an allowance of R50 per mensem, and a hospital assistant was placed in charge of the dispensary on a salary of R50 per mensem. No menial establishment is allowed, and the hospital assistant in consideration of the liberal salary he receives does all his own compounding and dressing. A small fee is paid from the allotment for contingencies for cleaning and for water-supply. This system has been found to answer very well, not only at Thal, but at all the other dispensaries named above, and it carries the recommendation of saving considerable expenditure on large establishments in a country where establishments of all kinds are extremely expensive and difficult to obtain and keep up.

Surgeon MacGregor, 7th Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry, acted as Civil Surgeon from the 1st April to the 10th December 1883; Surgeon Crofts, Xth Bengal Lancers, from the 10th December 1883 to the 26th September 1884; Surgeon Sargeant to the 19th December; and Surgeon Pratt for the rest of the year. Owing to changes in the garrison, frequent changes of the medical officers are unavoidable, however desirable it might be to avoid them. Third class Hospital Assistant Sherebaz was in charge of the dispensary from the 1st April to the 6th September 1883, when he was relieved by the present incumbent, Hospital Assistant Ram Prosad Bannerjee. Sherebaz was but indifferently qualified for the post. Ram Prosad Bannerjee is an intelligent man, but his returns and his work require constant and careful inspection. He is very untidy in his dress and work, and he frequently submits urgent petitions either for large advances of money to enable him to escape imminent ruin, or for leave to proceed to his home to secure his share of the ancestral estates.

At first the attendance of patients was almost limited to the civil establishments in the tehsil, but it has increased greatly since the winter of 1883, and the country people now attend the dispensary in great numbers as will be seen from the returns given below.

*Khushdil Khán* (*now Pishín*) civil dispensary was opened on the 8th April 1883, and placed in the charge of passed Medical Pupil Motee Singh, an intelligent and well-educated young Sikh. It was first located in a tent in the tehsil yard. In the autumn of 1883 the dispensary was removed along with the tehsil to the new cantonments at Pishín, where it has been located ever since. It is now held in a room in the tehsil given for the purpose by the Political Agent. No regular dispensary buildings have yet been provided.

As in the case of Thal-Chotiálí, the only establishment employed is a hospital assistant, who does all the compounding and dressing himself, for which he receives a salary of R50 per mensem.

Medical Pupil Motee Singh held charge of the dispensary till February 17th, 1884, when he was accidentally killed by falling down a deep well on a dark night. Hospital Assistant Shekh Dadamyah then carried on the duties for a short time, and 1st class Hospital Assistant Syad Hussain took over charge on the 5th March 1884. This hospital assistant had shortly before this time undergone punishment for misconduct in India, and it was soon ascertained that he could not be trusted, and on this account and further misconduct at Pishín he was sent

back to India. He was relieved on the 11th August by 2nd class Hospital Assistant Kaim Khán, who is still in charge, and performs his duties very satisfactorily.

This dispensary is well attended by the villagers as well as by the bazar people and others. It is found to be quite adequate for the present requirements of the station, which is the head-quarters of the Pishín district.

*Gulistan civil dispensary* was first opened on the 13th April 1883 by 3rd class Hospital Assistant Sirbuland Khán. It is located in a hut in the fort. There is no recognised hospital accommodation, but shelter can always be provided for patients requiring or wishing for treatment in hospital.

There are only a few tribal sowars at Gulistan, and no other Government establishments and the patients treated at the dispensary are consequently almost entirely drawn from the country people who contribute a very creditable attendance at the dispensary. Hospital Assistant Sirbuland Khán has been in charge since the dispensary was first opened. He is not smart or well-educated, but he speaks Pushtu fluently and suits very well for the kind of work required of him at this out-of-the-way place.

*The Kachh civil dispensary* was opened on the 1st April 1883, and was placed in the charge of the Hospital Assistant attached to the Kachh garrison, who received an allowance of R10 per mensem. The dispensary was held in the same room as the Military dispensary, and no separate buildings were set apart for hospital purposes. The dispensary was removed on the 5th July 1883 along with the troops forming the garrison to *Sháhrig,* where it has been at work ever since as the Sháhrig dispensary. The attendance of patients at Kachh was small owing to the thinness of the population in the neighbourhood. But the medical officer there performs several successful operations on patients who come to him from distant villages. There being several large villages in the Sháhrig district, the attendance of patients naturally increased when the dispensary was opened there. Owing to frequent changes of the hospital assistants the attendance of patients has not been quite satisfactory, but it has improved greatly since October last, when the dispensary was constituted a regular civil dispensary after the withdrawal of the garrison.

*The Sháhrig dispensary* was re opened in its present form on the 27th October 1884 by 2nd class Hospital Assistant Mír Muhammad Alí. It was found necessary to maintain a civil dispensary at Sháhrig after the withdrawal of the garrison, not only for the purposes of the country people, but also for the large civil establishments located there. It is also extensively used by railway employés. The dispensary is held in a room in the fort, and there are also plenty of spare rooms suitable for hospital purposes.

The salary of the hospital assistant in charge of the dispensary is R50 per mensem. He also receives an allowance from the railway, which also provides a few hospital servants for the railway hospital.

*The civil dispensary at Gundakinduff* was opened on the 1st May 1883 by Hospital Assistant Shumsheer Singh, in medical charge of the detachments of troops holding that post. A severe epidemic of fever had broken out in the villages of the Quat-Mundai and Badra valleys, and the dispensary was opened chiefly for the relief of the people of these districts. The place is almost deserted in the summer owing to the fierce heat, and there is very little work done at the dispensary at this season. But in the cool season, and while the railway works are in progress, there is a very fair attendance of patients. This dispensary has been like Sháhrig very useful to the railway employés, and has recently been handed over to the railway authorities. The medicines have hitherto been provided by the civil dispensary, Quetta.

Hospital Assistant Shumsheer Singh, who has been in charge most of the time, has done excellent service. First class Hospital Assistant Solomon David has been in charge since November 1884.

*The Narí Gorge* (Harnái Road works) civil dispensary was opened on the 26th December 1883 for the purpose of affording medical aid to the employés of the then Harnái Road works. In the summer of 1884 it was removed to Mangi with the office of the Engineer-in-Chief, and it is now known as the Mangi dispensary. For the first four months it was in the sole care of 3rd class Hospital Assistant Futteh Muhammad, a man whose conduct was so grossly bad that he was reprimanded by the Surgeon-General for it later on in the year. In this man's care the dispensary did not flourish. His sole care seemed to be to submit enormous contingent bills and to collect a large staff of hospital servants about him, while he himself neglected the work there was to be done. During the summer and autumn the dispensary was placed under the supervision of the medical officer with the troops at Mangi, and in the winter again after the troops left Mangi it came more directly under the Residency Surgeon.

Futteh Muhammad was replaced in December 1884 by Hospital Assistant Ourban Hussain, who is now in charge and performing his duties well.

This dispensary was regularly visited by the Residency Surgeon. It is now under the supervision of the medical officer in charge of the Railway.

*The Bolan* (Public Works Department) civil dispensary was opened at Mach on the 12th May 1883. There were at that time a large number of workmen collected on the Bolan Road works. The dispensary was held in a tent, and it moved about with the Engineer officers as circumstances required. It was closed temporarily in February 1884, and again re-opened at Mach on the 21st November 1884, and was moved down to Kirta soon after. Hospital Assistant Ramayah was in charge of it for the first period. Hospital Assistant Abdul Karim was in charge from November 1884 till the 1st June 1885, when he died of cholera at Kirta. Hospital Assistant Sheikh Hafizula is now in charge.

The attendance of patients at the different dispensaries from 1880 to 1884 will now be considered.

There is not room in this report for the detailed returns for each dispensary separately, and collective returns are therefore substituted which give in a condensed form similar information to that given in the separate returns, as they observe the same classification of disease and arrangement of the cases treated, &c.

The annual return for the Kalát dispensary for the year 1880 is not available, as previous to that year it was not the custom to prepare regular annual returns from the registers for it, or for the Quetta dispensary.

The following statement shows the attendance of patients, &c., at the Quetta dispensary for the year 1880:—

*Return of In and Out-Patients treated at the Dispensary of Quetta during the year 1880.*

| | | | Total number of patients treated out-door. | In-patients. | | | | | Total number of patient treated both in-door and out-door. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Total treated. | Cu·ed. | Relieved. | Discharged otherwise. | Died. | |
| General Diseases. | Order A. Febrile or Zymotic Diseases. | Small-pox | ... | 5 | 3 | ... | ... | 2 | 5 |
| | | Malarious fever, ague and remittent | 607 | 39 | 31 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 646 |
| | | Cholera | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| | | Other diseases of this order | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | 6 |
| | | Total | 611 | 46 | 35 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 657 |
| | Order B. Constitutional Diseases. | Rheumatic affections | 203 | 17 | 15 | 2 | ... | ... | 220 |
| | | Syphilitic affections | 68 | 12 | 10 | 1 | 1 | ... | 80 |
| | | Scrofula | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| | | Anœmia | 10 | 2 | 2 | ... | ... | ... | 12 |
| | | Leprosy | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| | | Phthisis | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| | | Dropsy | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| | | Other diseases of this order | 80 | 14 | 11 | 1 | 2 | ... | 94 |
| | | Total | 361 | 45 | 38 | 4 | 3 | ... | 406 |
| Local Diseases. | | Ophthalmia | 112 | 2 | 2 | ... | ... | ... | 114 |
| | | Inflammation of the external ear | 45 | 3 | 3 | ... | ... | ... | 48 |
| | | Goitre | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| | | Respiratory affections | 202 | 24 | 10 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 226 |
| | | Heart diseases | ... | 1 | ... | ... | ... | 1 | 1 |
| | | Dysentery | 169 | 20 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 10 | 189 |
| | | Diarrhœa | 214 | 11 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 225 |
| | | Worms | 1 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 1 |
| | | Liver diseases | 4 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 4 |
| | | Spleen diseases | 92 | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... | 93 |
| | | Gonorrhœa and its complications | 53 | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... | 54 |
| | | Abscesses, boils, and whitlows | 72 | 22 | 17 | 2 | 1 | ... | 94 |
| | | Skiu diseases | 132 | 16 | 13 | 1 | 1 | ... | 148 |
| | | Ulcer | 236 | 18 | 15 | 1 | 2 | ... | 254 |
| | | Labour, premature, natural, and difficult ¦ | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| | | Other local diseases | 783 | 36 | 26 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 819 |
| | | Total | 2,115 | 155 | 99 | 15 | 13 | 19 | 2,270 |
| Conditions neither General nor Local. | | Debility and old age | 7 | 5 | 4 | 1 | ... | ... | 12 |
| | | Poisons, and poisoned wounds | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| | | Injuries | 90 | 36 | 32 | 2 | ... | 2 | 126 |
| | | Total | 97 | 41 | 36 | 3 | ... | 2 | 138 |
| | | Grand Total | 3,184 | 287 | 208 | 25 | 19 | 26 | 3,471 |

*Showing the Class and Sex of the Patients treated.*

| | TOTAL TREATED. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | DAILY AVERAGE NUMBER. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | EUROPEANS. | | | EURASIANS. | | | MUSALMANS. | | | HINDUS. | | | OTHER CLASSES. | | | TOTAL. | | | | | | |
| | Men. | Women. | Children. | Men. | Women. | Children. | Men. | Women. | Children. | Men. | Women. | Children. | Men. | Women. | Children. | Men. | Women. | Children. | Men. | Women. | Children. | Total. |
| In-door | ... | ... | .. | ... | ... | ... | 201 | 14 | 8 | 39 | 5 | 2 | 20 | ... | ... | 260 | 19 | 10 | 6·2 | 0·25 | 1·0 | 7·27 |
| Out-door | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 1,634 | 94 | 43 | 934 | 50 | 30 | 357 | 28 | 12 | 2,925 | 172 | 85 | 20·23 | 2·18 | 1·23 | 23·64 |
| Total | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 1,835 | 108 | 51 | 973 | 55 | 32 | 377 | 28 | 12 | 3,185 | 291 | 95 | 26·25 | 2·43 | 2·23 | 30·91 |

*Showing the result of the Major Surgical Operations performed during the year 1880.*

| DISEASE FOR WHICH OPERATION WAS PERFORMED. | | Nature of operation according to Circular No. 31, dated 24th May 1872. | Remaining on 31st December. | Performed during the year. | Total. | RESULT. | | | | Remaining under treatment. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No. | Name. | | | | | Cured. | Relieved. | Discharged otherwise. | Died. | |
| 152 | Cataract | Linear extraction | ... | 2 | 2 | 2 | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| 1101 | Fracture of clavicle | Adjusted | ... | 1 | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| 570 | Vesical calculus | Lithotomy | ... | 3 | 3 | 3 | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| 45-1 | Fatty tumour | Removal by knife | ... | 3 | 3 | 3 | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| 491 B. | Hœmorrhoids | | ... | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... |
| | | TOTAL | ... | 11 | 11 | 10 | 1 | ... | ... | ... |
| | | Minor operations performed during the year | ... | ... | .. | 211 | ... | ... | ... | ... |

*Showing the Expenditure incurred on account of the Quetta Dispensary in the year 1880.*

| | R a. p. |
|---|---|
| Establishment | 1,880 11 11 |
| Contingencies (exclusive of Europe medicines) | 635 14 8 |
| TOTAL | 2,516 10 7 |

The dispensary was in the care of Surgeon Kirtaker for the first three months of the year, and for the remaining nine months in that of the Residency Surgeon. Owing to the prolonged absence of the Residency Surgeon on tour in the districts and with the Governor General's Agent, there was a considerable time during which the hospital assistant (Kassim Alí) had to perform all the duties of the dispensary and hospital himself.

It will appear from the return that the chief causes of sickness were malarious fevers, bowel-complaints, ulcers, respiratory affections, and rheumatic affections, and these have always been found to be the chief causes of sickness at Quetta. Small-pox was prevalent in the autumn and winter.

The expenditure incurred on account of the Kalát dispensary in the year 1880 was as follows:—

| | R a. p. |
|---|---|
| Establishment | 2,287 0 0 |
| Contingencies (exclusive of Europe medicines) | 555 5 0 |
| TOTAL | 2,842 5 0 |

The total expenditure for Kalát and Quetta together was therefore R5,358-15-7.

The following are the returns of the dispensaries for the year 1881, and they include the Quetta and Kalát dispensaries only. The Sibi dispensary only came under the superintendence of the Residency Surgeon in September 1881, and no return of patients has been furnished, but a statement of the expenditure on account of this dispensary has been included in the statement of expenditure for the Kalát and Quetta dispensaries.

*Return of Patients treated at the Quetta and Kalát Civil Dispensaries collectively in 1881.*

| | | Total number of Patients treated out-door. | In-patients. Total treated. | Cured. | Relieved. | Discharged otherwise. | Died. | Total number of Patients treated both in-door and out-door. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| General Diseases. Order A. Febrile or Zymotic Diseases. | Small-pox | 11 | 11 | 7 | ... | 2 | 2 | 22 |
| | Malarious fever | 1,566 | 317 | 311 | ... | 2 | ... | 1,883 |
| | Cholera | .. | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| | Other diseases of this order | 101 | 18 | 14 | ... | 1 | ... | 119 |
| | Total | 1,678 | 346 | 332 | ... | 5 | 2 | 2,024 |
| General Diseases. Order B. Constitutional Diseases. | Rheumatic affections | 370 | 59 | 50 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 429 |
| | Syphilitic affections | 214 | 57 | 41 | 1 | 7 | ... | 271 |
| | Scrofula | 20 | 1 | ... | ... | 1 | ... | 21 |
| | Anœmia | 57 | 6 | 4 | 1 | ... | 1 | 63 |
| | Leprosy | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| | Phthisis | 8 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 8 |
| | Dropsy | 7 | 3 | 2 | ... | 1 | ... | 10 |
| | Other diseases of this order | 399 | 43 | 38 | 1 | 2 | ... | 442 |
| | Total | 1,075 | 169 | 135 | 5 | 13 | 2 | 1,244 |
| Local Diseases. | Ophthalmia | 470 | 18 | 17 | ... | 1 | ... | 488 |
| | Inflammation of external ear | 153 | 6 | 6 | ... | ... | ... | 159 |
| | Goitre | 1 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 1 |
| | Respiratory affections | 641 | 187 | 170 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 828 |
| | Heart diseases | 5 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 5 |
| | Dysentery | 355 | 49 | 39 | 2 | ... | 4 | 404 |
| | Diarrhœa | 319 | 52 | 40 | 1 | ... | 4 | 371 |
| | Worms | 8 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 8 |
| | Liver diseases | 63 | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... | 64 |
| | Spleen diseases | 212 | 26 | 16 | 1 | 9 | ... | 238 |
| | Gonorrhœa and its complications | 185 | 64 | 61 | ... | 1 | ... | 249 |
| | Abscesses, boils, and whitlows | 278 | 20 | 17 | 1 | ... | ... | 298 |
| | Skin diseases | 213 | 5 | 4 | ... | 1 | ... | 218 |
| | Ulcer | 420 | 43 | 23 | 2 | ... | 2 | 463 |
| | Labour, premature, &c | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| | Other local diseases | 1,130 | 66 | 47 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 1,196 |
| | Total | 4,453 | 537 | 441 | 10 | 20 | 19 | 4,990 |
| Conditions neither General nor Local. | Debility and old age | 102 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 1 | ... | 109 |
| | Poisons, and poisoned wounds | 2 | 5 | 3 | ... | 1 | ... | 7 |
| | Injuries | 170 | 46 | 35 | ... | 2 | 1 | 216 |
| | Total | 274 | 58 | 41 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 332 |
| | Grand Total | 7,480 | 1,110 | 949 | 17 | 42 | 24 | 8,590 |

*Showing the Class and Sex of the Patients treated.*

| | Total Treated. Europeans. Men. | Women. | Children. | Eurasians. Men. | Women. | Children. | Mussulmans. Men. | Women. | Children. | Hindus. Men. | Women. | Children. | Other Classes. Men. | Women. | Children. | Total. Men. | Women. | Children. | Daily Average Number. Men. | Women. | Children. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| In-door | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 621 | 33 | 16 | 387 | ... | ... | 53 | ... | ... | 1,061 | 33 | 16 | 19·55 | ·89 | ·90 | 21·34 |
| Out-door | 5 | ... | ... | 30 | ... | ... | 4,601 | 706 | 537 | 1,219 | 72 | 62 | 220 | 16 | 11 | 6,076 | 794 | 610 | 45·45 | 6·23 | 4·77 | 56·45 |
| Total | 5 | ... | ... | 30 | ... | ... | 5,223 | 739 | 553 | 1,606 | 72 | 62 | 273 | 16 | 11 | 7,137 | 827 | 626 | 65· | 7·12 | 5·57 | 77·69 |

*Showing the result of the Major Surgical Operations performed during the year 1881.*

| Diseases for which operation was performed. | | Nature of operation. | Performed during the year. | Result. | | | | Remaining under treatment. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No. | Name. | | | Cured. | Relieved. | Discharged otherwise. | Died. | |
| 154(a) | Cataract | Linear extraction | 6 | 3 | ... | 3 | " | ... |
| 1101 | Fracture of clavicle | Set up | 4 | 3 | ... | 1 | .. | ... |
| 570 | Vesical calculus | Lithotomy | 12 | 10 | ... | ... | 2 | ... |
| | Dislocation of elbow joint | Reduction | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... | . |
| 1128 | Fracture of Fibula | Set up | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| 617 | Hydrocele | Tapping and injection | 2 | 2 | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| 759 | Caries of Metacarpal bones | Amputation | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| 1122 | Fracture of femur | Set up | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| 1105 | Fracture of finger (compound) | Amputation | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| 175 | Trichiasis | Removal of fold of skin | 4 | 4 | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| | Gangrene of foot | Amputation (Fergusson's) | 1 | ... | 1 | ... | ... | ... |
| 490 | Fistula in ano | Incision | 2 | 1 | ... | ... | ... | 1 |
| 491(b) | Hœmorrhoids | Removal by knife and actual cautory | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| | | TOTAL | 37 | 29 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
| | | Total number of minor operations performed | 416 | 407 | 7 | 2 | ... | ... |

*Showing the Expenditure incurred on account of the Quetta, Kalát, and Sibi Dispensaries in the year 1881.*

| | R a. p. |
|---|---|
| Establishment | 6,200 2 1 |
| Contingencies (including office, bazar medicines, and diets) | 1,736 9 8 |
| TOTAL | 7,936 11 9 |

Of the attendance of patients above detailed, the Quetta dispensary furnished 5,225, the Quetta Jail Hospital 432, and Quetta Police Hospital 581, or a total of 6,238 for Quetta, while the Kalát dispensary furnished 2,352.

The attendance of patients at the Quetta dispensary in 1881 as contrasted with that of the previous year is shown in the following statement :—

| | 1880. | 1881. |
|---|---|---|
| In-patients | 287 | 284 |
| Out-patients | 3,184 | 4,941 |

The improvement in the attendance for the year under report was largely due to successful efforts to provide prompt and kindly treatment for the patients presenting themselves at the dispensary. Hospital Assistant Kassim Alí had got a bad name among the people. After his removal Hospital Assistant Samuel Pillay, who is a much superior man and far better qualified for the post, soon began to secure the confidence and respect of the people. It is quite impossible to conduct a dispensary successfully with a resident hospital assistant in charge who systematically neglects his duties whenever the superintendent's back is turned.

Fevers, as usual, were the most common complaints, and were of a much more severe type than obtained the previous year. Bowel-complaints were also very prevalent.

The unhealthiness was most marked in the summer months, owing largely, in my opinion, to the extraordinary heat at that season, and to the prevalence, day and night, of strong north-west and south-west winds.

Small-pox was prevalent in the spring, and about 5,000 persons were vaccinated in the Quetta district by the Residency Surgeon and the hospital assistant in addition to the dispensary work.

The attendance at the Kalát dispensary was less than it was the previous year, partly owing to the absence of His Highness the Khán and his army from Kalát for a time, and also partly to lack of energy and attention on the part of Assistant Surgeon Fuzl-ud-din.

Formerly His Highness the Khán seldom left Kalát, and he had a much larger army, and as the dispensary has always been very popular at Kalát, it loses patients whenever His Highness the Khán and his followers are absent. In more recent years this has not been so markedly noticeable, as the army is now very small, and the country people furnish most of the patients.

Malarious fevers were prevalent at Kalát in the hot weather, and in the spring small-pox was epidemic. The Assistant Surgeon vaccinated about 100 children at the dispensary.

*Return of Patients treated at the Sibi, Quetta, and Kalát Civil Dispensaries, collectively, in 1882.*

| Class | Order | Disease | Total number of Patients treated out-door. | In-patients: Total treated. | In-patients: Cured. | In-patients: Relieved. | In-patients: Discharged otherwise. | In-patients: Died. | Total number of Patients treated both in-door and out-door. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| General Diseases. | Order A. Febrile or Zymotic Diseases. | Small-pox | ... | 2 | 2 | ... | ... | ... | 2 |
| | | Malarious fever | 3,621 | 229 | 214 | 4 | ... | 6 | 3,850 |
| | | Cholera | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| | | Other diseases of this order | 337 | 33 | 27 | 5 | ... | ... | 370 |
| | | Total | 3,958 | 264 | 243 | 9 | ... | 6 | 4,222 |
| | Order B. Constitutional Diseases. | Rheumatic affections | 933 | 72 | 66 | 2 | ... | 2 | 1,005 |
| | | Syphilitic affections | 584 | 65 | 60 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 649 |
| | | Scrofula | 16 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 16 |
| | | Anæmia | 62 | 8 | 5 | 1 | ... | 2 | 70 |
| | | Leprosy | 2 | 1 | ... | ... | 1 | ... | 3 |
| | | Phthisis | 3 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 3 |
| | | Dropsy | 9 | 10 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 19 |
| | | Other diseases of this order | 729 | 70 | 56 | 8 | 2 | ... | 799 |
| | | Total | 2,338 | 226 | 189 | 15 | 5 | 9 | 2,564 |
| Local Diseases. | | Ophthalmia | 420 | 21 | 19 | 1 | 1 | ... | 441 |
| | | Inflammation of external ear | 266 | 5 | 5 | ... | ... | ... | 271 |
| | | Goitre | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| | | Respiratory affections | 1,013 | 235 | 201 | 5 | ... | 23 | 1,248 |
| | | Heart disease | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| | | Dysentery | 911 | 102 | 86 | 4 | ... | 10 | 1,013 |
| | | Diarrhœa | 922 | 75 | 62 | ... | 2 | 7 | 997 |
| | | Worms | 42 | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... | 43 |
| | | Liver diseases | 99 | 2 | 1 | ... | ... | 1 | 101 |
| | | Spleen diseases | 406 | 40 | 33 | 4 | ... | ... | 446 |
| | | Gonorrhœa and its complications | 396 | 43 | 37 | 4 | ... | ... | 439 |
| | | Abscesses, boils, and whitlows | 619 | 34 | 20 | 8 | ... | 2 | 653 |
| | | Skin diseases | 142 | 5 | 5 | ... | ... | ... | 147 |
| | | Ulcers | 791 | 39 | 35 | 2 | ... | 1 | 830 |
| | | Labour, premature, &c. | 4 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 4 |
| | | Other local diseases | 1,105 | 113 | 96 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 1,218 |
| | | Total | 7,136 | 715 | 601 | 34 | 4 | 46 | 7,851 |
| Conditions neither General nor Local. | | Debility and old age | 34 | 5 | 3 | 1 | ... | 1 | 39 |
| | | Poisons, and poisoned wounds | 115 | 14 | 3 | 2 | ... | ... | 129 |
| | | Injuries | 147 | 58 | 42 | 8 | 1 | 2 | 205 |
| | | Total | 296 | 77 | 48 | 11 | 1 | 3 | 373 |
| | | GRAND TOTAL | 13,728 | 1,282 | 1,081 | 69 | 10 | 64 | 15,010 |

*Showing the Class and Sex of the Patients treated.*

| | Total treated: Europeans: Men. | Europeans: Women. | Europeans: Children. | Eurasians: Men. | Eurasians: Women. | Eurasians: Children. | Mussulmans: Men. | Mussulmans: Women. | Mussulmans: Children. | Hindus: Men. | Hindus: Women. | Hindus: Children. | Other classes: Men. | Other classes: Women. | Other classes: Children. | Total: Men. | Total: Women. | Total: Children. | Daily average number: Men. | Daily average number: Women. | Daily average number: Children. | Daily average number: Total. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| In-door | ... | ... | ... | 3 | ... | ... | 818 | 25 | 6 | 398 | 2 | ... | 2 | ... | ... | 1,251 | 25 | 6 | 37·60 | 2·10 | ·24 | 39·94 |
| Out-door | 174 | 3 | 2 | 376 | 19 | 10 | 8,199 | 515 | 306 | 2,552 | 91 | 71 | 1,356 | 24 | 30 | 12,657 | 652 | 419 | 90·33 | 7·80 | 3·14 | 101·27 |
| Total | 174 | 3 | 2 | 379 | 19 | 10 | 9,017 | 538 | 312 | 2,950 | 93 | 71 | 1,388 | 24 | [illegible] | 13,908 | 677 | 425 | 127·93 | 9·90 | 3·38 | 141·21 |

*Showing the result of the Major Surgical Operations performed during the year 1882.*

| Diseases for which operation was performed — No. | Diseases for which operation was performed — Name. | Nature of Operation. | Remaining on 31st December 1881. | Performed during the year. | Result — Cured. | Result — Relieved. | Result — Discharged otherwise. | Result — Died. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 44 | Encephaloid of eyeball | Excision | ... | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... |
| 152 | Cataract | Linear extraction | ... | 7 | 5 | 1 | 1 | ... |
| 370 | Vesical calculus | Lithotomy | ... | 6 | 5 | ... | ... | 1 |
| 760 | Necrosis | Bone extracted | ... | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... |
| 1103 | Compound fracture of humerus | Amputation in upper third | ... | 3 | 2 | ... | 1 | ... |
| | Ascites | Tapped | ... | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... |
| 1121 | Fracture of femur | Set up | ... | 4 | 3 | | ... | 1 |
| 45 | Fatty tumour of cheek | Removal by knife | ... | 1 | 1 | ... | .. | ... |
| 1104 | Fracture of ulna | Set up | ... | 1 | 1 | ... | .. | ... |
| 617 | Hydrocele | Tapping and injection | ... | 2 | 2 | ... | ... | ... |
| 759 | Caries matacarpal bones | Removal and amputation of 3 fingers. | ... | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... |
| | Entropium | Removal of lid with hair bulbs | ... | 1 | 1 | . | ... | ... |
| 1104 | Fracture of radius | Put up | ... | 2 | 2 | ... | ... | ... |
| 772 | Anchylosis | Tenotomy and motion | ... | 1 | 1 | .. | ... | .. |
| 1110 | Dislocation of shoulder | Reduction | ... | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... |
| | Adherent iris | Iridectomy | ... | 3 | 3 | ... | ... | ... |
| 490 | Fistula in ano | Operation with knife | 1 | 1 | 2 | ... | ... | ... |
| | Strangulated inguinal hernia | Reduced by operation | ... | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... |
| 1105 | Fracture of matacarpal bones | Put up | ... | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... |
| 1101 | Fracture of R. clavicle | Ditto | ... | 1 | ... | ... | 1 | ... |
| | | Total | 1 | 40 | 35 | 1 | 3 | 2 |
| | | Total number of minor operations performed. | ... | 1,041 | 1,009 | 3 | 28 | ... |

*Showing the Expenditure on account of the Quetta, Kalát, and Sibi Dispensaries during the year 1882.*

| | R | a. | p. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Establishment | 6,996 | 10 | 8 |
| Contingencies (including office, diets, and bazar medicines) | 2,063 | 6 | 7 |
| Total | 9,060 | 1 | 3 |

The following statement shows the number of cases contributed by each dispensary in the foregoing return :—

| | No. |
|---|---|
| Quetta Civil Dispensary | 8,162 |
| " Police " | 568 |
| " Jail " | 419 |
| Kalát Civil " | 1,609 |
| Sibi " " | 4,252 |
| Total | 15,010 |

The attendance at the Quetta dispensary shows an increase of 2,937 over that of the previous year; that at the Kalát dispensary fell from 2,352 in 1880 to 1,609, owing chiefly to His Highness the Khán and his troops being in Kachhi for ten months this year.

The year throughout was healthy, and there was no epidemic of disease of any kind. The most common diseases were malarious fevers, which represent 25 per cent. of the total number of cases treated, Quetta furnishing 30 per cent. on its own numbers, Kalát 14 per cent. only, and Sibi 24 per cent. Next to malarious fevers come bowel-complaints, respiratory affections of the milder acute kinds, rheumatic affections, and ulcers.

*Return of Patients treated at the Quetta, Kalát, Sibi, Thal-Choliáli, Pishín, Gulistán, Sháhrig, and Gundakinduff Civil Dispensaries, collectively, in 1883.*

| | | Disease | Total number of Patients treated out-door. | In-patients: Total treated. | Cured. | Relieved. | Discharged otherwise. | Died. | Total number of Patients treated both in-door and out-door. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| General Diseases. | Order A. Febrile or Zymotic Diseases. | Small-pox | ... | 6 | 3 | | | 3 | 6 |
| | | Malarious fevers | 6,063 | 339 | 297 | ... | | 5 | 6,402 |
| | | Cholera | ... | | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| | | Other diseases of this order | 1,042 | 76 | 75 | 1 | ... | ... | 1,118 |
| | | Total | 7,105 | 421 | 375 | 1 | ... | 8 | 7,526 |
| | Order B. Constitutional Diseases. | Rheumatic affections | 1,545 | 83 | 78 | 1 | | | 1,628 |
| | | Syphilitic affections | 906 | 82 | 74 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 988 |
| | | Scrofula | 50 | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... | 51 |
| | | Anæmia | 122 | 5 | 2 | ... | ... | ... | 127 |
| | | Leprosy | 1 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 1 |
| | | Phthisis | 14 | 1 | ... | ... | ... | 1 | 15 |
| | | Dropsy | 20 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 26 |
| | | Other diseases of this order | 1,403 | 80 | 74 | ... | ... | 2 | 1,483 |
| | | Total | 4,061 | 258 | 231 | 3 | 2 | 7 | 4,319 |
| Local Diseases. | | Ophthalmia | 1,224 | 39 | 38 | ... | ... | ... | 1,263 |
| | | Inflammation of external ear | 326 | 17 | 17 | ... | ... | ... | 343 |
| | | Goitre | 1 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 1 |
| | | Respiratory affections | 1,779 | 149 | 83 | 2 | 1 | 12 | 1,928 |
| | | Heart disease | 5 | 2 | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | 7 |
| | | Dysentery | 1,235 | 145 | 114 | 3 | ... | 18 | 1,380 |
| | | Diarrhœa | 978 | 60 | 53 | ... | ... | 6 | 1,038 |
| | | Worms | 103 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 103 |
| | | Liver diseases | 78 | 3 | 2 | ... | ... | ... | 81 |
| | | Spleen diseases | 538 | 22 | 21 | ... | .. | ... | 560 |
| | | Gonorrhœa and its complications | 544 | 23 | 22 | 1 | ... | ... | 567 |
| | | Abscesses, boils, and whitlows | 889 | 38 | 35 | 1 | ... | ... | 927 |
| | | Skin diseases | 939 | 11 | 11 | ... | ... | ... | 950 |
| | | Ulcers | 1,572 | 97 | 76 | 1 | ... | 1 | 1,669 |
| | | Labour, premature, &c. | 5 | | | | | | 5 |
| | | Other local diseases | 2,579 | 48 | 40 | 1 | 2 | 5 | ... |
| | | Total | 12,795 | 654 | 513 | 10 | 3 | 42 | 13,449 |
| Conditions neither General not Local. | | Debility | 369 | 17 | 14 | ... | ... | 2 | 386 |
| | | Poisons, and poisoned wounds | 481 | 24 | 24 | ... | ... | ... | 505 |
| | | Injuries | 983 | 118 | 70 | 3 | ... | 2 | 1,101 |
| | | Total | 1,833 | 159 | 108 | 3 | ... | 4 | 1,992 |
| | | Grand Total | 25,794 | 1,492 | 1,227 | 19 | 5 | 61 | 27,286 |

*Showing the Class and Sex of the Patients treated.*

| | Total Treated. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Daily Average Number. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Europeans. | | | Eurasians. | | | Mussulmans. | | | Hindus. | | | Other classes. | | | Total. | | | | | | |
| | Men. | Women. | Children. | Men. | Women. | Children. | Men. | Women. | Children. | Men. | Women. | Children. | Men. | Women. | Children. | Men. | Women. | Children. | Men. | Women. | Children. | Total. |
| In-door | 1 | ... | ... | 3 | ... | ... | 780 | 13 | 23 | 655 | ... | ... | 8 | ... | ... | 1,456 | 13 | 23 | 42·64 | 1·66 | 1·56 | 45·86 |
| Out-door | 146 | 12 | 2 | 265 | 25 | 9 | 13,169 | 1,674 | 1,360 | 4,262 | 814 | 888 | 1,571 | 697 | 900 | 19,413 | 3,222 | 3,159 | 183·93 | 11·43 | 13·6 | 208·42 |
| Total | 147 | 12 | 2 | 268 | 25 | 9 | 13,958 | 1,687 | 1,383 | 4,917 | 814 | 888 | 1,579 | 697 | 900 | 20,869 | 3,235 | 3,182 | 226·57 | 13·09 | 14·62 | 254·28 |

*Showing the result of the Major Surgical Operations performed during the year 1883.*

| Diseases for which operation was performed. | | Nature of Operation. | Remaining on 31st December 1882. | Performed during the year. | Result. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Number. | Name. | | | | Cured. | Relieved. | Discharged otherwise. | Died. |
| | Tumours | Removal | ... | 3 | 3 | ... | ... | ... |
| 570 | Vesical calculus | Lithotomy | ... | 16 | 14 | .. | ... | |
| 1103 | Compound fracture of humerus | Put up | ... | 2 | 2 | ... | ... | ... |
| | Laceration of penis | Amputation | ... | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... |
| 1122 | Fracture of femur | Put up | ... | 1 | ... | 1 | ... | ... |
| 1128 | Fracture of fibula | Do. | ... | 3 | 3 | ... | ... | ... |
| 175 | Trichiasis | Removal of hair bulbs and flold of skin | ... | 2 | 1 | 1 | ... | ... |
| 154 | Cataract | Linear extraction | ... | 5 | 3 | ... | 2 | ... |
| | Strangulated inguinal hernia | Reduced by taris under chloroform | ... | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... |
| | Niems | ...... | ... | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... |
| 772 | Anchylosis | Tenotomy, &c. | ... | 1 | ... | 1 | ... | ... |
| | Staphyloma of right eye | Extirpation of eyeball | ... | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... |
| 1110 | Dislocation of humerus | Reduced | ... | 4 | 4 | ... | ... | ... |
| | Dislocation of elbow joint | Do. | ... | 2 | 2 | ... | ... | ... |
| | Dislocation of wrist joint | Do. | ... | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... |
| | | Total | ... | 44 | 37 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| | | Total number of Minor Operations performed | ... | 1,575 | ... | ... | ... | ... |

*Showing the expenditure on account of the Quetta, Kalát, Sibi, Thal-Chotiálí, Pishín, Gulistán, Sháhrig, and Gundakinduff Dispensaries during the year 1883.*

| | R a. p. |
|---|---|
| Establishment | 9,574 7 11 |
| Medicines | 3,145 6 7 |
| Office contingencies and diets | 2,845 8 2 |
| Total | 15,565 6 8 |

The following statement shows the number of cases treated at the different dispensaries included in the foregoing return :—

| | No. |
|---|---|
| Quetta Civil Dispensary | 9,392 |
| " Police " | 344 |
| " Jail " | 298 |
| Sibi Civil " | 4,031 |
| Kalát " " | 2,698 |
| Thal-Chotiálí Civil Dispensary | 3,137 |
| Pishín " " | 2,980 |
| Gulistán " " | 3,957 |
| Sháhrig " " | 324 |
| Gundakinduff " " | 125 |
| Total | 27,286 |

The attendance at the Quetta Dispensary shows an increase over last year of 1,230; Sibi a decrease of 221; and Kalát an increase of 1,089, owing chiefly to the exertions of the intelligent and competent Assistant Surgeon in-charge at Kalát—Shekh Ata Muhammad.

It will be noticed that 10,523 of the aggregate number of applicants for relief during the year were treated at the new dispensaries opened in April. Of this number, only a small fraction over one per cent. were treated in hospital as in-patients.

The prevalent diseases were first of all malarious fevers, which head the list in all the dispensary returns. The percentage of these affections to the total treated from all causes at the dispensaries respectively is as follows:—Quetta 27, Kalát 14, Sibi 21, Thal-Chotiálí 17 (?), Pishín 21, Gulistán 25, Gundakinduff 31, Sháhrig 50; or an average, on the whole, of about 24 per cent.

Next, after fevers, come bowel-complaints, which were most prevalent at Sibi, Quetta, and Pishín; then respiratory affections most common at Kalát, Quetta, and Sibi; next come ulcers, ophthalmia, syphilitic affections, and skin diseases, which are common in all the districts.

*Return of Patients treated at the Quetta, Thal-Chotiálí, Kalát, Sibi, Pishín, Gulistán, Sháhrig, Gandakinduff and Mangi Dispensaries, collectively, 1884.*

| | | Total number of Patients treated out-door. | In-patients. | | | | | Total number of Patients treated both in-door and out-door. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Total treated. | Cured. | Relieved. | Discharged otherwise. | Died. | |
| General Diseases. Order A. Febrile or Zymotic Diseases. | Small-pox | 3 | 11 | 8 | ... | 1 | 2 | 14 |
| | Malarious fever, ague and remittent | 14,050 | 791 | 774 | ... | 1 | 11 | 14,841 |
| | Cholera | 25 | 1 | ... | ... | ... | 1 | 26 |
| | Other diseases of this order | 487 | 12 | 11 | ... | 1 | ... | 499 |
| | Total | 14,565 | 815 | 793 | ... | 3 | 14 | 15,380 |
| General Diseases. Order B. Constitutional Diseases. | Rheumatic affections | 2,518 | 119 | 108 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2,637 |
| | Syphilitic " | 1,457 | 44 | 40 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1,501 |
| | Scrofula | 63 | 10 | 6 | ... | 2 | 2 | 73 |
| | Anœmia | 252 | 3 | 3 | ... | ... | ... | 255 |
| | Leprosy | 36 | 8 | 5 | ... | 1 | ... | 44 |
| | Phthisis | 46 | 10 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 56 |
| | Dropsy | 20 | 2 | 1 | ... | 1 | ... | 22 |
| | Other diseases of this order | 1,211 | 35 | 32 | 2 | ... | ... | 1,246 |
| | Total | 5,603 | 231 | 199 | 7 | 8 | 10 | 5,834 |
| Local Diseases. | Ophthalmia | 1,580 | 32 | 29 | ... | ... | ... | 1,612 |
| | Inflammation of the external ear | 628 | 10 | 10 | ... | ... | ... | 638 |
| | Goitre | 4 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 4 |
| | Respiratory affections | 2,350 | 159 | 117 | 3 | 2 | 31 | 2,509 |
| | Heart diseases | 25 | 2 | ... | 1 | 1 | ... | 27 |
| | Dysentery | 2,395 | 304 | 258 | 1 | 1 | 42 | 2,699 |
| | Diarrhœa | 1,631 | 220 | 182 | ... | 1 | 35 | 1,851 |
| | Worms | 120 | 2 | 2 | ... | ... | ... | 122 |
| | Liver diseases | 170 | 9 | 6 | ... | ... | 3 | 179 |
| | Spleen " | 932 | 24 | 23 | 1 | ... | ... | 956 |
| | Gonorrhœa and its complications | 991 | 18 | 18 | ... | ... | ... | 1,009 |
| | Abscesses, boils, and whitlows | 1,414 | 70 | 64 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1,484 |
| | Skin diseases | 1,002 | 29 | 29 | ... | ... | ... | 1,031 |
| | Ulcer | 4,212 | 248 | 239 | ... | 1 | 1 | 4,460 |
| | Labour, premature, natural, and difficult | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| | Other local diseases | 4,974 | 331 | 296 | 10 | 13 | 9 | 5,305 |
| | Total | 22,428 | 1,458 | 1,273 | 19 | 21 | 122 | 23,886 |
| Conditions neither General nor Local. | Debility and old age | 829 | 63 | 47 | 2 | ... | 13 | 892 |
| | Poisons and poisoned wounds | 52 | 5 | 5 | ... | ... | ... | 57 |
| | Injuries | 1,439 | 163 | 142 | 1 | 4 | 9 | 1,602 |
| | Total | 2,320 | 231 | 194 | 3 | 4 | 22 | 2,551 |
| | Grand Total | 44,916 | 2,735 | 2,159 | 29 | 36 | 168 | 47,651 |

*Showing the Class and Sex of the Patients treated.*

| | TOTAL TREATED. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | DAILY AVERAGE NUMBER. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | EUROPEANS. | | | EURASIANS. | | | MUSSULMANS. | | | HINDUS. | | | OTHER CLASSES. | | | TOTAL. | | | | | | |
| | Men. | Women. | Children. | Men. | Women. | Children. | Men. | Women. | Children. | Men. | Women. | Children. | Men. | Women. | Children. | Men. | Women. | Children. | Men. | Women. | Children. | Total. |
| In-door . . | 3 | ... | ... | 9 | ... | ... | 1,812 | 15 | 4 | 886 | 1 | ... | 5 | ... | ... | 2,715 | 16 | 4 | 44·24 | 0·76 | 0·61 | 45·61 |
| Out-door . . | 136 | 29 | 14 | 411 | 103 | 34 | 23,016 | 3,472 | 3,544 | 8,963 | 1,056 | 1,168 | 2,497 | 210 | 263 | 35,023 | 4,870 | 5,023 | 258·76 | 20·50 | 21·11 | 300·37 |
| TOTAL . | 139 | 29 | 14 | 420 | 103 | 34 | 24,828 | 3,487 | 3,548 | 9,849 | 1,057 | 1,168 | 2,502 | 210 | 263 | 37,738 | 4,886 | 5,027 | 303·00 | 21·26 | 21·72 | 345·98 |

*Showing the result of the Major Surgical Operations performed during the year 1884.*

| DISEASES FOR WHICH OPERATION WAS PERFORMED. | | Nature of Operation. | Remaining on 31st December 1883. | Performed during the year. | RESULT. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Number. | Name. | | | | Cured. | Relieved. | Discharged otherwise. | Died. |
| 570 | Vesical calculus . . . | One dilatation of female urethra, nine lithotomy . | ... | 10 | 10 | ... | ... | ... |
| | Cicatrix from burn . . | Removal . . . | ... | 1 | ... | 1 | ... | ... |
| | Gangrene of toes (dry) . . . | Do. . . . | ... | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... |
| | Fracture of femur . . . . | Put up . . . | ... | 2 | 2 | ... | ... | ... |
| | " . . . . | Removal . . . | ... | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| | Caries of tarsal bones . . . | Do. . . . | ... | 1 | ... | 1 | ... | ... |
| | Pan ophthalmitis . . . | Extirpation of eyeball . | ... | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... |
| | Cataract . . . . | Linear extraction . . | ... | 5 | 4 | ... | Absconded. | ... |
| | Phymosis . . . . | Circumcision . . . | ... | 1 | ... | ... | 1 | 1 |
| | Compound comminuted fracture of left tibia and fibula with grangrene | Amputation below knee . | ... | 1 | ... | ... | ... | 1 |
| | Fracture of humerus and gangrene of arm caused by tight ligature applied by patient's parent . | Amputation below shoulder joint . . . | ... | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... |
| | Hydrocele . . . . . | Tapping in two<br>Radical cure in one . | ... | 3 | 3 | ... | ... | ... |
| | Anchylosis (knee) . . . . | Tenotomy and movement . | ... | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... |
| | | Total . | ... | 32 | 25 | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| | | Total number of Minor Operations performed . | ... | 2,412 | ... | ... | ... | ... |

*Statement showing the Expenditure incurred on account of the Dispensaries during the year 1884.*

| | R | a. | p. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| On establishment . . . . . . . . . . | 11,172 | 7 | 8 | Less than 2 annas 10 pie per patient. |
| " medicines . . . . . . . . . . | 2,992 | 14 | 3 | |
| " diet . . . . . . . . . . | 1,487 | 8 | 7 | |
| " miscellaneous charges . . . . . . . . | 1,468 | 0 | 10 | |
| Total expenditure during the year . | 17,120 | 15 | 4 | |

The following statement shows the number of patients contributed by the different dispensaries respectively during the year :—

| | No. |
|---|---|
| Quetta Civil Dispensary | 11,251 |
| " Police " | 594 |
| " Jail " | 378 |
| Sibi Civil " | 7,286 |
| Kalát " " | 3,472 |
| Mangi (Railway) " | 5,016 |
| Thal-Chotiálí Civil Dispensary | 6,370 |
| Pishín " " | 4,695 |
| Gulistán " " | 4,724 |
| Sháhrig " " | 3,047 |
| Gundakinduff " " | 818 |
| Total | 47,651 |

The attendance at the Quetta dispensary showed an increase over last year of 1,859; Sibi an increase of 3,255, largely due to the fact of the extensive railway works in the neighbourhood having attracted large numbers of people to the district and town of Sibi; and Kalát realised an increase of 774.

The five last named dispensaries in the above statement, which were open for work for only nine months of the previous year, show a total attendance of 19,654, or an increase of 9,131.

The Railway dispensary at Mangi having been opened on the 26th December 1883, there is no return of patients for that year, but the returns for 1884 are included in the foregoing general return, as will be seen above. The great majority of the patients who seek relief at the Mangi dispensary are Hazárá, Pathan, and other Railway labourers.

Malarious fevers were responsible for a little under one-third of the total admissions at all the dispensaries. These affections were excessively prevalent all over the country in the autumn, and were extremely fatal among the coolies employed on the Pishín State Railway at and below Mangi.

The following are the approximate percentages of admissions on account of malarious fevers to total admissions from all causes at the different dispensaries respectively: Quetta 34, Kalát 19, Thal-Chotiálí 32, Sibi 30, Pishín 25, Gulistán 31, Sháhrig 31, Gundakinduff 22, Mangi 38. Gundakinduff shows a small percentage, because the place was practically deserted in the hot weather when the fevers were most prevalent, and to a certain extent the case of Sháhrig was similar. Kalát, as usual, was the most free from these affections.

Next, after malarious fevers, come bowel-complaints, and then *ulcers*. The latter are extremely common among the coolies employed on the Pishín Railway works. At Sháhrig there were 1,143 admissions from ulcers alone, or 40 per cent. of the total cases treated; at Gundakinduff 139 cases were treated, or 17 per cent. of total admissions. Next come rheumatic and respiratory affections, ophthalmia, injuries, and syphilitic affections.

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The Lock-Hospital, Quetta.

The returns of the lock-hospital at Quetta are not included in those given above. They show a total of 644 cases of the different varieties of venereal diseases treated both as in-door and out-door patients in the course of the year 1884.

The lock-hospital was taken over by the Civil Department from the Military Department on the 5th November 1883, and is now located in the jail ward at the Civil Dispensary, Quetta, which has been found and reported to the Political Agent to be an unsuitable and most objectionable place for it.

The hospital assistant receives R10 per mensem as an allowance for the charge of this hospital. Inspections are conducted twice a month.

The duties of the Residency Surgeon.

All the civil dispensaries under the Baluchistan Political Agency are under the control of the Residency Surgeon, who has them supplied with medicines, &c., checks their bills, and is responsible to the Governor General's Agent for their working. His head-quarters are at Quetta, where there is a large civil dispensary and hospital, and a police, a jail, and a lock-hospital, a large European and Native civil establishment and a native town. Owing to the long distances separating the dispensaries (north and south from Thal to Kalát about 220 miles, and east and west from Sibi to Gulistán, about 140 miles) which have to be visited periodically by the Residency Surgeon, a considerable part of his time is spent on tour in the several districts of the Agency. When on tour the Residency Surgeon, besides inspecting the dispensaries and checking the records and accounts and satisfying himself as to the attendance of patients, also makes sanitary inspections of the different stations, and communicates with the respective Political Agents on

such sanitary questions as may require attention. He also takes a supply of medicines with him for the use of the country people among whom his route may happen to lie. The dispensary work done in this way is often considerable and does not appear in the returns of the dispensaries.

When his services can be spared for the purpose, the Residency Surgeon accommpanies the Governor General's Agent on tour.

All arrangements for vaccine operations in the districts, and in cases of epidemic outbreaks of disease, such as small-pox, fever, or cholera, are carried out under his advice and supervision.

Formerly the medical arrangements for the Sind-Pishín State Railway were to a limited extent under the control of the Residency Surgeon. He visited the dispensaries regularly and maintained their supply of medicines, and saw that their records were duly kept up. But the Engineer-in-Chief was solely responsible for the number of dispensaries maintained and the system of dispensary relief adopted. The control of the temporary dispensaries established in November last to meet the requirements of the railway during an outbreak of cholera was in the hands of the Engineer-in-Chief and Surgeon Day, M.S. In the spring of the present year a medical officer (Dr. Fooks) was appointed to have medical charge of the Railway, and it is believed that since then three additional medical officers have been appointed to the line. The Engineer-in-Chief now makes his own medical arrangements either direct with Government or the Surgeon-General or through his medical officers.

The chief medical requirement of the Agency now is a reserve of hospital assistants to fill vacancies in cases of emergency and sickness among the staff of hospital assistants, and to admit of the hospital assistants in charge of dispensaries being granted leave when necessary and advisable. Quetta being a long distance away, and separated by a difficult road, from the source of supply, there is always necessarily great delay in obtaining hospital assistants from the Panjab.

QUETTA: J. C. FULLERTON, M.CH., M.B.,

*16th September 1885.* *Residency Surgeon.*

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